

**After Action Reports
of
Combat Command "R"
(7th Armored Division)
August 1944 - June 1945**

<https://www.7tharmddiv.org/docrep/N-7AD-CCR-AAR.doc>

Transcribed from the original documents in Box 15673 (7th Armored Division 607-CCR-0 to 607-CCR-0.7) of Record Group 407 (Adjutant General's Office) at National Archives II in College Park, MD by

- William H. Bell, nephew of Hoyt Bell of Company "C", 40th Tank Battalion – August 1944, December 1944 – January 1945, March-May 1945, June 1945 text pages
- Wesley Johnston, son of Walter Johnston of Company "B", 38th Armored Infantry Battalion - September-November 1944, February 1945, June 1945 form pages

The reports are dated either at the end of the report month or in the first days of the month following the report month.

Edited by Wesley Johnston, son of Walter Johnston of Company "B" 38th Armored Infantry Battalion. The original spellings and format are generally retained in the transcript. Word wrap in which a line of text continues to the next line is not necessarily as in the original. In some cases in the transcription, the font size is reduced from the original, in order to keep each page together. *Entries in italics are hand-written.* If there is any question of accuracy, please contact Wesley Johnston (wwjohnston@aol.com) so that the original scanned images can be checked to assure that the transcript does or does not match the original.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS COMBAT COMMAND RESERVE
7TH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 257 U.S. ARMY

SUBJECT: Combat History of Combat Command "R", 7th Armored Division.

TO : Commanding General, 7th Armored Division, APO 257, U. S. Army.

Combat Command "R" left Tidworth Barracks, England at 1005, 7 August for marshaling area (Camp D-14) near Weymouth, England. Column composed of 17th Tank Battalion and Headquarters C.C. "R". Arrived at 1700. Distance traveled: 74 miles.

August 8th was spent in marshaling area preparing for trip across the channel. Drew rations to build up reserve. Marshaling vehicles into craft loads.

Pulled anchor 0700, 9 August and pulled out into harbor on LST 176 vehicles and men of C. C. "R" and Hq. and Hq. Co., 17th Battalion and Medical Detachment. 17th Tank Bn. aboard.

10 August was spent on the English Channel in convoy with other LST's and LCT's. Smooth sailing. Dropped anchor at high tide on beach near Village De Nord, France.

Both vehicles and men unloaded from their craft at approximately 0800, 11 August. Other craft unloading simultaneously. Moved under MP control approximately 20 miles to assembly area near Vesly, France. Arrived 1700. Units reforming from loading craft. Tactical grouping of C C "R" consisted of 17th Tank Battalion, 489th Armored and Company "C", 129th Ordnance Maintenance Bn. The 48th Armored Infantry Battalion was also in C C "R".

12 August was spent in resting and preparing for orders. Division ordered Combat commanders to move units to new assembly area in vicinity of St. Suzanne, East of Laval, France. C C "R" plus 48th Armored Infantry Battalion left area at 2350. 17th Tank Battalion at 0300 and 489th Armored F.A. battalion at 0700. Engineers reverted to unit control as did Medical and Ordnance (Supporting only).

Reached LOUGVIGY, FRANCE and ordered to assemble in vicinity of LANDEAN for refueling and subsequent movement to ST SUZANNE in vicinity of LAVAL. C C "R" commander left for Division C.P. in vicinity of ST SUZANNE after ordering 48th Armored Infantry Battalion to proceed under unit control. S-4 ordered to meet C-4 at Corps Headquarters. S-3 to remain at present location and bring forward 38th Armored Infantry Battalion still not completely in VASLY area.

C. O. reported to Division C. P. to learn of further orders to move to new area in vicinity of LE FERTE BERNARD. C. O. proceeded with 17th Tank Battalion. S-3 and S-4 had not joined at this time. Orders to attack, using

SECRET
1

SECRET

available troops was given by Division Commander. C C "R's" mission was to attack along road LE FERTE BERNARD, LA LOUPE, CHATEAUNEUF, DREUX. H*hour at 1515. At 2400 column had advanced along route just Southwest of LA LOUPE. Held up by 87th Rcn who reported enemy AT guns, snipers, and enemy tanks in LA LOUPE. C. O. of 17th tank was ordered to attack and to support 87th Rcn Sqdn and drive out any enemy resistance. Tanks employed 1 platoon medium and 2 platoons of light tanks. One enemy tank fired upon. Complete darkness halted attack. No infantry as yet with C C "R".

Passed through LA LOUPE 15 August at 1100. New orders passed C C "A" along our route and placed C C "R" in support of them. Went into bivouac near EPERNON, FRANCE.

Ordered by C C "A" to move to EPERNON and clear route GC 122 East for the movement of C C "A". Numerous snipers encountered in the city. 8 prisoners taken. Undetermined number killed. City cleared at 2100. C C "A" moved through EPERNON at 2100 to assembly area 8 miles south of RAMBOUILLET. C C "R"'s mission completed at approximately 2100, 16 August 1944. Outposts were established around EPERNON. Bivouacked one and one half miles south of EPERNON.

Five thousand five hundred aerial bombs weighing five hundred pounds were located in a factory and woodlands surrounding our bivouac site. Attacked by five ME 109's while in bivouac with no damage done.

C C "A" ordered C C "R" to move on the city of RAMBOUILLET, seize and hold the town and destroy the enemy in our front. Reconnaissance revealed Infantry troops and Tanks in and around the area. C C "R" headquarters and 17th Tank Battalion moved at 1230. Field guns, mine fields, AT guns and tanks were encountered. Assault guns made direct hits on gun emplacements and a garrison where German soldiers were quartered. RAMBOUILLET was not entered by any force of troops as we were ordered to abandon our mission, we were now under Division Control. Our first vehicle and casualty was lost in this encounter. Results of our operations unknown. Aerial fight overhead and immediately after we shot down 1 plane (ME109). Move on Division order to assembly area at 182100 August 44 to assembly area near CHATEAUNEUF.

C C "R" ordered by division to move to assembly area vicinity of DRUEX and outpost all important roads in C C "R" sector. Column attacked by single FW 148. Plane destroyed and pilot captured by nearby troops. C C "R" now composed of 17th Tank Bn, 38th Armd Inf Bn. (-), C/33rd Engs., 440th Armd F. A. Bn, 814 T. D. (-). and supported by Co. "C", 77th Med Bn. Armd. Outposts established and contact made with 5th Infantry Division.

20 August 44, still in assembly area near DRUEX. 1 company of Infantry, 1 Company of Medium tanks and 1 Battery Artillery ordered to C C "B" of the 5th Armd Div. for a mission. Returned same day. Outposts still established and still in contact with 5th Infantry Division.

Disengaged in present position and ordered to advance East covering flank of XX Corps, destroying the enemy to its front and seizing a bridgehead over the Seine River at MELUN. 21 August was spent in marching on these orders with a little sniper fire encountered. Approximately 25 prisoners taken and undetermined number killed.

SECRET

22 August 44 was spent on march along route ALLARDON, DOURDAN, SOCOY into MELUN. Enemy snipers, field guns, road blocks, road mines and some small arms fire was encountered. Part of a bicycle company were overtaken and destroyed. Division Commander had ordered that C C "R" be in MELUN at 221400 August 44. Leading element of C C "R" reported at 22 1410 they had reached the city and were awaiting instructions. Enemy estimated at 200 were encountered in town. Snipers and AT fire were causing the most trouble. Demolitions were being carried out by the enemy in great force. The main bridge in MELUN was still reported intact at 1800. Withdrew to outskirts of MELUN for the night.

Artillery was called for the first time 23 August 44. Known gun positions and other enemy installations were targets. Artillery was used to good effect. Main attack launched at 1440 with 20 minutes of Artillery preparation. Tanks with Infantry following close up were employed. Mine fields were encountered with the result that the attack was slowed down. Some AT fire was drawn with the loss of one tank. German "doodle-bugs" were found for the first time. A company of 38th Infantry Bn. crossed the river to the Island in the Seine River by boats and by swimming. The bridge had been blown at 0800. Heavy enemy small arms fire accounted for our heaviest casualties to date. We drew some artillery fire on our left. Withdrew to assembly area outside of MELUN for the night.

We went back into town 240700 August 44. MELUN had been cleaned out by Infantry the day and night before. No enemy positions in the city met. A company, 38th Armd Inf Bn. reported everything on the island under control. Our C. P. drew mortar fire from the enemy for approximately 2 hours. Their position was located, artillery employed and knocked out their guns. Our artillery continued firing on given targets. Bivouaced in town for the night.

City of MELUN turned over to Civil Affairs Authorities at 1100, 25 August 44. Moved out of MELUN at 1100 and crossed the Seine River in the vicinity of TIILLY, France. C C "R" now in Corps Reserve.

260950 August 44: Received the following message: 1. Cross Seine River at FOUNTAINBLEAU without delay relieving the 11 Inf at the FOUNTAINBLEAU bridgehead. 2. Outpost line LE CHALILLET -LANCE en BRIE-MONTERREAU, joining with elements of 10th Infantry Division vicinity MONTEREOU, protecting that bridge. 3. Reserve Commander, Ex. Officer, or senior officer of Command remain at Corps Headquarters until relieved. Moved to vicinity of FOUNTAINBLEAU, where we protected the bridge. Relieved at 2330 by 90th Infantry Division.

Upon receiving notice that we were relieved by 90th Division, C C "R" made a march by way of river road, MELUN, Highway N 446, to the vicinity of PROVINS. C C "R" composed of the 17th Tank Bn, 440th Armd F. A. Bn., 38th Armd Inf Bn. (-), C/33rd Armd Engs and C/814 T. D., was given the mission of advancing in multiple columns (Task Forces) following C C "A" over prescribed routes, prepared to reinforce any column to its front, and seize bridgehead over AISNE-MARNE canal, and VESLE river within its zone of advance. March started at approximately 271430 August 44. No contact with the enemy.

Elements of C C "R" still in task force groups marching in multiple columns seizing and holding important bridges. No enemy opposition of any

SECRET

importance being encountered. Task Forces marching in direction of REIMS. Prisoners being taken by giving themselves up. CHATEAU-THIERRY passed through and one task force given the mission of holding the bridge there until relieved.

signed)
Frank C. Lauer, JR.
Major, Infantry
S-3.

SECRET

CO. AFTER ACTION REPORT - AUGUST, 1944

HISTORY OF RESERVE COMMAND

7 August 44 Left Tidworth Barracks, England at 1005 for marshalling area (Camp D-14) near Weymouth, England. Column composed of 17th Tank Battalion and Headquarters CC"R". Arrived at 1700. Distance traveled: 74 miles.

8 August 44 Day spent in preparing for trip across channel. Drew rations ("C" "D" and "K") to build up reserve. Marshalled vehicles into craft loads.

