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HEADQUARTERS 7TH ARMORED DIVISION  
APO 257 U. S. ARMY

SUBJECT: After Action Report, 7th Armored Division,  
Period 1-30 September, 1944.

TO : Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. (Thru  
Channels).

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO:  
**CANCELLED**  
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
*Fred Meyer*  
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE *Col W. W. 90/1/46*

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SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

The 7th Armored Division, after landing in France 10-14 August, spearheaded the attack of the XX Corps, Third United States Army, across France; covering over 600 miles in pursuit of the enemy in 21 days. It fought major engagements at CHARTRES and NSLUN, CHATEAU-THIERRY was taken, and REIMS encircled. On the 31st day of August a crossing was secured across the MEUSE RIVER, and VERDUN was entered without serious opposition. The beginning of September found the Division consolidating its MEUSE bridgehead. Unfortunately a critical gasoline shortage forced the Division to halt its activities and gave the retreating enemy a chance to reorganize and to prepare his defenses. In spite of the lack of gasoline, a diversionary effort was made northward in the direction of SEDAN during the opening days of the month. On 5 September, when gasoline was again made available to the Division, strong reconnaissance forces were sent speeding eastward over four routes. On 6 September the reconnaissance units reached the MOSELLE RIVER north of METZ and contacted the enemy in the vicinity of GRAVELOTTE. Here they met fierce enemy resistance in the form of artillery and anti-tank gun fire. The Combat Commands of the Division were committed to accomplish the task assigned by the XX Corps--the crossing of the MOSELLE RIVER. The terrain was unfavorable to tanks and bad weather prevailed. Meeting determined enemy resistance, especially from picked troops of a German Officer Candidate School at METZ, little progress was made against the defense of that city. After an unsuccessful attempt to establish a bridgehead across the MOSELLE RIVER, north of METZ, and failing to break through the outer perimeter defenses of the city, in conjunction with the 5th Infantry Division, a bridgehead was forced across the river to the south and east of that city. Operating with the 5th Infantry Division, the 7th Armored

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Division fought to extend the MOSELLE bridgehead in a costly inch-by-inch movement that carried it to the SEILLE RIVER. On 24-25 September, the 7th Armored Division was relieved by the 5th Infantry Division and assembled in the vicinity of SPONVILLE, preparatory to a long march to Belgium and Holland. The command passed from the XI Corps, Third United States Army, to the XIX Corps, First United States Army. The month closed with the Division in the vicinity of ST ANTHONIS, Holland, opening a new attack to clear hostile resistance from the territory west of the MEUSE RIVER and the PEEL SWAMP.

THE POINT AT VERDUN

September opened with the Division extending its MEUSE bridgehead, and directing a diversive action north along the east and west banks of the MEUSE RIVER toward SEDAN. C. C. "R", commanded by Lt. Col. JAMES W NEWBERRY, and composed of the 17th Tank Battalion, 38th Armored Infantry Battalion, 440th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion, (-), G/33rd Armored Engineer Battalion, and C/77th Medical Battalion Armored, had extended the bridgehead to just east of STAIN and was in an assembly area approximately seven miles northeast of VERDUN. C. C. "A", commanded by Colonel Dwight A ROSEBAUM, was in the vicinity of TILLY, after establishing a bridgehead there, and at MONTAIRCHE, and on the 2nd moved into an assembly area at BRAB, just north of VERDUN. At this time C. C. "K" was composed of the 40th Tank Battalion, 46th Armored Infantry Battalion, 480th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, A/814th T. D. Battalion, and A/33rd Armored Engineer Battalion. C. C. "E" under the command of Brig. Gen. JOHN B. THOMPSON, moved east across the AISE RIVER in the vicinity of APRMONT on the edge of the Argonne Forest, and assembled northwest of VERDUN on the west side of the MEUSE RIVER. The units

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which composed the Combat Command at that time were the 31st Tank Battalion, 23rd Armored Infantry Battalion, 434th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, B/33rd Armored Engineer Battalion, B/814th T. D. Battalion, and A/87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized.

On the night of September 1st, VERDUN was bombed by enemy planes and a few casualties were caused among some units of the Division. It was thought that the bridges within the city were the targets. Although the bridges remained intact, considerable damage was inflicted on the commercial district of the city. VERDUN had been a rather important enemy supply center. The material in the twelve warehouses and other installations which were captured included \$5,000,000 in fur coats and jackets, a large German bakery, well equipped and with a supply of 300 tons of white flour, an arsenal of approximately ten buildings containing many horse-drawn artillery pieces, several thousand pairs of sun-goggles, several million rounds of small arms ammunition, and a completely equipped tool shop. A high honor was accorded the Division here when the grateful liberated city presented the Division with The Medal of Verdun, the first presentation since 1916.

