

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ANIP735017
By SNARA Date 9/20/10

84th Inf Div
Hendones
19 Dec 44-16 Jan 45

A long integrated narrative on winter defense and offense in hilly, wooded country. A full and well-written account with much explanatory detail down to companies and many scattered passages descriptive of combat data on infantry tank coordination.

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE
John M. ...
13/10/10

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMDT 735017

By STARRA Date 9/20/10

NOTES -- THE DEFEAT OF MARCHÉ, BELGIUM

1. Acknowledgement must be made to the Historical Section 84th Infantry Division for the material made available on the defensive operations of the Division in and around Marche, Belgium. Only through the efforts of this section was the true picture preserved in narrative form.
2. G-3 Journal 84th Infantry Division , 25 December 1944
3. After Action Reports 335th and 333 Infantryes, December 1944
4. Terrain study from the observations of the area by members of Historical Section 84th Infantry Division
5. Reports received by G-3 84th Infantry Division , 21 Dec. 44
6. G-3 Journal 84th Infantry Division, 21 December 1944
7. Coordinates used pertain to Maps of France and Belgium 1/50,000 -- Sheets 79, 80, 105 and 106
8. Overlay I
9. Order of VII Corp -- G-3 Journal 21 December 1944
10. Appendix A to the narrative.
11. After Action Report 333d Infantry , December 1944
12. Lt. Col. Ole D nielson, G-5, 84th Infantry Division to T/S Theo Dräger 26 December 1944
13. Overlay II
14. G-3 Periodic Report 84th Infantry Division -- 24 December 1944
15. G-2 Report 84th Infantry Division, 25 December 1944
16. ~~IX~~ Ibid, 25 December 1944
17. G-3 Periodic Report , 26 December 1944
18. G-5 Journal, 84th Infantry Division, Message File 26 December 1944

DECLASSIFIED
Authority **AND735017**
By **SNARA** Date **9/20/10**

- 19 Lt. Col. James B Charnock, G-6 84th Infantry Division to T/8 Theodore Draper, Historical Section 84th Inf. Division 28 December 1944
- 20. Brigadier-General A. R. Bolling to T/5 Theo. Draper 26 December 1944
- 21. G-8, G-3 Periodic Reports, 31 December 1944 (84th Infantry Division)
- 22. G-2 Periodic Report, 84th Infantry Division, 28, Dec., 44
- 23. Told G-2, 24, December 1944
- XI.

222222

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MMDP735017
By SNARA Date 9/20/10

DEFENSE OF MARCHE
84th INFANTRY DIVISION - BELGIUM

Belgium (2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Capt G. A. G. G. G.

Verbal Orders The German offensive against southern Belgium and northern Luxembourg was launched 16 December 1944. By 1900 December, strong enemy forces were penetrating between Houffalize and Bastogne and driving south of Marche towards the Meuse River. That same day, the 84th Infantry Division was ordered to prepare to move southward in the general direction of the German thrust.

As soon as the first verbal order was received, plans were drawn up to move the division by combat teams. At 121500, 20 December 1944, the 334th Combat Team was instructed to move without delay to Verviers, Belgium, but at 140000 that same day the destination of the entire division was changed to Marche, Belgium.

Within 24 hours the division had to be relieved on the line in Germany by the 102nd Infantry Division and get set to move about 60 miles south, prepared to fight at its destination on a moments notice. (1)

From Germany to Belgium

The problems faced by the 84th Infantry Division on route to Belgium and immediately on arrival can best be expressed in the old phrase -- "the fog of war." In this case the fog was unusually dense.

The division did not know what to expect in Marche, where the enemy was, how strong he was, or where and how strong our friendly forces were. In fact, the original

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AND735017

By SNARA Date 9/20/10

(12983) (C)
orders indicated that Marche would be a bivouac area. During the trip to Marche from Palenberg, ^{Germany} information as to enemy location and the safety of roads was lacking and due to the necessity for speed there was no time to attempt to get information, had that information been available. What members of the division heard was unusually disturbing--that German forces in American uniforms and American vehicles had spearheaded the attack, that German ~~xxxx~~ paratroopers fully disguised as Americans had been dropped in rear areas to attack headquarters and spread as much panic and disorganization as possible, that the enemy was seizing our supply dumps to replenish his supplies.

Fortunately, the first combat team to leave, the 334th Infantry, was able to get to its destination without delay. It left Palenberg, Germany, at 1500~~h~~, 20 December 1944, and arrived in Marche, Belgium, at 0100~~h~~, 21 December 1944. Its route was Palenberg-Aisdorf-Aachen-Verviers-Marche. It was led by the Commanding General and a small staff. ~~EN~~ route, Brigadier-General Alexander R. Bolling, Commanding the 84th Infantry Division, visited the headquarters of the First United States Army and received instructions that the division was attached to XVIII Airborne Corps. The Commanding General also reported to the headquarters of the XVIII Airborne Corps and received orders to move the division into an assembly area in the vicinity of Marche on the night of 22 December 1944, however the 84th Infantry Division was attached to the VII Corps. (2)

Meanwhile, the 2d Armored Division was coming down

the same roads at the same time so the other two combat teams, the 333rd and 335th, had to be split up. The 335th Infantry left Ubach, Germany, at 0830▲, 21 December 1944, and closed in the vicinity of Marche at 1720▲, 21 December 1944. Its route was Aisdorf-Aachen-Verriers-Marche. The 333rd Infantry left Sierpenseel, Holland at 0930▲, 21 December 1944, and closed in the vicinity of Marche at 1900▲, 21 December 1944. Its route was Heerle-Valkenburg-Maastricht-Liege-Marche. (3)

By the night of 21 December 1944, the 84th Infantry Division and all of its attached units had safely arrived in the vicinity of Marche. The division headquarters was established in Marche at 1700▲, 21 December 1944.

The entire movement was accomplished without the loss of a single vehicle though the weather was unfavorable. Moreover, the 12-hour warning before the first combat team moved out was so short that it was possible to close in the new area in fighting trim only because the division was stocked with two days rations, full tanks of gasoline and a basic load of ammunition.

The Ardennes

For the 84th Infantry Division, its new sector also represented a different type of terrain. The town of Marche itself, although generally considered in the region of the Ardennes, as about two miles north of the main Forest

of Ardennes and the country nearby is somewhat more open than the sector immediately to the south. (4)

As a whole, the Ardennes is heavily forested, plateau land, about a fifth of a mile in elevation. The river system is represented chiefly by the Meuse on the west and northwest, the Ourthe on the east, and the Lesse on the south. Above Marche, about six miles away at Hotton, the Ourthe runs southeast to northwest. Below Marche, about seven miles away at Rochefort, the Homme River, a tributary of the Lesse, runs east to west.

There is no well-defined ridge system in the area but there is much rolling country. ~~XXXXXX~~ The Ardennes is well covered with two-way hard-surfaced roads, as well as numerous secondary roads. But there is so much forest land, especially south of Rochefort, that tanks and rechanized equipment can undertake cross country operations only with the greatest difficulty and utmost risk. In many regions this activity is absolutely prohibited by terrain contour and forest. The principal road centers are Verviers and Halmedy in the north and St. Vith, Bastogne, Laroché and Marche in the south.

In general, the rolling country, forested areas and river valleys offer excellent opportunities for cover and concealment as well as for infiltration and ambush tactics. Nevertheless, the advantages are far from being entirely in

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMDP735017

By SMARA Date 9/20/10

favor of the aggressor. Providing the least bit of resistance is maintained at key-points, especially road centers, the defense can turn the same terrain features against the aggressor with such force that he will struggle for every important objective and pay heavily for attaining it. (3)

Establishing a line

21-23 December 1944

When the 334th Infantry arrived in Marche on the night of the 20-21 December 1944, it found itself in a situation as little like a "bivouac area" as possible. In fact, the division immediately became an island of resistance to hold back what was momentarily threatening to become a tidal wave of German panzers.

In and around Marche, on 21 December 1944, the only organized force was the 51st Engineers (C) Battalion which was trying to hold road blocks between Laroche and Hotton and between ^(N 3869)Champion and Marche. One engineer platoon was attacked at Hotton at 0900A, 21 December 1944 by four or five enemy tanks and a small force of infantry. Ten minutes later, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 334th Infantry was ordered to set up a perimeter defense around Marche and the 1st Battalion to put out strong local security. (5) Small, stray, units lost from their organizations, were picked up in the vicinity of Marche for several days. But so great was the confusion that, as late as 23 December 1944, the G-3 Periodic report of the First United States Army recorded a report that Marche had been taken by the enemy. On 22 December 1944, the Germans dropped a demand for surrender //

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMD735017

By STARRA Date 9/20/10

Bastogne which falsely claimed that they had captured Marche. And as late as 31 December 1944, the war map in the Service newspaper, Stars and Stripes, showed Marche in German hands though the 84th Infantry Division had already held it for ten days. Of the four important road centers in the southern portion of ~~the~~ ⁽⁴⁴⁶⁷⁸⁾ sector, Laroche and St. Vith were captured and Bastogne was encircled by 22 December 1944. Unless Marche was held, it was very likely that the Germans would have rolled on to the Meuse.

On 21 December 1944, only the 334th Infantry had been in Marche long enough to take any positive measures of defense. Company F, 2d Battalion, was sent to meet the attack at Hotton and had organized a defensive position there by 1730A. Company E, 2d Battalion, was sent to ~~KXX~~ ⁽¹³⁸⁵⁾ Hamptean (in the vicinity of which it had been previously reported that about 20 enemy paratroopers had landed) and had organized ~~by~~ a defensive position by 1830A. At both towns, the enemy was repulsed--the first fighting of the 84th Infantry Division in Belgium. At Hotton, 7 Mark V tanks, 1 half-track and 20 enemy infantrymen were fought off and four of the tanks destroyed. Patrols were sent out ~~whetn~~ reported that Marche was still unoccupied at 1300A and that the road between Hotton and Hamptean was clear except for mortar fire. ⁽⁶⁾ The big job of the day was establishment of a line to carry out Field Order No. 12--"to hold the enemy south of the Hotton-Marche road at all cost." The 3d Battalion 334th Infantry, dug in from the crossroad at K516834 to the

DECLASSIFIED

Authority **AND735017**

By **SNARA** Date **9/20/10**

village of Menil--a distance of over three miles. The 2d Battalion, 334th Infantry, dug in from Menil to Hamptean and from Hamptean to Melruxex--a distance of more than three and a half miles. The foxholes were about 150 yards apart to cover the exceptionally large front. (7)

At that time, it should be emphasized, the 84th Infantry Division had no ~~fix~~ friendly troops on its right flank and no ~~fix~~ friendly troops on its left flank. The German drive in the Malmady-Stavelot sector had lost its ~~momentum~~. ~~The German drive in the Malmady-Stavelot sector had lost its momentum, forcing the enemy to shift most of his pressure south between St. Vith and Bastogne, thereby placing the 84th Division in the line of main threat. From 21 December 1944 on, therefore, it was a race against time, a race between the successful organization of the Marche-Hotton sector and the German columns driving toward the Meuse.~~

When the 355th Infantry received the next day it filled out the perimeter defense of Marche by digging in on the line Hollogne-Waha-Tamodine. (K3082) (K2988) (K2583)

The 333d Infantry was placed in division reserve between Walllet and Marche. (8)

By 23 December 1944, then, a defensive position was fully established around Marche. But both flanks of the 84th Infantry Division were still wide open. The 2d Armored Division and the 75th Infantry Division were concentrating in the rear of the division, between Marche and the Meuse. Elements of the 2d Armored Division were meeting stiff opposition as far west as Haversin and Ciney, the latter about twelve miles northwest of Marche. (K1986) (K1197)

As a result, the possible threat of encirclement of Marche was temporarily averted. The danger was not so much a direct attack on the

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ANN735017

By SP4ARA Date 9/20/10

division lines, over-extended as they were, as a wide flanking movement towards Dinant which would enable the enemy to cut the division off from the rear.

In those first ~~days~~ two days, one of the biggest problems was a lack of information about the enemy. The division came into the sector with a minimum of information just when the fighting was reaching a maximum of "fluidity". Apparently, by 23 December 1944, the enemy had decided that Marche itself was not too strongly held and preferred to go around Marche to the south. And yet, without friendly forces on southern or western flanks, it was difficult to know just how great the threat was. In the late afternoon of 23 December 1944, the division headquarters moved to Baillonville, about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles north of Marche.

It was quickly decided to make good this lack of information and to guard ~~our~~ against a turning movement by organizing a counter-reconnaissance screen from Wanlin, about 14 miles west of Marche, to Grupont, about 10 miles south-west of Marche. The 3d Battalion, 335th Infantry, was given the mission of holding Rocherfort and setting up road blocks at Telling, Grupont, Nassogne and Harsin. ^(K2972) ^(K2977) ^(K2972) ^(K2977) Company C, 638th TD Battalion, and Company C, 309th Engineers (C) Battalion, were attached to it. The 1st Battalion, 333rd Infantry, was sent out to Wanlin, Beauping and Wellin. Company A, 638th TD Battalion, and Company A 309th Engineers (C) Battalion, were attached to it. This action represented the first battalion-scale combat missions of the 84th Infantry Division in Belgium.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority **MND735017**

By **STARRA** Date **9/20/10**

The Counter-Reconnaissance Screen (9)

23-24 December 1944

The reconnaissance areas assigned to the battalions were so large that each battalion had to split up into companies which operated more or less independently and sometimes the companies had to split up into more or less independent platoons. (10)

As for the 3d Battalion, 655th Infantry, Company I left Marche for Rochefort at 1400, 23 December 1944, and arrived at its destination without incident. Company I was supposed to go Harfumont but it met enemy resistance in the form of tanks and infantry at Marlole and could not move any further. The rest of the battalion went to Rochefort by way of Hogme, Sinshin and Haversin in order to talk over the ground to the north and west. Each battalion column was preceded by a strong reconnaissance element, including a section of heavy machine guns, two bazooka teams, anti-tank rifle grenade teams and riflemen, led by the S-2. (10)

At Rochefort, Company K, reinforced by a reconn. element was immediately sent to establish roadblocks at Grunpont and Tellin, over five miles southeast of Rochefort. By that night, 23 December 1944, one platoon of Company K plus 1 tank destroyer was stationed in Tellin, while two platoons and 2 tank destroyers went off to Grunpont. On the side Bure (between Tellin and Grunpont), however, the latter were held up by an enemy force, including tanks, tanks and half-tracks, and they could not get to Grunpont until the next morning, 23 December 1944, when they established a roadblock there. (10)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMDP735017

By SP4 MKA Date 9/20/10

The enemy was driving through in force by 23 December 1944 in this very area. Company L at Marlole was completely cut off by enemy forces by enemy forces between Marlole and Rochefort and Company K was completely cut off by enemy forces between Grunpont and Rochefort. Late that afternoon, German tanks and infantry started to come into Rochefort from the south. In effect, the battalion was encircled.

On the evening of 23 December 1944, orders were received to bring Company K back to Rochefort but no messenger was able to get through to it. Lt. Charles J. Ford was then given the mission and he managed to bring back Company K and 3 self-propelled tank destroyers by 2300. When Company K arrived in Rochefort, German tanks and infantrymen had already infiltrated in large numbers and infantrymen joined Company I in defense of the town. Meanwhile, Company L was still cut off at Marlole. All of its officers had been killed by five direct hits on its OP just as they were planning an attack.

In Rochefort, fighting raged from the evening of 23 December 1944 to about 1500 the next day. Six to eight tanks were destroyed and many enemy infantrymen killed or wounded. At about 1300, 24 December 1944, the battalion was ordered to return to Marche but, under the circumstances it was almost as hard to get out of Rochefort as to stay there.

