Task Force Wemple, Combat Command R, 7th Armored Division 3-4 October 1944 Attack South toward Kasteel Hattert

Task Force Wemple, Combat Command R, 7th Armored Division
3-4 October 1944
Attack South toward Kasteel Hattert:
17th Tank Bn (-C, D); C/38th Armd Inf Bn; 1 plat/A/82nd Engr Combat Bn
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Last updated: May 31, 2021- What's New? 7th Armd Div Patch

Overview

When Operation Market-Garden in mid-September 1944 opened a long narrow salient from the Belgian border nearly to Arnhem, Netherlands, German forces sought to cut the route and isolate the northernmost Allied forces of the salient. So, the U. S. 7th Armored Division was taken away from Gen. George Patton's Third Army which was stalled in its efforts to seize Metz, France, and sent north to Second British Army to protect the east flank of the salient and expand it by seizing Overloon, Netherlands, starting with attacks at the end of September 1944.

The 7th Armored Division attacks were based at Sint-Anthonis, north of Overloon, with attacks directly south to Overloon and also on the east and west flanks. The west flank attack easily reached Oploo so that they could then attack east toward Overloon. The east flank, closer to Germany, sought to make a similar attack but ran into much stronger German forces that prevented them from reaching the area east of Overloon.

Combat Command Reserve, referred to as Combat Command R or CCR, was tasked with the eastern attack. Task Force Wemple was created for the attack, jumping off at 0800 on 3 October. After being stopped that day and the next, the attack was stopped after suffering significant casualties. This web page details the attack and the casualties.

NOTE:
There is conflict in the 17th Tank Battalion and Combat Command "R" After Action Reports (and the 7AD HQ Report which is identical to the CCR Report) of the units in Task Force Wemple. The units in both account were 17th Tank Bn (-C) and C/38th Armd Inf Bn. The differences are that the 17th Tank Bn report shows 17th Tank Bn (-C, D) and one platoon of A/82nd Engr Combat Bn but NOT 1/C/87 while the CCR report shows 17th Tank Bn (-C) and 1/C/87 but NOT any element of 82nd Engr Combat Bn. Since Lt. Col. Wemple commanded 17th Tank Battalion, the presumption is that the 17th Tank Battalion After Action Report was the correct one.

NOTE:
17th Tank Battalion and 38th Armored Infantry Battalion and 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron were organic elements of 7th Armored Division, while 82nd Engineer Combat Battalion was not. Thus, this page has very little specific to the platoon of A/82 that was part of Task Force Wemple.

Contents

Maps

After Action Reports

Morning Reports

Individual Deceased Personnel Files

Found Items

Map

These four maps of the attack were created by 7th Armored Division Association Historian Wesley Johnston. Click on a map to see it full size.

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After Action Reports

17th Tank Battalion After Action Report

The dates before the attack are included, since they give the context -- the big picture -- of which the attack was one part. The After Action Report of 38th Armored Infantry Battalion has no mention of the actions of C/38 while the Company was an element of Task Force Wemple, so that the 38 AIB Report is not included here.

