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The C/38 Morning Reports are the only company-level records. They were completed as of midnight (2400) each day and turned in the next morning, hence their name. They contained (a) the location of the company as of 2400, (b) specifics of all personnel status changes, (c) strength counts, and sometimes (d) a Record of Events entry. The Morning Reports for the date of the action (14 Sep) and the dates of the retroactive reports (17 and 21 Sep) are included.
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14 Sep-p 1
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14 Sep-p 2
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17 Sep-p 1
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17 Sep-p 2
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17 Sep-p 3
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21 Sep
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PAGE UNDER CONSTRUCTION VIA CONVERSION OF ANOTHER PAGE SO THAT MOST OF THE FOLLOWING IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE PAGE
The After Action Reports were written by Battalion Headquarters at the end of each month. The S-2 (Intelligence) and S-3 (Operations) reports and/or journals were usually included, but they are not included here, since they were separated from the After Action Reports at the National Archives.
As a supporting element of the Division, the nature of the way in which the engineers were assigned within the Division meant that 33 AEB Battalion Headquarters often had little or no knowledge of the specifics of what any 33 AEB company (A/33, B/33, and C/33, which were typically attached separately to CCA, CCB and CCR, respectively) was actually doing. So the Battalion-level After Action Reports usually could not shed much light on events in complex situations. And that was definitely true in this case as the 33 AEB After Action Report of September 1944 makes no mention of the actions of Company "A".
Company "A" was attached to Combat Command "A" at this time. CCA was divided into several task forces, which are identified in the CCA After Action Report on 6 Sep 1944. A/33's platoons were split up and assigned to the different task forces. At this time, I do not know the platoons of the men who were wounded and killed. I have highlighted the task force compositions in the 6 Sep report, and I have also highlighted the mentions of Pierrevillers and Silvange (spelled Sylvange in the text). It appears that Task Force Brown was the TF closest to Silvange on the night of 7 Sep 1944. If that was the TF of the A/33 men who became casualties on 8 Sep, that would have been 1/A/33 (1st Platoon) and HQ/A/33.
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Date
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Combat Command "A" After Action Reports
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6 Sep
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CC A departed assembly area in vicinity of BRAS at 1400 6 Sept 44. The Combat Command advanced in two columns with the mission of seizing bridgeheads over the Moselle and Saar Rivers successively. Column D, the North column, Lt Col Chappuis commanding, was composed of the 48th AIBn (-A, B), B/40th Tk Bn, 695th AFA Bn, 2d Plat A/814th TD Bn, and 2d Plat A/33d Engr Bn. Column C, the South Column, Lt Col McConnell commanding, was composed of the 40th Tk Bn (-B,C), A/48th AIBn, 489th AFA Bn, 3d Plat A/814th TD Bn, 1st Plat A/33d Engr Bn. Accompanying the South Column, and following it, was a task force under, Major Brown consisting of C/40th Tk Bn, B/48th AIBn, A/814th TD (-2,3 Plats), A/33d Engr (-l, 2 Plats), Hq CCA, Tns, D/40th Tk Bn. D Clm, North, crossed LD at 1455 moved along route prescribed, continued along this route turning south into Briey. At Briey bridges were blown. Prior to this time commanding officer of this task force was informed that he would turn North and try to cross Moselle River in the vicinity of Richemont. However, he located a crossing South of Briey and requested permission to use it and was granted same. Column crossed Orne River at Hatrize and then continued North along the south bank of the Orne River with mission of seizing crossing of Moselle River near junction of Orne and Moselle Rivers. About 2200 this column ran into considerable mines which delayed them and forced them to move due East rather than in Northeasterly direction. Their position at 0400 7 Sept was in the vicinity of Malancourt. C Clm, South Clm, commanded by Colonel McConnell, moved forward in the prescribed formation and met considerable traffic, 90th Infantry Division Artillery. However, after clearing this heavy traffic column was able to proceed at moderate rate as far as Conflans, where the column ran into elements of the 87th Cav Rcn Sqdn (Mecz). At this juncture, Colonel Rosebaum decided on his new plan; that of moving Task Force Chappuis toward Richemont and moving South Column, C Clm, eastward, well to the north of town of Metz. South Column continued movement as far as Doncourt where it turned toward St. Marie. At St Privat South column encountered considerable machine-gun and mortar fire, minefields and road blocks which held up the column and forced it to deploy. By 2300 Infantry patrols of Column had entered town of St Privat. One Tank Company had deployed on the Southeast of town and one Tank Company had deployed on the North, Enemy resistance at St Privat was stubborn and they were using grenades extensively along with shifting machine-gun fire. The enemy was reported to be well dug in and numbering about 2000. As of 0600 7 Sept our operations for the day had resulted in the eastward advance of D Clm to Mondelange and C Clm to St Privat. Advance elements of D Clm had reached the Moselle River.
