Deep Re-examination of the Dornot Bridgehead, 8-11 Sep 1944
German Accounts
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Overview

This web page contains German accounts. Two things to keep in mind: (1) the "enemy" referred to in the text are the Americans, (2) the Germans referred to the bridgehead as the Ancy Bridgehead and not the Dornot Bridgehead.

-- Wesley Johnston, Historian, 7th Armored Division Association

Contents

Fahnenjunkerschule VI:
Defense of Metz, 1-8 September 1944
Transcription - Images

This German account of the first days of the defense of Metz was found by American troops when Metz was finally taken (22 Nov 1944). It documents the Fahnenjunkerschule VI (Officer Candidate School or OCS) personnel's actions. The fact that they wrote a document of almost 40 pages while the battle was still going on for 2.5 months shows that the Germans felt secure enough in Metz during the battle to use resources documenting the battle while it was happening. While the report title covers only 1-8 September, the reality is that the report includes actions through 12 September, thus including the entire Dornot Bridgehead period. In fact, the last page includes a status report of Fort Driant on 24 September. So, the report appears to have been written in late September 1944.

Here is the American introduction to the document: "Upon the reduction of Metz, various documents and reports were found by the CIC in the Gestapo Headquarters in Metz, which also served as the CP of the 462nd Infantry Division of the German First Army. The following is a translation by 1st Lt Walter Haag and M/Sgt J. Haftbillig of the German Order of Battle Detachment attached to XX Corps."

It appears that what the Americans called the Dornot Bridgehead was referred to by the Germans as the Ancy Bridgehead. Ancy is immediately north of Dornot and almost adjacent to Dornot.

Novéant-sur-Moselle Sector - 7 September 1944 - Thursday

Novéant-sur-Moselle is the next town 2 miles south of Dornot. Gorze is up the west bank above and west of Dornot and Novéant by about 3 miles. The abbreviation "Kg" is Kampfgruppe = Battle Group; thus "Kg. v. Siegroth" is Battle Group von Siegroth. The reference to a bridge MAY be the same location as the modern one just north of Novéant crossing the Moselle to just south of Corny; I have yet to verify the location of the bridge that the Germans used.

  • “Suddenly the lst Sergeant of 1 [not sure if L or the number 1] Company jumps into the fox hole of Captain Schmidt and reports that the train of the combat outpost was attacked at Dornot between 0400 and 0500 and that the Americans had occupied the town.

    Immediately the reserve platoon is alerted and committed in a switch line on the north edge of Noveant. Our patrol W of Dornot is attacked in the woods. Thus combat group Schmidt is cut off.” (p. 19)

  • “At 1130 we receive orders from Kg v. Siegroth to withdraw across the Moselle at dusk, together with our right neighbor, the company Schorr which is engaged in bitter fighting in Gorze.” (p. 19)

  • “The afternoon is quiet except some artillery harassing fire. At 1900 Co Schorr disengages itself from the enemy and slowly withdraws through the positions of Kg Schmidt to Noveant, where they start crossing the Moselle River.

    The crossing on the badly damaged bridge causes many difficulties and the 88mm AT Gun fell into the river, shortly before we had reached the opposite bank.

    Thus also the combat outposts of Noveant and Gorze accomplished their mission ideally and gained precious time for our command.” (p. 20)

Fort Driant

Fort Driant was not one of the forts on the east bank of the Moselle. But the bridgehead was very much within range of its guns which were used against the men in the bridgehead.

  • “The enemy advancing through the Bois des Ognons to the Moselle river to the south tries to force the crossing of the Moselle near Ancy and Dornot, in order to encircle Metz from the south. An enemy attack against the line of the combat outposts north of [Ancy] is repulsed under heavy losses for the enemy.” (p. 32)

  • “10 September. The lieutenants are waiting impatiently. Capt Hickmann, the company commander, stands on the armored observation post. Down there, to both sides of the village (Ancy) on the slopes and on the Moselle, 2 km in front of them, the Americans, careless and unsuspecting are moving around. Trucks and armored cars are moving to and fro. To the left of the village rubber boats and engineer tools are carried to the crossing point.

    "Right gun, range 2300, deflection 2600, ready to fire!" Quietly the orders are sounded through the megaphones. "Right gun ready for firing!" it comes back. "Right gun fire!" The discharge is short and hard. For the first time since the mounting of the guns, they are firing on the enemy. This battery which is dominating the entire Moselle valley far to the south, is going to worry the enemy. The impact of the projectile is too far. A concentration of vehicles in a small wood is the first target. "Right gun deflection 2400 - 40 over! Ready, fire!" The projectile drops almost at the target. Another correction and direct hit! The first trucks are burning.