1 October 1944
On 1 October 1944 the 17th Tank Battalion minus Company "D" was in an assembly area about one kilometer northwest of the village of Ledeacker or in the vicinity of Coordinate 700402. The battalion was an element of C.C. "R" and was standing by to carry out the mission of following up C.C. "B". in the attack to the southeast along the Maas River. The day was used in performing much needed maintenance of vehicles.
2 October 1944
The battalion remained in the same assembly area. The Bn Staff and the Bn Commander made visits to higher headquarters and to the headquarters of the units in contact in order to keep up with the situation. Late in the afternoon the Bn Commander went to a meeting at C.C. "R" Hq and received the plan and his orders for the attack which was to begin on 3 Oct 44. C.C. "R" had been ordered to relieve C.C. "B" who was in contact with the enemy in the vicinity of the towns of Mullen and Vortum. C.C. "A" was attacking the town of Overloon from the west and they had been stopped by heavy enemy resistance before they were in the town. C.C. "R"'s plan briefly was to the south and east remaining on the west side of the Railroad and to seize positions directly east of the town of Overloon. The C.C. "R" commanding Officer divided his command into two forces, one commanded by Lt. Col. FULLER to be known as Task Force FULLER and one commanded by Lt. Col. WEMPLE to be known as Task Force WEMPLE. Task Force WEMPLE consisted of the 17th Tank Battalion minus Company "D" and Company "C"; Company "C" of the 38th Inf. Bn., and one platoon from Company "A" of the 82nd Engineer Bn. Company "D" of the 17th Tank Bn was still with Task Force JONES and Company "C" of the 17th was to be with Task Force FULLER. Task Force WEMPLE was to move from the assembly area through St. Antonis and southeast along a route which had been picked by the 87th Rcn. Sqd. to the line of departure which was the road going southwest out of the small town of Hof. The left or east boundry of this force was the railroad running northwest and southeast. The Rcn. Squadron was to furnish a guide to lead the force to the line of departure and the force was to be in position on the line of departure ready to start the attack at 0800, 3 October 1944.
At 2230, 2 October 1944 Lt. Col. WEMPLE called all of the officers of his force together and gave them the plan and their orders. Since the force did not expect to encounter any strong enemy resistance until after L.D. had been crossed the force was ordered to stay on the road until that point had been reached and the following march order was given: 1 Platoon of Medium Tanks from Co "B", 1 Platoon of Infantry from Co "C" of the 38th Inf Bn followed by the remainder of the tanks in Co "B", then the platoon of Engineers followed by the Force Commanders Tank and his S-3 in a half track and the air support tank, then the remainder of Co "C" of the 38th Inf Bn followed by Co "A" of the 17th, then the assault Gun Platoon, the Mortar Platoon and the rear command group. Elements of the 87th Rcn Sqd were to act as left flank guard for Force WEMPLE and were to advance on the east side of the railroad.
All elements of Task Force WEMPLE were ordered to stay on the road until contact was made then the force was to leave the road and to deploy as much as the terrain would permit. The force had been ordered to be in position on the line of departure by 0800 and to wait there until C.C."R" ordered the force to attack.
3 October 1944
At 0630 on 3 Oct 44, the leading elements of Task Force WEMPLE moved out of the assembly area. The guide from 87th Rcn Sqd joined the force at St. Anthonis and guided us down to the line of departure. We failed to mention that the leading tank company had a forward observer with them mounted in a tank and the Infantry Company had a R.O. with them who had a half track and a quarter ton vehicle with radios. The 440th Field Arty. Bn. was in a position so they could support our advance and we could call for fire at any time through the F.O.
At 0800 Task Force WEMPLE was in place on the line of departure awaiting orders from C.C. "R" to continue the attack. At 0950, we received the order to attack and at 1012 Co "B" of the 17th followed by one company of Infantry on foot moved out. Co "A" of the 17th and the platoon of Engineers had been deployed along the line of departure to support the attack. At 1030 the leading tanks started receiving small arms fire and mortar fire from the woods to their direct front which was the woods in the vicinity of 785347. The attack continued to push forward until 1100 at which time the Infantry was pinned down by mortar and small arms fire in the vicinity of 783351 and at 1105 the leading tank from company "B" was knocked out by a mine at 783350. At 1110 another tank was hit by fire from an AT gun which fired from the woods to the south but the tanks could not determine the exact location. The infantry was pinned down and the tanks were maneuvering to the east and west firing into the woods and trying to locate the enemy AT gun positions. At 1145 another Co "B" tank was knocked out by AT fire by AT fire but the enemy gun position could not be located. By this time the enemy had started laying heavy arty fire on our leading elements and they were also dropping Nebelwefers or rockets on them. The Nebelwefers and the arty was coming directly from the south from the woods in the vicinity of 789335. The infantry was pinned down by mortar, small arms, rocket and arty fire; the tanks had run into mines and AT fire therefore the attack was stopped in the vicinity of 783350. Co "B" tanks were deployed to hold what ground had been gained. The force commander brought the Co "A" tanks up to try to maneuver to the east of the woods where the heaviest enemy resistance seemed to be. The plan was for Co "A" to try to envelope the enemy position while Co "B" and the infantry fired on the enemy positions.
At 1600 Co "A" moved out on their attack and at 1625 one tank was knocked out by AT fire at 786355. The enemy AT fire came from the east but the exact positions of the enemy guns could not be located. The Co "A" attack was stopped by heavy AT gun fire and arty fire. Everytime the Co "A" tanks moved out on their attempt to circle around to the east they were simply covered with heavy arty fire and direct AT gun fire, therefore their tanks were pulled back to a position in the vicinity of their original line of departure. The assault guns were pulled up to a position on the line of departure and they placed fire on the enemy positions.
At 1730 the force commander Lt Col WEMPLE went to a meeting at C.C. "R" Hq and received orders for a night attack. At 2130 Lt Col WEMPLE called a meeting of his Cmdg officers at his rear C.P. in vicinity of 757351 to give orders for the night attack. The plan was for the Infantry to advance along the original axis of advance to a point beyond the minefield and to hold that position while the engineers removed the mines so the tanks could move up. At 0030 [4 October] the Infantry moved out on the attack and they advanced to the edge of the first woods where they were pinned down by fire from the woods and from both flanks. However the Engineers got up to the mines and removed them. The tanks started to move into the woods but small arms fire and the mortar fire was so intense that the Infantry could not follow them so the attack progressed no further. The tanks drew Bazooks and AT rifle grenade fire from the woods so it was impossible for the tanks to enter the woods without Infantry to support them. By 0300 all except one platoon of the Infantry had moved back to about the line of departure. The platoon which did not move back had been pinned down by cross M.G. and mortar fire. Before dawn the force was pulled back to their original positions just south of the line of departure.
Task Force losses for the 3rd Oct 44 were 4 medium tanks, one was knocked out by mines and three by AT guns. There were only three men wounded in the 17th Tank Bn and the seriousness of their wounds is not known. The Infantry had 15 casualties.
4 October 1944
At 0845 Capt Pilat, Co "B" Commander reported a German patrol of 12 men approaching our front line elements from the east. The patrol was taken under fire and at least 5 were killed or wounded and the remainder went into dug in positions on the east side of the railroad track. The enemy continued to place arty and Nebelwefer fire on our front line units but all tanks crews were in the tanks and the Infantry was dug in so we suffered no casualties. By this time the enemy strength to our immediate front in the woods was estimated as two companies of Infantry in well dug in positions armed with mortars, M.G.'s, rifles and Bazookas. Several probable AT gun positions had been reported and fired on by our arty but we could not determine whether the arty fire was doing any good. The forward observer who was up with our front line tanks placed fire on enemy positions continuously and caused some casualties to the enemy but their positions were so well dug in that is was impossible to clean them out with arty.
At 1005 on the 4th of Oct we received word that the Company Commander of Co "C" of the 17th which was attached to Task Force FULLER had been wounded and that company had also lost two other tanks from German AT fire.
Lt Col WEMPLE had received orders early in the morning of the 4th of Oct 44 to attack again however we were supposed to receive some air support and the force commander had been ordered to hold up his attack until 1100. The air support did not come so the attack was started at 1100. We did not have enough Infantry to support the attack but the plans were made and the attack was started regardless. Our mission was to over run the enemy position in the woods and to take the woods with the tanks. The plan was for Co "A" to move down to the woods from the north and west and to move between the two groups of woods in the vicinity of 785346. The tanks were to ush into the woods and the infantry was to follow the tanks and dig in around them to keep the enemy Bazooka men from getting the tanks. Co "B" was to support the action by firing on the enemy positions. At 1100 the attack was started. One platoon of Co "A" tanks moved around to the west of the woods then cut back to the east and got up between the two wooded areas then the German AT Guns cut loose. The German guns were so well camouflaged that our crews could not see them, the tanks fired continuously at all probable positions but they could not silence the German guns. By 1253 Co "A" had 5 tanks knocked out by German At gun fire, including the company commanders tanks. Three more tanks had been hit but were able to pull back to the original starting point. In addition to the AT fire the enemy was placing heavy arty fire on our tanks and infantry. Since it was impossible to get the tanks into the woods, the force commander pulled his force back to the original position. In this action Co "A" lost 5 tanks completely, three were damaged and had to be carried back for repairs and three more had developed mechanical trouble which required maintenance work. Actually Co "A" had only one tank left that was ready for action. Capt. PIER, the company commander of Co "A", was wounded and evacuated, one enlisted man was killed, one enlisted man was wounded and one officer and 20 enlisted men were missing in action. The Infantry had one officer M.I.A. and 31 EM either K.I.A. or M.I.A.
At 1210 on the 4th of Oct 44, we received word that some P-38's would be over our area and ready to perform a mission in about twenty minutes. The air support officer who was with us and who was equipped with radio to communicate with planes was alerted. The planes were over our area at 1235 and the air support officer gave them the instructions. The target was designated by the arty firing red smoke on it. The planes dropped 8 fire bombs on the target and reported that they set the woods on fire. The area which was bombed was thought to be the location of some enemy arty.
At 1330 our troops reported that enemy aid men were seen picking up some of our wounded but they would not let our aid men into the position to pick up the men.
At 1430 the P-38's came back (4 planes) and dropped 5 bombs on another target for us. Again the target was designated by use of red smoke fired by our arty. They also strafed the position. The four P-38's were back again at 1645 and fired another mission for us.
The force WEMPLE set up a defensive position in vicinity of original line of departure and stood by for further orders. The remainder of the infantry company was used to outpost the remaining tanks for security at right.
Late in the afternoon of the 4th of Oct 44, Lt. Col. WEMPLE pulled his remaining force back to a point in the vicinity of 779351 and set up a defensive position. The tanks were deployed in a semi-circle with fields of fire to the east and south and the infantry was dug in around the tanks to protect them from enemy bazookas. The force remained in this position throughout the day, the only activity being dismounted patrols. Three infantry patrols were sent out trying to determine the strength of the enemy in the woods in the vicinity of 784347 and 786350 but the patrols obtained very little information because the enemy were so well dug in and camouflaged. The enemy would pin the patrols down with small arms and mortar fire every time they would get within 300 yards of their positions. The enemy placed Nebelwefer and arty fire on our position forward throughout the day and night of 5 Oct 44 but we did not have any casualties.
The R & I Platoon of the 17th Tank Bn was given the mission of patrolling down to the houses in the vicinity of 779339. They worked down to a point in the vicinity of 781341 where they were pinned down by small arms and mortar fire. The fire came from the houses to their south and from the east and west. They located the enemy dug in along the canal in the vicinity of 784341 and in a field in the vicinity of 777342. We brought three tanks up to 779349 and placed fire on the enemy positions while the I & R Platoon pulled back. There was no enemy activity during the night except arty and nebelwefer fire. We did not lose any tanks or personnel during the day or night.
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Combat Command "R" After Action Report