9 August 44 Loaded vehicles and men on LST 176 at Weymouth 1140. Vehicles and men of CC"R", Hq and Hq Co, 17th Tank Bn. and Med Det, 17th Tank Bn. (In part). Moved into harbor at 1805.

10 August 44 Pulled anchor at 0700 with other LST's and LCT's in convoy. Smooth sailing. Dropped anchor at high tide on beach near Village De Nord France.

11 August 44 Vehicles and men unloaded approximately 0800. Other craft unloading simultaneously. Moved under MP control approximately 20 miles to assembly area near Vesly. Arrived 1700. Units reforming from loading craft. Tactical grouping of CC"R": 17th Tank Bn, 489th Armd FA Bn, 48th Armd Inf Bn, and 33rd Armd Engs (-), supported by Company "C", 77th Med Bn Armd and Co, "C", 129th Ord Maint Bn.

12 August 44 Men rested and prepared for orders. Division ordered Combat Commanders to move units to new assembly area in vicinity of St. Suzanne, East of Laval. CC"R" plus 48th A. I. B. left area at 2345, 489th at 0700, and 17th Tank Bn. at 0300. Engineers reverted to unit and division control as did Medical and Ordnance (Supporting only).

13 August 44 Reached town of LOUGVIGY and ordered to assemble in vicinity of LANDEAN for refueling and subsequent movement to ST SUZANNE in the vicinity of LAVAL. CC"R" Commander left for Division CP in the vicinity of ST SUZANNE after ordering 48th A I Bn to proceed there under unit control. S-4 ordered to proceed independently to meet G-4 at XX Corps CP. S-3 to remain at present location and bring forward 38th A I Bn still not completely in VESLY area.

14 August 44 CO reported to Division CP to learn further orders to new area in vicinity of LE FERTE BERNARD. CO proceeded with 17th Tank Bn. No word from S-3, CC"R" and 38th A I Bn. Orders to attack using available troops was given by Division. CC"R" 's mission was to attack

along road LE FERTE BERNARD, LA LOUPE, CHATEAUNEUF, DREUX. H-hour 1515. At 2400 column had advanced along route just southwest of LA LOUPE. Held up by 87th Rcn Squad who reported enemy AT guns, snipers, and enemy tanks in LA LOUPE. CO of 17th Tank Battalion was ordered to attack and to support 87th Cav Rcn Squadron (1 Co. and Hqs Sqdn.), and drive out any enemy resistance. Tanks employed 1 platoon median and 2 platoons of light tanks. One enemy tank fired upon. Complete darkness halted the attack. Still no infantry with C C "R".

15 August 44 Passed through LA LOUPE in march column at 1100. New orders passed CC"A" along our route and placed CC"R" in support of CC"A". Bivouaced near EPERNON.

16 August 44 Ordered by CC"A" to move to EPERNON and clear route GC 122 east for the movement of CC"A". Numerous snipers found in EPERNON. Eight prisoners captured and undetermined number killed. Mission completed at 2100. CC"A" moved through EPERNON to assembly area 8 miles south of RAMBOUILLET. Outposts were left in all roads leading into EPERNON. Bivouaced one and one half miles south of EPERNON.

17 August 44 5,000 unfused 500 lbs aerial bombs located in factory 1/4 mile from bivouac site were discovered. Other bombs found in adjacent woods. Attacked by five ME 109's while in bivouac with no damage done.

18 August 44 CC"A" ordered CC"R" to move at 1100 and patrol the route to RAMBOUILLET. Enemy believed to be in outskirts of town. Mission to seize and hold town. Gun positions of field guns AT guns were located as well as road blocks, mine field and a garrison of enemy soldiers estimated at 400. Direct hits were scored on a gun position. 814 TD Bn destroyed one French Souma Tank. Mission on way to completion when ordered by CC"A" to abandon fight and return to assembly area. Large aerial fight overhead. Column shot down one plane immediately after the fight (ME 109). Moved on division order to assembly area 4 miles east of Chateauneuf at 2300.

19 August 44 CC"R" received orders from Division to move into assembly area vicinity of DREUX and to outpost all important roads in CC"R" sector. Column attacked by single FW 140 and plane destroyed. Pilot captured. CC"R" now composed of 17th Tank Bn, 38 AIBn. (-), 440th FA Bn, 33rd Armd Engs (-) and 814th TD Bn (-).

20 August 44 Still in assembly area vicinity of DREUX. 1 Co. Infantry, 1 Co. Tanks, and 1 Battery Artillery sent to CC"B" of 5th A.D. Returned same night. Outposts still established and reconnaissance being made. Contact with the 5th Infantry Division also made.

JAMES W. NEWBERRY
Lt. Col., Inf.
Commanding

/s/ FRANK C. LAUER, JR., Major, Inf., S-3

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS CC-R
7TH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 257 U.S. ARMY

2 SEPTEMBER¹ 1944

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORTS.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, 7TH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 257, U.S. ARMY.

CC-R CONSISTING OF 17TH TANK BN, 440TH ARMD F.A. BN, 38TH ARMD INF BN (-), 814 TD BN (-), C/33RD ARMD ENGS, AND C/77TH MED BN SUPPORTING, WERE IN ASSEMBLY AREA APPROXIMATELY 7 MILES NE OF VERDUN, FRANCE, ON 1 SEPTEMBER 1944. AN ACUTE SHORTAGE OF GASOLINE EXISTED. 1ST AND SECOND ESHELON MAINTENANCE WERE BEING PERFORMED ON VEHICLES. HOT BATHS WERE AVAILABLE TO THE MEN OF THE COMMAND.

MAIN FORCE OF CC-R WAS STILL IN BIVOUAC AREA ON 2 SEPTEMBER. A TASK FORCE CONSISTING OF 1/38, 1/17, 1/1/33, 1/1/814, UNDER THE COMMAND OF LT COL KEELER (INF), ON ORDER OF DIVISION MOVED ON EAST BANK OF MEUSE RIVER FROM VICINITY OF VERDUN TO SEDAN. TASK FORCE PROCEEDED 32.4 MILES WHERE ENEMY ROAD BLOCKS, AT GUNS OF UNKNOWN CALIBER, FORCED THEM TO HALT AND ORGANIZE. DUE TO LACK OF FUEL IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DEPLOY THE FORCE PROPERLY AND COL KEELER HELD THEM IN A STRONG ASSEMBLY POSITION ABOUT 2.5 MILES SOUTH OF STENAY, FRANCE. A FEW ENEMY SNIPERS WERE ENCOUNTERED IN THIS VICINITY. ESTIMATED STRENGTH : 25 TO 50. THERE WAS NO COMMUNICATION WITH THIS FORCE FROM CC-R HEADQUARTERS. AT APPROXIMATELY 1530 DIVISION ORDERED THE FORCE TO REJOIN THE REMAINDER OF CC-R. ALL AVAILABLE GAS WITHIN CC-R WAS SENT TO THE TASK FORCE AND THEIR RETURN WAS EFFECTED WITHOUT INCIDENT BY 040215 SEPTEMBER 44.

COLONEL MALONY, GEORGE H, INF REPORTED TO CC-R AS COMMANDER AT 041445 SEPTEMBER 1944, VICE LT COL NEWBERRY, JAMES W. RELIEVED. METTING FOR STAFF, BN COMMANDERS AND COMPANY COMMANDERS WAS HELD AT 1730 WHERE POLICIES, ORDERS AND SOP WAS TAKEN UP BY NEW C.O.

CC-R WAS NOTIFIED AT 050245 SEPTEMBER THAT ENEMY INFANTRY WAS REPORTED ADVANCING SOUTH FROM JAMETZ, FRANCE. C.O. ORDERED INFANTRY PATROLS OUT WITH THE MISSION TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY. PATROLS WERE OUT UNTIL 1130 WHEN THEY RETURNED WITHOUT CONTACTING THE ENEMY. C/33RD ENGS DETACHED FROM CC-R AT 051740 SEPTEMBER 44 AND ATTACHED TO 87TH CAV. RCN. SQDN. GASOLINE SHORTAGE RELIEVED BY RECEIVING 10,500 GALLONS. NO CHANGE IN LOCATION AT 052400 SEPTEMBER 44.

-8TH ARMD INF BN, A AND B COMPANIES 17TH TANK BN, COMPANY, 814 TD BN WERE RELIEVED FROM ATTACHED TO CC-R AND ATTACHED TO 87TH CAV RON SQDN AT 060040. MOVEMENT OF 38TH AND C/814TH WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY 060230 SEPTEMBER 44.

- 1 -

¹ The report date should clearly have been in October, since it covers the month of September, but it really does have "September" typed here.

SECRET

06 SEPTEMBER 44 DIVISION WAS GIVEN MISSION OF ADVANCING E AND NE WITHIN CORPS ZONE AND SECURE CROSSINGS OVER THE MOSELLE AND SAAR RIVERS. CC-R TO ADVANCE ALONG ROUTE PRESCRIBED BY DIVISION FOLLOWING CC-B. DEPARTED FROM ASSEMBLY AREA AT 1535. ORDER OF MARCH: RCN CO/814, 17TH (-), CC-R HQS, 440TH, TNS. AN ADVANCE OF 22 MILES WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY. COLUMN HALTED AT 1810 WHEN THEY CLOSED UP ON CC-B, INTO BIVOUAC AREA NEAR SUZEMONT, FRANCE.

071005 SEPTEMBER 44, CC-R WAS ORDERED TO MOVE OUT OF ASSEMBLY AREA AND SUPPORT CC-B IN THEIR ATTACK. ALL UNITS OF CC-R REVERTED BACK TO OUR CONTROL WITH EXCEPTION OF C/33RD ENGS.

C.O. CC-R GIVE ORDERS FOR 440 TO GO INTO POSITION W OF REZONVILLE, FRANCE. 38TH SUPPORTED BY MEDIUM TANK CO OF 17TH TO MOVE OVER A DESIGNATED ROUTE TO JOIN 23RD ARMD INF BN AT ANC. PLANS FOR THIS ATTACK WERE COMPLETED AT 1330, MOVEMENT BEGAN AT 1400.

INFANTRY MOVED FORWARD TO AN ASSEMBLY AREA BY VEHICLE, WERE DISMOUNTED AND PRESSED FORWARD ON FOOT TO GAIN ACCESS TO A ROUTE SHOWN TO THE CC-R COMMANDER BY A MEMBER OF THE FFI. AT THIS TIME INFANTRY ELEMENTS COME UNDER STRONG HARASSING FIRE FROM THE DUG-IN POSITIONS OF THE ENEMY. MEDIUM TANK COMPANY WAS CALLED FORWARD TO DEPLOY AND SCREEN THE ADVANCE OF THE FOOT ELEMENTS. ARTILLERY CALLED FOR TO NEUTRALIZE ENEMY FIRE.