Upon order from Corps, Task Forces were sent out from C. C. "B" to proceed north along the west bank of the river and from C.C. "R" to move up the east bank on 2 September, An a feint to make the enemy believe that Corps had again changed its direction of attack. Due to an acute shortage of gasoline, all available gas tanks were drained in order to enable the C. C. "B" Task Force, consisting of two companies of tanks, one company of Infantry and one battery of Field Artillery to proceed on its mission. It reached a point one mile north of MONTFAUCON. The Task Force from C. C. "R", commanded by Lt. Col. KEELER and consisting of one company of the 18th A.I.Bn, one company of the 17th Tank Bn, two companies of the

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33rd Armored Engineer Bn, and two companies of the 814th T. D. Bn, met strong enemy resistance, and, unable to deploy due to lack of fuel, went into a strong assembly position about 2½ miles south of STENAY. At 031435 September these Task Forces were ordered to cease operations and return to their assembly areas. The return was delayed by lack of gasoline, but by 4 September enough gasoline had been collected to enable them to return. During the period from the 2nd to the 5th, all other units were confined to their assembly areas because of the fuel shortage.

THE METZ CAMPAIGN

On 4 September, the XI Corps plan for operations to the east was presented and the part that the 7th Armored Division was to play explained to the Unit Commanders. The 7th Armored was to advance in multiple columns to seize crossings over the MOSELLE RIVER and push on to cross the SAAR RIVER, leaving elements behind to guard the MOSELLE Crossing until relieved by the 5th and 90th Infantry Divisions. In case the 7th Armored was held up, the 5th and 90th Divisions were to pass through its lines and push on to the objective.

The 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, was augmented by the 38th A. I. Bn., (-1), Co's "A" and "C" of the 17th Tank Bn., Co "C" 33rd Armored Engineer Bn, Co "C" 814th T. D. Bn., and the 206th Engineer Bn. to form a Combat Reconnaissance Force to be sent out in four columns as soon as gasoline was available, to establish a bridgehead on the MOSELLE RIVER. The Force was divided into four Task Forces commanded by MAJOR WELLS, 1ST LT STEWART, LT. COL. BOYLAN, and LT. COL. KESLER, respectively. The troops were divided as follows:

FORCE "A"  
WELLS, Comdg.  
A/87  
4 Plt. E/87  
B (-) 17

FORCE "B"  
STEWART, Comdg.  
B/87  
3 Plt. E/87  
1 Plt. F/87  
1 Plt. B/87  
2 Plt. C/33

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FORCE "C"  
 BOYLAN, Comdg.  
 D/87  
 1 Plt. E/87  
 87 (-)  
 A/17  
 C/38  
 C(-) 814  
 274 (-)  
 C (-) 33  
 IPW

FORCE "D"  
 KEELER, Comdg.  
 C/87  
 2 Plt. E/87  
 38 (-)  
 A/274  
 F(-) 87  
 3 Plt. C/814  
 3 Plt. C/33

The four Task Forces moved out at ~~7/6/39~~ September. Task Force WELLS on the southern flank proceeded through VIGNEUILLES, CHAMBEY, and GORZE, meeting little enemy resistance, chiefly small arms, until within ten miles of the MOSELLE RIVER, where it met heavy artillery fire. A patrol did succeed in reaching the river, but found no suitable site for the crossing and was forced to withdraw under constant artillery fire. Task Force STEWART followed a route through MARS-IA-TOUR, VIGNVILLE, REZONVILLE, to GRAVELOTTE. Heavy anti-tank and mortar fire was met at REZONVILLE and after unsuccessful attempts to by-pass GRAVELOTTE to the south and east, the force returned to VIGNVILLE. Task Force KEELER moving east along a line north of the main effort, and encountering resistance one mile west of BRIEY, swung south and met more enemy fire southwest of VERNEVILLE. Task Force BOYLAN proceeded through STAIN, CONFLANS and DONGCOURT to the vicinity of VERNEVILLE where they pushed forward in force in the face of enemy artillery fire and by-passed that town, moving to a position north of GRAVELOTTE.

The probing fingers of the Divisions' reconnaissance having encountered the enemy along the Division front, it was found necessary to commit the Combat Commands at ~~7/6/39~~ September. C. C. "A" and C. C. "B" moved out with C. C. "R" following C. C. "B". C. C. "A" was divided into two columns. The northern one commanded by Lt. Col. CHAPPUIS was composed of the 48th Armored Infantry Bn, (-"A", "B"), B/40th Tank Bn, 695th Armored Field Artillery Bn, 2nd Platoon of A/814 T. D. Bn.