3 OCTOBER 44 CC-R CONSISTING OF 17 TANK BN(-), 38 ARMD, INF. BN., 440 F.A., C/87 RCN, A/82 ENGRS IN SUPPORT, RELIEVED CC-B IN ZONE BEGINNING AT 030800 OCTOBER 44. 434TH F.A. REINFORCING FIRES OF 440 F.A. BN. CC-R SPLIT INTO 2 TASK FORCES, TASK FORCE FULLER AND WEMPLE.

TASK FORCE WEMPLE CONSISTED OF 17TH TANK BN (-C0. C), C/38TH ARMD, INF. BN., 1/C/87.

TASK FORCE FULLER CONSISTED OF 38TH ARMD. INF. BN. (-CO.C), C/17TH TANK BN.

TASK FORCE WEMPLE MET STUBBORN RESISTANCE. INFANTRY WAS PINNED DOWN BY INTENSE FIRE OF ALL CALIBERS. TANKS ADVANCED 500 YARDS IN EASTERN SECTOR OF ZONE, WERE FORCED T0 WITHDRAW BY BAZOOKAS AND ARTY FIRE. ONE (1) TANK WAS LOST TO A MINE, 3 WERE-KNOCKED OUT BY ANTI-TANK GUNS AND 1 BY A BAZOOKA. TASK FORCE FULLER PROGRESSED SLOWLY AGAINST THE ENEMY, ENCOUNTERING HEAVY SMALL ARMS, MORTAR AND ARTY FIRE. NEBELWERFFR FIRE (SCREAMING MINNIES) WERE RECEIVED FOR THE FIRST TIME. ELEMENTS OF CO-B INFILTRATED TO POSITIONS APPROXIMATELY 600 YARDS IN FRONT OF LINE OF DEPARTURE.

ENGINEERS MAINTAINED ROADS, REPAIRED DAMAGED BRIDGES AND REMOVED MINES IN TASK FORCE WEMPLES ZONE.

PREPARATION FOR A NIGHT ATTACK WAS MADE. INFANTRY WAS WELL DUG IN, PREPARED TO REPULSE ANY COUNTER-ATTACKS THAT SHOULD COME.

TASK FORCE WEMPLE LAUNCHED ATTACK AT 041100 OCTOBER 44 TO THE SOUTH ADVANCING APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS BEFORE THE ATTACK WAS REPULSED WITH HEAVY LOSSES TO INFANTRY AND 8 OUT OF 9 TANKS WITH THIS FORCE.

TASK FORCE FULLER LAUNCHED NITE ATTACK AT 040300 OCTOBER 44 ADVANCED APPROXIMATELY 200 YARDS. 2 COUNTER-ATTACKS BY THE ENEMY WERE REPULSED.

DURING MORNING HOURS TROOPS RECEIVED HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE.

AT 041100 A COORDINATED ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED WITH LITTLE SUCCESS. RECEIVED HEAVY ENEMY FIRE OF ALL CALIBERS. AIR SUPPORT BOMBED AND STRAFED ENEMY POSITIONS WITH UNDETERMINED RESULTS. ENGINEERS BUILT 28 FEET TREADWAY BRIDGE, REMOVED 1 MINE FIELD AND MAINTAINED ROADS.