Five minutes before it was ready to leave, Company I had to report that all of its trucks had been knocked out. Company K had no trucks. Both companies were ordered to walk

DECLASSIFIED

Authority **AND735017**

By **SNARA** Date **9/20/10**

westward in the hope that they would be picked up by elements of the 2d Armored Division. Company M and battalion headquarters entrucked and reached Givet at 0100A, 25 December 1944. From Givet, they sent the trucks back for the others and found all of Company K and part of Company I on the road. The remainder of Company I ~~XXXX~~ ran into elements of the 2d Armored Division north of Jemelle and came back directly to Marche. Company I was relieved in Marlole on 24 December 1944.

On the trip from Givet to Marche reports were constantly received that Marche had been taken by the enemy. The route was Givet-Philippville-Charleroi-Namur-St. Trond-Waremme-Marche. They returned to Marche at 1210A, 26 December 1944, having travelled about 125 miles in 36 hours instead of one-fifth the time and distance by a more direct route.

The efforts of the 1st Battalion, 333d Infantry, to establish a counter-reconnaissance screen at Wanlin, Beauraing and Wellin were somewhat similar. At 1800A, 22 December 1944, the battalion left its assembly area at ~~(K2772)~~ Moressee, passed thorough Marche but ran into a fight between elements of the 2d Armored Division and an enemy tank-infantry force near Marolle. It went back to Marche in order to make a detour through Sinsin and Haversin and arrived in Wanlin at 0545, 23 December 1944. By 0800A, Company B was in ~~XXXXX~~ Wellin, Company C in Beauraing and Company A remained in Wanlin. These towns were held ~~by~~ until 2300A that day when the battalion received orders to come back.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AND735017

By SNARA Date 9/20/10

When the battalion received reports that the enemy had taken Cliney, it had to take another route, another wide circle, Beauring-Dinat-Mamur-Ohey-Bailionville, and went to a new assembly area in Walllet at 1630, 24 December 1944. (11)

These attempts to establish counter-reconnaissance screens south of Marche served to delay the enemy's strength in this sector and the direction his thrusts. It may also have served to deflect the enemy's pressure from Marche itself until we were ready to meet it. The battalions were withdrawn as soon as it became apparent that the enemy had penetrated in force between Rochefort and Hargiment. On the whole, losses were light in terms of the risk involved in the operation and the benefits drawn from it. (12)

Attack at Verdenne

24-28 December 1944

By 24 December 1944, the position of the 84th Infantry Division was much clearer.

The line extended generally along the line Hamptean Menil-Verdenne-Hollogne-Waha-Hassonville-Ave-Hogne, a distance of about twelve miles. The 334th Infantry held the sector from Hamptean to the cross-section about three-quarters of a mile north of Chaplon (K316834), a distance of about five miles. The rest was held by the 355th Infantry. (8)

The flanks had been filled in. By 24 December 1944, the 2d Armored Division was attacking towards Humain and Buissonville on the right flank. (13) However, was rather towards the right flank. The main enemy pressure

It was fortunate that the enemy did not make a
The left. (13)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority **MMD735017**

By **STARRA** Date **9/20/10**

direct attack on the division until 24 December 1944, when positions were established and flanks were, for the first time protected. When it came the attack hit the very center of the line.

The 3d Battalion, 334th Infantry, had organized a position from the crossroads north of Champion to the village of Menil, Company I on the right, Company L on the left, Company K in reserve and Company M in support.

In the center of this line was a triangle of villages, Verdennes ^(K3484) ^(K3385) ^(K3384) Marene and Bourdon, the latter about a mile ^{North} ~~west~~ of the other two. By taking Bourdon, moreover, the enemy could cut the Marche-Hotton road in half and, it should be remembered the defense of this road was the main mission of the division, the village which bore the brunt of the enemy's attack was Verdennes.

On the night of 23 December 1944, an enemy force estimated at 2 reconnaissance companies succeeded in infiltrating behind Company I's position into a woods at (K845380) about half a mile west of Verdennes. At 1500A the next day, 24 December 1944, Company K, 334th Infantry, and 1 platoon of Company A, 771st Tank Battalion, followed by Company A, 334th Infantry, launched a counter-attack to clear the woods. (u)

As was found out later, this enemy force was struck by the 84th Infantry Division just as it was about to hit Verdennes from the rear while another enemy force hit Verdennes frontally. In other words, ~~both~~ both our attacks and their attack on Verdennes were planned for 1500. As a result, only half the enemy's attack came off. (S)

In the woods, the Germans had already deployed for their own attack and had reached the edge of the woods when four of our tanks opened fire on them with machine guns while our infantry closed in. The German attack from the woods was completely broken up and the enemy tried vainly to flee. Companies K and A soon cleaned out the woods and captured 67 prisoners. (15)

But the other half of the German attack, the frontal assault on Verdenne, was temporarily more successful. An enemy force of 5 Mark V tanks, 2 half-tracks an armored car and 100 infantrymen drove into Verdenne and continued to move ~~westward~~ as far as a chateau about 200 yards north of the village. By this time, Companies K and A were finished clearing the woods, freeing the former for a counterattack on Verdenne. Meanwhile, however, the enemy was reinforcing his units in Verdenne and in the salient north of Verdenne. (15)

At 0100, 25 December 1944, Company K, 334th Infantry and Company L, 333rd Infantry, counterattacked, Twenty-five minutes later, Verdenne was ours again. Twenty-~~two~~ was relatively light. All that night and day, both companies were busy cleaning out the village and chateau, gathering in 9 ~~of~~ officers and 296 enlisted men as prisoners. Many were taken from the 1st Battalion, 166th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 116th Panzer Division.

When ~~the~~ Verdenne ^{was} ~~was~~ the salient between Verdenne and Bourdon became a pocket of enemy resistance. This pocket was approximately 800 yards long and 300 yards wide in the woods extending from K330856 to K345862 ^{woods}

In the woods, the Germans had already deployed
for their own attack and had reached the edge of the woods
when Gout of our tank company ^{was} on ^{the} ^{edge} ^{of} ^{the} ^{woods}.

When ~~the~~ ^{the} Vergennes ^{was} the salient between Vergennes
Regiment, 11th Panzer Division, ^{was}
were taken from the 1st Battalion, 106th Panzer Grenadier,
Killed. Six enemy tanks were knocked out. The prisoners
3 X officers and 800 enlisted men as prisoners. Many were
were being cleaned out the village and captured. Many were
was relatively light. All that night and day, both companies
and Company B, 233rd Infantry, counterattacked. Twenty-
at 0100, 23 December 1944, Company K, 233rd Infantry
Vergennes and in the salient north of Vergennes. (12)
Meanwhile, however, the enemy was reinforcing his units in
the woods, treating the former for a counterattack on Vergennes.
By this time, Companies K and A were finished cleaning
~~the~~ ^{the} ^{area} ^{as} ^{far} ^{as} ^a ^{chateau} ^{about} ³⁰⁰ ^{yards} ^{north} ^{of} ^{the} ^{village}
and 100 infantrymen drove into Vergennes and continued to move
An enemy force of 2 Mark V tanks, 2 half-tracks in armor, and
frontal assault on Vergennes, was temporarily more successful.
but the other half of the German attack, the
captured by prisoners. (13)
to the. Companies K and A soon cleaned out the woods and
woods was completely broken up and the enemy tried vainly
while our infantry closed in. The German attack from the
when four of our tanks oblige on them with machine guns
for their own attack and had reached the edge of the woods
In the woods, the Germans had already deployed

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMDT 735017

By STARRA Date 9/20/10

midway between Verdenne and Bourdon. In it were 5 enemy tanks and an estimated force of two infantry companies. (16)
All day, 26 December 1944, Companies A and B 335d Infantry, tried to clean out the pocket but met strong tank fire and withdrew. At 0705, the enemy sent over very heavy artillery fire, followed up by an infantry tank task force in the direction of Verdenne. All our available artillery fire was immediately concentrated on this attack and it was effectly broken up. At 0800, the enemy tried again, this time penetrating our lines approximately 100 yards and four more tanks broke through to join the five already in the pocket. By 0945, however, ~~the~~ original lines were restored and ~~the pocket was restored to its original position.~~ ~~ATTENTION was returned to the pocket.~~ (17)

At 1015, the pocket was hit by elements of the 334th Infantry, Company D, 87 Chemical Battalion and knocked out. At 1700, after a two-minute artillery preparation the remaining five tanks were attacked, but this time without success. At 2215, it was the enemy's turn to strike but he lost three tanks in the effort without preparation. At the end of the day, 26 December 1944, the lines in front of Verdenne were stabilized and ~~the~~ lines in front been ~~punished~~ punished, but it was not certain whether or not the pocket had been entirely cleared.

There was another hot encounter on the 26th December 1944 which helped to discourage the enemy. At about 1830, when two enemy attempts at Verdenne had been repulsed, a

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMND735017

By SP4ARA Date 9/20/10

strong enemy force, including 8 tanks, 10 half-trucks, 8 motorcycles, 1 American jeep and about 80 infantrymen tried to break through at another point further north, this time at the village of Menil, between Marene and Hamptean. As this force came up the road from Marene, it ran into a "Daisy chain" of mines and had to leave the road, thus driving right into the positions of Company I and M, 535rd Infantry. Bazookas and rifle grenades opened up on the tanks and the infantrymen tried to flee back to their own lines in the woods east of Menil. Three battalions of artillery were fired at the disorganized infantrymen while the vehicles were destroyed in the open field. By 1900A, the action was over; 25 enemy vehicles were knocked out, including 6 tanks and 32 prisoners were taken. (18)

It was not until the next day, 27 December 1944, that ~~we~~ ^{the division} was able to take stock of the three-day battle around Verdene. At 2110A, a small enemy attack of one tank and approximately a company of infantry was turned back by our artillery fire. Soon after, a strong combat patrol was sent into the pocket, captured 15 prisoners and reported that the pocket no longer existed. Actually, this enemy pocket between Verdene and Bourdon, the main threat to the division positions, was effectively dealt with by the night of 26 December 1944. By the night of 27 December 1944 ~~The~~ ^{The} front was relatively quiet. In the zone of one battalion, 5d Battalion 334th Infantry, 16 tanks, 8 half-trucks, 1 armored reconnaissance car, 2 ambulances and 3 motorcycles represented the losses in vehicles which the enemy had to leave on the battlefield. (19)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMDP735017

By SNARA Date 9/20/10

The following statement was made by the Commanding General, VII Corps to the Commanding General, 84th Infantry Division on 25 December 1944: "The Army and Corps Commanders have commended the Division for its fine work since its arrival here. We nearly have them beaten. We must keep holding on." (20) (19)

By 26-28 December 1944, it was sufficiently clear that the 84th Infantry Division had held.

All Quiet Around Marche
29-31 December 1944

The last three ~~warlike~~ days of the month in the Marche sector were relatively quiet. Evidently the series of unsuccessful attacks between 23 December 1944 and 28 December 1944 and the losses suffered in them had discouraged the enemy from trying to break through in the area again.

The 29th December 1944 was the least active day in the sector since the division had arrived there. Extensive reconnaissance patrols were sent out during the hours of darkness to probe for evidence of the enemy's new intentions. On 30 December 1944, signs of defensive preparations by the enemy were detected in the form of mine-fields, road blocks, entrenchments and prisoners reports. On the last day of the month, no aggressive ~~any~~ moves were noted except for an increase in artillery and heavy mortar fire before daylight. The enemy continued to dig in and the outline of a possible OPL was observed. (21)

During the period 26 December to 31 December 1944, sufficient transportation was ~~held~~ held in readiness at all times to motorize an infantry regiment in 30 minutes. Between 0600

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMID735017

By SP4ARA Date 9/20/10

different conditions, in open warfare, against German armor rather than pillboxes, without the usual security of information and protected flanks, in the direct line of an enemy offensive.

The results in both cases were equally gratifying. The confidence of officers and men was high when they came out of German and still higher when they finished the month in Belgium.

The 84th Infant Division was ready to go over to the offensive in the Ardennes.

The Enemy

21-31 December 1944

In general, the enemy units were employed in Kampfgruppen (Battle Groups) rather than by divisions. These "Battle Groups, however, came predominantly from the 116th Panzer Division and the 2d Panzer Division, the former east of the Marche-Hottot road, the latter generally south and southwest of Marche. By 25 December 1944, elements of the 9th Panzer Division were identified generally south of Marche, and elements of the 560 Volks Grenadier Division in the vicinity of Hottot. (23)

The attack against Verdenne, 24-26 December 1944 was launched by the 1st Battalion, 156 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 116th Panzer Division, followed by the 2nd Battalion, 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 116th Panzer Division. By this time, the 10th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 9th Panzer Division, was given a purely defensive mission in the Wahaloigne area. By 27 December 1944, prisoners generally agreed that the 116th Panzer Division was no longer a fighting

force. There was no change in enemy dispositions
MARCH
Inso far as the division knew for the rest of the month. (23)

... ON THE NIGHT OF 15 DECEMBER 1944 ...
... AT THE VILLAGE OF ...
... THE COMPANY ...
... THE NIGHT OF 15 DECEMBER 1944 ...
... AT THE VILLAGE OF ...
... THE COMPANY ...

APPENDIX A
THE DEFENSE OF MARCHE

Statement by Lt. Leonard R. Carpenter, Commanding Co. K,
3d Battalion, 335th Infantry -- on the Counter-Reconnaissance
Screen 23 - 24 December 1944 ^{TO T/S TRACK SHANK}
^{HISTORICAL SECTION 84 INF DIV.}

On the night of 22 December 1944 at 1930▲,

Major Gordon A. Bahe, Battalion Commander, 3d Battalion,
335th Infantry called 1st Lt. Leonard R. Carpenter, commanding
Company K, and instructed him to proceed with his company and
one platoon of Tank Destroyers, a platoon of Engineers, one
57 mm Anti-Tank Gun, a section of heavy machine guns, ~~guns~~
to the town of Tellin and Gnypon, mine the bridge at the
latter town and establish road blocks at both villages.
The company was at this time located in the village of Willet
northwest of Marche. Nothing was known either of the enemy
or friendly situation in that vicinity, except that Company
I, 335th Infantry was in the town of Rochefort, on a like
mission.

The convoy did not get started until mid-night.
The company traveled in open two and one-half ton trucks,
led by the battalion S-2. Roads were icy and one tank
destroyer, of five, ~~was~~ slipped off the road bed and was
abandoned enroute to Rochefort. Between the hours of 0400▲
and 0500▲ 23 December 1944, Lt. Carpenters command arrived
in the village of Rochefort, Belgium. Engineers had already
demolished the bridge on the main road Rochefort-Gnypon,
three hours were lost finding another route. Finally the

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

MMDT35017

By

SMARA

Date

9/20/10

(A 2277)
Group arrived at Waverille. In the village, it was learned from citizens that six German tanks had been seen between Waverille and Grupont. Instead of branching off in several smaller units, as had been originally planned, it was decided that the whole force would be taken to Tellin and then Grupont. (A 2268)

Upon arrival at Tellin the convoy left the third and fourth platoons of Company K, one tank destroyer and proceeded toward Grupont. On the eastern outskirts of Bure (A 2369) the lead jeep in the convoy was fired upon. Lt. Carpenter talked to a civilian in the vicinity and was informed that there were nine Germans and one half-track in the town of Grupont. The civilian further volunteered to lead the Americans to the village by a route which would enable them to ambush the enemy. The 1st platoon under the command of 2nd Lt. George Prewitt went after the Germans. About half an hour after the platoon had left small arms fire was heard coming from the direction of the town.