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and 2nd Platoon, A/33 Engineer Bn. proceeded along the route to BIEY, turning south to cross the ORNE RIVER at HATRIZE. Continuing north it engaged the enemy in the vicinity of MALANGJURT at ~~077670~~ and by ~~077645~~ had advanced to MONTEBLANCE on the MOSELLE RIVER., where it received continuous enemy artillery fire. In the meantime, the southern column, Lt. Col. EDWARD MCCONNELL commanding, consisting of the 40th Tank Bn. (- "B" & "C"), A/45 Armored Infantry Bn, 48th Armored Field Artillery Bn, 3rd Platoon A/814th T. D. Bn., and 1st Platoon A/33 Armored Engineer Bn., moved east from COMPIEGNE towards ST MARIE and met strong resistance at ST PRIVAT, but continued on to join the other Force in the vicinity of HOUCONCOURT. Accompanying the south column and following it was a Task Force under Major BROWN, made up of C & D/40th Tank Bn., B/48th A. I. Bn., A/814th T. D. Bn. (-2, 3 Plats), A/33rd Armored Engineer Bn (-1, 2 Plats), Hq C. C. "A", and Trains. C. C. "A" Headquarters was moved forward at ~~0771130~~ September. The Commanding General, 7th Armored Division, Major General Lindsey McDonald Silvester, visited the Combat Command at 1800 and ordered C. C. "A" to hold its position, and stated that bridge-in equipment would be sent forward. This equipment, however, was not available and from the 8th to the 15th of September when it was relieved by elements of the 90th Division, C. C. "A" 's position remained essentially unchanged: with Task Force MCCONNELL in the vicinity of TALANGE, Task Force CHAPPUIS north of HOUCONCOURT, Task Force BROWN in the vicinity of SYLVANGE, and C. C. "A" Headquarters about 2000 yards northwest of PIERREVILLERS.

In the meantime, Brig. Gen. JOHN B. THOMPSON, Commanding General of C. C. "B", divided his Command into two Forces and proceeded in two columns. Force 1 (north column) under command of Lt. Col. ALLISON consisted of 23rd A. I. Bn., (-B), 434th A. F. A. Bn., (-C), B/33rd Armored Engineer Bn., (-one platoon),

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A/31st Tank Bn, and 2nd Platoon B/814th T. D. Bn. Force 2 (south column) commanded by Lt. Col. ROBERT C ERLENDUSCH, consisted of 31st Tank Bn(-A & D), B/23 A. I. Bn, C/434 A. F. A. Bn., 1st Platoon, B/33rd Armored Engineer Battalion, and 3rd Platoon, B/814th T.D. Bn. The north column met no resistance until it reached GRAVELOTTE where it joined Task Force WELLS and Task Force STEWART of the Combat Reconnaissance Force, attempting to by-pass GRAVELOTTE to the south. The south column of C. C. "B" contacted the enemy at GORZE and attempting to by-pass GORZE to the south encountered mine fields, booby traps, and heavy artillery fire. C. C. "B" was ordered to support C.C. "D" and moved up to close on C. C. "D" at 061810 September, closing into bivouac area at SUZEMONT. On 7 September C. C. "B" moved out of bivouac and at 1400 deployed to attack, meeting opposition from entrenched positions in thickly wooded hillsides in the form of artillery, mortar, bazooka and machine gun and small arms fire. At 171705 orders were received by C.C. "B" to halt in place and hold until passed through by elements of the 5th Infantry Division, then to withdraw to an assembly area as Corps Reserve.

Elements of Force 1, C.C. "B", had succeeded in reaching the MOSELLE RIVER in the vicinity of DORNOT at 070400 September after a cross-country march. During 7 September this Force cleared the town of enemy resistance in spite of effective enemy artillery fire from concealed fortified positions on high ground immediately across the river. As neither the terrain nor the situation was at all favorable to armor, this task fell to the 23rd Armored Infantry Battalion which held the position until 080000 when orders were received that all operations in that sector would be carried on under the command of the 5th Infantry Division. The 23rd Armored Infantry Bn., reinforced by two battalions from the 5th Infantry Division forced a bridgehead across the river in the vicinity of DORNOT on 8 September in the face of heavy artillery and mortar fire from steel

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and concrete fortifications and concealed earth-works. This bridgehead was maintained at high cost in the face of overwhelming odds, until the night of 10-11 September when the survivors were withdrawn across the river to a point in the woods west of DORNOT.