    The first concentration of fire of both guns has directly hit the target. More trucks are burning. The enemy runs, fleeing into the woods, leaving everything in great panic. The enemy is quickly leaving the village. The next target is the bridge crossing. The ponton boats can be observed distinctly. In a short time the equipment is destroyed and the enemy is fleeing to the rear. The fire fight lasting for two hours has prevented the attempts of the enemy on this forenoon for further crossings of the river.

    At noon the enemy is firing into the battery positions with assistance of air-observation planes. In the afternoon the battery is under heavy fire of light and medium artillery. Two observation posts of the enemy are destroyed by two direct hits. The Ancy bridgehead is destroyed on this day, with the essential support of the Moselle battery.” (pp. 34-35)

20 July 1945 Interview of Genoberst. Johannes Blaskowitz, commander of the Metz defense until 1 October 1944
Defense of Metz

Soon after VE Day, the U. S. Army began interviewing the surviving German commanders or having them write their accounts of actions they led, creating a series of Foreign Military Studies. One series of interviews was called ETHINT, a contraction of European Theater Interrogations. ETHINT-32 is the 20 July 1945 interview of General Johannes Blaskowitz about the defense of Metz, which he commanded during the Dornot Bridgehead. He provided no specifics about the Dornot Bridgehead, but his big picture view is important context and directly addresses some beliefs the U. S. troops had developed about the defense of Metz. So, I include the full transcription here. This transcription was from a copy in the U. S. National Archives Record Group 407 (Adjutant General's Office) WWII Miscellaneous Files in which it is labeled ML-7.

THE DEFENSE OF METZ

Interview with Genoberst. JOHANNES BLASKOWITZ, 20 July 1945. Interview held
At CCPWE 32, “Ashcan”. Interviewer: Major KENNETH W. HECKLER
Interrogator: Capt HERBERT SENSENIG

(Circumstances: During the METZ defense period, Gen BLASKOWITZ commanded Army Group “G” which comprised the forces at METZ. He remained commander of the Group until 1 October 1944, when he was placed on the inactive list. He was returned to duty in December 1944)

Q. Why did the Germans reverse their earlier tactical doctrines which belittled fixed fortifications and rely on such fortifications at METZ?
A. Initially METZ was considered forward of the Westwall, and in front of the more modern fortifications. Therefore it was not garrisoned until late in the summer of 1944. At that time it became necessary to choose a defense line for the purpose of rallying the withdrawing troops, and also to gain some more time during which the Westwall itself could be re-armed.

Q. Was not this a departure from the theory that mobile reserves were to be preferred to fixed fortifications?
A. Yet a line had to be established, and the MOSELLE River along the line of NANCY, TOUL, EPINAL, REMIRONT and in the direction of BELFORT was selected as the one which best combined natural and constructed defenses. METZ was an anchor in this line.

Q. When you pierced the MAGINOT Line in 1940, we thought you had lost respect for fixed fortifications such as METZ?
A. Much of the talk of the weakness of the MAGINOT Line was propaganda. It was not easy to get through, and we suffered losses in penetrating it. Of course we were fully conscious of the weakness of the METZ forts, but they furnished an opportunity to delay. I can tell you that we wish we had had such fortifications in the interior of FRANCE, particularly along the SEINE and SOMME Rivers. Our wihdrawal across FRANCE would have been much more satisfactory and pleasant if we had had such fortifications. The principle is that when withdrawing you need points where you can check backward movement, and points where your troops can rally and have some additional means to continue a delaying action.

Q. What strategic part did METZ play in Germany Army plans for counter-offensive?
A. None. We never had the strength or the intentions to launch a counter-offensive centered around the use of METZ.

Q. PW interrogation brought out the statement that HITLER had ordered a defense of METZ to the last man. Was there such an order, and if so, did it have the concurrence of the higher Army commanders?
A. Hitler did not particularly issue such an order for METZ as I recall, but it was implied and understood for all fortresses. If such an order did not exist, the commander of the fortress might not exhaust all means available to him for the defense. It should not be taken literally “to the last man”, but merely means until all means have been exhausted. The order received the concurrence of the commanders--so long as METZ was not encircled from the east where its defenses were weakest because it had naturally been constructed with FRANCE in mind.

Q. Was the German decision to hold at METZ due to awareness of the American supply difficulties after VERDUN had been reached?
A. To be sure, it was noticed that the American forces had slowed the tempo of their advance, and we knew they must be having supply difficulties. Yet this was not as important a factor as the simple fact that METZ to BELFORT presented a natural chain along the MOSELLE River for fortification purposes.