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7th Armored Division Headquarters After Action Report

CCR was composed of the 17Tnk Bn (-), 38 AIB, 440 AFA Bn, C/87 Cav Rcn Sq Mecz., and A/82 Engr Bn, and divided into two task forces composed as follows:

Task Force WEMPLE
17 Tnk Bn (-C)
C/38 AIB
1/C/87 Cav Rcn Sq Mecz

Task Force FULLER
C/17 Tnk Bn
38 AIB (-C)

CCR advanced with tanks and infantry towards OVERLOON from the north. In this sector, artillery, Nebelwerfer, and mortar fire from well concealed and dug-in positions caused heavy tank casualties and prevented advance beyond the original position.

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Morning Reports

17th Tank Battalion

Click here to see the images of the 17th Tank Battalion Morning reports. All elements are included here, even though C/17 and D/17 and Service Company were not part of Task Force Wemple.

Element	3 October	4 October
Battalion HQ	S.W. of St. Anthonis QE 6936 Left bivouac NW of St. Anthonis, Holland at 0700, passing thru St. Anthonis and pulled into tactical bivouac SW of St Anthonis, Holland at 1100. Remained in bivouac throughout day. Nord de Guerre Grid Zone.	SW of St. Anthonis QE 6936 Remained in tactical bivouac SW of St Anthonis, Holland. Nord de Guerre Grid Zone.
HQ Company	S.W. of St. Anthonis QE 6936 Left bivouac NW of St. Anthonis, Holland at 0700, passing thru St. Anthonis and pulled into tactical bivouac SW of St Anthonis, Holland at 1100. Remained in bivouac throughout day. Nord de Guerre Grid Zone. 31 074 328 LeBlanc MOS 653 S/Sgt / Reduced to Pvt as of 29 Sep 1944. Promoted to Sgt as of 29 Sep 1944 36 313 766 Schock MOS 651 Sgt / Promoted to S/Sgt as of 29 Sep 1944	SW of St. Anthonis QE 6936 Remained in tactical bivouac SW of St Anthonis, Holland. Nord de Guerre Grid Zone.
Company A	St Anthonis, S.W., QE 6936 Left bivouac area 4 miles N.W. [sic] of St Anthonis, Holland in tactical formation, encountered enemy S.W. of St Anthonis Holland and remained in area attacking enemy Nord de Guerre Grid Zone 37 067 390 Johnson, Charles L. Pvt / "SSN 531" Dy to lost to 24th Evac Hosp LD (Battle) LWA	St Anthonis, S.E., QE 7137 Co. makes attack with 12 tanks S.E. of St Anthonis, Holland and are repulsed with heavy loss. 01 012 280 Pier, Mortimer D. Capt / "Dy 1203", Dy to lost to 24th Evac Hosp LD (Battle) LWA 35 273 926 Burns, Robert T. SSN 542 Sgt / Dy to lost to 24th Evac Hosp LD (Battle) LWA
Company B	St. Anthonis, SE, QE 7137 Left bivouac area 4 mi SW of St. Anthonis at 0630. Company in attack formation SE of St. Anthonis. Met stiff enemy resistance. (Nord de Guerre Grid Zone). 36 118 171 Kretschmer T/4 / LWA, LD (Battle) laceration on nose, remained on dy. 32 296 440 Montefusco. Albert J. SSN-616 Cpl / Dy to Div Clearing Sta LD, (non-battle) Slightly Sk. [MR 7 Oct: "Fr Div Clearing Sta LD, (non-battle) slightly sick to lost to 24th Evac hosp, LD, (non-battle) slightly sick.] 34 254 741 Brandon, Orville F SSN-604 Pvt / Dy to Div Clearing Sta LD, (Battle) LIA. [Amended 5 Oct to "Dy to lost to 24th Evac Hosp LD (Battle) LWA.] [MR 6 Oct] 33 136 870 Michalochick SSN 736 Tec 5 / LWA, LD, (battle) as of 3 Oct 44, remained on Dy (laceration wounds on face)	St Anthonis, S.E., QE 7137 Company still in attack SE of St. Anthonis. (Nord de Guerre Grid Zone)
Company C (NOT part of Task Force Wemple; part of Task Force Fuller)	St. Anthonis, 3 mi S.E., QE 7236 Co departed bivouac area St. Anthonis 1 1/2 mi N. W. at 0600. Proceeded thru St. Anthonis to bivouac area at present location. Co in reserve. Co began attack on Overloon at 1400. Nord de Guerr [sic] Grid Zone. 33 172 525 Kustafik, John F. MOS 660 Tec 5 / Asgd & jd Co fr 86th Repl Bn APO 153.	St. Anthonis, 3 mi S.E., QE 7236 Co in tactical formation at present location. Captured 15 prisoners. Weather: Fair. Nord de Guerre Grid Zone. 01 012 152 Binder, William M. 1st Lt / "Duty 1203" Dy to lost to 24th Evac Hosp LD (Battle) LWA.
Company D (NOT part of Task Force Wemple)	Liesel, (3 1/2 mi, E., Asten) QE6715 Company remained in present location at Hq C.P., in Liesel, Holland. Enemy artillery fire continuing. (Nord de Guerre Grid Zone). 38 079 847 Sims, Claudy A. SSN-615 Pfc / Dy to Lost to 24th Evac Hosp, LD, Battle, LWA.	Liesel, (3 1/2 mi, E., Asten) QE6715 Company remained in present location at Hq C.P., in Liesel, Holland. Enemy artillery fire continuing. Enemy of approximately ten were routed in an attempt to infiltrate our lines. Enemy casualties unknown, no American casualties. (Nord de Guerre Grid Zone).
Service Company (NOT part of Task Force Wemple)	Asten, 1 mi North West, QE 6115 Co and Trains remain in same bivouac area 1 mile North West of Asten (Nord De Guerre Grid Zone). 6 323 017 Davidson, Herbert C. SSN813 M Sgt / Duty to lost to 24th Evac Hosp LD, (Non-battle), slightly sick. 32 209 913 Drehner S Sgt / Div Clearing Sta, LD, (non-battle), Slightly sick to dy as of 2 Oct 44.	St. Anthonis, QE 7037 Co with Trains (CCR) moves from old bivouac to present location of St. Anthonis. Distance traveled 30 miles. Nord De Guerre Grid Zone
Medical Detachment	Blauwenhoek, Holland Outskirts, QE 7035 Departed from bivouac area at St. Ahthonis Holland at 0650 3 Oct 1944 arrived at Blauwenhoek, Holland at 1030 3 Oct 1944 Distance 5 miles. Nord De Guerre Grid Zone. 34 263 143 Buchanan MOS 861 Pfc / Promoted to Tec 5 as of 29 Sep 1944	Blauwenhoek, Holland Outskirts QE 7035 Remained in Blauwenhoek, Holland. Nord De Guerre Grid Zone.