Orders were received that C. C. "B" would be attached to the 5th Infantry Division and that Regimental Combat Team #2 of the 5th Infantry Division was attached to the 7th Armored Division. Plans were made to crack the outer bastions of the METZ stronghold and a task force from C. C. "A" led by Lt. Col. MCCONNELL, consisting of G/40, A/40, 489th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and one Platoon, A/814th T. D.Bn., was to attack south from ST PRIVAT while the Regimental Combat Team attacked south of ST PRIVAT with its three battalions. After an intense artillery preparation, the attack jumped off at ~~1913~~ September and Task Force MCCONNELL met strong resistance south of ST PRIVAT including concrete pillboxes, dug-in positions and tree forts. In the attack his force lost 7 tanks, 1 M-7, and 1 M-10. The elements of the Regimental Combat Team #2 made slight progress and suffered heavy casualties in the face of fierce enemy resistance and counter-attacks. At ~~122~~ September the first battalion was relieved by the 87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, who took over the sector on the eastern edge of GRAVELOTTE. On 13 September the 2nd and 3rd Battalions with the 87th continued to attack but little progress was made.

What the Division faced was a more or less perimeter defense built around the city of METZ, a defense established on ground organized in the late 19th Century and used during the First World War. Using forts and terrain to the greatest advantage, the enemy had garrisoned key positions with infantry forces supplemented by heavy artillery support. The enemy troops used in the defense were primarily from the Military School Metz, both faculty and students, selected

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non-commissioned officers in Officer Training, many of whom had been conducting "school problems" over the terrain now being used. As all the artillery positions were pre-registered, this element was used to the utmost advantage. Besides an advantage in the knowledge of a terrain ill-adapted to the use of armor, strongly fortified positions, and well trained and fanatical troops, the weather also worked to the enemy's advantage as continued cloudy and rainy weather hampered air support to a large extent.

At 1445 September, Field Order #11, XX Corps, arrived, which ordered the Division to assemble west of the MOSELLE RIVER, upon relief by the 90th Infantry Division. The Division was to be prepared to cross the MOSELLE RIVER on Corps Order, passing through the 5th Infantry Division bridgehead, and to attack vigorously east and north to encircle the city of METZ and seize objectives to facilitate crossings of the 90th Infantry Division to the north of the city. Regimental Combat Team #2 was to revert to the 5th Infantry Division. All units of the 7th Armored Division were ordered to a new assembly area southwest of MARSELA-TOUR with the exception of C. C. "B" which was to remain east of the MOSELLE RIVER. The assembly was completed at 1530. On 12 September C. C. "B" operating under the 5th Infantry Division had crossed the MOSELLE RIVER at ARNAVILLE with the mission of outposting a line MARDIGNY-LORRY-MARIGNULLES.

At 151445, XX Corps ordered the Division to attack across the MOSELLE RIVER and C. C. "R", which was still moving to the assembly area was ordered to continue across the river and attack. C. C. "A" followed C. C. "R", leaving at 1521. The river crossing was made difficult by rain, mud, and darkness but at 1614 September, C. C. "A" on the Division's left flank had commenced the attack in the vicinity of ARNY and at 1715 was on the outskirts of MARIGNULLES which it took by 1717 with the aid of the 23rd Armored Infantry Battalion. The following

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day C. C. "A" was relieved by elements of the 5th Infantry Division and placed in Division Reserve. C. C. "B" after crossing the river, proceeded against slight opposition until it reached a wooded area about two miles west of SILLIGNY which the enemy was defending in force. Continued attacks in three forces, each composed of one company of infantry, one company of tanks, and, one company of engineers made it possible to approach to within 50 yards of the town against strong opposition. At 1915~~00~~ September, the town was entered but the forces were pinned down by the heaviest artillery fire they had yet experienced, and were unable to proceed or withdraw. A withdrawal was finally made under cover of darkness. On 20 September C. C. "B" was relieved by C. C. "A" who was to continue the attack against SILLIGNY and beyond to cross and establish a bridgehead on the SEILLE RIVER.

In the face of withering enemy artillery fire and mortar fire, little progress was made for the period, 20 September to 24 September.

C. C. "B", in the meantime, on 15 September headed south toward the town of MARDIGNY and VITTONVILLE but was relieved of those objectives by the 5th Infantry Division. The Combat Command attacked BOULIGNES on 18 September and captured that town after heavy fighting. It then proceeded on to LONGUEVILLE which it took after overcoming fierce sniper, machine gun and mortar fire. Plans were made to cross the SEILLE RIVER in an attack on CHEMINOT.

#### THE MOVE NORTH

At 2316~~00~~ September orders were received stating that the Division would be relieved by the 5th Infantry Division and would return to an assembly area in the vicinity of SPONVILLE. The Division moved back across the river under radio silence after being relieved by the 5th Infantry Division and by 25113~~00~~ September

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had closed into the assembly area, where it prepared for movement upon Corps order.