THE ENEMY FROM STRONGLY ENTRENCHED POSITIONS IN THICKLY WOODED HILLSIDE COVERING ROUTE TO OBJECTIVE WAS ABLE TO COVER BY FIRE THE ROUTE OF ADVANCE OF THIS COMMAND. ENEMY HAD APPROXIMATELY A BATTERY OF ARTILLERY, MORTARS (UNDETERMINED), BAZOOKAS AND MACHINE GUNS AND RIFLES, ALL OF WHICH COULD FIRE FROM WELL CONCEALED POSITIONS. DUE TO TIME AVAILABLE TO THE ENEMY, HIS ARTILLERY SURVEYS OVER OUR ROUTE OF ADVANCE WERE EXTREMELY ACCURATE. STRENGTH OF ENEMY UNDETERMINED. INFANTRY AND TANK ELEMENTS HAD PROGRESSED ALONG THIS ROUTE FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR WHEN AT 071705, LN 0 JOINED C.O., CC-R AND INFORMED HIM THAT DIVISION ORDERED HIM HALT IN PLACE, HOLD UNTIL 2000, OR UNTIL PASSED THROUGH BY ELEMENTS OF 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION. CC-R THEN REVERTING TO CORPS CONTROL. AT 072000, CC-R WITHDREW ALL ELEMENTS AND RETURNED TO ASSEMBLY AREA OCCUPIED ON PREVIOUS NIGHT.

CC-R IN CORPS RESERVE SPENT THE ENTIRE DAY OF 8 SEPTEMBER IN ASSEMBLY AREA NEAR SUZEMONT FRANCE. 17TH TANK BN. WAS ATTACHED TO 90TH INFANTRY DIVISION.

CC-R STILL IN CORPS RESERVE 9 SEPTEMBER 44 WITH ONLY A ROAD PATROL OF INFANTRY COVERING THE ROAD NET OF DONCOURT-VIONVILLE-MARS LA TOUR. PATROL CONSISTED OF 1 INFANTRY PLATOON. PATROLS OPERATED ON 45 MINUTE I INTERVALS.

SEPTEMBER 10, CC-R RELEASED FROM XX CORPS TO 7TH ARMD DIV BUT COULD NOT CROSS THE MOSELLE RIVER WITHOUT PERMISSION OF XX CORPS. CC-R MOVED TO AN ASSEMBLY AREA NEAR ST MARIE. CC-R CLOSED IN BIVOUAC APPROXIMATELY 1920.

- 2 -

SECRET

SECRET

A MISSION WAS ASSIGNED TO ATTACK AT 110630 SEPTEMBER ALONG THE ROAD RONCOURT-PIERREVILLERS, THEN SE TOWARD BRONVAUX AND REDUCE THE FORTS IN THE AREA BRONVAUX AND SEMECOURT. IT WAS PLANNED TO ATTACK IN TWO (2) COLUMNS WITH A THIRD TF IN RESERVE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE ATTACK OF EITHER OF THE LEADING TF'S. THE ATTACK WAS BEGUN AT 110630 UNDER PROTECTIVE ARTILLERY FIRE BY TF WEMPLE, WITH TF KELLER FOLLOWING. ADVANCE OF FIVE (5) MILES WAS MADE BEFORE CONTACT WAS GAINED WITH THE ENEMY. A CONCRETE ROAD BLOCK AND SMALL ARMS FIRE WERE ENCOUNTERED IN THE VICINITY OF PIERREVILLERS. THE COLUMN THEN SWUNG SOUTH AND WAS ATTACKING BRONVAUX FROM THE EAST. COL MOLONY AND LT COL KEELER, (C.O. 38TH ARMD INF BN.) WERE WOUNDED BY ARTILLERY FIRE AT 1205. LT COL WEMPLE ASSUMED COMMAND OF CC-R., MAJOR RANKIN OF 38TH ARMD INF BN, MAJOR DAILY OF 17TH TANK BN.

AT 111515 LT COL HART OF 440TH F.A. ASSUMED COMMAND OF CC-R AND THE ATTACK PLAN WAS CHANGED. CC-R ATTACK ORDER ISSUED AT 111610 SEPTEMBER 44. TWO (2) TASK FORCES CONSISTING EACH OF 1 INF COMPANY, 1 TANK PLATOON AND 1 TD PLATOON AND 1 PLATOON ENGINEERS TO ATTACK SOUTH OF DONCOURT TO SECURE ARTILLERY OBSERVATION ON HIGH GROUND IN THAT AREA. CC-R NOW UNDER CONTROL OF CC-A. TASK FORCES WERE ON OBJECTIVES AT 112200 SEPTEMBER 44. AT 2400 CC-R HELD GROUND GAINED DAY PREVIOUS, WITH ENGRS TANKS AND TD'S, WHILE B AND C COMPANIES, 38TH ARMD INF JOINED TF MCCONNELL IN ATTACKING FORTIFIED AREA AROUND HILL 363.

TF RANKIN COMPOSED OF ONE (1) RIFLE COMPANY ONE (1) PLATOON OF MEDIUM TANKS, ONE (1) PLATOON OF TD'S AND ONE (1) PLATOON OF ENGRS OPERATED ON THE SOUTH EDGE OF WOODS NORTH OF MARANGE-SILVANGE. TF WEMPLE, COMPOSED OF B/38TH AND 1 PLATOON OF ENGINEERS, FINDING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OPERATE WITH VEHICLES THROUGH AREA, DISMOUNTED AND OCCUPIED THE SOUTHERN SLOPES OF THE HIGH GROUND NORTHWEST OF BRONVAUX. TF WEMPLE AND TF MCCONNELL (CC-A) WERE ABLE TO MAKE CONTACT IN SPITE OF THE DEEP VALLEY THEY WERE FORCED TO NEGOTIATE. THIS ACTION OCCURRED 12 SEPTEMBER 1944. LT COL ADAMS, ANDREW J., ASSUMED COMMAND OF CC-R.

SEPTEMBER 13, 17TH TANK BN WAS HOLDING GROUND PREVIOUSLY GAINED. OTHER TASK FORCES WORKING UNDER CC-A. PATROLS WERE ACTIVE TRYING TO DETERMINE ENEMY STRENGTH. RECEIVING SOME ENEMY ARTILLERY.

CC-R ATTACKING LIMITED OBJECTIVES AS OUTLINED BY DIVISION. MEETING ENEMY RESISTANCE IN SMALL ARMS FIRE AND ARTILLERY FIRE. ELEMENTS OF CC-R TO BE RELIEVED BY 90TH INF DIVISION.

CC-R HEADQUARTERS AUGMENTED BY LT. COL STREETER AS EX 0, LT TREANORE AS COMPANY COMMANDANT, AND 19 ENLISTED MEN.

CC-R CLOSED INTO NEW ASSEMBLY AREA VICINITY MARS LA TOUR UPON RELIEF BY UNITS OF 90TH INFANTRY DIVISION. TRAINS AND OTHER ELEMENTS THAT WERE NOT NEEDED MOVED AT 141400 SEPTEMBER 44. CC-R HQS CLOSED INTO BIVOUAC AREA AT 150330 SEPTEMBER 3944.

LT. COL ADAMS RELEIVED AS C.O. CC-R AND COL. PETE Y HEFFENER, JR ASSUMED COMMAND.

UPON ARRIVAL AT NEW ASSEMBLY AREA, CC-R PREPARED TO MOVE EAST TO CROSS MOSELLE RIVER AND PASS THROUGH THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION.

SECRET

AT 151430 SEPTEMBER 1944, CC-R CONSISTING OF 17TH TANK BN, 440, ARMD F.A. BN, 38TH ARMD INF BN (-), C/33RD ARMD ENGS, C/814TH TD BN. AND A/87TH CAV RCN SQDN. MOVED FROM ASSEMBLY AREA NEAR MARS LA TOUR, FRANCE ON DIVISION ORDER TO CROSS THE NIOSELLE RIVER, BEING PREPARED TO ATTACK WEST OF MOSELLE RIVER ON CORPS ORDER.

CC-R ADVANCED INITIALLY IN COLUMN BEHIND 695 ARN1D F.A. BN, CROSSED THE MOSELLE RIVER AT ARNAVILLE, FANCE ON 151830 SEPTEMBER 44.

AFTER CROSSING RIVER COLUMN WAS DEPLOYED WITH A STRONG RIGHT FLANK GUARD. MARCH WAS CONTINUED WITHOUT MUCH OPPOSITION UNTIL THE ADVANCE GUARD HIT ROAD BLOCKS IN WOODED AREA APPROXIMATELY 2 MILES WEST OF SILLEGNY, FRANCE. AT THIS POINT SOME SMALL ARMS FIRE RECEIVED. CC-R PULLED OFF THE ROAD INTO AN ASSEMBLY AREA, OUTPOSTED THE AREA AND SENT OUT A RECONNAISSANCE PATROL TO FIND NEW ROUTES FOR ADVANCE OF ELEMENTS.

16 SEPTEMBER 44, CC-R ATTEMPTING TO ATTACK EAST FOUND A DETERMINED AND STUBBORN ENEMY IN WELL DUG IN POSITIONS WITH SMALL ARMS FIRE, GOOD ARTILLERY OBSERVATION, AND A THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF THE TERRAIN WE WERE OPERATING IN. ARTILLERY FIRE WAS LAID ON CC-R THROUGHOUT THE DAY. INSTANCE FROM OPEN FIELDS WERE CLEARED WITH 23 PRISONFRS BEING TAKEN. IN THE WOODED AREAS THE ENEMY WAS DEFENDING IN FORCE. MORTAR FIRE WAS RECEIVED SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE DAY. ROAD BLOCKS WERE ENCOUNTERD AND BULLDOZERS WERE BROUGHT UP TO CLEAR THE WAY. 1 BULLDOZER WAS KNOCKED OUT. UNFAVORABLE WEATHER PREVAILLED.

CC-R NOW OPERATING IN TASK FORCES WITH COL WEMPLE COMMANDING A FORCE COMPOSED OF 1/38TH, 2/17TH/1/C/33RD. AND COL. ROSEBRO COMMANDING A FORCE COMPOSED OF 1/38TH, 1/17TH, 1/C/33RD. 1 FORCE IN RESERVE.

TF WEMPLE WAS GIVEN THE MISSION OF ATTACKING SILLEGNY. THIS TF WAS ABLE TO PENETRATE THE WOODS AND GET INTO CLEAR GROUND WHERE HEAVY ARTILLERY CONCENTRATIONS WERE LAID ON THEM. TF WAS UNABLE TO REACH THE TOWN.

TR ROSEBRO WAS GIVEN THE MISSION OF CLEARING THE WOODS OF THE VICINITY OF SILLEGNY. THIS FORCE GOT TO THE EASTERN EDGE OF THE WOODS WHERE IT MET DETERMINED RESISTANCE IN HEAVY ARTILLERY, MORTAR, MACHINE GUN AND SMALL ARMS FIRED PINNED THEM DOWN. THIS FORCE DUG IN AND HELD FOR THE NIGHT THE GROUND IT HAD GAINED.