In the meantime, Lt. Carpenter set up a CP in the village of Bure. Occupying a stone house which overlooked Grupont. The two remaining platoons occupied buildings behind the house.

A German tank came into Bure from Grupont and fired point blank at the CP. Someone, gave the order to disperse and the two platoons, plus the attached units, made their way back to Tellin. Lt. Carpenter was left alone in the house. Two other tanks came up behind the first and the occupants dismounted and began to search the house. The lieutenant, (A-2)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 755017
By: SP-8 BJA/STW
Date: 08/24/01

hid himself in a potato bin in the cellar and was not discovered. Late in the afternoon, after the Germans had gone, he opened up his SCR 300 radio and learned the location of his company. With the help of a Belgian, in Bure, he found a concealed route to Tellin and rejoined his unit. This occurred on the night of 23 December 1944.

At 0830H, 24 December 1944, Lt. Carpenter received new orders from his battalion commander. His command was to proceed to Rochefort to reinforce Company I, 336th Infantry.

Company K, less the 1st platoon, still in the vicinity of Orpigny arrived at Rochefort to find the town undergoing an intense artillery barrage. The company dismounted from their vehicles outside the town and proceeded in on foot. It was discovered, later, that the Germans had infiltrated into the town during 23 December 1944 and it was not known which buildings were safe. Company K moved into a large hotel with Company I.

Major Gordon Deke also moved his battalion Op into the town that afternoon and placed his small staff in a building across the street from the hotel.

Throughout the remainder of the day and all during the night small arms fire rang through the town. Two heavy machine guns and two 87 mm anti-tank guns. Two heavy the vicinity of the hotel. Machine guns blazed away at known or suspected targets. Later in the night two German tanks came into the town. The Americans did not have weapons to combat the tanks adequately nor enough troops to attempt to take the offensive against the Infantry.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: MMDP735017

By SP7ARA Date 9/20/10

At 0900 25 December 1944, the situation became desperate. The hotel was receiving fire from buildings on all sides. A German tank came up the street and fired at the hotel from extremely short range destroying several jeeps and two British reconnaissance cars in front of the building. All crew members of one 57 mm gun, outpost the building, were killed by artillery fire.

0930, Lt Carpenter received orders from Major ^(K 2376) Bahe to withdraw to Jemelle.

While the units were being organized for the withdrawal, a sergeant from the Tank Destroyers arrived with news that Jemelle had been occupied by the Germans the night before. Lt. Carpenter decided that in any event he must get his company out of Rochefort. To screen their movements from the enemy's view the men threw smoke grenades into the street and moved out under this artificial concealment, on the double. Making their way to the north they moved down the railroad tracks for a thousand yards until they came to a wooded area. Reorganization was once again in order and Lt. Carpenter called a halt. A count revealed 80 men from Company K, 60 men from Company I, and a few from other units. Totaling the count he found himself in command of 150 men.

Starting out on an azimuth of 130 degrees, the group traveled for one thousand yards and met a 2½ ton truck that had escaped from Rochefort. The driver agreed to shuttle the men down the road Rochefort-Wanlin to a point ⁽⁰⁴⁷⁶⁾

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By MMDT35017

SMARA, Date

9/20/10

where the bridge was out, a distance of about two miles.

When the last load arrived at this point a Belgian civilian informed them that German forces were ahead. Lt. Carpenter decided to abandon the road as dangerous. The ~~question~~ question ^{then} arose as to what was to be done with the truck. The driver ~~agreed~~ decided to take a chance and try to reach Dinant and seek help. With ~~him~~^{him} volunteers he started out.

Lt. Carpenter took the remainder of his force and moved about 800 yards. Three more civilians were encountered. This time good news was forthcoming. Americans were reported ahead at the town of ~~Wanlin~~^{Wanlin}.

Shortly after receiving this news Lt. Carpenter was discovered by the battalion S-1. The S-1 proceeded on to ~~Wanlin~~^{Wanlin} and returned with several trucks which transported the force to Givet, which was still the hands-off friendly troops. Arrival time 1730, 24 Dec. 1944

SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS

The 1st Platoon of Company K

The ~~1st~~ Carpenter decided to send the first platoon, from Bure, to investigate the nine Germans and ~~the~~ half-tracks in the town of Grunpont the civilian who had brought the news agreed to lead the platoon to Grunpont by a concealed route. The Belgian said he was sure the Americans could lay an ambush for the Germans.

The first platoon was commanded by 2nd Lt. George O Prewitt. They started for Grunpont along the railroad track that curved away from the highway into the town. The 30 man

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MMDT35017
By SMARA Date 9/20/10

platoon came to a wooded bluff overlooking the village. From the bluff Lt. Prewitt saw not nine Germans and one half-track, but one company of infantry, five German tanks, two Sherman tanks, 15 half-tracks, two American jeeps, one American two and one-half ton truck, and three German ambulances, moving across the bridge at Gruppont and heading toward Bure. The town he had just left.

The Lt. placed his second squad on the side of the bluff facing the road leading into Gruppont from Bure. His third squad, he placed on the side of the bluff overlooking the town. The first squad was placed at the foot of that same side along the river bank to prevent the Germans coming along the face of the bluff and surprising his third squad. Realizing that he was overwhelmingly outnumbered the Lt. sent a runner back to the company commander to get further orders. While the runner was gone a German, on outpost near the first ~~squad~~^{position}, spotted the ~~squad~~^{men} and started to fire. The squad leader of the first squad made short work of him with one shot. Luck was beaming on the 1st Platoon. The noise of the convoy muffled the sound of the ~~shots~~^{firing} and saved the platoon from detection.

About fifteen minutes after he left, the runner returned with the news that the company had left Bure. A short time later a ~~guard~~^{German} on the bridge spotted some members of the second squad and spread the alarm. The Germans sent patrols into the woods, but the platoon managed to elude them. After spraying the woods with automatic weapons fire the patrols withdrew.

Before making any further moves the Lt. decided

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND735017
By SP7MARA Date 9/24/10

to send a patrol to verify the runners findings. The patrol returned with the same message. Lt. Prewitt decided to withdraw. He started out along the river running perpendicular to the road Bure-Tellin. It was planned to follow the river to the south and then cut back, follow parallel to the road until he was opposite Tellin. He would then move into Tellin where he assumed he would find the rest of Company K.

With the BAR team covering the withdrawal, the platoon started out along the river. After following the river for 20 minutes ~~they turned~~ the platoon turned right and started on the journey for Tellin. It was almost dusk and getting cold. The men had no food, and the water in their canteens had ~~frozen~~^{frozen}. They had no overcoats or over shoes. Walking to a point where it was thought they were opposite Tellin, the platoon turned right once more. But on arriving at the edge of the road they found that the Germans were all along it, and they had missed Tellin. Carefully working their way across the road, the platoon found themselves in an open field. Lt. Prewitt saw some haystacks in the field. He selected a stack for each squad and a fourth for platoon headquarters. A town could be seen in the distance. Lt. Prewitt sent a patrol there to find out if it was the town of Tellin. The patrol returned with the news that the town was Bure, but civilians had directed them to Tellin. The Lt. then sent out a second patrol to reconiter a route to Tellin. It was 2300 on the night of the 23d December 1944. He gave instructions for the patrol to be back at 0100, 24 December.

A-7

then, as was the custom, met a civilian. THIS CIVILIAN WAS

A-8

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NND 735017

By: SP7 MRS Date: 9/20/10

At 0430 the next morning, two of the four men sent on patrol returned with the news that they had found the route and the other two were in a barn in Telling awaiting their return. They also reported neither Germans nor Americans in Telling. The two in the barn had agreed to return immediately, if the Germans entered the town before the platoon arrived.

When the platoon reached Telling they found sandwiches and wine awaiting them. The two men who had waited in the barn had not been idle.

At daybreak, 24 December 1944, Lt Prewitt started out to see if he could find out anything about the situation from the townspeople. He learned that the road between Telling and Rochefort had been cut by German armored units. Civilians informed him that there were friendly troops at Givet, but that was 55 ~~miles~~ kilometres away. Discovering a doctor in the village who owned an automobile, the Lt. decided to send two men to Givet to get a truck to come for the troops. Just as the two men left a German reconnaissance car entered the town from the direction of Bure. The automobile got safely on its way. Lt. Prewitt returned to the barn to alert the rest of the platoon. After circling the town and finding nothing suspicious the Germans returned in the direction from which they had come. Lt Prewitt later learned that two guards he had posted on the road to Bure had been captured by the Germans in the reconnaissance car.

Lt. Prewitt decided to start for Givet on foot and meet the trucks. The platoon walked for a mile, and then, as was the custom, met a civilian. This civilian was

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 735017
By: SP4ARA Date: 9/20/10

XXXXXXXXXXXX
CHAMLY (K1567)

From the town of Garity, and said there were American soldiers on the other side of the town. Continuing through the town Lt. Prewitt spotted six engineers at the bridge on the outskirts. He found that they had been left there to blow up the bridge before the German advance. The Capt. in charge of the engineers offered to take the platoon to get it in the two trucks that he had with him. The platoon loaded on the trucks. While they were waiting to leave, a German tank came up to the other side of the bridge which had been blown. The tank opened fire but missed the truck. As the trucks were pulling out, the men saw German paratroopers falling on the town behind. They continued without mishap and arrived in Givet on Xmas day in time for a turkey dinner.

Found that without any friendly tank forces on either bank. For another three days, 24-26 December 1944, the 2nd Infantry Division tried to break through the lines between Harbise and Notton toward the Meuse. By the night of 26 December 1944, it was clear that the attempt was a complete failure. ①
4. Reconnaissance (1-9 January 1945)
On First Army's side of the Meuse, the involved complex movement by four divisions of VII Corps on narrow log roads. The traffic was especially heavy and coordination efforts because the movement included two groups of engineers. It also involved the formation of various tank-infantry teams and tank convoys. On the whole the organization of the offensive was haphazard based on the scattered divisions of the offensive. Nevertheless the enemy also organized the attack.
A-9

DEPICTING THE BULGE
(3- January 1945)

In January 1945, the 84th Infantry Division returned to the offensive after beating back one of the main German thrusts in the Ardennes.

The January 1945 offensive was part of a larger operation to wipe out the German "bulge" in the Ardennes.

While units of the First Army came down on the northern flank of the bulge, units of the Third Army pushed up from the south and the 83rd British Division attacked in the center.

In general, the battle of the Ardennes passed through three major phases.

1. The German Offensive (16 -- December 1944)

The Division arrived in Marche Belgium in direct line of the German drive. For three days 31-23 December 1944 it found itself without any friendly ~~xxxxxx~~ forces on either flank. For another three days, 24-26 December 1944, the 116 Panzer Division tried to break through its lines between Marche and Hotton toward the Meuse. By the night of 26 December 1944, it was clear that the attempt was a complete failure. (1)

2. Regrouping (1-3 January 1945)

On First Army's side of the bulge, this involved a complex movement by four divisions of VII Corps on narrow icy roads. The traffic was especially heavy and coordination difficult because the movement included two armored divisions. It also involved the formation of various tank-infantry teams and task forces. On the whole the organization of the offensive was initially based on the armored divisions organization. Meanwhile the enemy also regrouped some of

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND735017
By: SP MARA Date: 9/20/10

DEPICTING THE BULGE
(3- January 1945)

In January 1945, the 84th Infantry Division returned to the offensive after beating back one of the main German thrusts in the Ardennes.

The January 1945 offensive was part of a larger operation to wipe out the German "bulge" in the Ardennes.

While units of the First Army came down on the northern flank of the bulge, units of the Third Army pushed up from the south and the 53rd British Division attacked in the center.

In general, the battle of the Ardennes passed through three major phases.

1. The German Offensive (16 -- December 1944)

The Division arrived in Marche Belgium in direct line of the German drive. For three days 21-23 December 1944 it found itself without any friendly ~~xxxxxx~~ forces on either flank. For another three days, 24-26 December 1944, the 116 Panzer Division tried to break through its lines between Marche and Hotton toward the Meuse. By the night of 26 December 1944, it was clear that the attempt was a complete failure. (1)

2. Regrouping (1-3 January 1945)

On First Army's side of the bulge, this involved a complex movement by four divisions of VII Corps on narrow key roads. The traffic was especially heavy and coordination difficult because the movement included two armored divisions. It also involved the formation of various tank-infantry teams and task forces. On the whole the organization of the offensive was initially based on the armored divisions organization. Meanwhile the enemy also regrouped some of

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND735017
By: STARRA Date: 9/20/10

his forces in the Ardennes to enable him to attack on Third Army's front.

3. The Allied Offense (3- January 1945) ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Armor and Infantry worked together, as much as the terrain allowed, as a team, and therefore, it is necessary to deal with them together, ~~em~~ special emphasis will be placed on the role of the infantry.

Regrouping

(1-2 January 1945)

When the month of January 1945 opened the 84th Infantry Division was still holding the sector between Marche ^(P2183) and Hottin, the 53d(British)Division on ~~the~~ its right, the 83d Infantry Division on its left. The 2d and 3d Armored division's previously placed on the right and left respectively, were already engaged in reorganization and regrouping.

On 1 January 1945, the 53d(British)Division began to take over the Marche-Hottin sector and the 84th Infantry Division began to move further north in the vicinity of ^(P4072) Barvaux. The 53d Division assumed responsibility for the sector at 1000 2 January 1945. (2)

In less than 36 hours, the 84th Infantry Division completed its relief and concentration. The 335th Infantry, the first regiment to move, was attached to the 2d Armored Division at 2145 1 January 1945 and cleared the division zone by mid-night. The 334th Infantry closed in its new assembly area in the vicinity of Biron at 0300 3 January 1945.

The 333 Infantry closed in the vicinity of Grandmenil at 0300, 3 January 1945. The division headquarters moved from Bailionville to Barvaux at 1100, 2 January 1945. At noon, 2 January 1945 the 290th Infantry Regiment (75th Infantry Division) and the 4th Cavalry Group were attached to the 84th Infantry Division. (3)

By morning of 3 January 1945 the 84th Infantry Division was fully assembled in its new zone. The 290th Infantry was on line in front of Werpin, Magester and Amonines between the rivers Ourthe and Aisne. The 333rd Infantry held a position between Erzee and Grandmenil between the Aisne River and the Manhay-Houffalize road. The 334th Infantry was back in reserve around Biron. The 4th Cavalry Group was placed just in back of the 290th Infantry near Soy. (4)

The 84th Infantry Division was prepared to attack on a nine mile front between the Ourth River and the Manhay-Houffalize road.

On the German side, the regrouping was suspected to be equally far-reaching. The 1st SS Panzer Division, 13th SS Panzer Division and the Panzer Lehr Division were sent to join the attack at Bastogne. The 560th Volksgrenadier Division was moved from the Ourthe-Aisne sector to the Marche-Hotton sector, ~~was~~ held by the 53d (British) Division. (5)

In the new zone the 2nd SS Panzer Division was moved into the Ourthe-Aisne sector and the 9th SS Panzer Division into the sector between the Aisne and the Manhay-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: MMDP735017
By: STVARA Date: 9/20/10

Houffalize road. At the same time, the Ourthe River became the boundary between the 5th Panzer Army on the right and the 6th Panzer Army on the left. (5)

There was every indication that the enemy meant to put up stiff resistance to the coming offensive. In the rolling hills country of the Ardennes this could mean but one thing. He would of necessity have to be blasted off each and every hill-top. Hilltops were endless.