The Division cleared from the zone of the Third United States Army, XX Corps, at 262/1/ September, at which time the Army boundary was crossed, and came under the command of the First United States Army, XIX Corps. All elements of the Division with the exception of stragglers closed in the assembly area in the vicinity of EYSDEN, Belgium, at 2715/5 September, travelling over 200 miles in 24 hours. The route followed was: COMPLANS, ETAIN, LONGUYON, LONGWY, ARLON (Belgium), BASTOGNE, MARGHE, HUY, HANNUT, ST. TROND and HASSELT. Two days were spent here awaiting orders and attending to maintenance of vehicles and equipment.

The 7th Armored Division moved from its assembly area in the vicinity of EYSDEN, Belgium, to an assembly area in the vicinity of VLIJSDEN, Holland, at 30/27 September. The Division again moved to the vicinity of ST ANTHONIS to direct its attack under a new mission, assigned by the XIX Corps. This mission was to clear hostile resistance from the area west of the MEUSE RIVER and in the vicinity of PEEL SWAMP and to contact the 1st Belgian Brigade advancing from the south.

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Losses in personnel during the month of September of the 7th Armored Division (attached troops excluded) were:

Killed and died of wounds	153
Wounded	737
Missing	316
Non-battle casualties	618

In material, the losses were:

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Tanks, Medium	47
Tanks, Light	8
M-10	2
M-8	1
Vehicles of all types	84

## Enemy material reported destroyed consisted of:

Tanks, Mark IV	2
Guns, 88mm	4
Guns, 75 mm(or larger) guns	4
Vehicles of all types	15

September saw changes of commanders in both C. C. "B" and C. C. "R". Colonel DWIGHT A ROSEBAUM retained command of C. C. "A", throughout the period. On 2 September Lt. Col. ANDREW J ADAMS relieved Brig. Gen. JOHN B THOMPSON as commanding officer of C. C. "B", and was in turn followed in that capacity by Brig. Gen. JOHN M DEVINE on 11 September. The present commanding General of C. C. "B", Brig. Gen. ROBERT W HASBROUCK succeeded General DEVINE on 25 September. C. C. "R" had a number of changes in commanders during the month. On 4 September Lt. Col. JAMES W NEWBERRY was relieved by Col. GEORGE H MCLONY who was wounded in action on the 11th, which day Lt. Col. JOHN A WEMPLE assumed command and passed it on to Lt. Col. NORMAN E HART. Lt. Col. ANDREW J ADAMS assumed command on 12 September and continued in command until relieved by Col PETE T REFFNER on 15 September. Col. REFFNER was wounded on the 20th and Lt. Col. WILLIAM H. C. FULLER assumed command until Col. JOHN L RYAN, JR., the present

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commanding officer took his position on 21 September. (At the present time the Staff and Unit Commanders are as shown on APPENDIX 1).

During the period 1 September to 30 September the Division used the following amounts of supplies:

377,000 gal fuel

9,000 gal oil

802 tons of rations

950,000 gal water

## Ammunition:

Cal..30 all types-----	1,050,464
Cal..45 Ball-----	138,600
Cal..50 all types-----	110,126
37mm all types-----	1,516
57mm all types-----	60
75mm all types, G&H-----	7,624
105mm How, all types-----	31,657
60mm Mortar all types-----	1,470
81mm Mortar all types-----	2,639
76mm Gun all types-----	4,311
Rockets HE, AT-----	446
Grenades all types-----	3,206
Mines-----	1,000
2" Mortar Smoke Bombs-----	36

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## HEADQUARTERS 7TH ARMORED DIVISION

ROSTER OF STAFF AND UNIT COMMANDERS

## APPENDIX I

## AFTER ACTION REPORT

## MONTH OF SEPTEMBER

	<u>Serial No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Branch</u>
Silvester, Lindsay McDonald Commanding General	03 148	Maj. Gen.	USA
Adams, Andrew J. Chief of Staff	018 579	Colonel	GSC
Maxwell, John V. A.C. of S. G-2	0 350 099	Lt. Col.	GSC
Murray, Everett W. A.C. of S. G-2	0 335 901	Lt. Col.	GSC
Leydecker, Charles E. A.C. of S. G-3	019 227	Lt. Col.	GSC
Hodgson, Reginald H. A.C. of S. G-4	0 336 219	Lt. Col.	GSC
Carr, Francis E. Adjutant General	01 000 213	Major	AGD
Keating, Lawrence H. Division Chaplain	0 416 583	Lt. Col.	Chaplain
Schroeder, Frederic W. Chemical Warfare Officer	0 219 333	Lt. Col.	CWS
Thomson, Rex Civil Affairs Officer	0 520 286	Major	CMP
Bellamy, Jesse P. Finance Officer	0 177 755	Lt. Col.	FD

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Roster of Staff and Unit Commanders Cont'd.