CC-R STILL RECEIVING HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE IN THE SECOR OF OPERATIONS, WERE OPERATING IN THREE (3) TASK FORCES. ONE TF MAKING A FRONTAL ATTACK WAS HANDICAPPED BY ROAD BLOCKS OF TREES IN THEIR DIRECTION OF ATTACK. ANOTHER TF OPERATED ON THE RIGHT FLANK AND THE WOODS IN WHICH THEY WERE OPERATING WERE CLEARED OF THE ENEMY. THE THIRD TF WORKED TO OUR LEFT IN CONJUNCTION WITH CC-A WHO WERE ATTACKING THE TOWN OF MARIEULLES, FRANCE. A ROAD BLOCK COVERED BY AT FIRE WITHHELD CONTINUED ATTACKS. THIS ACTION TOOK PLACE 17 SEPTEMBER 1944.

171900 SEPTEMBER 44 DIVISION ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS FOR CC-R TO CONTINUE PRESENT MISSION SOUTH OF PROPOSED ROUTE. ATTACK SILLEGNY NORTHEAST AND SECURE CROSSINGS OF THE SEILLE RIVER SOUTH OF SILLEGNY AND CONTINUE EAST IN ZONE OF ADVANCE. ONE (1) COMPANY 206 ENGINEERS NOW IN SUPPORT.

THE ATTACK ON SILLEGNY PROGRESSED TO THE CREST OF THE HIGH GROUND WEST OF SILLEGNY. WHEN THE TROOPS APPROACHED THE TOWN, VERY HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE AND AT GUN FIRE CAUSED FIVE (5) TANK CASUALTIES AND THREE (3) TD CASUALTIES AND HEAVY INFANTRY LOSSES, BUT FORCES DROVE

- 4 -
SECRET

SECRET

TO WITHIN FIFTY (50) YARDS OF THE TOWN UNDER HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE AND NEUTRALIZED THE AT FIRE. AT 181200 SEPTEMBER FORCEABLE ATTEMPTS WERE BEING MADE TO ENTER THE TOWN AGAINST DETERMINED ENEMY RESISTANCE. 1/48 RELIEVED CC-A, ATTACHED CC-R AT 181730 SEPT 44.

1/48TH ARMD INF BN RELIEVED FROM ATTACHED TO CC-R AT 190700 SEPTEMBER AND ATTACHED TO DIVISION TRAINS. 1/38TH RELIEVED FROM ATTACHED TO DIVISION TRAINS AND ATTACHED TO CC-R AT 190700 SEPTEMBER 1944.

ATTACK ON SILLEGNY PROGRESSED AGAINST ENEMY RESISTANCE. THE TOWN WAS ENTERED AT APPROXIMATELY 191500 SEPTEMBER 44. AFTER ENTERING THE TOWN, WE RECEIVED THE HEAVIEST ARTILLERY FIRE YET EXPERIENCED. FORCES WERE PINNED DOWN IN THE TOWN UNABLE TO PROCEED OR WITHDRAW. THIS SITUATION CONTINUED INTO THE NIGHT.

AN ENEMY COUNTERATTACK WAS REPULSED BEFORE DARK.

AT 191750 SEPTEMBER 1944 A DIRECT HIT WAS MADE ON A MEDIUM TANK APPROXIMATELY 15 FEET FROM THE COMMAND C.P., KILLING ONE TANK CREW MEMBER AND INJURING TWO (2) OTHERS. MAJOR LAUER (S-3 OF CC-R) SUFFERED SEVERE SHRAPNEL WOUNDS, AND WAS EVACUATED. T/5 MENDOSA (RADIO OPERATOR ON DUTY) WAS INJURED BY SHRAPNEL AND WAS EVACUATED.

DIVISION ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS AT 191600 FOR CC-R TO CAPTURE SILLEGNY AND SECURE CROSSINGS OF THE SEILLE RIVER, THEN REVERT TO DIVISION RESERVE WHEN PASSED THROUGH BY CC-A. THIS WAS TO BE A COORDINATED ATTACK WITH CC-A IF SILLEGNY HAD NOT FALLEN BY 192100 SEPTEMBER 1944.

20 SEPTEMBER 1944. CC-R, C.P. HAS NOT MOVED. ENEMY ARTILLERY STILL BEING RECEIVED IN THIS LOCALITY. COL. HEFFNER EVACUATED TO HOSPITAL AND COLONEL FULLER ASSUMED COMMAND.

THE RELIEF OF CC-R WAS BEING EFFECTED BY CC-A, WITH THE INFANTRY MOVING TO AN ASSEMBLY AREA SOUTH OF ARRAY TO REORGANIZE DUE TO HEAVY LOSSES SUSTAINED IN THE PRECEDING DAYS AROUND SILLEGNY. 17TH TANK BATTALION AND 440 FIELD ARTILLERY SUPPORTED ATTACK OF CC-A.

CC-R STILL SUPPORTED THE ATTACK OF CC-A ON SEPTEMBER 21ST BUT WAS BEING RELIEVED SLOWLY.

COLONEL RYAN REPORTED AND ASSUMED COMMAND, RELIEVING LT COLONEL FULLER WHO ASSUMED COMMAND OF THE 38TH ARMORED INFANTRY BATTALION.

LT. COLONEL WILLIAMS REPORTED TO CC-R AS S-3.

DIVISION ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS 221200 SEPTEMBER 44 FOR CC-R TO REVERT TO DIVISION RESERVE AND ASSEMBLE IN VICINITY OF LORRY. 440 ARMD F.A. BATTALION TO GIVE GENERAL SUPPORT TO DIVISION ARTILLERY.

CC-R HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO ASSEMBLY AREA AS DIRECTED BY DIVISION WAS REORGANIZAING AND CARRYING ON VEHICULAR AND PERSONAL MAINTENANCE.

CC-R HAD CLOSED INTO NEW ASSEMBLY AREA 221940 SEPTEMBER 44.

IN ASSEMBLY AREA ALL DAY 23 SEPTEMBER 1944 CARRYING ON REORGANIZATION AND VEHICULAR AND PERSONAL MAINTENANCE.

231900 SEPTEMBER 44 DIVISION ISSUED ORDERS THAT WE WOULD MOVE TO NEW ASSEMBLY AREA VICINITY OF PUXIEUX, FRANCE. MOVE WAS MADE WITHOUT INCIDENT TO ASSEMBLY AREA VICINITY PUXIEUX, FRANCE. CLOSING IN TO ASSEMBLY AREA AT 240630 SEPTEMBER 44.

SECRET

A U.S.O. SHOW ARRIVED AT CC-R HEADQUARTERS TO PUT ON A SHOW FOR THE TROOPS BUT INCLIMATE WEATHER PREVENTED THIS. DESPITE THE RAIN UNITS WERE BUSY CARRYING ON MAINTENANCE OF VEHICLES DURING THE DAY OF 24 AND 25 SEPTEMBER 1944.

AT 251745 SEPTEMBER 44, CC-R NOW RECONSTITUTED AND REORGANIZED STARTED MOVEMENT TO A NEW ASSEMBLY AREA IN VICINITY OF HASSELT, BELGIUM. MARCH WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. CLOSED INTO ASSEMBLY AREA 26 1730 SEPTEMBER 1944, VICINITY OF EYSDEN, BELGIUM. NOW IN XIX CORPS.

OUTPOSTS WERE ESTABLISHED AND PATROLS WERE IN OPERATION WHILE BIVOUACED IN VICINITY OF EYSDEN, BELGIUM. CONTACT WAS MADE WITH THE UNITS ON EITHER SIDE OF US. THESE OUTPOSTS AND PATROLS WERE KEPT IN EFFECT DURING OUR BIVOUAC, NEAR EYSDEN ON 27 AND 28 AUGUST 1944.

29 SEPTEMBER 44, GC-R MOVED TO NEW ASSEMBLY AREA NEAR DEURNE, HOLLAND, PREPARATORY TO ASSIST THE DIVISION IN CLEARING THE ENEMY RESISTANCE IN THE SECTOR. OUTPOSTS WERE ESTABLISHED.

30 SEPTEMBER 44 FOUND CC-R STILL IN ASSEMBLY AREA, MAINTAINING OUTPOSTS, BUT HAVING NO CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY. CC-R NOW IN DIVISION RESERVE.

THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER FOUND CC-R IN COMBAT FOR A PERIOD OF 46 DAYS. IT HAD GROWN FROM AN INFANT ORGANIZATION OF 3 OFFICERS AND 14 ENLISTED MEN AND 3 VEHICLES TO AN ORGANIZATION OF 5 OFFICERS AND 36 ENLISTED MEN AND 6 VEHICLES.

COMMAND OF CC-R CHANGED ON EIGHT DIFFERENT OCCASIONS DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER.

THREE (3) CASUALTIES DURING THE PERIOD COVERED. NO DEATHS.

(signed)
H.S. STREETER
LT. COL. CAV.
EX. O.

- 6 -
SECRET

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS CC-R
7TH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 257, U.S. ARMY

31 OCTOBER 1944

SUBJECT : AFTER ACTION REPORTS.

TO : COMMANDING GENERAL, 7TH ARMORED DIVISION, APO 257,
U.S. ARMY.

1 OCTOBER 1944, CC-R CONSISTING OF 17TH TANK BN (- CO A WITH TASK FORCE JONES 814 T.D.) AND 38TH ARMORED INFANTRY BN (-CO. C DIVISION C.P. GUARD), WAS IN DIVISION RESERVE WITH C.P. LOCATED NEAR ST. ANTHONIS, HOLLAND. STAFF CONSISTED OF COLONEL JOHN L. RYAN, JR, COMMANDING, LT. COL. H.S. STREETER, EX. O., LT. COL. H.R. WILLIAMS, S-3, CAPT. NORWOOD G. READ, S-2, CAPT CLEMENT O. STEVENSON, S-4, LT. JAMES F. STIDHAM, COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER AND LT. J. A. TREANORE, HQS COMMANDANT. MAJOR GLEN G. HAIRSTON, SURGEON. FIRST ECHELON MAINTENANCE WAS BEING PERFORMED ON VEHICLES. 38TH INF. WAS UNDERGOING REORGANIZATION DUE TO HEAVY LOSSES SUSTAINED PREVIOUSLY. NEW REPLACEMENTS WERE BEING ACQUAINTED WITH THEIR DUTIES AND LEADERS. AT 1000 BRITISH LIAISON OFFICER PAID C.P. A VISIT GIVING S-2 ENEMY INFORMATION.

CC-R HAD OUTPOSTS ESTABLISHED IN THE DIVISION SECTOR AS PRESCRIBED BY DIVISION.