PLAN OF ATTACK

The attack on the western portion of the north side of the bulge was based on four divisions, two infantry -- the 84th and 83rd -- and two armored -- the 2d and 3d. Of these two large tank-infantry teams were made up. The 84th Infantry Division was teamed with the 2d Armored Division, the 83rd Infantry Division with the 3d Armored Division.

The whole offensive was launched between two rivers, the Ourthe and the Salm. The entire area is cut almost squarely in half by the Manhay-Houffalize road. On the right the 2d Armored Division and the 84th Infantry Division were given the sector between the Ourthe River and the road. On the left the 3 Armored Division and the 83rd Infantry Division were given the sector between the road and the Salm river. (6)

The original plan of attack was outlined in Field Order number one, issued on 2 January 1945

4

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND735017
By SP4ARA/DAC/SP2010

The VII Corps mission was to seize the area between Houffalize on the Ourthe and Bovigny on the Salm, prepared to continue the advance to the east on order by the First Army. The 2d Armored Division to seize the line of the Ourthe and establish a bridgehead at Houffalize. (P 6172) (P 2082) (6)

The 84th Infantry Division to attack in close support of the 2d Armored Division eliminate all pockets of resistance within its zone of action, protect the right flank of VII Corps and block any enemy movement across the Ourthe. To carry out these missions, the 84th Infantry Division coordinated the 333rd, 334th, 290th, regiments and Task Force Church closely with the 2nd Armored Division. (6)

The 2d Armored Division was to attack with two Combat Commands abreast, each covering approximately half the division's zone. Combat Command A extended from the Ourthe to the Aisne, Combat Command B from the Aisne to the Manhey-Houffalize road. (2)

Task Force Church of the 84th Infantry Division was formed to attack in close support of Combat Command A. This Task Force, led by the assistant commander of the 84th Infantry Division, Brigadier-General John H. Church, was made up of the 290th Infantry, the 4th Cavalry Group and one battalion of the 334th Infantry in reserve. It was ordered to eliminate all pockets of resistance within its zone of action and to protect the right flank of the Corps by blocking any enemy movement across the Ourthe River. Originally it was also supposed to isolate Laroché by seizing the village of Oelle and the high ground north of (P 4472) (4678) 5

Laroche. ②

The 353rd Infantry was instructed to attack in close support of Combat Command B by eliminating all pockets of resistance within its zone of action. The remaining two battalions of the 334th Infantry were initially placed in reserve, prepared to move out on one-half hours notice after the attack jumped off. The assembly areas of the three regiments corresponded to their zones of attack.

The 355th Infantry attached to the 2d Armored Division, under control of Combat Command A was destined to operate between the Ourthe and Aisne rivers. On the 2d of January the 1st Battalion 355th Infantry was attached to Task Force X A, the 5d Battalion to Task Force B. Companies F and G were attached to the 1st Battalion 66th Armored Regiment. Company C of the 66th Armored Regiment was attached to the 2nd Battalion 355th Infantry. The whole of the 2d Battalion 355 came under control of Task Force G. The attack to be launched through elements of the 75th Infantry Division to capture intermediate objectives and establish a bridgehead at Houffalize. ②

Although the ultimate objective of the 2d Armored in this operation was Houffalize an intermediate objective was the main road from Laroche to an important ~~XXXX~~ highway intersection between Laroche and Salmchateau at 576853. ^(P708c) My enemy forces left above the road would be effectively encircled once the road was cut. ②

Before the offensive began, a captured German map showed that the enemy was holding the following positions

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MMDP735017
By SP MARA Date 9/20/10

between the Ourthe and the Manhay-Houffalize road; the high ground at 419854 - ^(P4182) Trinal - ^(P4585) Magoster - Mignonnefa - ^(P4482) Vioux-Fourneau- ^(P5112) Freyneux and Odeligne. From this enemy line to the objective, Houffalize stretched a distance of about 16 miles. In the hills and woods of the Ardennes, in the middle of winter those were sixteen long miles. (8)

XXXXXXXXXXXX

SETTING FOR WINTER OFFENSIVE

If ever terrain and weather fought on the side of the enemy, it did so in the Ardennes. In many cases, these two combined, were more difficult to overcome than the enemy's forces. In practically every case, the enemy was able to take advantage of ideal ground to defend it. The terrain which aided the 84th Infantry Division in halting the march of the Panzer was not to constitute an obstacle to that same division.

Imnumerable hills of great height and steepness formed a sharply rolling relief, and heavily forested areas gave the enemy a succession of hills to sight and observe from as long as he desired. When he grew tired of defending on one line, another lending itself to defensive warfare equally as well as the first awaited him. Concealment offered by the thick forests was improved by the blanket of snow which covered everything. This enabled him to leave behind scattered strong points to further hinder advance.

The villages and towns astride the principal and

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MMD735017
By SP MARA Date 9/20/10

and secondary roads in the area while designated as objectives were not the real decisive points of resistance as a rule. These communities are usually flanked by high ground which upon occupation became the key to the ~~city~~ ⁽⁵⁰⁸⁾ situation. However there were exceptions. The village Santez looked down on the valleys and hills to the north from a height of 1800 feet, seemingly impregnable to assault if stubbornly held.

During any season of the year the Ardennes would have presented serious obstacles to an attacking force. In January those obstacles became formidable. If terrain was bad weather was worse.

On the morning of the offensive, 3 January 1945, it began to snow. It snowed all that week, sometimes waiting down, sometimes blizzard-like. The official temperature went down as low as 13 degrees above zero. The roads were icy and trails became invisible. Some of the woods were so dense and the mist so heavy that it was as dark as night in the middle of the afternoon. Even in the open visibility was often limited to thirty or forty yards.

The plan of attack called for tank-infantry teams but the tanks and other vehicles were frequently unable to operate tactically. In numerous instances, the infantry had to go off alone. To stay on the roads was dangerous and the snow in the fields was ~~some~~ ^{some} deep. Drifts were like ~~mind~~ ^{mind} hills. In this cold and snow, the problem of taking

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MMDT35017
By ST MARKA Date 9/20/10

cover was unusually difficult. The ground was hard as macadam and it often took two hours digging to get through the crust. To dig foxholes, the infantry had to hack away at the frozen ground and chip off small lumps of packed dirt. Rifleman reported that it took them as long as five hours to dig down as far as three feet. (9)

Especially in the first phase of the offensive air support was impossible. Even the artillery was unable to get observation through the sleet and mist..

Supply was an extremely difficult problem.

Units attacking into forested areas were often in a position where no usable roads reached them. They were supplied by hand carrying parties a slow and painful process in the rugged, snow covered, terrain. Still other units received their supplies via-half-tracks. (10)

Medical evacuation was hampered by a lack of winter equipment. The litter bearers had an almost impossible task in the Ardennes. Most efficient medical evacuation was carried on by utilizing light tanks of the armored units. Ingenuity was the watchword, the X 2d Battalion 333d Infantry ~~XXXXXXXX~~ succeeded in evacuating its wounded with ~~in~~ a captured enemy horse and sled. (9)

The snow provided enemy dugouts and emplacements with a quick, effective camouflage.

Compared to the divisions experience in the mud of Germany, that in the snow of the Ardennes in Belgium was

far more grueling. The skillful and sometimes stubborn enemy resistance, added to the terrain and weather, coupled with a lack of proper winter equipment and clothing, made the offensive in the Ardennes an outstanding example of the infantry's stamina and determination under the most adverse conditions imaginable in battle. (11)

The actions in these two sectors -- between the Ourthe and the Alster, and between the Alster and the (Meuse) -- fortification work will be taken up separately, although of course, development in one sector affected the other.

With the 55th Infantry attached to Combat Group A, Task Force A and B were to make the main effort, taking ^(11/22) Hangey, ^(11/23) Seltz, and eventually moved down the secondary roads in the area like the main Grand North of ^(11/22) ^(11/23) to German territory cutting the road between Tielman. That latter objective, however, was to be a joint venture in the form of ^(11/22) ^(11/23) and A and B and were to converge on this point. (12)

Task Force A with attached 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, was to attack at 0630 on 22 January 1947, in two elements with the tank leading, with objectives Hangey and Seltz and establish road blocks to the south and southwest and consolidate their positions after an expected counter-attack from the Germans. When this was completed they were to be relieved by elements of the 4th Infantry Division and then pass to Combat Group A reserves prepared to move on under the direction to any one either Task Force B or Task 10

BETWEEN THE OURTHE AND THE AISNE

Objective Befte

3-4 January 1945

The Aisne River cut the zone of the 2d Armored Division almost exactly in half. Two Combat Commands were to be employed in each zone. For the sake of clarity the actions in these two sectors -- between the Ourthe and the Aisne, and between the Aisne and the (Manhay) - Houffalize road will be taken up separately, although of course, development in one sector affected the other.

With the 355th Infantry attached to Combat Command A the rest of the 84th Infantry Division was in general support. Task Forces A and B were to make the main effort taking ^(P 4285) Magoster, ^(P 4484) Befte, and Devontave; moved down the secondary roads in the area take the high ground North of ^(P 4982) Nashe; move on to Samree thereby cutting the road Marche Vielsalm. That latter objective, Samree, was to be a joint venture on the part of Combat Command A and B who were to converge on this point. (12)

Task Force A with attached 1st Battalion, 355th Infantry, was to attack at 0830 on 3d January 1945, in two elements with the tanks leading, seize objectives Magoster west and establish road blocks to the south and South-attack from the Southwest. When this was completed they were to be relieved by elements of an expected counter-then pass to Combat Command A reserve, prepared to move on order to Devantave to support either Task Force B or Task //

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AMDP 735017
By SNARA Date 9/20/10

Force C.

Task Force B with attached 3d Battalion 335th Infantry was also to attack at 0830 on the 3d of January 1945 and seize successive objectives, high-ground 1500 yards north of Devantave and Devantave itself, consolidate on Devantave and make a reconnaissance to the southeast to Dochamps and northeast through the woods to a point on the road 350 yards northeast of Le Gaim EMERISSE. Establish contact

with Task Force A on the right and Task Force G on the left, and be prepared to seize Dochamps on order. (14)

~~Task Force C to be initially in Combat Command A's reserve. (Attached to it the 2d Battalion 335th Infantry and the balance of that regiment.) Establish strong road blocks south of Amonines. At 0830, 3d January 1945 to attack using only one company of infantry) supported by tanks and seize the high ground 100 yards southeast of Amonines. To make a reconnaissance to the southeast along the road 350 yards northeast of LE GAIM EMERISSE. Establish contact with Task Force A on the right and Task Force G on the left, and be prepared to seize Dochamps on order.~~

Task Force C to be initially in Combat Command A's reserve. (Attached to it the 2nd Battalion 335th Infantry and the balance of that regiment.) To establish strong road blocks south of Amonines. At 0830, 3d January to attack (using only one company of infantry) supported by tanks and seize the high ground 100 yards southeast of Amonines. To make a reconnaissance to the southeast along the road 350

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AMDP735017
By SMARA Date 9/20/10

yards northeast of Le Chamisse. Then he prepared to attack on order to clear the road to Docamps, to assist Task Force B, to contact Combat Command B on the left at the road junction $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Amonines, prepared to support the action of Task Force A and Task Force B. (14)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

D-Day was 3 January 1945, H-Hour was 0830. At that time, elements of the 2d Armored Division passed through the line held by the 290th Infantry ~~XXXXXX~~ Regiment (75th Infantry Division) and attacked towards the southeast. Sleet and rain fell intermittently. From early morning the roads were icy. (15)

Until about noon the attack went ahead. The enemy was taken by surprise. Some prisoners were captured while asleep. As a result, the enemy's OP line was broken through without much difficulty. By 0930, Task Force A had overrun the enemy's position at Trinal. When the town was mopped up 62 prisoners including one officer were taken. By noon however, ~~xxxx~~ resistance was more highly organized and effective. Magoster was harder to crack. The defense depended mainly on infantry with mines and bazookas. Our tank columns were held up at several points by bazookas and mobile anti-tank guns. By 1515, however Task Force B had advanced through Magoster. (16)

The main resistance that ~~day~~ first day came around the village of Befre, about 2000 yards from ~~xxxx~~ the jump off point. The 1st Battalion 290th Infantry tried to go around the town

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NAID 735017

By SP4ARA Date 9/20/10

4

by taking the woods on both sides as well as entering it frontally. By 1500 the high ground northeast and northwest of Beffe was taken. Fifteen minutes later, patrols of the 1st Battalion 290th Infantry began to enter the town itself. At 1630 however, a battalion of enemy infantry and a battalion of tanks launched a counterattack against Beffe. It was broken ~~up~~ by artillery fire and tank destroyers before gaining any ground. Nevertheless, by the end of the first day 3 January 1945, enemy fire from commanding ground south of Beffe was so heavy, the weather and the terrain so unfavorable that armor of the 66th Armored Regiment found it impossible to move into town. (17)

By nightfall artillery fire became so intense in the villages of Magoster and Beffe that elements of Task Force B found it necessary to withdraw from each to the high ground commanding the respective communities. Company B, 335th Infantry withdrew to the high ground North of Beffe. Company G of the same regiment fell back to the high ground north of Magoster for the night. (18)

In general the result of the first days fighting was inconclusive. The 2d Armored had advanced from 1500 to 3000 yards but a main strong point around Beffe could not be overcome. It was not so much that Beffe itself was so strongly held as that the enemy was able to take advantage of commanding ground around Beffe to hold the attack up. His defensive fires into Beffe came mainly from three places. From the Conroy ridge, about 1000 yards to the southeast, from the Min de Bardouive, about 1000 yards to the southwest and from the direction of Renedeux Bas, a village on the other side of

14

DECLASSIFIED
Authority **AMDP735017**
By **SMARA** Date **9/20/10**

the Ourthe, in the sector of the 53 (British) Division, about 2000 yards to the west. Although much of the heaviest fighting went on for Belfe itself, the basic problem of this phase of the attack was really the Consy ridge. (19)

The battle for Belfe was renewed at 0930 the next morning, 4th January 1945. This time us was pushed under more favorable circumstances. At 0800 that same morning the 53rd British Division launched an offensive in its zone on the West bank of the Ourthe, thus helping to protect the right flank of 2d Armored -- 84th Infantry Divisions', and tending to drive the enemy from commanding ground on the west bank from which American forces were receiving heavy fire and against which they could not effectively retaliate. By the end of the day, 4th January 1945, Rendoux Bas was taken by the British depriving the enemy of part of his favorable position on the west bank. (20)

The 1st Battalion 335 had continued the attack and seized the north half of Belfe while Company C supported by fire from Company A seized Magoster and on to Belfe making contact with Company B on the south end of Belfe where they dug in to defend their gain. (21)

The capture of Belfe was typical of the experience in the whole offensive. The town was subjected to intense artillery fire all morning. By 1400 the town was captured with a bag of very few prisoners. (21)

In effect after holding up the attack for a day the enemy was content to fall back to another position easily

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AND735017
By SMARA Date 9/20/10

defended a thousand yards south of Beffe. From the first his objective was no so much to hold as to delay, forcing that the attacker to pay the highest possible price for his gains.