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7 Sep
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On 7 Sept 44 Task Forces of Combat Command A were disposed as follows: Task Force Chappuis in vicinity of Mondelange on the Moselle River; Task Force McConnell in vicinity of St Privat; Task Force Brown in the same vicinity as Task Force McConnell. The 489th AFA Bn was in firing position in the vicinity of St Marie. Task Force Chappuis which already had been on the Moselle River began a methodical search for crossings and by noon of the 8th had reached a point slightly north of Maizieres where it received artillery fire from all directions all afternoon and evening. About 1000 Co D 40th Tank Bn was sent forward to contact CC A and reinforce them. Contact was made but A Co 40th Tank Bn was returned to CC A. Division reported forces of tanks and infantry withdrawing from the Northwest to the Northeast in the vicinity of Briey. Combat Command A was ordered to send a force to Briey to block the advancing enemy and secure flank of the Division. A Co 814th TD Bn, less one platoon, and one platoon A Co 33rd Armd Engr Bn, was dispatched on this mission. Result of their operation was to make the necessary defensive disposition Southwest of Briey. Later during the day they reported few enemy tanks and enemy infantry in Briey. No further reports were received. At about 1100 Task Force McConnell was sent by way of St Privat, Roncourt, Pierrevilleres to reinforce Task Force Chappuis. Task Force Brown followed Task Force McConnell. Task Force McConnell contacted Task Force Chappuis who had already reconnoitered for crossings over the Moselle River in the vicinity of Houconcourt. About 1130 Hq CC A, moved forward over the routes followed by Task Force McConnell and Task Force Brown, moving very slowly in bounds never exceeding one thousand yards. While crossing small dirt road at about 1500, NW of Sylvange, the column came under heavy artillery fire where casualties resulted and Hq CC A had to withdraw from the interdicted road. One battery 489th AFA Bn had been in firing position about 1000 yards west of point where Hq CC A was and also came under artillery fire making it necessary for them to withdraw to the North. A Co 48th Armd Inf Bn received instructions to make crossing of the Canal des Mines and the Moselle River West of the town of Talange. At about 1800 the CG 7th Armd Div visited this site with the Division G-3. Combat Command A was informed that bridge equipment and assault boats were being sent forward for the crossing. CO CC A had already moved forward and set up his own Hq in the vicinity, South of Talange where Col Chappuis' Task Force had dug in due to very heavy artillery fire. No further action except occasional artillery fire resulted during the night and at 0600 8 Sept 44 disposition of Combat Command "A" was as follows: Task Force McConnell vicinity Talange; Task Force Chappuis North of Houconcourt and vicinity; Task Force Brown vicinity Sylvange, Hq CC A in field about 2000 yards northwest Pierrevillers. Trains immediately south of Pierrevillers.
Personnel losses on this date included: Pvt 0'Connor, A Co 40th Tk Bn, KIA, Lt George M. Hook, A Co 40th Tk Bn, and Sgt Wickham, A Co 40th Tk Bn, SWA. Cpl Vincent J. Bearder and Tec 5 George W. Harrison, of Hq Co 40th Tk Bn, KIA, Pfc Milton E. Jones, Hq Co 40th Tk Bn, SWA. Lt William S. Vilda and Tec 4 Henry W. Hellyer, both of Hq CC A were seriously wounded in action. Vehicular losses reported one M-5 Tank of D Co 40th Tk Bn
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8 Sep
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Throughout 8 Sept 44 the CC A situation remained the same as it had been on the previous day. The front line was at Maizieres and the Command was engaged in holding that position. Enemy artillery was active in placing concentrations on all parts of the CC A area throughout the day. A task force was organized from elements of this Command to assist and cooperate with the 2d Inf in their attack from Verneville toward Tignomont. Col McConnell commanding C/40, A/48, 489 AFA, 2A/814 TD.
As a result of enemy shelling on 8 Sept 44 it was reported that Capt Eyberse of the 814th TD Bn had been killed, and that Joe L. Manning (rank unknown) of B Btry, 489th AFA Bn, had also been killed.
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9 Sep (actual 8 Sep)
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On 9 Sept 44 CC A position remained the same with the front line in the vicinity of Maizieres. Enemy artillery and mortar fire continued to harass a11 elements of CC A. At Pierrevillers, Lt Robert A. Schaaf, S Sgt Alfred J. Blackfish, and Cpl John W. Weir, a11 of A Co 33d Armd Engr Bn, were killed in action as a result of enemy artillery fire. Seriously wounded of the same company were Tec 4 Kraskiewicz, Pfc Caramadre, and Pfc Kassey. While holding a roadblock one mile South of Talange, the 2d Platoon, A Co, 814 TD Bn reported the capture of 25 PW's. This platoon reported one M-10 out of action as a result of enemy artillery fire.
It was reported by Liaison Officer, 40th Tk Bn, that the Task Force commanded by Col McConnell sent to cooperate with the 2d Infantry in their attack from Verneville toward Tignomont had encountered stiff resistance at St Privat. South of St Privat the enemy was firmly entrenched in the woods with well-concealed concrete pillboxes. Two strong forts were also of great aid to the enemy in their defense. It was rumored that for the past several years, since the German occupation, no civilians had been allowed entrance into these woods. In the attack on this date, Col McConnell's Task Force lost seven tanks, one M-10 and one M-7.
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The 9 Sep 1944 entry contains multiple errors that conflict with the A/33 Morning Report.
- The A/33 Morning Report, filed the morning of 9 Sep 1944, already showed the men as casualties. Thus, CCA first learned of the casualties 9 Sep 1944 and reported them on that date in the After Action Report.
- The A/33 Morning Report appears to show that the shelling that caused the casualties happened after the move from Pierrevillers to Silvange and not at Pierrevillers. In fact, the CCA Report shows no movement at all.
- Pfc. "Kassey" was really Pfc. Keesy.
- Tec 4 "Kraskiewicz" was really Tec 4 Krajkiewcz.
All in all, the A/33 Morning Report is far more credible than the CCA Report.
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