38TH ARMORED INF. BN WERE ALERTED AT 011145 OCTOBER 44 TO BE READY TO MOVE ON AN HOURS NOTICE TO SUPPORT CC-B IN ITS ATTACK, LT. CZABLINSKI, 602 ENG BN VISITED CC-R HQ. COMPLIMENTED CC-R ON ITS CAMOUFLAGE SAYING IT WAS BEST HE HAD ENCOUNTERED IN THE DIVISION. ONE SUGGESTION WAS MADE THAT WE SHOULD NOT MAKE AS MANY ROADS IN THE AREA AS WE WERE MAKING.

AT 1515 CC-R MOVED ITS C.P. 3/4 MILE.

2 OCTOBER FOUND CC-R IN ASSEMBLY AREA. AT 021200 C/87 ATTACHED TO CC-R. THEY WERE IMMEDIATELY GIVEN THE MISSION OF RECONNOITERING AND DETERMINING POSSIBLE ROUTES OF ADVANCE TO THE FRONT LINE OF DIVISION WHERE RELIEF COULD BE EFFECTED IF SO DESIRED BY HIGHER HQS.

38TH ARMORED INF BN (-1 CO) DETACHED CC-B AND ATTACHED CC-R 021630 OCTOBER 44. MOVED INTO ASSEMBLY AREA VIC ST. ANTHONIS, HOLLAND. DETACHMENTS MAINTAINED ROAD BLOCKS.

AT 022330 OCTOBER DIVISION ISSUED ORDERS FOR CC-R TO MOVE OVER PREVIOUSLY RECONNOITERED ROUTES FROM OUR PRESENT LOCATION TO ATTACK AROUND CC-B EAST OF PRESENT FRONT LINE OF CC-B AT 030800 OCTOBER 44. TO RELIEVE CC-B AND GIVEN THE MISSION OF CLEARING HOSTILE RESISTANCE WITHIN COMBAT COMMAND ZONE.

A/82 ENGINEERS TO SUPPORT CC-R IN OUR POSITIONS.

440 ARMORED FIELD ARTILLERY ATTACHED TO CC-R.

SECRET

3 OCTOBER 44 CC-R CONSISTING OF 17 TANK BN(-), 38 ARMD, INF. BN., 440 F.A., C/87 RCN, A/82 ENGRS IN SUPPORT, RELIEVED CC-B IN ZONE BEGINNING AT 030800 OCTOBER 44. 434TH F.A. REINFORCING FIRES OF 440 F.A. BN.

CC-R SPLIT INTO 2 TASK FORCES, TASK FORCE FULLER AND WEMPLE.

TASK FORCE WEMPLE CONSISTED OF 17TH TANK BN (-CO. C), C/38TH ARMD, INF. BN., 1/C/87.

TASK FORCE FULLER CONSISTED OF 38TH ARMD. INF. BN. (-CO.C), C/17TH TANK BN.

TASK FORCE WEMPLE MET STUBBORN RESISTANCE. INFANTRY WAS PINNED DOWN BY INTENSE FIRE OF ALL CALIBERS. TANKS ADVANCED 500 YARDS IN EASTERN SECTOR OF ZONE, WERE FORCED TO WITHDRAW BY BAZOOKAS AND ARTY FIRE. ONE (1) TANK WAS LOST TO A MINE, 3 WERE-KNOCKED OUT BY ANTI-TANK GUNS AND 1 BY A BAZOOKA. TASK FORCE FULLER PROGRESSED SLOWLY AGAINST THE ENEMY, ENCOUNTERING HEAVY SMALL ARMS, MORTAR AND ARTY FIRE. NEBELWERFFR FIRE (SCREAMING MINNIES) WERE RECEIVED FOR THE FIRST TIME. ELEMENTS OF CO-B INFILTRATED TO POSITIONS APPROXIMATELY 600 YARDS IN FRONT OF LINE OF DEPARTURE.

ENGINEERS MAINTAINED ROADS, REPAIRED DAMAGED BRIDGES AND REMOVED MINES IN TASK FORCE WEMPLES ZONE.

PREPARATION FOR A NIGHT ATTACK WAS MADE. INFANTRY WAS WELL DUG IN, PREPARED TO REPULSE ANY COUNTER-ATTACKS THAT SHOULD COME.

TASK FORCE WEMPLE LAUNCHED ATTACK AT 041100 OCTOBER 44 TO THE SOUTH ADVANCING APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS BEFORE THE ATTACK WAS REPULSED WITH HEAVY LOSSES TO INFANTRY AND 8 OUT OF 9 TANKS WITH THIS FORCE.

TASK FORCE FULLER LAUNCHED NITE ATTACK AT 040300 OCTOBER 44 ADVANCED APPROXIMATELY 200 YARDS. 2 COUNTER-ATTACKS BY THE ENEMY WERE REPULSED.

DURING MORNING HOURS TROOPS RECEIVED HEAVY ARTILLERY FIRE.

AT 041100 A COORDINATED ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED WITH LITTLE SUCCESS. RECEIVED HEAVY ENEMY FIRE OF ALL CALIBERS. AIR SUPPORT BOMBED AND STRAFED ENEMY POSITIONS WITH UNDETERMINED RESULTS. ENGINEERS BUILT 28 FEET TREADWAY BRIDGE, REMOVED 1 MINE FIELD AND MAINTAINED ROADS.

TASK FORCE FULLER REPULSED A COUNTER-ATTACK AT 050630 OCTOBER 1944 BY INFANTRY, PRECEEDED BY HEAVY ARTILLERY PREPARATION, AT THE SAME DATE AN ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED SOUTH AGAINST MODERATE RESISTANCE UNTIL A SMALL WOODS WAS REACHED WHERE HEAVY RESISTANCE WAS MET. FIRE FROM NEBELWERFER, ARTY, AND SMALL ARMS FROM WELL DUG IN POSITIONS. DURING AFTERNOON SUSTAINED STRONG COUNTER-ATTACK FROM 1630 UNTIL DARKNESS, RECEIVING EXTREMELY HEAVY NEBELWERFER AND ARTY FIRE. LOSS OF C.O. A CO/38 AND NUMEROUS NCO'S AND ACCURATE ENEMY FIRE OF ALL CALIBERS FORCED WITH-DRAWAL TO ORIGINAL POSITION, IT ION, WHICH WAS MA MAINTAINED WITH STRONG ARTY. SUPPORT.

TASK FORCE WEMPLE MAINTAINED PRESENT POSITION WITH PATROLS TO NORTH EAST AND SOUTH.

(2)

SECRET

SECRET

ARTY FIRED HARRASSING FIRE DURING EARLY MORNING HOURS. HEAVY CONCENTRATIONS ASSISTED IN REPELLING COUNTER-ATTACKS; EXECUTED COUNTER-BATTERY ON SUSPECTED NEBELWERFER LOCATIONS.

87TH CAV. RCN, EXECUTED RECONNAISSANCE IN OUR SECTOR'S.

6 OCTOBER 1944, CC-R SPLIT INTO TWO (2) TASK FORCES CONTINUING ITS ATTACK ON OVERLOON.

TASK FORCE WEMPLE MAINTAINED POSITION, PATROLLED TO NORTHEAST AND SOUTH-EAST. PLACED HEAVY MORTAR CONCENTRATION AT 0630 ON GROUP OF HOUSES LOCATED IN OUR SECTOR AND SUSPECTED AS HAVING ENEMY DUG IN AROUND THESE BUILDINGS.

TASK FORCE FULLER MAINTAINED HIS POSITION, IT PATROLLED SOUTH IN WOODS.

82 ENGINEERS PLACED ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES IN FRONT OF OUR POSITIONS.

RCN EXECUTED VIC. BOXMEER, SAMBEEK, VORTUM AND IN VIC OF TASK FORCE FULLER.

ARTILLERY FIRED HARRASSING FIRES THRUOUT THE DAY.

TWO (2) AIR MISSIONS WERE FLOWN. TARGETS DESIGNATED. RESULTS OF BOMBING WERE VERY GOOD AND STRAFING EXCELLENT.

070830 OCT 44 CC-R WAS ORDERED TO REMAIN IN PRESENT POSITION UNTIL RELIEVED BY ELEMENTS OF THE 11TH ARMORED DIVISION (BR). UPON RELIEF COMMAND WILL BE ASSEMBLED AND MOVED OVER ROUTE TO ASSEMBLY AREA VICINITY ZOMEREN HOLLAND.

TROOPS MAINTAINED POSITIONS, EXECUTED SOME PATROLLING TO NORTH-EAST AND SOUTH-EAST.

TWO (2) AIR MISSIONS FLOWN WITH GOOD RESULTS OBTAINED IN BOTH BOMBING AND STRAFING.

RELIEF OF CC-R BY ELEMENTS OF 11 A.D. (BR) WAS STARTED AT 071800 OCT 44.

8 OCTOBER, 44 CC-R CLOSED INTO BIVOUAC AREA VICINITY OF ZOMEREN, HOLLAND, AT 0430. CC-R NOW CONSISTING OF 38TH, 17TH, 814TH TD (-A&B CO'S), C/33. PLANS WERE MADE FOR OUR NEXT OPERATION AGAINST THE ENEMY, AND PLANS FOR COUNTER-ATTACK WERE SUBMITTED TO DIVISION. CHURCH SERVICES WERE HELD FOR MEMBERS OF CC-R AT 1640.

RECONNAISSANCE OF ROADS IN DIVISION SECTOR WAS MADE 0900. EX.O. AND S-3 CONTACT OTHER COMBAT COMMANDS FOR ENEMY INFORMATION AND ROAD RECONNAISSANCE INFORMATION, AND MADE PLANS FOR RELIEF OF EITHER COMBAT COMMAND SHOULD WE BE DIRECTED. 814 T.D. WHICH HAD BEEN MAINTAINED ROAD BLOCKS IN SOUTHERN SECTOR OF DIVISION ZONE WAS RELEASED TO CC-R. CLOSED INTO ASSEMBLY AREA 091530 OCT 44.

CC-R, STILL IN DIVISION RESERVE ON OCT 10, CONTINUED RECONNAISSANCE OF ROADS AND AREAS IN DIVISION ZONE. REPAIRED ROADS AND MINOR BRIDGES IN CC-R SECTOR. INSTITUTED TRAINING PROGRAM IN ACCORDANCE WITH TRAINING AND OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS AS DIRECTED BY DIVISION.

(3)

SECRET

SECRET

11 OCTOBER 44, CC-R STILL IN BIVOUAC VICINITY OF ZOMEREN HOLLAND, CONTINUED RECONNAISSANCE OF ROADS AND AREAS IN DIVISION ZONE. C/33 ENGINEERS REPAIRED ROADS AND GENERAL TRAINING WAS CARRIED ON IN OTHER UNITS OF CC-R.