Gonsy Ridge

5-6 January 1945

After Beffe the next objective was Gonsy. The 1st Battalion 335th Infantry resumed a day attack from Beffe at 1300, 5 January 1945, principal objective to seize the road junction at Gonsy, prepared to continue the attack to the south. Company C moved immediately through the woods on the right of the road, Beffe-Gonsy to support Company B's attack. Company A followed 400 yards behind Company B. The attack progressed 200 yards receiving enemy artillery and small arms fire from across the Ourthe River, this harrassing fire did much harm. Company B had moved down a draw west of Beffe and seized the road junction at Gonsy. The fire became so intense from the enemy positions south of Gonsy that all companies were ordered to withdraw to Beffe for a night attack. Combat Command A ordered the attack for 2300 5 January 1945 but the attack was delayed until morning so that white winter underwear could be obtained and used by the 1st Battalion as camouflage suits. (22)

During this same day units to the right and left had similar experiences with an enemy who resisted ~~well~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AMDT 735017
By SP4ARA Date 9/20/10

stubbornly. The 3d Armored Division in the Janisval area received an unsuccessful counterattack. The 53d (British) Division on the right made little or no gains for the day. The experience of the 84th Infantry Division was more or less general all along the line.

At 0100 on 6 January 1945 the 1st Battalion 335th Infantry (Task Force A) having received their camouflage suits, launched another attack down the road to Coney from the village of Belfe. Company B moved on the right of the road, south of Belfe, Company C on the left, Company A from positions south of Belfe supported the advance by fire. Companies B and C moved to within 75 yards of the road junction at Coney, but met heavy fire which checked their advance. A strong point consisting of machine guns and infantry supported by a German tank formed the obstacle. Bazooka fire accounted for the tank but artillery fire became so heavy on the road that once more the infantry received orders to withdraw. Companies B and C withdrew covered by fire of Company A. (23)

Since Task Force A had little success against Coney it was decided that the 1st Battalion, 335th Infantry would support the 3d Battalion of that same regiment (Task Force B) in its effort on Devantave. At 0800 6 January 1945 the 1st Battalion moved into the woods southeast of Nagoster and at 1600 moved to an assembly area south of ~~WIKIKIKIKI~~ WIGNONFE. (23)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMDT 735017
By STNARA Date 9/20/10

Deventave

3-6 January 1945

Another village of the Coney ridge, Deventave, is situated about 1200 yards east of Coney. To the west a large ridge line running generally north and south is covered by a forest of trees approximately a mile and a half long and a mile wide. This forest is divided into two parts, the Bois d'Arlonge, in the northern extremity and the Bois del Core in the southern extremity.

Task Force B was assigned the mission of taking the high ground north of Soy and on to the village of Deventave. The 3rd Battalion 335th Infantry attached to Task Force B was working under the command of a tank unit commander for the first time. 1st Lt. Leonard R. Carpenter commanding K Company of the 3d Battalion told the story. It appeared to the Company K commander and the rest that they were being rushed into a job without proper planning or proper reconnaissance for the first time. They received the attack order on the night of 2-3 January 1945 and making the jump-off on the 3d January. Reconnaissance was made to the forward assembly area where the troops dug in for the night, but beyond that they didn't know just ~~where~~ where each company would be during the attack, which provisions of the town they would clear of enemy, where they would organize or consolidate when the town was taken, or what artillery preparations were to be used. The companies were told that Company I would lead off with medium tanks and K Company would follow with the light tanks. Company I was to take Soy and

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MMDP735017
By SNARA Date 9/20/10

Gumpany K Devantave. (9)

At the forward assembly area several inches of snow covered the ground, the dirt was so hard it was impossible to dig with ordinary intrenching tools. The small unit commanders surveying the situation felt that it would have been better had the men been allowed to catch a good nights sleep, for the first time in three or four days and move to the forward assembly area just in time to cross the line of departure. A few extra picks and shovels of a little sturdier construction were obtained but each stroke of the pick would chip off small hunks of dirt about the size of an apple. The crust on the surface was about eight inches thick and took a good two hours of hacking to cleave through it the next layer was softer but still very hard. Water seeped into the bottom of the hole, as the men dug the pressure of their feet ~~xxxxx~~ turned the snow to water which formed a thin layer of extremely cold mud which seeped through overshoes, boots and socks. It took approximately five hours to dig a two man fox-hole and even they they were not as deep as they should have been. Overcoats brushing against the side of the hole collected water which turned to ice and coat-tails became like boards. If a man desired his handkerchief it was necessary for him to reach behind himself and lift his overcoat up like a plank. During the night a few men tried to sleep but the cold was too penetrating to allow sleep. The men had no blankets. (9)

Early on the morning of 3 January 1945 tanks came rumbling up into the area. These men feared that they would
/9

draw artillery fire as often had been the case in their experience before. At 0630 3 January 1945 the men began to prepare themselves for crossing the line of departure. Wearing overcoats and overshoes was optional. About thirty per-cent of ~~the~~ Company K decided against these encumbering articles of ~~extra~~ clothing. (9)

When company K moved from the assembly area to the line of departure a small trail was to be their guide however it was felt that this might be covered with mortar or artillery fire and so the company moved through the wooded area risking tree bursts. The woods were made up largely of fir trees, covered with snow. As the men moved up the gradual slope to the line of departure they ~~ploughed~~ ploughed through the snow, tree branches kept brushing against their necks and faces. It was difficult to keep contact as it was still dark. Having reached the line of departure they waited almost an hour later than the order had anticipated.

1st Lt. Carpenter went forward to investigate and found that one platoon of Company I had not crossed the line of departure even at that point. He decided to bypass his company around Company I and received the Battalion S-3's permission. In front of the line of departure was a long gradual descent of open ground. Company K started across moving two platoons abreast. A considerable amount of 88 fire fell and small arms were popping around intermittently. "In the clearing I could see, in the distance, a road and a small clump of trees. I was looking for a heavy clump on the reverse slope of our first objective.

Behind me was my radio operator, another man was to pick up the radio in case he became a casualty. Another 200 radio with two operators was behind my left platoon. At this point, I was told that Company I and the medium tanks were already on the first objective. So I pushed forward rapidly as I could through the snow. (9)

Company K moved forward, the formation was good, the men well dispersed. There were many shell craters from artillery fire along the route. When a shell landed it blew a layer of snow in the air and threw a black film on the snow surrounding the crater for a distance of 10 to 15 yards. (9)

The platoons stopped in a wooded area just short of their first objective to reorganize, then pushed forward to the top of the hill on which were located two medium tanks. Since orders were not forthcoming Lt Carpenter deployed his men in the woods and awaited developments. Figuring that it would take a minimum of two hours to dig a prone shelter the men did not start for the attack was to be resumed. (9)

Then, the artillery started. The Germans fired their Nebelwerfer shells (screaming meemies) and Company K hit the ground and most of the shells landed in their vicinity. The radio operator screamed; wounded were yelling for medics with in almost hysterical tones. The order was given to move forward and Company K moved through the clearing toward another wooded area. Company I ahead of them was held up. Again an enemy barrage was heard screaming snkx "on the way". Rockets and 88 fire poured down on top

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MM1D735017

By SNARA Date 9/20/10

of Companies I and K. One shell landed near a light tank disintegrating five men. Casualties were in abundance.

"Company I men went streaming back through us, covered with blood, panic written on their faces, reporting half the company casualties. We couldn't move forward, we could not get under cover and at the moment withdrawal was out of the question. 88's blasted straight at the men when they passed over the forward slope of the hill. Tanks refused to move forward. Two companies were held up by one 88 -- Company I unable to maneuver. We were unable to get artillery fire on the German gun. I could actually see the 88. Soon about 30 men came running back through our lines, from Company I, telling us to pull back. At first, that cry of withdrawal was just the cry of several panicky men. Just a few moments later I learned through one of their officers that they were withdrawing." (9)

Company K was pulled back to their old position on the edge of the woods where they dug in and remained until the night of 5-6 January. (9)

The company aid man, Pfc David E Bassert, reported on the medical situation during the afternoon of ~~the~~ 3 January 1945. "After about 10 minutes of that shelling, we withdrew from the woods, leaving the wounded that couldn't walk and the medics. If a man gets a wound in the leg and you have to cut his pants to get at the wound his whole leg freezes. There were no stretcher bearers. Light tanks were loaded with wounded, but there were too many for the tanks. It took about two hours to get the last ones out. All were suffering from ~~shock~~ shock. All were moaning and some yelling. Fragmentation wounds don't bleed too much. Cold was bad for the shock but helped clot the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority **MMDP735017**
By **SCMARA** Date **9/20/10**

the blood. * We thought surely we'd be relieved, if not that night then in the morning. We were wet with hot overcoats, blankets, or rations. Men were literally freezing, wet from snow, and the mud that thawed during the day but froze at night. Sometime during the night they finally brought food and blankets, overcoats and galoshes. But the damage had been done when the men got wet. Some fellows just cracked under the strain. We took one fellow out just raving crazy, battle fatigue I guess. Their holes were not very deep and not covered but they didn't give a damn. You couldn't see it was so cold, they huddled together in little holes about a foot and half deep. The next morning it snowed something terrible, about four or five inches. They huddled in blankets, covered with snow and ate cold rations. --- ~~xxx~~ waiting." ⁽²⁴⁾

On the morning of 6 January Company K moved out with the light tanks of Task Force B and into the town of Devantave meeting little or no resistance. ⁽⁹⁾

Shift Toward Samwee

6-9 January 1945

Task Force A began to move to the southeast portion of the zone bounded by the Ourthe and the Alme rivers. Its route completely canalized by the high ground and thick woods which forced the armor to stay on the only usable secondary road in the Task Force's area. On 7 January 1945, at 0830 the 1st Battalion 335th Infantry ^(P4683) attacked to seize the high ground northwest of **K** ~~Lald-Prangeleux~~ and was in control of

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND735017
By: SP7NARA/Date: 9/20/10

the objective at 1600. On 8 January at 0830 they made an attack on the hill Le Wate (481830) with tanks preceding the infantry. But when the enemy tanks were encountered the attack was held up all day and late that night the infantry withdrew to previous positions on high ground northeast of ~~CRUX~~^(P4683) Croix du Laid-Prangeleux. A night attack was planned but not carried out. (21)

Task Force B on the right, which had secured the village of Devantave on 6 January 1945 had encircled the town with a perimeter defense in which it remained through that night.

On 7 January 1945, Companies K and I of the 3d Battalion 335th Infantry were relieved by the 3d Battalion 290th Infantry and moved into the buildings of Devantave. Company L 335th Infantry remained on the road block vicinity of Devantave. The next day 8 January 1945 Company I was ~~wleft~~ to maintain its road block and the remaining two companies, K and I moved with the tanks of Task Force B southeast along the road from Devantave to Laid-Prangeleux. The road had been cleared by Task Force A the day before. The infantry and armor remained in the vicinity of Laid-Prangeleux. Later, on that same day, the Task Force was ordered into an assembly area west of Dochamps. Companies K and I withdrew with the armor through Devantave to Amonines, picked up Company I and moved to their new assembly area where they dug in for the night 8-9 January 1945. (21)

Combat Command A had scheduled the attack on Samree

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AND735017
By SP4ARA Date 9/20/10

by Task Force A and Task Force B for 0730, 9 January 1945. (P4883)

Task Force A moving from the vicinity of Le Wate took Mashez without meeting any resistance but was able to go no further. Enemy tanks were reported in the town. The tanks of Task Force A were having difficulty on the poor road over which they were forced to travel. An attempt to move Company B around the right of the hill Le Wate, to Samree was unsuccessful. The 1st Battalion 335th Infantry of Task Force A dug in on the forward slope of the high ground near Mashez. (21)

Task Force B launched its attack from the vicinity of Dochamps with the 3d Battalion 335th Infantry 0630 9 January 1945, the infantry riding the tanks. They reached the far edge of the woods 2000 yards south of Dochamps. Company I was withdrawn and sent around via Dochamps to a position 1500 yards south of the town. No further gains were made that day. The enemy's position in Samree was excellent, he was occupying a village which had been built on dominating terrain. As of the night of 9 January 1945 he had no intentions of abandoning it. ~~It remained for Task Force the reserve force of Combat Command A to seize the situation.~~ (21)

At this point it is necessary to explain the disposition of Task Force C for the six days preceding their ~~attack on Samree.~~

Task Force C, with attached 2d Battalion 335th Infantry, was initially the reserve of Combat Command A as such their mission was supposedly to maintain contact between Combat Commands A and B utilizing the road Barvaux - Samree for their purpose. (14)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MMDP735017
By SP7MARA Date 9/20/10

Later it was discovered that Task Force A would be able to move down through the village Trinal toward their objective all right but Task Force B had no tactically usable roads in their sector. (14)

On 3 January 1945 Task Force G was ~~not~~ charged with establishing out-posts and road-blocks south of Amonines to deny that route for counterattack. The Task Force remained just south of Amonines on the road Barvaux - Samree until 5 January 1945. (14)

On the 5th of January Task Force C was informed that Combat Command B had taken Lemormont 11 and the high ground at 484857 (Pm de Bergister) and had a patrol out which Task Force C would contact at the sawmill near the farm (de Bergister). Company E was sent down the road to make contact and realizing if they did make contact it would be necessary to be prepared to extend the line, Capt. Francis Price S-3 of the 2d Battalion 335 recommended that another company follow them. Company D was dispatched to assist Company E. A portion of the 82 Reconnaissance Battalion was sent to clear the woods on the right of the road. (14)

Company E reached 470865 and discovered an enemy strong point. (14)

Previous to this the infantry had been informed that elements of the 75th Infantry Division on the left were occupying the western slope of the hill overlooking the spot at which Company E had met its resistance. It was later discovered that infantry had occupied the hill all-right ~~in~~ but their positions were so far toward the crest -- instead of down on the western

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NAID735017
By SP4ARA Date 9/20/10

slope that they were not aware of the fire fight which was taking place on the road to their right. Had they been in the proper position the enemy would soon have been forced to evacuate their location. (14)

On the night of 5th January 1945 these troops moved down on the western slope of their hill but by that time the strong point had been reduced. (14)

Company G and elements of the 82nd Reconnaissance Battalion found scattered strong points in the woods as they attempted to clear them. On the night of 5 January the line remained as shown on the sketch. (14)

On 6 January 1945 Task Force G moved further down the road with orders to establish a road block at 478364 and push on toward Dochamps. Another road block was to be set up at the curve in the road 481945. (14)

Company G led off, Company E followed and Company F was left to maintain the road blocks. (14)

The road was a bottle neck for tanks. Two companies were attached to the 2d Battalion 355th, one medium and one light. ~~XX~~ The infantry used the light s mainly for evacuation, to reinforce road-blocks and for pulling aside obstacles. (14)

It was necessary to sweep the road for mines and obstacles so that the tanks could follow up. Road blocks were the biggest problem for ~~it~~ it took about two hours to reduce the average. Obstacles (fallen trees) and isolated strong points formed the remainder of the enemy's attempt to resist. Little artillery fire was received along the road most of the fire encountered

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MM1D735017
By SP4ARA Date 9/20/10

and took over to defend and hold the area if need be. The 1st and 3d Battalions of 335th were pulled back to Barvaux for a rest. ⁽¹⁹⁾

334th Infantry Toward Haroche
(7 to 11 January 1945)

During the period from the 3 ~~January~~ to 7th of January 1945 Task Force A, B, and C with the attached 335th Infantry Regiment had been engaged in clearing the enemy from Befte, Consy, Devantave, Lald-Prangeleux after which they shifted to the southeast toward the Aisme river with the village of Samree as their objective. While the west bank of the Aisme was being taken care of the east bank of the Ourthe was under attention. The 334th Infantry went into action on the 7th of January to ~~take~~ drive the enemy out of that area.