Company C, 38th Armored Infantry Battalion

Click here to see the images of the Company C, 38th Armored Infantry Battalion Morning reports. (The rest of 38 AIB was in Task Force Fuller.)

Element	3 October	4 October
Company C	1 1/2 Mi. N. of Overloon, QE7434 31 302 734 Grota (SSN 653) Sgt / Dy to trfd to 24th Evac hosp LWA (Battle) 33 845 236 Magnuson (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to trfd to 24th Evac hosp LWA (Battle) 32 284 048 Makson (SSN 745) Pfc / Dy to trfd to 24th Evac hosp LWA (Battle) 31 369 588 Rochette (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to trfd to 24th Evac hosp LWA (Battle) 36 706 641 Hays (SSN 745) Pfc / Dy to trfd to 24th Evac hosp LIA (Battle) 35 246 508 Blenka (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to trfd to 109th Evac hosp (Slightly Sk) Non-battle as of 20 Sept 44 11 138 106 Daniel, Micheli A. (SSN 745) Pvt / Asgd and jd fr 53rd Repl Bn as of 20 Sept 44 14 009 766 McCollum, Curtis B. (SSN 745) Pfc / Asgd and jd fr 53rd Repl Bn as of 20 Sept 44 33 846 218 Snyder, Perry L. (SSN 745) Pvt / Asgd and jd fr 53rd Repl Bn as of 20 Sept 44 34 192 434 Tognetti (SSN 651) T/Sgt / Dy to trfd to 24th Evac hosp (Slightly Sk) Non-Battle 34 264 259 Bush (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to trfd to 24th Evac hosp (Slightly Sk) Non-Battle	1 1/2 Mi. N. of Overloon, QE7434 35 678 230 Baker (SSN 745) Pfc / Dy to trfd to 24th Evac hosp LWA (Battle) 42 125 127 Frishman (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to trfd to 24th Evac hosp LWA (Battle) 11 131 757 Dow (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to trfd to 24th Evac hosp LWA (Battle) 34 254 395 Harris (SSN 745) Pfc / Dy to trfd to 24th Evac hosp (Slightly Sk) Non-Battle 33 565 131 Davis, E. (SSN 745) Pfc / Dy to trfd to 24th Evac hosp (Slightly Sk) Non-Battle [MR 8 Oct] 36 706 076 Majerczyk (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 7 031 664 Domanski (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 6 938 879 French (SSN 734) Tec 5 / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 38 583 229 Gutierrez (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 33 546 480 Geer (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 33 697 721 Crum (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 34 254 681 Waters (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 33 801 807 Fasone (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 35 731 610 Bruce (SSN 607) Pfc / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 31 329 105 Jacob (SSN 653) S/Sgt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 32 298 947 Marcus (SSN 531) Pfc / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 31 451 942 Sheridan (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 34 920 737 Edmondson (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 32 519 694 Engbarth (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 42 041 675 Erdman (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 33 767 187 Slovich (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 38 671 727 Cothron (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 34 896 730 Branson (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 33 846 218 Snyder, Perry L. (SSN 607) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 33 807 606 Snyder, Andrew G. Jr. (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 20 846 940 Haney (SSN 651) T/Sgt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 35 533 861 Cseh (SSN 653) Cpl / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 35 560 695 Radabaugh (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 34 192 500 Paschall (SSN 653) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 37 062 454 Boeckmann (SSN 607) Pfc / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 33 796 230 Brady (SSN 745) Pfc / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 16 005 669 Boekel (SSN 745) Pfc / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 33 768 176 Blubaugh (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 33 636 970 Beadle (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 33 529 694 Baldwin (SSN 653) Sgt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 38 521 086 Ayres, Thomas (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 34 495 563 Austin (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 34 982 768 Bivins (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44 [MR 8 Oct] 32 784 374 Picone (SSN 745) Pvt / Dy to MIA as of 4 Oct 44

Company A, 82nd Combat Engineer Battalion

Click here to see the 82nd Engineer Combat Battalion history in a personal memoir. Here is the section of that account relevant to Task Force Wemple.

Supporting the British

On September 27th the battalion (A & C Companies) was attached to the 7th Armored Division. Two days later all units moved north 78 miles, through a British held corridor near Eidenhoven, to bivouac at St Anthonis Holland. This mission was to assist the British in pushing the Germans south and east, back across the Muse River. The 7th’s immediate target was the city of Overloon just a few miles to the south of St. Anthonis. The 82nd set up and occupied defensive positions in former German trenches, constructed a treadway bridge and removed and laid mines. While laying a defensive mine- field, a squad from Co. A came under German fire. First, T/5 George Sanders, was killed by an exploding mine then, alerted to the mine laying activity, the Germans laid in machine gun and mortar fire seriously wounding the three other men in the mine laying party.

Although documentation is lacking, PfC Charles Piltzecker was wounded during this time. He died several months later while in the hospital.

The 7th Armored Division’s assault was cut down by heavy German fire. Tanks were being destroyed as fast as they emerged from deep wooded areas to launch the attack. Since they could not could not penetrate this fierce German resistance, the mission was suspended on October 6th. British command decided to implement a different attack plan. The 82nd moved back to base at Aalbeek Holland on October 8th. After 37 days with the Cavalry, Company B was detached from the 113th and rejoined the battalion at Aalbeek.

Troop C, 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron

Click here to see the images of the Troop C, 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Morning reports.

The 17th Tank Battalion After Action Reports make no mention of any element of 87th Recon in the accounts of Task Force Wemple, other than as a guide to take them to the Line of Departure but not at all as an element of Task Force Wemple.