121000 OCTOBER 44 CC-R TOOK OVER ROAD BLOCKS FROM CC-B. ROAD BLOCKS WERE ESTABLISHED AND PATROLS MAINTAINED IN OUR SECTOR. TASK FORCE MACE CONSISTING OF A/38, 4/D/17, 1/C/33, 1/RCN/814, ADVANCED SOUTH FROM THE CANAL AT WIELPAD ON A FRONT OF APPROXIMATELY 2000 YARDS DOWN TO OSPEL, HOLLAND. THE BOIS LA DUE CANAL WAS CROSSED WITHOUT ANY OPPOSITION FROM THE ENEMY. TASK FORCE RETURNED ACROSS THE CANAL AT 121800 OCTOBER TO FORMER POSITION, BIVOUACED FOR THE NITE AFTER STRONG OUTPOSTS WERE ESTABLISHED.

FAIR AND GOOD WEATHER PREVAILED 13 OCTOBER 44 WHEN TASK FORCE MACE MOVED AT 0715 TO WOODS SOUTH OF LEENSEL AND COMPLETED SEARCH OF WOODS AT 1300. TASK FORCE THEN MOVED BY VEHICLES TO VICINITY OF EASTERN EDGE OF WOODS AT SCHEPERSBERG PEELKEN ROGELSCHEDIJK. AT 1820 TASK FORCE MACE RECEIVED ARTILLERY AIR BURSTS WHICH WERE REPORTED TO BE EXTREMELY ACCURATE. PERSONNEL OF CC-R AND UNITS WAS 91%, TANKS 87%, OTHER COMBAT VEHICLES 98% WITH MORALE EXCELLENT.

OUTPOSTS AND PATROLS IN OUR SECTOR WERE MAINTAINED 14 OCTOBER. FOUR PLATOONS FROM 38TH, EACH BREAKING UP INTO THREE (3) PATROLS WERE GIVEN THE MISSION OF MAKING A RECONNAISSANCE TO THE AREA SOUTH, TO DETERMINE THE STRENGTH OF ENEMY, HIS INSTALLATIONS AND ANY OTHER DATA THAT COULD BE OBTAINED.

PATROLS REPORTED SOME ENEMY DUG IN, ENEMY USING PEET HEAPS BEING USED AS DUG OUTS, AND ENEMY USING HOUSES IN VICINITY AS O.P.'S. CIVILIANS GAVE REPORTS THAT THEY WERE BEING HARRASSED AT NIGHTS BY GERMANS COMING ACROSS THE CANAL AND DEMANDING FOOD.

ONE PATROL FAILED TO RETURN.

OUTPOSTS AND PATROLS WERE CONTINUED IN OUR SECTOR 15 OCTOBER 44. TWO COMPANIES OF THE 38TH AND 2 COMPANIES OF THE 17 TK BN, OPERATED IN THE VICINITY OF OSPEL HEIDE AND MEIJEL, FIRED INTO HOUSES AND OTHER LOCATIONS TO CLEAR FIELDS OF FIRE AND DENY THEIR USE TO ENEMY TROOPS. (THIS MISSION WAS UNDER COMMAND OF LT. COL. FULLER).

B CO, 38 (-1PLAT) CONTINUED OPERATIONS DURING THE NIGHT IN ENDEAVOR TO TRAP HOSTILE PATROLS. INTERMITTENT LIGHT ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE WAS RECEIVED DURING THE DAY.

16 OCTOBER- CONTINUED OUTPOSTS AND ROAD PATROLS. CONDUCTED AGGRESSIVE PATROL ACTION AGAINST HOSTILE TANKS AND PERSONNEL REPORTED AS OBSERVED IN SECTOR. SOME OF THE PATROLS RECEIVED INTENSE SMALL ARMS, AUTOMATIC AND AIR BURST FIRE.

CC-R COMPONENTS WERE 92% ON PERSONNEL, 94% TANKS WITH MORALE EXCELLENT. SOME RAIN FELL 16 OCTOBER, VISIBILITY POOR AND WEATHER CLOUDY.

(4)

SECRET

SECRET

CC-R OPERATING A TASK FORCE WITH LT. COL. WM. H. G. FULLER IN COMMAND, WITH TROOPS CONSISTING OF 38TH A.I.B. (-), 1 PLATOON CO C, 17 AND 3RD PLATOON CO D/17TH, PIONEER PLATOON/814TH T.D., C/33RD (-1PLAT) MOVED TO ESTABLISH A BRIDGEHEAD AT CANAL CROSSING ON DEURNE-AMERIKA ROAD. ADVANCE WAS SLOW AS TASK FORCE RECEIVED SMALL ARMS FIRE OF ALL CALIBERS AND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FROM WELL DUG-IN POSITIONS AND PILL BOXES.

CC-R CONTINUED TO OUTPOST SECTOR, CONDUCTED RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE WITH 2 RIFLE PLATOONS IN EASTERN SECTOR ENCOUNTERING SMALL ARMS, MORTAR AND HIGH AIR BURST FIRE.

ON 171800 OCT 44, DIVISION ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS FOR TASK FORCE FULLER TO OPERATE TO THE EAST GENERALLY ALONG DEURNE-AMERIKA AXIS, MAKING A CROSSING OVER THE CANAL TO THE NORTH OF PROPOSED BRIDGE-SITE. IN THE FACE OF LIGHT ENEMY RESISTANCE, WE WERE TO SECURE ACTUAL BRIDGE-SITE UNTIL RELIEVED BY ELEMENTS OF CC-B. IN THE FACE OF HEAVY ENEMY RESISTANCE OUR EFFORT WAS TO BECOME DIVERSIONARY TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ENEMY FORCES EAST OF CANAL.

17TH OCTOBER AT 2200, C.O. CC-R ISSUED THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS TO LT. COL. FULLER: HOLD PRESENT POSITIONS TONIGHT. CC-B IS HOLDING JUST SOUTH OF THEIR LINE OF DEPARTURE UNTIL EARLY TOMORROW MORNING. CC-B WILL SEND A LIAISON OFFICER WITH RADIO TO YOUR CP TOMORROW MORNING. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, CONSIDERING VISIBILITY ONLY, RECONNOITER ROUTES TO CANAL BEFORE FIRST MORNING LIGHT. AT FIRST LIGHT PUSH ON TO OBJECTIVE. USE LOTS OF ARTILLERY, INCLUDING SMOKE TO BLIND HOSTILE OBSERVATION. 4 TD'S WILL ARRIVE CHURCH 0500. IF AIR IS AVAILABLE I WILL NOTIFY YOU SO THAT TARGET CAN BE MARKED BY COLORED SMOKE. GET UNITS REORGANIZED AND REINFORCED SO THAT PUSH AT FIRST LIGHT CAN BE MADE WITH VOGOR. IF IMPOSSIBLE TO CROSS CANAL KEEP UP LOTS OF FIRE AND MOVEMENT TO FACILITATE CC-B MOVEMENT TO SOUTH. USE ALL SUPPORTING WEAPONS LIBERALLY.

TASK FORCE FULLER CONTINUED ATTACK TO EAST AT 0600 ADVANCING SLOWLY AGAINST SMALL ARMS, MACHINE GUN, MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRE. AT 1430 WERE RECEIVING NO ENEMY FIRE BUT ENCOUNTERED A DENSE ANTI-TANK AND ANTI-PERSONNEL MINE FIELD VIC 703185 COVERED BY FIRE FROM EAST SIDE OF CANAL. ONE ARMORED CAR KNOCKED OUT BY MINE. AT 1730 UNITS WERE ON WEST BANK OF CANAL AND IN CONTACT WITH CC-B AT 708188. C/33 SUPPORTED BY BRITISH ENGINEERS WERE CLEARING MINE FIELD. ROAD BLOCKS: CONTINUED OUTPOSTS AND ROAD PATROLS THRU OUT SECTOR. ONE PLAT C/38 CLEARED ALL HOUSES AT KATSBERG AND ALL HOUSES SOUTH OF DONK TO WITHIN 100 YARDS OF CANAL. ARTILLERY: FIRED PREPARATION, CONCENTRATIONS ON CALL AND HARRASSING FIRES ON ENEMY OBSERVED MOVING TO THE EAST WITH EXCELLENT RESULTS. 814 TD (TANK DESTROYERS): FIRED DIRECT FIRE MISSIONS DESTROYING TWO ENEMY OBSERVATION POINTS. RECEIVED DIRECT AP FIRE FROM UNLOCATED ENEMY POSITIONS. DESTROYED ENEMY MACHINE GUN AND BOAT. CP MOVED TO A NEW LOCATION.

(5)

SECRET

SECRET

TASK FORCE FULLER AT 0600 19 OCTOBER 44, RESUMED OPERATIONS IN COORDINATED ATTACK WITH CC-B, ADVANCED TO WEST BANK OF VAN DEURNE CANAL ASSISTING ATTACK BY FIRE CLEARING AREA OF SNIPERS AND REMOVING MINE FIELDS AS DIRECTED BY CG CC-B. AT 1220 RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO RELIEVE CC-B IN MAINTAINING BRIDGEHEAD. MOVEMENT INITIATED TO EFFECT RELIEF. AT 1615 RECEIVED ORDERS CANCELLING PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS. AT 1770 CG-CC-B INFORMED FORCE COMMANDER CC-B WAS IN POSITION AND TASK FORCE FULLER INITIATED WITHDRAWAL, MOVING TO BIVOUAC AREA. ASTEN-MEIJEL PATROL DISCONTINUED. A/87 EXTENDED PATROL SECTOR TO INCLUDE MEIJEL AT 1700. 20 TO 25 ROUNDS OF LIGHT ARTILLERY FELL ON NEDERWEERT FROM 1030 TO 1100 WITH TWO DIRECT HITS 57MM ON OUR OP.; NO CASUALTIES AND OP STILL USABLE. OTHER BLOCKS AND PATROLS, NO CHANGE. ARTILLERY FIRED CONCENTRATIONS ON CALL AND SMOKE MARKING MISSION FOR AIR STRIKE. AIR MISSION AGAINST ENEMY OP TOWER AT 1645, RESULTS UNOBSERVED DUE TO GROUND HAZE.

AT 191800 48TH A.I.B. ATTACHED TO CC-R, 38TH A.I.B. RELIEVED UPON REORGANIZATION OF NEW ATTACHED UNIT, CC-R WOULD BE PREPARED TO RELIEVE CC-B FOR RESPONSIBILITY OF SECURITY OF THE BRIDGEHEAD.

AT 201900 DIVISION ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS THAT 814 T.D. (-) AND A/C AND F CO'S 87TH WERE RELIEVED FROM CC-R. TO CONTINUE RESPONSIBILITY OF BRIDGEHEAD AND EXTEND LINE OF BRIDGEHEAD BY ACTIVE PATROLLING, (ESTABLISHMENT OF GOOD. O.P.'S) TO FINALLY INCLOSING WIDTH OF NEW Z OF RESPONSIBILITY. CC-R TO MAINTAIN IN BRIDGES IN ZONE.