On 6 January 1945 the 1st Battalion 334th Infantry, which had been on an alert status in Biron, ready to aid the Task Force Church on call, was relieved assignment and reverted to regimental control. ⁽²⁵⁾

The 2d Battalion of the 334th which had been resting in the village of Ny began to plan its portion of the offensive on the 3 January 1945. ⁽²⁶⁾

The 3d Battalion of the 334th in the vicinity of Biron rested and refitted. ⁽²⁷⁾

At 1940 6 January 1945 the 1st Battalion 334th Infantry moved to a ~~XXXXXX~~ assembly area in a woods 400 yards south of Pond des Malades. ^(P4338) They were joined there that same evening by the 2d Battalion 334th. The next day both battalions moved down the road from their assembly area to a forward assembly area in the Bois de Tave approximately 400 yards south of ^(P4465)

Mignonne.

The 1st Battalion was to attack the village of Mercouray and the 2d Battalion to capture the high ground in the Bois del Gore and the bald hill approximately 800 yards east of the Bois del Gore. The 2d Battalion was to take its objective first in order to ~~the~~ facilitate the capture of Mercouray. (25-26)

The line of departure for both battalions was to be the southwestern edge of the Bois de Tave.

On January 7 at 0730 the 2d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Joseph E. Williams, moved out in a wedge formation ^{thru} ~~the~~ heavily wooded ^{area} ~~zone~~. Company E was on the point, Company F to the right rear and Company G to the left rear. The distance to be traveled was roughly 1500 yards. The route proved to be ~~as~~ difficult as expected, the rough terrain was topped with thick underbrush and covered with about two feet of snow. (26)

From the beginning artillery fire was their chief tormenter, moving through wooded areas were tree bursts become deadly, reorganization was necessitated several times. Control was difficult. Though the battalion moved slowly by 1600A the objective was gained. Once gained the hill-top proved a ~~rather~~ ^(P4/13) hazardous position to hold. Small arms and automatic weapons fire from the vicinity of Ronzon, across the Ourthe, was poured onto the position by the Germans. Company G's mortar section was virtually wiped out when 14 men were hit by one shell ~~which~~ ⁽²⁶⁾ burst among them.

At 1505 also on the 7 January 1945 the 1st Battalion

crossed the line of departure. Moving across the same route the 2nd Battalion had followed the men half walked and half fell down the slopes. One of our own artillery barrages fell short and a fragment glazed off the helmet of the Battalion Commander Major Roland Kolb. Once again reorganization was necessitated along the route due to ~~an~~ a barrage of Nebelwerfer fire which fell on the battalion. (25)

Enemy resistance from the vicinity of Harcouray was not determined but nevertheless a show of action was made. Automatic weapons fire was heavy for a time and about six or eight Sherman tanks, manned by Germans, fired their machine guns at the attackers. Also present in the town were American two and one-half ton trucks and halftracks. The enemy began retreating toward Gieille and though there was a large amount of equipment in the town the prisoners taken ~~number~~ constituted a small group. Most of the enemy made good ~~his~~ ^{their} retreat from Harcouray. At 1600 7 January 1945 the objective was completely cleared and organization for the night began. (25)

The 1st Battalion remained in Harcouray until 1000A 8 January 1945 when they received orders to move down the road Harcouray-Gieille and capture the latter village. At 1330 the battalion crossed the line of departure, Company C on the right, Company B on the left and Company A in reserve. (25)

Isolated strong-points of enemy were met near the objective. At 1500 a five minute artillery preparation fell on the town and at 1510 the battalion began its movement into the town. At 153 the objective was taken and reorganization begun.

The enemy fired a great deal of mortar and artillery into Cielle for the remainder of the day.

While the 1st Battalion was busily engaged with Cielle, the 2d Battalion had been ordered from its hill-top positions to the village of Marcouray and later on the same day was to receive orders to move to Cielle and reinforce the 3rd 1st Battalion there for the night of 8 January 1945. During the night the 1st Battalion sent out patrols to which reported no enemy activity. (25)

On the 10th January 1945 another hill was assigned as the goal of the 2nd Battalion 334th Infantry. Major James V. Johnston, Executive officer of the 2d Battalion, ~~commanding the 2d Battalion~~ said, "When we moved into Cielle and I saw that tremendous hill, a hill that no self-respecting mountain goat would climb, I knew that would be our next objective." The hill in question lines almost due east of Cielle at a distance of about 2000 yards. It was possible to see the enemy dug in on the (4679) forward slope. (26)

It was decided to use a column of companies to occupy this next objective. "I figured if G company could get on top of ~~the~~ that hill and stay there we'd send another one up." (26)

The companies jumped off at 1100, 10 January 1945 and enemy resistance was heavy. In the beginning it looked as though the infantry would be unable to fight its way up the ~~xxxxxx~~ crest and a message was sent to division informing them of the situation. However in the meantime the ~~xxxx~~ enemy began to withdraw around the western slope of the hill to Larroche. (26)

Machine gun fire from the heavies of Company D accounted for a large number of the retreating enemy.

After this exodus the battalion was able to gain its objective and Company G, shortly thereafter, gained the crest of the hill. (25)

The 1st Battalion 334th Infantry had remained in Clelle during ~~the morning of the 10 January 1945~~ while the 2d Battalion was assaulting the hill east of the town. However at 1835 that same day an order was received attaching them to the 4th Cavalry Group. At 1900 Companies A and B were ordered by the 4th Cavalry to move five miles through rough country in deep snow to occupy strongpoints, southeast of the Samree-Laroché road, in the vicinity of Samree. Company C and elements of the 4th Cavalry assumed control of Clelle in the absence of Companies A and B. (25)

The two Companies A and B closed in their positions at 2330 10 January 1945 after a three hour and a half trek. Relay radio stations were set-up to maintain contact. (25)

At 1400, 11 January 1945, Companies A and B were relieved by the 3d Battalion 334th and arrived back in Clelle at 1530 where the men were given hot food ~~for relief~~ and enabled to warm themselves.

The 2d Battalion had held its positions on the hill east of Clelle through the 10th January 1945 and on the 11th was relieved by the 4th Cavalry Group. (26)

Major Johnston had the following comment on the actions leading up to the fall of Clelle. "The enemy fought a very fine delaying action and didn't give up easily. Weather of (34)

course was our chief obstacle , especially since the winter equipment of our troops was not adequate, they fought on despite conditions and deserve the highest praise. "

During the operation Company G of the 2d Battalion sent a patrol into the outskirts of Laroche on the night of 10 January 1945, ~~the~~ ²⁶ enemy was observed in the town and the patrol withdrew.

XX One Phase Completed

10 January 1945

With the occupation of Cielle and the high ground due east of it the 334th Infantry also reached the immediate objective, the Laroche-Vielsalm road, and thus between the Ourthe and Aisne Rivers the enemy had been pushed south of the road, and one phase of the offensive was completed. Combining forces in this operation had been Combat Command A of the 2d Armored Division and 355th Infantry Regiment in the left portion of the zone, ~~and~~ the ~~the~~ 334th Infantry and 4th Cavalry Group on the right.

ALSNE RIVER TO THE HANHAY-HOUFFALIZE ROAD *
(3 - 10 January 1945)

During the seven day period the offensive was being launched between the Ourthe and the Alsne rivers it was aided by a similar effort of Combat Command B of the 2d Armored Division in a zone from the Alsne River east to the Houffalize road. Both offensives were in reality one though divided by natural and military boundaries. They had a common milix intermediate objective the Vielsalm-Laroche road. (6)

Terrain and weather were the real enemies of the attacking forces. The infantry plodded on, numbed and frozen, when going one step further seemed impossible. Medium tanks on steel treads lumbered up icy slopes and skidded on narrow secondary roads. Armored engineers built treadway bridges, milix abolished obstacles created by felled trees and abandoned equipment. Observation for artillery fire was practically nil. Attacks were launched during driving snow-storms, heavy mists, early in the morning and late at night.

Accent on Armor
(3-6 January 1945)

Combat Command B of the 2d Armored Division was formed by two Task Forces X and Y. In the zone from the Alsne to the Houffalize road Task Force X was to operate on the left and Task Force Y on the right. The three battalions of the 333d Infantry, 84th Infantry Division, were to support, eliminating bypassed pockets of resistance and taking care of the

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMDP735017

By SMARA Date 9/20/10

enemy where armor couldn't reach him.

Combat Command B attacked at 0830, 3 January 1945, in the left of the division zone, passed through the 75th Infantry Division lines south of Chamon (P5189) and Manhay (P5390). Task Force X attacked south on the axis Grandmenil (P9052) - Odéigne (P8655). Troops of the 1st Battalion 41st Armored Infantry Regiment pushed through the woods south of Grandmenil and armor of the 1st Battalion 67 Armored Regiment attacked south along the edge of the woods. Enemy resistance with anti-tank and bazooka fire, combined with adverse terrain slowed the advance. At the end of the day Task Force X consolidated its gains in the vicinity of Gorolie (P5439). Task Force Y attacked south on the axis La Fosse (P5038) - Freyneux (P5186) and likewise encountered difficult terrain and determined enemy. ^(P5183) Le Batty was seized at 0900. Company G, 67 Armored Regiment and Co I 41st Armored Infantry Regiment reinforced Task Force Y for the assault on Freyneux. The village was seized at 1430 and at 1700 had been organized for defense. Elements of Task Force Y entered the ~~xxx~~ northern limits of ~~XXXXX~~ Lamornent¹ (P5086) at 1430 in the face of enemy resistance. Positions were consolidated in vicinity of the road junction at P5087 where Company B, 82 Reconnaissance Battalion had established a strong point. ⁽²⁸⁾

On ~~X~~ 4 January 1945, 0830, Combat Command B resumed the attack after an artillery preparation. Task Force X on the left advanced approximately 2000 yards toward Odéigne. One element of Task Force X traversed difficult terrain and

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MND735017

By SMARA Date 9/20/10

encountered direct fire from anti-tank guns emplaced in the vicinity of Belle Hale (P5586). Other elements pushed south through Le Grosse Hat woods and advanced along the Le Baty - Odeigne road. The attack was continued in darkness until 2100 positions being reached on the north and east edges of Odeigne. Force Y attacked from positions north of ~~XX~~ Lamormenil at 0900 and completed occupying the village at 1155. The force reorganized and attacked to seize the hill west of Lamormenil but was unsuccessful. Positions were organized for the night in vicinity of the hill at P4985. On the same day Combat Command R was attached to Combat Command B at 1400 on order of the Commanding General of the 2d Armored Division and redesignated as Task Force R. Task Force R closed in assembly area in the vicinity of Le Baty. (28)

On the 5th January 1945, visibility again poor, roads hazardous due to icing, Combat Command B delayed its attack until 1 0900. Task Force X attacked to seize the town of Odeigne. The 1st Battalion 67 Armored Regiment on the left attacked from the northeast and the 1st Battalion 41st Armored Infantry Regiment pushed from the west. The enemy fiercely resisted the two columns and the 1st Battalion 353rd Infantry, 84th Infantry Division, was ordered to assist the armored elements. Lt. Col. Norman D. Gaines, commanding the battalion of infantry, led his unit toward Odeigne from the northeast. Small arms fire was heavy though ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ the enemy did not employ artillery. The enemy clad in white snow-suits proved hard to identify. At the completion of the action it was estimated that 100 German dead and about 80 prisoners had resulted

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMID735017

By SP7ARA Date 9/20/10

From a skirmish that lasted until 2300, 5 January 1945.

Task Force Y was relieved by the newly constituted Task Force R and the latter attacked southeast along the roads west and southwest of Lamornemil with its mission the village of Dochamps and the high ground south of Lamornemil. The total gain was 1500 yards and positions were consolidated in the vicinity of P512847 at nightfall. (28) The objective at P70521-486241

The 6th of January at 0630 Combat Command B went to work again. The Commanding General of Combat Command B gave Company B, 82 Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, and Company I, 333rd Infantry Regiment the mission of attacking west to contact Task Force G of Combat Command A and to clean out the southwest portion of the ~~Batschuck~~ woods west of Lamornemil to take the Farm de Bergister (P4885) and the Farm Dite Forge (P4786). In the meantime Companies Kand L of the 3d Battalion 333rd were ordered to Lamornemil and Freynoux, respectively. ~~Company~~ The Company I experienced very little initial difficulty in the woods and moved at a good rate to the Farm de Bergister arriving there at 1130 that same day. Contact was made with Task Force G as had been planned.

Task Force R moved toward Dochamps on the road Freynoux-Dochamps but because of difficulty involved in moving road-bound tanks in this sector made very small gains. Thelme Farm de Bergister, Havissard (P4885) was organized for the night. The 2d Battalion 333rd Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion, 41 Armored Infantry, in Task Force X. Read conditions of the worst kind had held the armored progress to small, hard won gains. (12)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMD735017

By SNARA Date 9/20/10

Task Force X of Combat Command B, supported by the 3d Battalion, 533d Infantry launched its assault at 0830 7 January in an effort to cut the Vielsalm - Laroche road. The 3d Battalion jumped off from an L shaped line extending from P549853 around to P559351 and then back to P558859, Company E on the right, Company F on the left and Company G in reserve. The objective at 570851-559841 was attained at 0910 by Company E and at 0930 by Company F. Little resistance was met and by 1100 they had taken 2 officers and 19 ~~men~~ ^{men} ~~prisoners~~, prisoners. At 1000, this same day, the 1st Battalion, 333rd Infantry was attached to Task Force Hogan of the 3d Armored Division and given the mission of guarding the vital road junction at 566853 on the Laroche-Vielsalm road. The battalion closed and relieved the 1st Battalion 330th Infantry, 83rd Infantry Division, at 0800, 8 January 1945. Task Force R of Combat Command B turned over its sector south of Lamorenail to the Reconnaissance company of the 67 Armored Regiment and 3d Battalion 333rd Infantry having been unable to move to Dochamps. Task Force Y drove southeast from positions south of Odeigne, having the mission of cutting the Vielsalm - Laroche road from 544828 to 560841. Troops of the 3d Battalion 41 Armored Infantry Regiment advanced through the west portion of the Bois du Pays by the armor of 67 Armored Regiment found the woods impassable. The task force halted for the night and organized positions north of the Vielsalm Laroche road in the vicinity of P558839. (28)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MM0735017

By SNARA Date 9/20/10

The next day, 8 January 1945, Task Force X remained in position in the vicinity of Bois Du Fays, improved its road-blocks on the Vielsalm-Laroche road. Task Force ~~Z~~ began its movement down the Vielsalm - Laroche road and advanced to the vicinity of ~~550333~~ 553837 where it remained for the night. (28)

The next two days were spent en attemptan to move Task Forces X and R down the Vielsalm - Laroche road to take ~~KKSannee~~. The going was slow through the thickly wooded areas and the first day 9 January 1945 showed little progress. However on 10 January 1945, the pressure relieved by Task Forces A and B of Combat Command A, Combat Command B was able to roll into the town. The 3d Battalion 353rd Infantry had been doing its part to facilitate the drive. Assigned the difficult mission of clearing the great woods bounded on the west by Dochamps, on the north by Freyneux and on the east by Odeligne they commenced their task on 7 January 1945, and were unable to reach the southern extreme along the Laroche road until 1 0 January 1945. They had moved slowly over rocky terrain in the dense woods hindered by deep snow and poor visibility. The enemy fought a fine delaying action until he was forced to retreat across the Laroche road, on 10 January 1945, when this occurred (28) elements of the 2d Armored Division were ~~kitting~~ on the road, headed for Sannee, trapped them with machine gun fire from their tanks

~~XXXXXXXX~~

84th AND 2nd ARMORED CONVERGENCE
10-16
~~84th~~ January 1945)

When the Laroche-Vielsalm road was cleared, on the 10 January 1945, by the 84th Infantry Division and the 2d Armored Division a phase was completed. The two divisions began regrouping their forces for an attack which would clear the natural triangle formed with the Laroche-Vielsalm road as its base, the Manhay road its right side, the Ourthe river its left, its point Houffalize .