Element	3 October	4 October
Troop C	2 miles north west St Antonis, Holland QE 7040 1st and 3rd platoons went on road patrols with CCR. 2nd platoon and part of Hqs platoon remained in bivouac. 35 265 071 Osborn Sgt / Fr dy to Div Clearing Sta slightly sick, LD Non Battle 2 Oct 44.	6/10 mile south west St. Antonis, Holland QE 7038 Troop remained in bivouac with 1st platoon in reserve and 2nd platoon with CCR on road patrols. Tropp headquarters moved to new bivouac area 6/10 mile south west of St. Antonis, Holland.

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Individual Deceased Personnel Files

An Individual Deceased Personnel File (IDPF) was created for everyone who died while in service. For those whose remains were recovered, the IDPF followed the remains until their final burial. For those whose remains were never recovered, the IDPF sometimes contains accounts by survivors. The hope was that those accounts would either (a) help to find the remains or (b) would help to associate the remains with those of an Unknown (recorded in X-files, since each recovered Unknown was assigned an X-number associated with the temporary U.S. cemetery from which the graves regsitration team that recovered the remains was operating) or (c) would give sufficient information to know that the remains were unrecoverable, so that the case could be closed.

The files are listed alphabetically within unit. All who died are listed, even if I do not yet have their IDPF. In cases where I have the IDPF, click on the name header to see the PDF file of the IDPF.

17th Tank Battalion Individual Deceased Personnel Files

IDPF of Leonard C. Amerson (A/17) 4 Oct
Still Unaccounted

Since he was never found and identified, his official date of death is a year and a day after he went missing. So, while his official date of death is 5 October 1945, he went missing and was probably killed 4 October 1944.

Statement of S/Sgt Frank E Wolfe 18 Aug 1945 (PDF p 6): "I was car commander of the tank in which T/5 Leonard C. Amerson, 34262720 was my driver. My platoon leader was 2/Lt Dwight W. Rappleye. Our company was the assault company and my platoon was the assault platoon. The attack moved out over swampy, ravined, and wooded terrain. We moved to within approximately 500 yards of our final objectiv3e, when the company was met by intense anti-tank, artillery and mortar fire. My tank was hit by an anti-tank gun across the right fender. Thinking the tank was immobilized, the crew abandoned the tank all except the gunner. The gunner, Pfc Denton C. Stroud drove the tank around and the rest of the dismounted crew, except T/5 Amerson, got back into the tank and rode it out of the enemy line of fire."

(PDF p 7 & 18): others in crew: S/Sgt Frank E. Wolfe (tank commander), Cpl. Romeo D. Holcomb (Cannoneer) , Pfc Dention C. Stroud (Gunner), Pvt Robert S. Roman (Assistant Driver) "Another tank in the platoon was disabled by anti-tank fire and the platoon leader was captured. The survivors expressed the belief that Corporal Amerson had been captured since the platoon commander was captured, and the platoon had by-passed enemy infantry toward the rear before the platoon was fired upon. ... Company A lost 8 out of 12 tanks which were in the attack."

IDPF of Howard Thomas Bonds (A/17) 4 Oct
Still Unaccounted

Data on Remains Not Yet Recovered or Identified (OQMG form 371): "Last seen leaving damaged tank."

IDPF of William G. Davenport (A/17) 4 Oct
Still Unaccounted

Army Letter to parents & wife 25 May 1951: "killed ... while participating in an attack on enemy held woods."

(p.55) Intraoffice Reference Sheet 20 Nov 1950: "2. It is requested that efforts be made to associate the subject decedent with unknown X-5577 now interred in Neuville, Belgium, Plot Y, Row 4, Grave 79. 3. X-5577 was recovered from a tank and in the immediate area in which Cpl. Davenport was killed in action. However the amount of remains is very small."

After Action Report: "On 4 October 1944, Company 'A', 17th Tank Battalion, with other supporting units, attempted to overrun enemy positions in a wooded area in the vicinity of 785346, (Belgium). Strong enemy opposition was met and the company suffered such a loss of men and tanks until it was forced to with draw."

Determination of Status (21 Dec 1944): "A report from Co. A, 17th Tank Battalion, received in this office, reveals that Corporal Davenport's tank was hit by enemy fire while in the vicinity of a woods 200 yards south of Kijkuit, Netherlands. All were seen to leave the tank except Corporal Davenport. The tank was destroyed by fire immediately after being hit. It is believed by members of the crew who got out, that Corporal Davenport was killed while in the tank."

Affidavit of Sgt. Robert T. Burns (A/17) (30 Jan 1945): "On 4 October 1944 I was riding in the command tank of Company "A", 17th Tank Battalion when the Company was engaged with the enemy in the vicinity of Overloon, Netherlands. I was loader and riding in the turret. Corporal Willaim G. Davenport, 35,456,698, was gunner and Captain Mortimer D. Pier the company commander was also in the turret. When our tank was hit it seemed as if Captain Pier was blown out through the turret hatch. I noticed Corporal Davenport was in his seat, slumped back and apparently unconscious. He had a pretty bad wound in his left arm. I shook him and called out his name but there was no response. I could not determine whether he was breathing or not, however it is my personal opinion that Corporal Davenport may have been killed due to the fact tha he failed to respond when I shook him and called out his name before I left the tank."

CWO L. E. Deutsch (30 Jan 1945): "Names and present status of members of tank crew: / Captain MORTIMER D. PIER O1 012 280, slightly wounded in action and evacuated. Last known address is Detachment of Patients, U. S. Army Hospital Plant 4191, APO 209. U. S. Army. / Sergeant Robert T. Burns, 35,273,926, duty. / Tec 4 Jack Hill 35, 264,825, killed in action. / Corporal William G. Davenport, 35,456,698, missing in action. / Private Clayton Casey, 33,158,318, missing in action."

CWO L. E. Deutsch (17 Jan 1945): "Cpl. Davenport was the gunner of a medium tank whose mission it was to attack enemy woods north and east of Overloon, Netherlands. His tank was hit by enemy anti-tank fire. The tank burst into flames and the crew though wounded evacuated the tank except Cpl Davenport who is believed to have been killed."