21 OCTOBER 44, CC-R NOW CONSISTING OF 48TH, 17TH, C/33RD, C/203, AND 434TH AFA IN DIRECT SUPPORT. RELIEF OF ALL CC-R OUTPOSTS BY 87 CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON (MECHANIZED) IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPERATION INSTRUCTION, HQ 7 ARMORED DIVISION, 201000 OCT 44 COMPLETED 211300 OCT 44. 48TH ENLARGED BRIDGEHEAD AND CONDUCTED VIGOROUS PATROLLING. 17TH MOVED TO NEW POSITION CLOSING AT 1400. ESTABLISHED OUTPOSTS. C/33 MOVED TO POSITION DIRECTED. ONE PLATOON CONTINUED CLEARING MINES. ONE PLATOON WAS ATTACHED TO 48TH. C/203 ALSO MOVED TO POSITION AS DIRECTED WITH ONE PLATOON IN POSITION AT CC CP. ONE PLAT IN POSITION AT BRIDGE. ALL GUNS WERE IN FIRING POSITION AT 1545A. ARTILLERY SUPPORTED BRIDGEHEAD OPERATIONS ON CALL.

MAJOR SWEAT, FRED C. 0-399-193 JOINED CC-R ON LOAN FROM G-3. MAJOR SWEAT ACTED IN THE CAPACITY OF EX. OFFICER AND S-3.

LT. COL'S STREETER AND WILLIAMS, EX. O. AND S-3 RESPECTIVELY, RELIEVED FROM ASSIGNMENT TO CC-R AND TRANSFERRED TO 3RD ARMORED DIVISION AND 29TH INF. DIV. RESPECTIVELY.

22 OCTOBER 44. 48TH EXTENDED THE BRIDGEHEAD ON DEURNE-AMERIKA ROAD. C/33 ENGINEERS COMPLETED A BAILEY BRIDGE OVER CRATER THAT THE GERMANS HAD BLOWN ON OUR AXIS OF ADVANCE. CONTACT TO THE NORTH WAS MADE AND MAINTAINED WITH THE BRITISH 11TH ARMORED DIVISION.

C/17TH TANK MOVED INTO FIRING POSITION TO REINFORCE ARTILLERY FIRE,

(6)

SECRET

SECRET

ACTIVE PATROLLING WAS MAINTAINED AND SOME CONTACT MADE WITH THE ENEMY.

23 OCTOBER 44, CC-R CONTINUED ITS ASSIGNED MISSION, SENDING OUT DAYLIGHT PATROLS TO THE EAST AND SOUTH OF BRIDGEHEAD, OUTPOSTS WERE MOVED TO NEW POSITIONS. 48TH BEAT OFF ENEMY PATROLS OPERATING IN OUR ZONE AFTER A 45 MIN. ARTILLERY BARRAGE; SOME ENEMY CASUALTIES (UNESTIMATED) AND ONE PRISONER WAS TAKEN. WEATHER WAS CLOUDY WITH POOR VISIBILITY.

CC-R CONTINUED HOLDING BRIDGEHEAD, AND ACTIVE PATROLLING I ITS SECTOR 24 OCTOBER 44. PATROL MAINTAINED CONTACT WITH BRITISH 11TH ARMORED DIVISION ON NORTH. LITTLE ENEMY RESISTANCE WAS ENCOUNTERED.

AT 241100 OCTOBER 44, CC-R RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO RELIEVE C/203 AND C/33. CONTINUE RESPONSIBILITY OF BRIDGEHEAD UNTIL RELIEVED BY CC-B; WITHDRAWAL UPON RELIEF BY CC-A VICINITY ZOMEREN, HOLLAND.

25 OCTOBER 44. CONTINUED ACTIVE PATROLLING IN ZONE UNTIL RELIEVED BY CC-B. RELIEF OF CC-R BY CC-B COMMENCED 0900. ALL CC-R TROOPS EXCEPT 2 PLATOONS B/48 RELIEVED BY 1500. 2 PLATOONS B/48 RELIEVED 1930. RESPONSIBILITY OF ZONE ASSUMED BY CC-B AT 1645. 48 AIB (-2 PLATOONS) CLOSED IN BILLETS AT ASTEN, HOLLAND, 1600. 2 PLATOONS B/48 CLOSED ASTEN 2200. 17 TANK BATTALION ASSEMBLED ALL ELEMENTS IN BN AREA BY 1330 BUT UNABLE TO MOVE TO NEW AREA BECAUSE BILLETS NOW OCCUPIED BY OTHER TROOPS. C/203 RELIEVED ATTACHED CC-R 0900. C/33 (-1ST PLAT) RELIEVED ATTACHED CC-R 0900. 1ST PLATOON RELIEVED ATTACHED CC-R 1530. CP CC-R CLOSED VIC VREKWIJK 1330 AND OPENED ASTEN SAME HOUR.

26 OCTOBER CC-R IN RESERVE. REHABILITATION OF MEN, WEAPONS AND VEHICLES WAS BEING CARRIED ON. WEATHER WAS COLD AND CLOUDY.

CC-R ON 27 OCTOBER 44 RECEIVED ORDERS AT 0740 TO MOVE OUT TO REPEL AN ENEMY ATTACK VIC MEIJEL, A AND C CO'S 48 MOVED OUT 0812 TO ASSEMBLY AREA. TASK FORCE WEMPLE, C AND D CO'S 17TH ARRIVED ASSEMBLY AREA AT 0925 AND IMMEDIATELY MOVED OUT WITH MISSION TO DESTROY ENEMY AND CONTINUE MOVING SOUTH. THIS FORCE REACHED LINE AND AT CLOSE OF PERIOD WAS ATTEMPTING TO PUSH ITS LINE SOUTH TO BOUNDARY. 48 PASSED THROUGH 87 RECONNAISSANCE AT 1455. ALL ATTACKS MET STIFF RESISTANCE CONSISTING OF TANKS, ANTI-TANK FIRE, ARTILLERY AND INFANTRY. AT 1300 CC-R TOOK OVER 87 SECTOR AND 87 ATTACHED TO CC-R. 1/814 WAS ATTACHED TO CC-R AND FURTHER ATTACHED TO TASK FORCE WEMPLE AT 1200. 1/1/814 ATTACHED AT 1730 AND FURTHER ATTACHED 48TH INF AT THIS TIME. 1/23 ATTACHED CC-R UPON RELIEF OF CC-B IN ZONE AND FURTHER ATTACHED TASK FORCE WEMPLE BUT HAD NOT ARRIVED AT CLOSE OF PERIOD. CC-A TASK FORCE JOINED A/87 AT 1550 AND AT CLOSE OF PERIOD WERE PRESSING FORWARD TO POSITION. 87TH CONTINUED OPERATIONS IN ASSIGNED ZONE. AT 0610 RECEIVED INTENSE

(7)

SECRET

SECRET

ARTILLERY BARRAGE FOR 30 MINUTES ON ENTIRE FRONT, TROOP C FORCED TO WITHDRAW FROM MEIJEL BY ENEMY INFANTRY ESTIMATED AT 250. TROOP B MOVED FORWARD TO SUPPORT TROOP C. AT 1010 A COUNTER-ATTACK CENTERED ON ASTEN-MEIJEL ROAD. CO F ATTACHED 1 PLATOON ENVELOPING NORTH FLANK ENEMY POSITIONS. CO F (-) DOWN MAIN AXIS TO PROTECT BRIDGE AGAINST AGGRESSIVE ENEMY PATROLS. TROOP D WAS FORCED TO WITHDRAW SLIGHTLY, IN THE VIC OF HEITRAK AND NEERKANT. AT 1300 SQUADRON WAS ATTACHED CC-R.

28 OCTOBER 44 TROOPS OF CC-R CONSISTED OF 48TH A.I.BN (-), 2/17TH (MED), 87TH (-), 1/C/33, 2/B/814, OPERATING AS TASK FORCE UNDER LT. COL. CHAPPIUS, ATTACKED AT 0700, MEETING STIFF ENEMY RESISTANCE.

ENEMY TANKS AND INFANTRY IN NUMBERS OFFERED STUBBORN RESISTANCE, MAKING ADVANCE VERY DIFFICULT AS WELL AS FOR HINDERING OUR SCREENING OPERATIONS.

POSITIONS WERE CONSOLIDATED, INFANTRY WERE WELL DUG-IN AND PLANS WERE MADE TO HOLD FOR THE NITE AND ATTACK THE FOLLOWING MORNING.

281740- CC-R RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM DIVISION DIRECTING US TO CONSOLIDATE AND HOLD PRESENT POSITION, CLEAR ENEMY FROM ASSIGNED ZONE AND SECURE LINE OF NORD CANAL IN ASSIGNED ZONE, AND TO ALSO MAINTAIN CONTACT ON LEFT AND RIGHT WITH CC-B AND CC-A.

DURING THE NIGHT 29 OCTOBER A AND B/48TH WERE WITHDRAWN TO POSITIONS TO BUILD UP LINE OF C/48TH. REPEATED ENEMY COUNTER-ATTACKS WITH BOTH TANKS AND INFANTRY IN FORCE, FORCED THE INFANTRY BACK FROM ORIGINAL POSITIONS.

TANKS IN FORCE ATTEMPTED TO OVER-RUN POSITIONS HELD BY INFANTRY. 2 PLATOONS OF B/48TH, REINFORCED 814 T.D.'S AND TANKS HELD THE POSITION.

SUPPORTING ARTILLERY, 440TH AND ROYAL ARTILLERY, 25TH FIELD REGIMENT, 8TH ARMY GROUP (BR), MET ALL CALLS FOR ARTILLERY SUPPORT. THE 25TH FIELD REGIMENT FIRED OVER 10,000 ROUNDS ON THE 29 OCTOBER 44.

ARTILLERY WAS GREATLY RESPONSIBLE FOR REPELLING A GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACK WHEN THEY TRIED A DOUBLE-ENVELOPEMENT SUPPORTED BY TANKS AND ARTILLERY, OF THE POSITION HELD BY A CRITICALLY DECIMATED INFANTRY BATTALION.

RELIEF OF CC-R IN SECTOR WAS EFFECTED BY 15TH DIVISION (SCOTTISH). RELIEF STARTED AT APPROXIMATELY 292030 OCTOBER 44 AND WAS COMPLETED AT 300200 OCT 44.

CC-R UPON RELIEF BY 15 DIVISION (SCOTTISH) CLOSED INTO ASSEMBLY AREA AT 300730 OCTOBER 44, VIC MARHEEZE, HOLLAND AS DIVISION RESERVE.

DURING LATER PORTION OF PERIOD RELIEVED OF ALL TROOPS EXCEPT 17TH TANK BATTALION, 87TH CAV. RCN. SQDN, AND A/203.