	<u>Serial No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Branch</u>
McBride, Otto L. Hq. Commandant	0 316 013	Major	Cav.
Meyer, Hermann P. Inspector General	0 202 841	Lt. Col.	IGD
Oliver, John P. Judge Advocate	0 274 223	Lt. Col.	JAGD
Daniel, James P. Provost Marshal	01 011 270	Captain	GMP
McDermott, Emerson M. Signal Officer	0 356 361	Lt. Col.	SC
Bokenfield, Roy K. Special Service Officer	0 243 428	Major	INF.
Karpenski, Stephen J. Division Surgeon	0 303 731	Lt. Col.	MC
Hasbrouck, Robert W. C.G., Combat Command "B"	08 588	Brig. Gen.	USA
Rosebaum, Dwight A. CO, Combat Command "A"	012 752	Colonel	Inf.
Martin, Orville W. Div Arty Commander	012 253	Colonel	FA
Ryan, John L., Jr. Div Reserve Command	016 451	Colonel	Cav.
Evans, Richard B. Div Trains Commander	015 217	Colonel	Cav.

SECRET



SECRET

Roster of Staff and Unit Commanders Cont'd.

	<u>Serial No.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Branch</u>
✓ Wemple, John P. CO, 17th Tank Bn.	0 177 564	Lt. Col.	Inf.
✓ Erlenbusch, Robert G. CO, 31st Tank Bn.	021 230	Lt. Col.	Cav.
✓ Brown, John G. CO, 40th Tank Bn.	0 315 210	Major	Cav.
✓ Johansen, Theodore L. CO, 23rd Armd Inf Bn.	0 354 528	Major	Inf.
✓ Fuller, William H. G. CO, 38th Armd Inf Bn.	019 190	Lt. Col.	Inf.
✓ Chappuis, Richard D. CO, 48th Armd Inf. Bn.	0 312 837	Lt. Col.	Inf.
✓ Dubuisson, James G. CO, 434th Armd FA Bn	023 042	Lt. Col.	FA
✓ Hart, Norman E. CO, 440th Armd FA Bn	0 180 132	Lt. Col.	FA
✓ Milner, James W. CO, 489th Armd FA Bn	023 124	Lt. Col.	FA
Keltner, Clyde A. CO, 33rd Engr Bn	0 272 255	Lt. Col.	CE
Boland, John E. CO, 77th Med Bn Armd.	0 472 501	Lt. Col.	MC
Boylan, Vincent L. CO, 87th Cav Ren Sq Mees.	022 162	Lt. Col.	Cav.
Hughes, George E. CO, 129th Ord Maint Bn.	0 296 807	Lt. Col.	Ord.

SECRET

APPENDIX OF DOCUMENTS

G-1--PROBLEMS (Sept Summary)-  
 G-1--JOURNAL (31 Aug--30 Sept)-  
 G-1--MESSAGES (31 Aug--30 Sept)-  
 G-2--JOURNAL (1 Sept--30 Sept)-  
 G-2--NOTES (Sept Summary)-  
 G-2--MESSAGES (1 Sept--30 Sept)-  
 G-2--PERIODIC REPORTS (#20--#43)-  
 G-2--ISUM REPORTS (#32--#74)-  
 G-2--IFW REPORTS (#19--#33)-  
 G-3--BATTLE REPORTS (Record of Sept Summary)-  
 G-3--JOURNAL (1 Sept--30 Sept)-  
 G-3--MESSAGES (1 Sept--30 Sept)-  
 G-3--PERIODIC REPORTS (#17--#47)-  
 G-3--OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS-  
 G-3--FIELD ORDERS (#2, #10, -- #12)-  
 G-3--AIR OPERATIONS REPORT (1 Sept)-  
 G-4--JOURNAL--(1 Sept--30 Sept)-  
 G-4--MESSAGES--(1 Sept--30 Sept)-  
 MILITARY GOVERNMENT REPORT-

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 AFTERACTION REPORTS AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS  
 (JOURNALS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, OVERLAYS, ETC.,)  
 OF THE FOLLOWING COMPONENTS OF THE 7TH A. D.