The 2d Armored Division, with the 333rd Infantry attached, had the mission of obtaining a bridgehead over the Ourthe river at Houffalize. Task Force Y was to spearhead the attack down the Houffalize road. (28)

The 84th Infantry Division (-) from positions along the Laroche road was to attack on January 13 and ~~to clear the area northeast of the Ourthe River in the division zone, capturing Berlesmenil (P5277), Madrin (P5375), and Filly (P5473). The 4th Cavalry Group was assigned the right portion of the division zone. The 355th was to seize Berlesmenil and when pinched out by the 4th Cavalry Group to assemble in division reserve in the vicinity of Samree. The 334th Infantry to seize Madrin and Filly and maintain contact with the 2d Armored on the left.~~ (29)

On the 11th of January a certain amount of regrouping was essential to line units up for their new tasks. In the 2d Armored Division Combat Command B set up Task Force X under Colonel Paul A. Disney and Task Force Y under Colonel Timothy

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMDT 735017

By SNARA Date 9/20/10

~~Enemy~~ A Pedley Jr., commander of the 333rd Infantry. Within the 84th Infantry Division the 1st Battalion 334th Infantry was moved by motor from Clelle to Samree to place it for an attack on a strong point just south of Samree. The ~~1st~~ ^{1st} ~~3d~~ ^{3d} Battalions, 335th Infantry, resting in Barvaux (P4096) were alerted for action. (28)

An enemy strong point in the vicinity of P5180 was a potential rupturing factor as far as the Infantry Division's plans were concerned. It consisted of Infantry in a wooded area, surrounded by trip-wires, booby-traps, mines, backed up by three tanks. Company C, of the 1st Battalion ~~3d~~ 334th Infantry, followed by Company B, was dispatched from Samree early on the morning of 11 January to deal with the enemy. All during the day Company C fought desperately for possession of the strongpoint but the number of obstacles and the dominating terrain, stubbornly defended made reduction of the position impossible. The skirmish was carried through the 13th of January and it was not until the 13th January after the enemy had withdrawn during the night before that Company C was able to clear the area of mines etc. (25)

On the 13th of January at 0830 Task Force Y of Combat Command B spearheaded the attack of the 2d Armored Division down the Houfalize road. The 2nd Battalion, 333rd Infantry was employed through the woods Au Laid Bois. Confusion resulted when artillery preparations called down on enemy strong -points in the vicinity of P576831 landed on troops of the 2d Battalion. At 1130 that same day the advance was halted because of high casualties and disorganization.

At 1500, 13 January 1945 the attack was resumed against ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~village~~ An Laid Boie. Companies G and F leading the attack made little progress initially. But when tanks were able to assist them Company G entered Les Tailles (P5882) and Company F went into Collas (P5781). By 2100 that day the two villages were completely in the hands of Task Force Y. That same day Task Force X of Combat Command B was employed against Petite Tailles (P5983). Two companies of enemy infantry were ~~employed~~ ^{employed} ~~to defend~~ ^{to defend} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~village~~ ^{village}. The attack from the direction of Les Fonds (5782) was made frontally at 1040. At 1400 Company I 67 Armored Regiment and a squad of Company B 17 Armored Engineer Battalion maneuvered east in the 8d Armored Division zone, turned west and assaulted Petite Tailles from the east. The maneuver was successful and enabled the 1st Battalion 336rd Infantry to enter the town from the west. The two elements met in the village and mopping up began. 28

~~The~~ ^{The} ~~tenacious~~ ^{tenacious} ~~rear~~ ^{rear} ~~guard~~ ^{guard} ~~action~~ ^{action} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~enemy~~ ^{enemy} ~~continued~~ ^{continued} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~though~~ ^{though} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~units~~ ^{units} ~~made~~ ^{made} ~~progress~~ ^{progress} ~~toward~~ ^{toward} ~~their~~ ^{their} ~~goal~~ ^{goal} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~Houffalize~~ ^{Houffalize} ~~it~~ ^{it} ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~not~~ ^{not} ~~until~~ ^{until} ~~13~~ ¹³ ~~January~~ ^{January} ~~1945~~ ¹⁹⁴⁵ ~~when~~ ^{when} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~84th~~ ^{84th} ~~Infantry~~ ^{Infantry} ~~Division~~ ^{Division} ~~launched~~ ^{launched} ~~its~~ ^{its} ~~attack~~ ^{attack} ~~on~~ ^{on} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~right~~ ^{right} ~~side~~ ^{side} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~road~~ ^{road} ~~that~~ ^{that} ~~resistance~~ ^{resistance} ~~began~~ ^{began} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~appear~~ ^{appear} ~~less~~ ^{less} ~~determined.~~ ^{determined.} ~~Two~~ ^{Two} ~~units~~ ^{units} ~~of~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~Infantry~~ ^{Infantry} ~~Division~~ ^{Division} ~~initiated~~ ^{initiated} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~attack.~~ ^{attack.} ~~The~~ ^{The} ~~1st~~ ^{1st} ~~Battalion~~ ^{Battalion} ~~334th~~ ^{334th} ~~Infantry~~ ^{Infantry} ~~from~~ ^{from} ~~positions~~ ^{positions} ~~near~~ ^{near} ~~Samree~~ ^{Samree} ~~was~~ ^{was} ~~given~~ ^{given} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~main~~ ^{main} ~~effort~~ ^{effort} ~~mission~~ ^{mission} ~~carrying~~ ^{carrying} ~~it~~ ^{it} ~~down~~ ^{down} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~road~~ ^{road} ~~toward~~ ^{toward} ~~Hedrin.~~ ^{Hedrin.} ~~Companies~~ ^{Companies} ~~A,~~ ^{A,} ~~B,~~ ^{B,} ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~D~~ ^D

The Lt. moved forward through the lines and spotted a couple of German, or at least appeared to be a couple of Germans. He ordered his men to wait while he made further investigation. The men waited and when the Lt. failed to return reported the incident to the Battalion command post. Major Kolb decided to take a look. With a small group the Major ~~XX~~ retraced the Lt's steps. Suddenly to his front (south) he ~~XX~~ observed a German command car pull up to the base of the hill and halt. Two men stepped out and began making their way up the hillside. Major Kolb and his men moved to one side of the trail and awaited their approach. When the pair moved within a short distance of the group the small band leveled their weapons and four arms moved sky-ward.

When the captive was returned to the battalion command post it was discovered that he was a captain, commanding the 1st Battalion of the 60th Regiment, 116th Panzer-Grenadier Division. Unaware that his ~~Main~~ Line of Resistance had had been penetrated to a depth of 1000 yards the German Commander was out on a tour of inspection. Shortly after the capture of the battalion commander, a German half-track pulled up at the base of the hill, a German half-track and then ~~milled~~ moved away. The men of the ~~XI~~ 1st Battalion held their fire not chancing disclosing their position. Upon talking to the German captain, Major Kolb learned that the officer had disposed about 80 ~~of~~ men of his unit around the hill. Precautions were taken during the night to see that the German officer did not escape. 25

1 Dec 17 - 16 San 45

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ND 735017
By SNARA Date 9/20/10

While the 1st Battalion 334th Infantry was engaged in capturing its intermediate objectives the 2d Battalion 335th Infantry was launching an attack against a village objective. Berismonil was the object of the 2nd Battalion's operation. Since the 1st Battalion 334th was making the main effort in the sector the 2nd Battalion was denied the use of a road to its objective. The 2nd Battalion decided to use the draw running from Samree to Berismonil as its route of approach, the battalion planned to tie in on the road Laroche-Berismonil just short of the objective and move in from the west. They were warned that the road was suspected of being heavily mined. At 0830 on the 13th the unit began making ~~its~~ ^{route} slow painful progress over the difficult terrain. As must be emphasized often, the weather and the rock strewn, hilly terrain made the going tough. Engineers followed the battalion as progress attempting to construct a hasty road but ~~the~~ to no avail. By nightfall the battalion reached the northern outskirts of Berismonil attaining complete surprise. As Captain Francis K Price, S-3 of the Battalion aptly put it "Apparently the enemy didn't ~~think~~ expect anyone to use this damnable route." ~~The~~ Regimental headquarters, 335, gave the unit permission to dig in on their northern approach for the night. Since it was impossible to evacuate wounded the battalion aid station was hand carried forward and placed in one of the buildings on the outskirts of Berismonil.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AWD 735017
By SPNARA Date 9/22/10

The 3d Battalion 334th Infantry was also engaged on 13th January 1945. Its objective was Croix-du-Lala-Vevy (P5278) was taken with ease, the only difficulty which was accounted for the fact that the operation required from 1010 until 1500, was the large number of booby-traps and mines found on the road south of Smaree.

In the 2d Armored zone on this same date elements of Combat Command A advanced up to 5000 yards in the right half of the division zone through Bois De Belhez and the Bois de Wirvin. Task Force A advanced about 1/2 miles north of Wirvin (P5570). Snow and mines were the chief obstacles. The 2d Battalion 333rd Infantry attached to Task Force X moved out in attack at 0800, 13 January 1945, Company F moved into the village of Gollas (P5781) at 1000 by night fall the battalion line extended from P582802 to 590805. Visibility poor the terrain and weather were described as "worse than the enemy". Task Force Y of Combat Command B disposed with the 3d Battalion 333d Infantry on the left and the 3d Battalion 67 Armored Regiment on the right attacked from Petite Tailles. Dense woods, dug in enemy infantry, artillery and mortar fire made the attack difficult ~~xxxxxx~~ moving. The 3d Battalion 333d Infantry drove south along the Houffalize road reaching positions at P601815, about six miles north of Houffalize. At 1800 the 3d Battalion 67 Armored Regiment launched a further attack east toward Pisserotte (P6181) and at 2045 occupied the town. The 1st Battalion ~~xxxxxx~~ 333d Infantry remained in position south of Petite Tailles.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MMDP735017

By SPINARA Date 9/20/10

Task Forces of 2d Armored Division advanced from two to three miles in their attacks south to the Ourthe river on 14 January 1945. ⁽²⁸⁾

In Combat Command B the 1st Battalion 67 Armored Regiment (Task Force X) launched an early morning attack at 0415, gaining the intermediate objective the hill in vicinity of 587779 north of Willogne. Task Force X continued the attack at 0800 south through the Bois de Cedroigne, dividing itself into two elements in order to attack the twin cities of Dinez and Willogne (P5076). Company E, 2d Battalion 333d Infantry (attached to 2d Battalion 67 Armored Infantry) left the position at 583802 and made its way toward Dinez. Companies F and G, and a company of light and medium tanks went down the road from 590814 to Dinez. In General the infantry went first into the woods and cleaned them out for the tanks, while in the open the tanks went first.

By 1130 14 January, very little resistance was being met still the going was slow. At 1600, Company F attacked Dinez capturing approximately 100 PW's. Company E took Willogne during the night 14-15 January 1945 and after both positions were thoroughly mopped up the Task Force consolidated for the night. ⁽²⁸⁾

Task Force ⁽²⁸⁾, Combat Command A attacked at 0830 14 January 1945 utilizing the 1st Battalion A1 Armored Infantry Regiment and Companies I and C, 66th Armored Regiment in seizing the wooded hill at 56778 ~~xxxxxx~~ ^{xxxxxx} north of Avant Behlez in the Bois D'Achourffe. This force pressed on southeast, coordinating with Task Force B on the right in capturing Chevroumont (P5776) and the high ground to the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ND 735017
By SNARA Date 9/24/00

south overlooking Achouffe (P5774). Task Force B attacked at 0830, 14 January 1945, and advanced rapidly south to seize the town of Wibrin and push on to the high ground north of Petite-lormont (P5573). (28)

On the 14th of January 1945, in the 84th Division zone, the 1st Battalion 334 moved from its position just 1500 yards north of ~~XXXX~~ Nadrin, to capture that village. Some small arms resistance was received from the town. At 1000A, a 10 minute artillery preparation was laid into Nadrin and companies A and B moved in. The objective was completely in battalion hands at 1130. Civilians in the town pointed out the German hiding places and more than 115 were eventually evacuated through battalion ~~ent~~ cage. Prisoners stated that 400 had been present in the town and it was estimated that at least 200 made good their escape. (25)

During the night 13-14 January 1945 when the 1st Battalion 334 had moved forward on the hill overlooking Nadrin, the 2nd Battalion 335 had reached Berlesmenil, the next morning at 1000 (14 January 1945) they moved into the town capturing approximately 15 prisoners. Original orders had instructed them to hold Berlesmenil and they immediately set about outposting the town and setting up defensive positions. An order was received to take Ollomont (5375) a 334 objective. At 1400, Companies F and G moved out and occupied the town that afternoon, it was then turned over to the 334th Infantry and the 2d Battalion 335 returned to Berlesmenil to complete outposting the town. (14)

south overlooking Achouffe (P5774). Task Force B attacked at 0830, 14 January 1945, and advanced rapidly south to seize the town of Wibrin and push on to the high ground north of Petite-Mormont (P5573). (28)

On the 14th of January 1945, in the 84th Division zone, the 1st Battalion 334 moved from its position just 1500 yards north of ~~XXXX~~ Nadrin, to capture that village. Some small arms resistance was received from the town. At 1000A, a 10 minute artillery preparation was laid into Nadrin and companies A and B moved in. The objective was completely in battalion hands at 1130. Civilians in the town pointed out the German hiding places and more than 115 were eventually evacuated through battalion ~~ent~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ cage. Prisoners stated that 400 had been present in the town and it was estimated that at least 200 made good their escape. (25)

During the night 13-14 January 1945 when the 1st Battalion 334 had moved forward on the hill overlooking Nadrin, the 2nd Battalion 335 had reached Berlesmenil, the next morning at 1000 (14 January 1945) they moved into the town capturing approximately 15 prisoners. Original orders had instructed them to hold Berlesmenil and they immediately set about outposting the town and setting up defensive positions. An order was received to take Ollomont (5375) a 334 objective. At 1400, Companies F and G moved out and occupied the town that afternoon, it was then turned over to the 334th Infantry and the 2d Battalion 335 returned to Berlesmenil to complete outposting the town. (14)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AMP 735017

By SPNARA Date 9/20/10

The third unit of the 84th Infantry Division ~~to~~
go into action 14 January 1945 was the 3d Battalion
334th Infantry. From positions near Croix-du-Laid-Vevy
they had attempted an attack on Madrin on 13th January
but were unable to progress further than the forward
slope of the hill Sur les-Hales (P5276) by that evening.

On 14 January after Madrin had been secured by the
1st Battalion 334th Infantry the 3d Battalion passed through
to take Pilly. The village was entered at 1600 by
leading elements of the infantry. Once on the position
and consolidating at orders were received to proceed and
capture two more small villages to the south, Petite Normont
and Grande Normont (5573). The new objective was to
be taken by dark 14 January but when the order was received
it was much too late to hope to accomplish the mission on
time. Company I remained to hold Pilly and Companies K I and
M went into the attack against the new objectives. Meeting
little resistance the two villages were completely in
334th hands by 2230 14 January 1945

With the capture of Pilly all the division objectives
in the offensive against Houffalize were taken.