IDPF of Jack Hill (A/17) 4 Oct
Buried Henri-Chapelle, Belgium USMC G-8-71

I do not have his Individual Deceased Personnel File.

From IDPF of William Davenport: Hill was a member of the same tank crew and was killed when Davenport and went missing in action.

IDPF of Michael B. Kelly (A/17) 4 Oct
Buried St. Mary's Cemetery; Fort Mitchell, KY - Section 12

Report of Investigation Area Search (21 Jun 1946): (recovery of his remains from isolated grave) location QE-7331 [Wesley Johnston: error - see first burial discussion below -- actual location 794-316, probably same as German 23839 on recovery map at Overloon museum], shrapnel found in body, body found by "A. Tennissen, German Civilian Overloon"

Statement of Sgt. Thomas F. Delozer, 6869 QM Bn AGRC (no date, apparently June 1946): "Isolated grave of Michael B. Kelly was reported to me by a Dutch soldier in charge of some German prisoners digging up dead German soldiers. The German dug into the grave of Kelly because they were told by the farmer that it was German soldier. ... The grave was located in a farmer's garden. About five or six hundred yards northwest of Kelly's grave are five or six American tanks setting in a heavily mined field. The farmer says nobody has been to the tanks and therefore the tanks may still have bodies."

Statement of M. Teunissen, Vierlingsbeekse Weg, Overloon C3 (no date, apparently June 1946): (translation) "The first time I seen this body was the day after I came back after the evacuation about the middle of December, of 1944. On the cross was written that he was killed the 4th of October 1944. On the 11th of April ['46 in the original but no year in the translation] the German mine cleaners dug up the body. ..."

Modern Evaluation

[Wesley Johnston Evaluation: It very much appears that, as did McLean, Kelly survived the destruction of his tank and was captured by the Germans. However, Kelly must have been seriously wounded, so that the Germans only took him a short distance south before he died and was buried with German dead. Kelly is definitely not T-1741 who appears on the map with Baldwin and Epstein's recoveries, since he was not even close to where T-1741 was recovered.]
First burial in farmer's garden, 3 kilometers east of Overloon, Netherlands [Wesley Johnston: 21 Jun 1946 recovery text only gives QE-7331 which is west of Overloon and seems to be clearly in error; earlier map gives location as 764-316 and shows location on map east of Overloon at 794-316. I believe that the 794-316 location is the most correct, since it is shown explicitly on the map and simply mis-read when the coordinates were written down. This location is consistent with him having been taken south from the battle area by the Germans and is also consistent with him being buried with Germans. This is further confirmed by the location 23839 on the Dutch post-war German remains recovery map of the Overloon area (map at the Museum: "Terrein der Opgravingen Overloon".]
Piet Peters Research: image file matches 51°35'10.97"N 5°58'55.32"E

IDPF of Aloysius James McLean, Jr. (A/17) Captured 4 Oct
Died as POW 31 Jan 1945 in Now-Poland in Shootout between German and Soviet Troops
Still Unaccounted Aloysius McLean

Casualty Status (23 Dec 1953): "He failed to return to military control after liberation of Stalag III-C, Altdrewitz, Poland, by Russian troops on 31 January 1945 ...".

See PDF page 16 for a very good summary of circumstances when he was last seen alive.

Adjutant General to Sen Brooks (22 Sep 1947) [PDF 63-64. source 56]: "... was the gunner of a medium tank whose mission it was to attack enemy held woods north and east of Overloon, Netherlands. The tank was hit by enemy anti-tank fire, burst into flames and burned. It was believed that the crew evacuated the tank and since the area was in enemy territory it was impossible to make a further search. ... A subsequent report received from the German Government, through the International Red Cross, stated that Private McLean was a prisoner of war at Stalag III-C, Germany."

Poland Detachment to CO, 1st Field Cmd AGRC (12 May 1948) [PDF 48]: Para 3 "have not ... been able to work on large mass graves or on all unmarked graves in localities where they were extremely numerous." Par 4 apparently focusing on Alt Drewitz unaware that the PWs had been marched west toward Szumilowo. Narrative of Investigation (15 Dec 1947) [PDF 49]: Par 5 "Extensive searching in both Alt-Drewitz and Kustrin."

Memorandum for Record (6 Jun 1949) [PDF 34-37]

"he was reported missing on 10/4/44 in action in Netherlands. Records amended 3/16/45 as a POW. He failed to report after the camp was liberated on 1/31/45. Status changed to MIA. Death presumed 3/1/46."

Modern Evaluation

Wesley Johnston: Post-war accounts by Stalag III-C survivors state that as the Soviet troops approached from the east, the prisoners were marched west out of the camp. They had nearly reached the town of Szumilowo when the Soviet troops caught the column and opened fire. In the firefight between the Germans and the Soviets, eight American POWs were killed and have never been recovered and identified. When U. S. Army Graves Registration came to the area after the war, which by then was no longer part of Germany but was part of Poland, they were completely unaware of the march west and thus searched the Stalag III-C site and the town of Alt Drewitzeast of it but never searched the area near Szumilowo where the POWs were killed.

IDPF of Tom Terral Tompkins (A/17) 4 Oct
Still Unaccounted

Modern Evaluation

This is really a very disappointing IDPF. Though it is larger than most IDPFs, the bulk is statements from Dutch town officials. They apparently failed to interview even one member of A/17 to find out what had happened.
My own research leads me to believe that Bonds, Davenport, and Tompkins were in a tank that was hit west of Kijkuit and north of de Hattert and that their remains were probably entirely destroyed in the fire within the tank. However the IDPF for Bonds does say that he was last seen leaving the tank. So there is a possibility that the remains of Bonds were buried and/or recovered. But there is no such mention on the same form (OQMG 371) for Tompkins.

IDPF of Charles E. Wawrzyniak (A/17) 4 Oct
Buried at Ardennes USMC (Neupré-en-Condroz, Belgium) D-9-11

I do not have his Individual Deceased Personnel File.