Sent G-3 #4 +

at  
 24-1 am

Sent G-3

30 Oct 44

Armed Combat Command "A" X  
 " Combat Command "B" X  
 " Combat Command "C" X  
 7th Armored Division Trains X  
 arty 7th Armored Division Artillery X  
 23rd Armored Infantry Battalion X  
 38th Armored Infantry Battalion X  
 48th Armored Infantry Battalion X  
 Armed 17th Tank Battalion X  
 " 31st Tank Battalion X  
 " 46th Tank Battalion X  
 arty 434th Armored Field Artillery Battalion X  
 " 440th Armored Field Artillery Battalion X  
 " 489th Armored Field Artillery Battalion X  
 Engr 3rd Armored Engineer Battalion X  
 Med 77th Armored Medical Battalion X  
 Armed 27th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized X  
 Ord 129th Ordnance Maintenance Battalion X  
 Sig 147th Armored Signal Company X  
 arty 814th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Attached) X  
 X 203 AAA AW Bu X  
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## G-2 NOTES

(1 September - 30 September 1944)

L-183

With the bridge across the MEUSE River in VERDUN secured, the pertinent question to be solved as far as intelligence was concerned was whether the enemy had enough force to the immediate east of the river to launch a desultory counterattack against the then slight bridgehead, or would he mass his remaining forces at some point to the Division front to make a determined stand. The extension of the bridgehead on 1 September precluded the immediate application of the counterattack premise, and reports from various sources indicated that no determined stand would be made to the immediate Division front. Indications pointed to the next logical defense line - the MOSSELLE River to the North and South of METZ.

Task Forces were dispatched to the north on both the east and west banks of the MEUSE River to feint the movement of the XX Corps. These Task Forces met little action on 2 September; such as there was was typical of the previously encountered resistance. There was some organized resistance in the populated points to the East of the river, particularly in the vicinity of STENAY. Only patrol activity was encountered to the West of the river.

With the receipt of orders for the Division to move to the East to establish a crossing of the MOSELLE River, it was decided, in view of the lack of aggressive action on the part of the enemy to the east of the bridgehead, that multiple column combat patrols should be utilized in an attempt to reach the river line with the least delay.

Aforementioned patrols met strong opposition only after having gone a major portion of the way to the River line. Initially enemy action was absent; his only labors being in the form of road sign

changes which added to the difficulty of the patrols' activities. By the end of the day 5 September, such strong resistance was met that the entire command was ordered into action. The picture that presented itself was one of more or less perimeter defense built around the city of METZ, with ultimate protection of the river line proper inferred. The spearheading mission of the Division was reduced because of the unfavorable terrain and artificial obstacles that presented themselves in the nearness to the river line. It was extremely difficult for members of the command to take prisoners to determine the strength of the garrisons or the extent of the defenses. Slowly the picture began to unfold itself; the defense of the city and the river line was established on the ground that had been previously organized for World War I and in the late 19th Century. There was no early indication, however, of how many of the existing installations were being used by the German in this current defense.

One column of the Division was able to get to the river to the north (vicinity of HAGONDANGE), but was unable to get across the river because of the nature of the troops contained therein. Serious artillery fire was continually being received from extremely well concealed positions and from the forts on the perimeter of METZ. Likewise heavy artillery fire was being received from the vicinity of GRAVELOTTE, and from intermediate points between the above.

Meager information from prisoners and from studies being made, supplemented by reports from the French underground and civilian statements, was exploited to every extent possible to determine the nature of the defenses, the extent, and the manpower being used. The general concensus arrived at was as follows: Those forts existing in the perimeter defense of METZ that were of value to the German were

being used by him in his defense scheme. Between the forts the German was using the terrain to its best advantage, garrisoning positions with infantry forces supplemented by heavy artillery support from existing forts and from field positions. Personnel being used were primarily from the Military School METZ, which had been a permanent establishment of the Wehrmacht. The faculty and the students were being utilized to man the defenses, and these forces were augmented by such stragglers as had reported to the city from deserted positions to the West. The school personnel was largely made up of highly trained non-commissioned officers in officer training, and many of them had been conducting "school problems" over the terrain in which they were being used. Artillery personnel was especially adept, and as the positions were all preregistered, the artillery proved a particularly formidable weapon for the defense of the position. The garrison had been formed roughly into two regiments - an MGK Regiment and a Regiment GCS. All troops to the west of the river were evidently commanded by the ex-commandant of the military school. Many newly commissioned, and incidentally, quite fanatical, officers were to be found in most of the units opposing the Division.

Conservative estimates as to the troops in the defense placed, in addition to the school troops, the 3 Panzer Gren Div to the South of METZ, the 17 SS Panzer Gren Div to the East of METZ, the 559 Inf Div to the North of METZ (vicinity THIONVILLE), and numerous straggler groups placed under the operational command of a training division staff. Of the odd groups known to be in the area, the only more or less formidable ones were the 208th Magen Bn and a Sicherungs (Security) Bn. It was believed, though never confirmed, that was a great amount of GHQ artillery in the area under the control of one of the divisions present.