Q. There was a report current that the defense of METZ was so tenacious because OCS candidates had received their tactical schooling in the fortifications themselves and had carried out problems therein.
A. It is true that there had been an OCS school at METZ, and many of the tactical problems of the classroom concerned use of the fortifications. However, I heard that these potential officers were being used as soldiers in the line until their being commissioned. I considered this a waste of manpower and advocated their withdrawal from the line at METZ. When I was placed on the inactive list on 1 October, they were still in the line, but I believe they were withdrawn after I left.

Q. There were PW reports that HIMMLER, at one time, had taken personal charge of the METZ defenses. Was this true?
A. I believe that these reports can be explained in this fashion: HIMMLER was chief of the replacement army, and as such was in charge of sending in reinforcements to METZ. It was for that reason that he was present at METZ. However, I do not believe that he assumed personal charge of the tactical defense of the forts.

Q. To what extent did improvisation enter into the utilizing of the METZ fortress system.
A. Some field fortifications were thrown up on the east bank of the MOSELLE River to supplement the existing fixed fortifications. However, there was no time for the preparation of anything permanent.

Q. Was the THIRD ARMY plan for the encirclement of METZ, which went into operation on 9 November, immediately apparent? When did it become apparent, and what were the measures taken to frustrate the plan?
A. Even before 1 October 1944, when I was relieved of command of the area, they were beginning to fight between NANCY and METZ, and in November they began the attack north of METZ. It was apparent what the American forces were trying to do, since that was the logical way to reduce METZ. No definite counter-measures could be taken or could have been taken to frustrate that move for the simple reason that we did not have sufficient forces available to put up more than a delaying defense until METZ fell.

"Combat History of the 17. SS-Panzer-Grendier-Division: Götz von Berlichingen: Volume II"
by Hans Stöber, translated by Klaus Scharley
(2019; J. J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc.; Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada)

This published account includes contextual information by the author as well as transcripts of various original records. Note that while the English translation is dated 2019, the original German text preface by the author was written in 1984.

Chapter 3 "Dornot Bridgehead" is on pages 14-35. In the following, the transcripts are in italics while the author's text is in bold. Since the author's text is under copyright only brief segments are included. In particular, the very useful map on page 16 is not included here, so that I reference it only in descriptive text of my own. The information extracted is chosen for the potential value that it provides for the impact on the American troops since these web pages are focused on finding and identifying the remains of those American troops not yet recovered and identified. The book provides a great deal more information about the German troops than is included here. As these are German records, all references to "the enemy" are references to the American troops.

While all the original document text in the book is clearly set in either shaded boxes or in boxes defined by an outline, the exact source of the text is not always clear. I have tried to identify the source of the original text in each case, but I cannot be sure that I have done so correctly.

Page 14: Uncertain Source, possibly 3. Panxer-Grenadier Division - 8 September 1944, Friday

  • “The tenacious, unexpected strength of the defence forced the enemy to attempt a crossing of the Mosel south of the city by going around Metz. After the Fahnenjunker had withdrawn their front at and south of Gravelotte to the Fortresses Kronprinz and Ars, the enemy pushed his forces forward from Gorze to Dornot, which then surprisingly crossed the Mosel east of there with a strong combat patrol on 8 September. At the same time enemy forces advanced on Novéant. The weak Ersatz Battalion 208 (Major Voß) resisted there for one day and was then withdrawn by ferry onto the right bank of the Mosel.

    The enemy crossing at Dornot encountered only individual posts on the right Mosel bank. They were unable to throw back the enemy patrol.” (p. 14)

Page 16 Map: "Dornot (Dorningen) Bridgehead"

I do not include the map here since it is under copyright.

The American forces crossing the Moselle are shown as 23rd Armored Infantry Battalion (7th Armored Division) and 11th Infantry Regiment (5th Infantry Division). They are show with an arrow showing them advancing about 2 kilometers to Fort Saint Blaise, which was apparently defended by "I.AR17 (Guse)". A dashed arrow then shows the Americans withdrawing to the contained bridgehead area between the road and the river.

The German units attacking from the flanks are all units of the II./SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment 37. 5./37 attacked along the road from the north from Jouy, and 7./37 attacked along the road from the south (after moving west from Fey). 6./37 attacked inland from the north toward Fort Saint Blaise on a line roughly parallel to the river and the road but about 1 km inland.

Behind these earliest German attacking units on the south, the map shows 1 PZ ABT 103 (1st Panzer Abteilung) and 8./37 advancing north along the road toward Corny behind 7./37. To the north of Jouy but with no indication of movement was "I SS-B-SCH"

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