While the 84th Infantry Division had occupied
the objectives in its zone on 14 January 1945, Task forces
of the 2d Armored Division were on the verge of so doing.
On 15 January 1945 Task forces of the 2d Armored Division
reached the Ourthe River and approached within one mile of
the division's final objective -- Houffalize. The Belgian

DECLASSIFIED
Authority ND 735017
By SNARA Date 9/20/10

towns of Achouffe, Mont (P5974) and Tavernoux (P6173) were seized and advances up to 5000 yards made on the front. (28)

Task Force B of Combat Command A, in the extreme right of the division zone, attacked south at 0900, 15 January 1945, advancing toward the Ourthe river. At 1030 the task force occupied the high ground west of Achouffe, then pivoted east to assault the ~~the~~ town of Achouffe. At 1300 the village was reported clear. (28)

At 1740 the attack was once again resumed and final gains were organized in the vicinity of P5973 North of Hazy (P5972). Patrols were dispatched south to the Ourthe river. (28)

In Combat Command B Task Force X jumped off at 1030 from the vicinity of Willogne and Dinez, employing armor of the 3d Battalion 67 Armored Regiment on the west side of the Houffalize road and troops of the 1st Battalion 333rd Infantry (84th Infantry Division) farther west. The first objective was the village Mont which was secured by 1400, 15 January 1945. According to Lt. Col. Norman D Carnes, Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion 333rd Infantry "This action was outstanding ~~xxxxx~~ as an example of the close coordination of tank, artillery and infantry. Resistance was light only some scattered artillery and mortar fire." Small pockets of automatic weapons in woods adjacent to Mont neutralized by rifle fire. The advance was continuous and rapid. A considerable quantity of ammunition, supplies and vehicles were captured or destroyed and about 30 PW's taken in Mont. The attack pushed on ~~xxx~~

over improving terrain for armor. Final positions for the day were consolidated in the vicinity of P604734, one mile north of Houffalize. (31)

Task Force Y of Combat Command B, under command of Colonel Timothy Pedley Jr., (G.O. 333rd Infantry) with the 3d Battalion, 333rd Infantry moved from Aux Alwes (P60777) at 0830, 15 January 1945 and seized the ridge between Dinez and Pontenaille (P6075), and launched a second assault at 1300 which netted them the village of Pontenaille and then continued their drive towards Tavernoux (P6183). The town was under Task Force Y's control at 1640. This advance over open terrain south of the Bois de Gedgegne was again viewed with a great deal of satisfaction by another infantry commander, Lt. Col William T. Barrett, G.O. 3d Battalion 333d Infantry who described it as an example of perfect teamwork. During the day, 15 January, patrols were sent into Houffalize by Company K, 333d Infantry. The patrols took a few prisoners who reported that they had been abandoned to their fates by their superiors who had seen fit to flee the city. Tanks were unable to move into Houffalize since the bridge at 698727 had been demolished. (10)

On the 16th of January 1945 the 333d Infantry, 84th Infantry Division was relieved of attachment to 2nd Armored Division and the regiment went into a rest area in the vicinity of Palenge, Belgium (P3698). Elements of the 335th Infantry moved to Barvaux, Belgium and the 334th also joined them there. These latter two regiments having been relieved 15th January 1945. (32)

of the 3d Armored Division.

53

(34)

54-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MMPT 735017
By SCNARA Date 9/20/10

133

Short Respite

(16-20 January 1945)

The 84th Infantry Division, concentrated in the general area Palenge, Darvaux, Blier, Belgium was placed in VII Corps reserve. The division spent the time resting, reorganizing and maintaining equipment preparatory to resumption of operations. (33)

Limited Operation

(21-25 January 1945)

Orders were received which sent Field Order number five to press and alerted the division for its final offensive effort in the Ardennes sector.

On 20 January 1945, Letters of Instruction number six ordered the 333d ~~Infantry~~ and 334th Infantryes to ~~make~~ an assembly area in the vicinity of Otre (P6485) prepared to attack Bast through elements of the 83d Infantry Division and the 335th Infantry. During the 20 and 21 January 1945 the movement was made and units formed to cross the line of departure running generally north and west of Gouvy, Ourthe and Beho. (34)

Task Force Church, made up of 335th Infantry, one platoon of Company C, 309 Engineers, Company Dm 87th Chemical Battalion was created 21 January 1945. (35)

The Plan VII Corps was to seize the limited objective Beho (P7681) - Gouvy (P7177) with the 84th Infantry Division reinforced by Task Force Doan and Task Force Richardson of the 3d Armored Division. (34) - 54 -

The 333d Infantry was to attack in its zone on the left at 0815, 22 January, 1945 and seize Cierpoux (P7134) -- Rogory (P7384) and the high ground ~~(P7384)~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ at P7383 and P7483. One battalion was to remain in division reserve at Probedroux (P6885). (34)
The 334th Infantry, in the center, was to attack in its zone 22 January 0815 seize and hold high ground in the vicinity of P7390 and Beho. Maintain contact with Task Force Church on the right and 333d Infantry on the left. (34)

Task Force Church, with attached task forces of the 3d Armored Division, Doan and Richardson, to attack in its zone on the right, seize and hold ~~xxxxxx~~ Gouvy and the high ground at 7731. (34)

When passed through the 1st Battalion 335th Infantry was to revert to division reserve. Task Force Doan was to be employed on the right only defensively. (34)

Task Force Church attacked at 0815 22 January, objective Gouvy, the 3d Battalion 335th Infantry leading with the 3d Battalion following. Adverse weather conditions and good enemy observation from commanding terrain delayed the advance initially. Strong points, heavy artillery and mortar fire constituted the obstacles. However by 1200 22 January 1945 Gouvy was in the hands of 3d Battalion 335th Infantry. The advance was continued east of Gouvy but resistance offered by the Germans ~~km~~ from their new defensive positions west of ~~xxxxxx~~ held the battalion gains to almost nil. (36)

The 3d Battalion 335th prepared to relieve the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MMDT35017
By SNARA Date 9/20/10

situation after the capture of Gouvy by moving through the town and the line held by the 2d Battalion 355th. The 3d Battalion reached Gouvy at 1415, 22 January 1945 but was unable to make ~~for~~ gains further to the East than those accomplished by 2d Battalion 355th Infantry. Task Force Richardson had supported the advance of the 2d Battalion by fire. Task Force Doan was relieved from its position on the division right flank by the 4th Cavalry Group at 1115 22 January 1945. (36)

The ~~strong~~ The 333d Infantry attacked with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast at 0815, 22 January 1945. The 1st Battalion 333d Infantry advanced along the Division North boundary through deep ~~new~~ snow and captured the high ground overlooking Beho from the east at P7591, their furthest penetration. The 2d Battalion 333d Infantry advanced to a position on line with the 1st Battalion. Little resistance was met. (36)

In the 334th Infantry the main effort of the attack on Beho was given to the 2d Battalion. The 3d Battalion was on the 2d's left and the 1st was to follow the 2d into the village. The plan called for the 2d Battalion to move in a column of companies. However the sector was so wide that two platoons of Company F joined Company E in the lead. When the column reached a point just short of the village the two platoons dropped back in column and Company E moved into the town meeting very little resistance.

During the night 22-23 January 1945 the 334th Infantry issued orders ~~forwards~~ instructing the 2d Battalion that the high ground east of Beho and the village of Andrange (P7781). (26)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MMDT355017
By SNARA Date 9/20/10

At 0600, 25 January 1945, Company E was to make another attack against the high ground to the east, and on the the village Andrange. Company G on the right was to move to the southeast and tek the high ground in the western portion of the 1st Hecken-Berg Forest. 20

The attack was launched on schedule. Company G met little opposition during its advance to the high ground in the forest. Company E had a similar experience until they moved into the first two houses of the village Andrange. The enemy was discovered to be dug in on the reverse slope of the hill. It had been anticipated that approximately one company of Germans would be encountered in the village. When the first elements of Company E gained the two houses and surveyed the scene before them they realized they were up against an estimated four companies reinforced with two tanks. The Germans began a counterattack. The two tanks began to pour fire into the buildings but the walls were thick and it had little effect. However the ~~enemy~~ enemy, superior in number, began to close in under cover of the tank fire. The enemy came within such close proximity that their own supporting artillery fire began to fall on Company E. The forward observer from the 326 Field Artillery Battalion, believing capture imminent destroyed his radio, the only communication with Battalion headquarters at the time. The situation began to look hopeless. However it was obvious to those in the battalion command-post that Company E was in trouble. The reserve Company, F, was committed on the left flank where they could

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND735017
By: SP MARA Date: 9/20/10

support Company E by fire. The maneuver was effective and the Germans were forced to withdraw and the gains made by Company E were consolidated. (26)

On this same day, 25 January 1945, Task Force Church attacked and secured Ourthe with little or no opposition. (37)

The ~~XXXXXX~~ 84th Infantry Division had completed its mission in Belgium.

German fire was much greater to the infantry in this situation than they would have been against them. The third one-fifth of the artillery would have fired on them and they would have fired ordinarily.

I'd not like to say that tanks should not be used in modern warfare. They have their place just as any other weapon. However I have an attached tank battalion and I haven't seen it at all and don't believe it's ordered to go --- in all this snow and these hills.

Infantry might want to know that they are with tanks, not with the communication system. They would become body-guarded for tanks and when the tanks come along they they button up and the tank infantry looks for a job --- when the tanks proceed as one regiment that the Infantry would be going up.

During the past week there was some discussion as to when the company is not done to guard the line while tanks go past, during the night, to be arrived and then cover for a further situation, perhaps some time to go. The Infantry now may have all night protecting the line

17-16 Jan 45

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND735017
By SP7ARA Date 9/20/10

In summing up the operation in the Ardennes sector Brigadier-General Alexander R. Bolling made the following comments on the tank infantry operation.

" I dont think we got the best possible results in the employment of infantry with tanks in this set-up. If anything, tanks held up the infantry. We were on our objectives as a division 24 hours before the Infantry-Tank teams were.

Casualties were much greater to the infantry in this situation than they would have been without them. We fired one-fifth of the artillery ammunition that we would have fired ordinarily.

I'M not the one to say that tanks should not be used in modern warfare. They have their place just as any other weapon. However I have an attached tank battalion and I havent used it at all, and wont unless I'm ordered to do --- in all this snow and these hills.

Infantry supply wont work when they are with tanks, nor will the communication system. They merely become body-guards for tanks and when the tanks come under fire they button up and the ~~fix~~ infantry looks for a hole---- then the tanks proceed on and report that the infantry isn't keeping up.

During the fight with tanks --- once the position is taken the doughboy is left there to guard the line while tanks go back, during the night, to be serviced and their crews get a little relaxation, perhaps something to eat. The infantry man stays awake all night protecting the line

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND735017
By SP MARA Date 9/20/10

he has taken.

If they are going to use infantry with tanks in a situation where they want a whole regiment of infantry, they should take some of these seperate infantry regiments that are around and give them training with the tanks. Instead of taking regiments from a division ~~xxxxxxx~~ which hasn't had this training ----due to a shortage of tanks in the states----and fight them with tanks under strange commanders, with different systems until they are all chewed up and then hand them back to make another attack with us.

The thing that impressed me most about the offensive was the will ~~xxxxxxxx~~ of the doughboy to go forward under the most adverse conditions imaginable in battle. They were up against the weather, terrain and the difficulty of supply. I marvel frankly at what those men can take. " (11)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: MMDP735017
By: SP7 MKA Date: 9/20/10

NOTES -- DRAFTING THE BUZZ

1. See "The Defense of Marche"
2. G-3 Periodic Report, 84th Infantry Division,
2 January 1945
3. Told
4. Told, 3 January 1945
5. G-2 Periodic Report, 84th Infantry Division, 1-5
January 1945
6. Field Order Number 1, Headquarters 84th Infantry
Division, 2 January 1945
7. Letter of Instructions ---- 5 January 1945,
Headquarters 84th Infantry Division .
8. G-2 Periodic Report, 84th Infantry Division,
2 January 1945.
9. 1st Leonard R. Carpenter, Commanding Officer,
K Company, 335th Infantry Regiment, 84th Infantry
Division to T/S Theodore Draper, Historian,
84th Infantry Division. 10 January 1945
10. Major Paul Lanou, Executive Officer, 3d Battalion
333d Infantry Regiment, 84th Infantry Division
to Capt. John J. O'Grady 20 January 1945.
Palenge, Belgium.
11. Brigadier-General Alexander R. Bolling, Commanding
General, 84th Infantry Division, to Capt. John J.
O'Grady - 24 January 1945, Otre, Belgium.
12. Told, Field Order Number 1.
13. After Action Report, 2d Armored Division --
January 1945.
14. Capt. Francis K. Price, Executive Officer, 2nd
Battalion, 335th Infantry Regiment, 84th Infantry
Division, to Capt. John J. O'Grady --28 January
1945, Thoris, Belgium.
15. G-3 Periodic Report, 84th Infantry Division,
3 January 1945.
16. After Action Report 335th Infantry Regiment,
84th Infantry Division.
17. Told
18. ~~Col. Colonel Thomas D. Gammill, 1st Division
Headquarters, 84th Infantry Division~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MMR735017
By SP4 MRA Date 9/20/10

Notes

18. Told
19. Told
20. G-5 Periodic Report, 84th Infantry Division,
4 January 1945
21. After Action Report, 335th Infantry, 84th Infantry
Division, January 1945
22. Told
23. 1st Lt. Goss, Historian, 335th Infantry, 84th
Infantry Division. 28, January 1945, to
1st Lt. Robert McHaffie, Historical Officer
84th Infantry Division
24. Pfc. David Bassert, Aid man Company K, 335th
Infantry Regiment, 84th Infantry Division, to
r/s Theodore Dreper, Historical Section 84th
Infantry Division -- 10 January 1945
25. Major Travers J. Hiller, Executive Officer,
1st Battalion 334th Infantry, to Capt. John
J. O'Grady, 30 January 1945, Barvaux, Belgium
26. Major James V. Johnston, Executive Officer,
2d Battalion 334th Infantry, 84th Infantry
Division, to Capt. John J. O'Grady, 19 January 1945
Barvaux, Belgium
27. G-3 Periodic Report, 84th Infantry Division,
7 January 1945
28. After Action Report, 2d Armored Division, January 1945
29. Field Order Number 4, Headquarters 84th Infantry
Division, 11, January 1945, Barvaux, Belgium
30. Journal, 3d Battalion 334th Infantry, 13 January 1945.
31. Lt. Colonel. Norman D. Garnes, 1st Battalion,
333d Infantry Regiment, 84th Infantry Division,
to r/s Theodore Dreper, Historical Section 84th
Infantry Division. 19 January 1945
32. G-5 Periodic Report, 84th Infantry Division,
17 January 1945,
33. Told,

34. Field Order Number 5, Headquarters 84th Infantry Division, Biler, Belgium. 30 January 1945
35. Letter of Instructions, Headquarters I 84th Infantry Division, dated 30 January 1945
36. Periodic Report 335th Infantry Regiment, 28 January 1945
37. G-3 Periodic Report, Headquarters 84th Infantry Division, 24 January 1945
-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AMP 135017
NARA Date 4/24/10
BY 5

Map of Forest & Field
Scale 1:1000
Sheet - 45-174
512-512

84



IV XVII




339
338




333
334

15
84



334



34
40

IV
XVII

RESEARCH
ANONYMUS
ANONYMUS
ANONYMUS


Map of Camp & Outpost
June 1880
Scale - 1/2" = 100'
8/12/2-1882



309

90
+
90

82
+
22




3 335

333
AT WARREN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NND 735017
By: SP-8 SARA Date: 09/20/00

MAP OF FRANCE AND BELGIUM
Scale 1/50,000 - Sheets 79-80-105-106
23 Dec 1944 - MARCHE BELGIUM

ORIGIN I



84th INFANTRY DIVISION
 MAP OF FRANCE & BELGIUM
 SCALE 1/50,000
 SHEETS - 79-80-91-92-106
 3- JAN 1945

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY: 6880
 DATE: 01/15/2013