Company C, 38th Armored Infantry Battalion Individual Deceased Personnel Files

IDPF of James D. Baldwin (C/38) 4 Oct
Buried at Netherlands USMC (Margraten, Netherlands) C-12-7

HQ 1237 Eng C Bn Memo 3/23/45: Grave discovered by Co. A on 3/22/45 at "E73793437".

IDPF of Charles M. French (C/38) Captured 4 Oct
Died of Wounds as POW 14 October 1944 at Lagerlazarett VI-J at Düsseldorf-Gerresheim, Germany
Buried at Maple Park Cemetery; Aurora, MO

Red Cross Notice 12/27/44: Died 14 Oct 44 at 0045 at Gerresheim POW base hospital.

German Death Card: Stalag VI J at Dorsten; POW #7178; date captured 10/13/44; wounds: blood in pleura area; dead 14 Oct 44 0.45 at Dusseldorf (medical station?); buried 10/18/44 Honors Cemetery Dusseldorf Sec 111C grave No. 606.

Verlustmeldung (Damage notification) No. 70 442: Stalag VI J, Dorsten; died 14 Oct 44 at Lazarett VI J Dusseldorf-Gerresheim; POW # VI J 7178; buried 18 Oct 44 Ehrenfrieddhof grab Nr. 606, Feld 111 C.

IDPF of Luis Gutierrez (C/38) 4 Oct
Buried at Netherlands USMC (Margraten, Netherlands) N-6-15

British Record 2 Mar 45: "Above [Jacobs & Gutierrez} buried side by side in one grave near spot where found. Delay in burial accounted for by fact that vicinity heavily mined & apparently under floods for some time prefious to our arrival."

Burial at 784351 St. Anthonis Sheet 19 NW; Vicinity Groeningen, Holland (not buried before March 45 due to mines & floods; buried by British) (IDPF of Jacob has map.)

IDPF of Henry M. Haney (C/38) 4 Oct
Buried at Ardennes USMC (Neupré-en-Condroz, Belgium) A-15-18

Finding of Death: "Circumstances of disappearance: He was a member of an Infantry unit which made a night attack on the enemy in the vicinity of Overloon, Holland."

Notice of Disinterment 7 May 47: disinterred on 7 May 47 at Castle Hattert.

Identification Check List 4 May 47: Clothing included cotton drawers marked '5352'.

Report of Investigation 6/4/47: Germans buried him with 6 of their own, who had been buried 9/26/44.

Modern Evaluation

Wesley Johnston Evaluation: Castle "De Hattert" was in German hands, and was reduced to rubble 5 Oct 44 by US fighter bombers. (See pp. 68-69 of Overloon book.) So he was definitely in German hands, dead or alive. Cotton drawers marked '5352' probably belonged to Pvt. Joseph V. Reddington, 31 415 352, of C/38 who had been captured 19 Sep 44 at Sillegny, France. Haney's body was recovered 7 May and not 4 May. The only record that shows 4 May was probably actually 4 June since it was at the US Military Cemetery. All other records say 7 May.

IDPF of Robert J. Jacob (C/38) 4 Oct
Buried at Mountain View Cemetery; Bridgeport, CT

QM Mem (early 45): "Delay in Burial is accounted for by the fact that vicinity was heaviily mined and apparently under floods for some time."

Two bodies buried together at Groeningen - other was Pvt. Luis Gutierrez - 784351 St. Anthonis Sheet 19 NW; Vicinity Groeningen, Holland (not buried before March 45 due to mines & floods; buried by British)

Click on image for full size

Father's letter (5 Sep 45 PDF pp 25-36): trained with 106th Inf Div; helped FBI catch 2 Nazi spies in Indianapolis

See IDPF of Gutierrez, which has more of the recovery records.

IDPF of William R. Robbins (C/38) 4 Oct
Buried at Pleasant Hill Cemetery; Cincinnati, IA

I have his IDPF but have not yet scanned it.

First burial at Coord 779-353 (Map: Overloon, Holland 'S Hertogenbusch Sheet 5 1:100,000) (per IDPF of Robbins) - British had reported his grave at Coord 773 348 (per IDPF of Dail)

Company A, 82nd Engineer Combat Battalion Individual Deceased Personnel Files

Click here to see the 82nd Engineer Combat Battalion history in a personal memoir. Here is the section of that account relevant to Task Force Wemple.

Supporting the British

Although documentation is lacking, PfC Charles Piltzecker was wounded during this time. He died several months later while in the hospital.

IDPF of George D. Sanders (A/82)
Died 6 October 1944 of Wounds Suffered 4 Oct 1944
Buried at Henri-Chapelle American Cemetery (Henri-Chapelle, Belgium) E-9-60

I do not have his Individual Deceased Personnel File

WWII Regsitry: 32745212 - Entered the Service from Herkimer County, New York - Awards: Bronze Star, Purple Heart

IDPF of Charles Hugo Piltzecker (A/82)
Died 1 Jun 1945 of Accidental Gunshot Wound vicinity of Ehringhausen, Germany
Buried at Netherlands American Cemetery (Margraten, Netherlands) H-13-7 Charles Piltzecker

Report of Death (PDF pp 12-13): Cause of Death: Accidental gunshot wound - includes copy of 1 Jun 1945 certification by Cpl. Gordon M. Delaney (A/82) identifying remains

Inventory of Personal Effects (PDF p 26): 1 Jun 1945 signed by WOJG Marvin Q. Silver (82d Engr Combat Bn)

Modern Evaluation

Wesley Johnston Evaluation: While he was apparently wounded 4 Oct 1944 (and was awarded a Purple Heart), he apparently survived and returned to duty since he was with A/82 1 Jun 1945 when he was killed by an accidental gunshot wound. So, the memoir on the 82nd's webpage that surmised that he died in hospital of his 4 Oct 1944 wounds is incorrect.

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Found Items

Sherman Tank Parts (B/17)

Click on the image for full-size image.

Tonnie Ebben of Groeningen near Overloon, Netherlands, found the parts in 2021 at about 51°35'54.3"N 5°58'47.0"E. He shared the photographs and location with Niek Hendrix of Ospel. Tonnie told Niek that the Germans had two 88 mm guns at the Castle Hattert and not just one.

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7th Armored Division Association Home Page

Active overview of all pages at the 7th Armored Division web site