Regardless of the information that was available on the enemy, his formidability was not in the form of the number of troops or type of troops that he had, but the excellent advantages of terrain that served him and the prepared positions that he had been given the opportunity to occupy. It became a well-established fact that his defense of the MOSELLE River line was a determined one, and one into which he would exert a great amount of energy. The German forces were not aggressive when there was no need to be; they chose to let the terrain do the fighting for them.

Through contact with the 5th Inf Div and the 90th Inf Div, with air reconnaissance, and with higher headquarters, all previous presumptions became established coldly as existing facts - the enemy was holding at all costs. The only recommendations that could be made were for forces to be used to get outside the perimeter of the defenses and skirt them; terrain presented, however, a difficult problem herein.

On 15 September, the Division moved from its positions against the German defenses to the northwest of METZ (west of the river) to attack positions southeast of METZ. The plans called for the Division to pass through the bridgehead established by the 5th Inf Div. The 90th Inf Div relieved units of the Division in previous positions. Mutual exchanges of information of intelligence nature were effected on both missions, and from information gained from the 5th Inf Div, the conclusion was drawn that in this sector, as in the past occupation, determined defenses would be the activity to be encountered.

It should be noted that during the operations against the METZ defense sector, cloudy and rainy weather hampered operations of air support to such an extent to almost neutralize the value of the ground targets that could be spotted for assignment to the air.

Conditions did permit, however, occasional photographic sorties, and from them invaluable information as to the formation of the defenses was gained. Route reconnaissance was executed by means of photos, and crossing sites for existing streams were chosen with some success.

The operations across the MOSELLE River from the bridge sites again took the Division into direct observation of the German. The terrain was even more suited to defense than the area to the NW of METZ because its nature canalized armored operations, throwing the vehicular columns into observed fields without escape. Weather conditions further canalized the Division's operations.

The extension of the bridgehead was accomplished against serious opposition, determined to be effected by the 37th Regt of the 17th SS Pz Gren Div and the 29th Regt of the 3rd Pz Gren Div, plus numerous odd groupings, again falling under control of the divisions on the front. Heavy artillery was continuous. The German's knowledge of the terrain and his pre-occupation of it added tremendously to his defensive ability.

Our forces were able to make their way to the SEILLE River line against the above opposition; the severity of the opposition necessitating the commitment of the entire strength of the command. All roads in the area were blocked systematically, and the German had all of the blocks covered by fire of all calibers. The 37th Regt was forced to withdraw to prepared defenses to the north of the Divisions assigned sector, and was engaged by elements of the 5th Inf Div advancing on the Division left flank. Elements of the command were able to reach SILLEGNY, but were unable to advance beyond because of counterattack by infantry and tank forces under the support of artillery from forts in the vicinity of VERNY and ORNY, which covered the entire Division front with fire. Elements were also able to reach the river line in the vicinity of LONGUEVILLE

LES CHEMINOT, but were unable to cross the river.

8 Through patrol reports and from various other sources, it was determined that the SEILLE River line was a main line of defense, and the difficulty encountered in attempted crossings of the river bore out this discovery. Artillery on the high ground to the front and to the flanks of the Division front continually hampered operations.

From a captured map, the defensive sectors of the Germans were discovered to correspond to the earlier manifestations. The sectors were to be defended, basically, within the Division zone by the 3rd Pz Gren Div. Capture of prisoners from the units of this division bore out this contention.

Fighting of the nature described heretofore was carried out for a period of five days. Intelligence was ample because of the static situation, but as had originally been discovered, it was a case of not having too much enemy against the Division, but having just enough at the right places, aided by every element conducive to defense, particularly against armor - weather, terrain, limited road net, and permanent defense of installations.

Throughout the period of the attack against the defense sector of METZ, information tended to confirm all original indications; the enemy was defending and defending with determination the sector, utilizing the old forts, the natural defense corridors of numerous stream crossings, and protecting the so-called SAAR entrance into Germany.

During the period, information in great amounts was amassed on those portions of the MASINOT LINE and the SIEGFRIED LINE within the sector of the XX Corps, wherein the Division was to have operated. All this information was released to applicable units when the Division was recalled from the sector and sent to the North to engage the



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German in the vicinity of OPLOO, HOLLAND.

When orders were received for the Division to change sectors, liaison was established without delay with the XIX Corps to determine the area into which the Division was to be assigned. American troops not having previously been engaged in the particular sector into which the Division was sent, liaison was established with the British VIII Corps and the British 11th Armored Division, and the 1st Belgian Brigade. These units had been engaged in the sector, and from them the desired information relative to the type of enemy, identifications, type of warfare experienced, and terrain was obtained.