AT 301840- RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO MOVE TO SCREEN AND SECURE NORTHWEST OF NORD AND NEDERWEERT CANALS WITHIN ZONE.

310550 OCTOBER 44- MOVED ADVANCED C.P. FROM VIC MARHEEZE, HOLLAND TO NEDERWEERT, HOLLAND, WHERE CC-R OUTPOSTED AND OCCUPIED POSITIONS NORTHWEST OF NORD AND NEDERWEERT CANALS. LITTLE ENEMY ACTIVITY OBSERVED. SOME INTERMITTENT ARTILLERY FIRE RECEIVED. AT 311630 23RD A.I.B. ATTACHED CC-R.

(8)

SECRET

SECRET

B/23 COMMITTED TO REINFORCE POSITIONS NOW HELD BY 87TH CAV. RCN.
SQD. IN ASSIGNED ZONE.

AT MIDNIGHT, 31 OCTOBER 44, TROOPS OF CC-R CONSISTED OF 17TH TANK
BATTALION, 23RD ARMORED INFANTRY BATTALION (-), 87TH CAVALRY RECONNAISSANCE
SQUADRON, MECHANIZED (-), A CO., 203RD AAA., WITH 440TH ARMORED FIELD
ARTILLERY IN DIRECT SUPPORT.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

(signed)
NORWOOD G. READ
CAPTAIN, INFANTRY

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS CC-R
7TH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 257, U.S. ARMY

30 NOVEMBER 1944

SUBJECT : AFTER ACTION REPORT, MONTH OF NOVEMBER, 1944.

TO : THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.
(THROUGH CHANNELS)

1 NOVEMBER 1944: CC-R STAFF CONSISTED OF COL JOHN L. RYAN JR., COMMANDING, LT. COL. SMITH, ERNEST M., EXECUTIVE OFFICER, MAJOR FRED C. SWEAT, S-3, MAJOR GLENN G. HAIRSTON, SURGEON, CAPT. CLEMENT O. STEVENSON, S-4, CAPT. NORWOOD G. READ, S-2, LT. JAMES F. STIDHAM, COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER AND LT. JOHN A TREANORE, COMMANDANT.

TROOPS OF CC-R CONSISTED OF 17TH TANK BN., 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ. (MECZ), 23RD A. I. BN. (-), WITH 440TH A.F.A. AND A/203 AAA IN SUPPORT. C.P. OF CC-R LOCATED IN NEDERWEERT, HOLLAND.

CC-R HAD A MISSION OF HOLDING ALONG THE LE DUC AND BOIS DE NORD CANALS. THE LINE-WAS OCCUPIED AND PATROLS WERE MAINTAINED BY 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ.

C/17TH TANK BN. WAS MOVED TO VICINITY LEER, HOLLAND, ON ALERT FOR IMMEDIATE MOVEMENT TO ANY PART OF THE SECTOR. INTERMITTENT ARTILLERY FIRE WAS RECEIVED THRUOUT THE DAY IN NEDERWEERT AND ALONG THE LE DUC AND BOIS DE NORD CANAL. C.P. CC-R RECEIVED DIRECT HIT ON THE ROOF.

WEATHER WAS COOL WITH POOR VISIBILITY.

AT 2300, DIVISION ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS DETACHING A/203 AAA AND GAVE CC-R THE MISSION TO CONTINUE TO HOLD ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SUPPORT BY FIRE THE ATTACK OF CC-A TOWARD CANAL DE NORD.

2 NOVEMBER: AN OFFICER WAS SENT TO CC-A TO ESTABLISH LIAISON BETWEEN CC-R AND CC-A AND TO COORDINATE FIRE SUPPORT OF CC-R IN THE ATTACK.

0800, LT. COL. BOYLAN (C.O., 87TH CAV. RCN. PHONED THAT EVERYTHING WAS QUIET THE PRECEEDING NIGHT.

AT THIS TIME C.O. CC-R INSTRUCTED LT. COL. BOYLAN THAT RELIEF OF 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ. BY 23RD A.I.BN. WOULD START IMMEDIATELY; GUIDES TO BE AVAILABLE TO 23RD A.I.BN.

AT 1106 23RD A.I.BN HAD TAKEN OVER THE ENTIRE SECTOR FORMERLY HELD BY 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ. WITHOUT INCIDENT.

LT. ROBERTS AND SQUAD, 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ. DRAGGED THE LE DUC CANAL FOR POSSIBLE ENEMY TELEPHONE LINES. NOTHING FOUND.

INTERMITTENT ENEMY ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE WAS RECEIVED THRUOUT THE MORNING WITH SLIGHT DAMAGE TO ONE HALF-TRACK AT C.P. CC-R.

23RD A.I.BN. SUPPORTED ATTACK OF CC-A BY FIRING ASSAULT GUNS, MORTARS AND HEAVY MACHINE GUNS, ON ALL OBSERVED AND PROBABLE ENEMY POSITIONS TO THEIR FRONT, BURNING SEVERAL HOUSES AND HAYSTACKS.

VISUAL CONTACT WITH CC-A ESTABLISHED AT 1115.

440TH A.F.A. FIRED 324 ROUNDS PREARRANGED HARASSING FIRE DURING THE NIGHT AND FIRED MISSIONS ON CALL THRUOUT THE DAY FOR A TOTAL OF 1400 ROUNDS DURING DAY OF 2 NOVEMBER 44.

COMBAT EFFICIENCY OF CC-R ON 2 NOVEMBER WAS: TANKS--56%, OTHER COMBAT VEHICLES--92%, PERSONNEL--93%, MORALE --EXCELLENT.

3 NOVEMBER: CC-R WAS STILL HOLDING ALONG DE NORD AND LE DUC CANALS, AND SUPPORTING CC-A IN THEIR ATTACK WITH DIRECT FIRE.

LIAISON OFFICER BETWEEN CC-A AND CC-R NOTIFIED C.O. CC-R THAT 38TH A.I.BN. HAD JUMPED OFF AT 0645 AND THAT RAPID PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE.

87TH CAV. RCN. SQ. WAS RELIEVED FROM ATTACHED TO CC-R AT 030730.

AT 0805, LIAISON OFFICER BETWEEN CC-R AND DIVISION ARRIVED AT CC-R COMMAND POST WITH INSTRUCTIONS THAT 23RD A.I.BN. WAS TO BE RELEASED TO DIVISION CONTROL AND TO RECONNOITER FOR ASSEMBLY POSITIONS.

AT 1100, C.O. CC-R ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS TO LT. COL. RHEA (C. O. 23RD A.I.BN.) TO WITHDRAW REMAINING ELEMENTS. ATTACK OF CC-A HAD CLEARED ENEMY RESISTANCE ACROSS CANAL BOIS LE DUC.

DIVISION DIRECTED CC-R AT 1225 TO ASSEMBLE 23RD A.I.BN. IN OUR VICINITY, AND THAT CC-A DID NOT CONTEMPLATE USING THEM.

AT 1430, TASK FORCE VVEMPLE, CONSISTING OF C/17TH TANK BN., AND B/33RD ENGINEERS COMPLETED THE RELIEF, OCCUPYING ONLY THAT PART OF THE POSITION AT THE JUNCTION OF THE CANALS.

ASSAULT GUNS WERE IN POSITION ALONG OUR FRONT TO GIVE FIRE SUPPORT IF NEEDED.

23RD A.I.BN. RECONNOITERED NEW ASSEMBLY AREA EAST OF LE DUC CANAL.

440TH A.F.A. FIRED 200 ROUNDS HARASSING FIRE DURING THE NIGHT AND 1600 ROUNDS IN SUPPORT OF CC-A'S ATTACK.

4. NOVEMBER: CC-R RECEIVED MESSAGE AT 1155 FROM C.G. ATTACHING 23RD A.I.BN., 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ., C/33RD ENGINEERS, B/814TH T.D., D/17TH TANK BN. TO CC-R; 17TH TANK BN. (-COMPANY "D", AND ALL ASSAULT GUNS) RELIEVED FROM ATTACHMENT.

CC-R WAS TO ASSUME MISSION OF 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ., IN ZONE OF CC-A IN ADDITION TO ITS PRESENT MISSION. CHANGES EFFECTIVE 1230, EXCEPT FOR UNITS ENGAGED.

CC-R TO ASSUME SECURITY OF CANAL DU NORD PROGRESSIVE AS NORTH BANK OF CANAL WAS CLEARED OF ENEMY BY CC-A WITHIN ZONE. CC-R WAS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR BLOWING BRIDGE ACROSS DENORD CANAL AND BRIDGES ON CANAL LE DUC, IN EMERGENCY ONLY.

AIR SUPPORT WAS AVAILABLE ON CALL, WEATHER PERMITTING.

ENGINEERS REMOVED MINES IN OUR SECTOR.

AT DARK 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ. ESTABLISHED LISTENING POSTS IN FRONT OF OUR LINE. LITTLE ENEMY ACTIVITY WAS REPORTED.

5 NOVEMBER: CC-R CONTINUED SECURITY OF ZONE ASSIGNED WITH OUTPOSTS ON THE DE NORD AND BOIS LE DUC CANALS.

FIRING POSITIONS FOR ASSAULT GUNS WERE IMPROVED AND ALTERNATE POSITIONS PREPARED. ENGINEERS CONTINUED CLEARANCE OF MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS AND MAINTENANCE OF ROADS AND BRIDGES IN CC-R AREA.

COMBAT EFFICIENCY OF CC-R WAS: TANKS--69%, OTHER VEHICLES--97%, PERSONNEL--98%. MORALE WAS EXCELLENT. COOL WEATHER PREVAILED WITH POOR TO GOOD VISIBILITY.

AT 1610 G-3 INFORMED C.O. CC-R THAT 23RD A.I.BN. WOULD RELIEVE 48TH A.I.BN. (ATTACHED CC-A) BEGINNING AT 2000. 23RD A.I.BN. RELIEVED FROM CC-R, AND 48TH A.I.BN. ATTACHED, TO CC-R.

PLANS WERE MADE FOR RELIEF OF 48TH A.I.BN. BY 23RD A.I.BN. AND RELIEF STARTED AT 2000. RELIEF WAS COMPLETED AT 0430 THE FOLLOWING MORNING.

6 NOVEMBER: UNITS OF CC-R CONTINUED OUTPOSTING AND PATROLLING WITHIN OUR ZONE. ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS AND RECONNAISSANCE WAS CONTINUED.

PLANS WERE MADE 6 NOVEMBER 44, FOR A/48TH A.I.BN. TO HELP 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ; HOLD POSITIONS ALONG DE NORD CANAL.

AS A RESULT OF INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY C.O. CC-R THE FRONT HELD BY 87TH. CAV. RCN. SQ. WAS MATERIALLY REDUCED, WITH A/48TH A.I.BN. TAKING OVER LEFT FLANK OF SECTOR. NEW POSITIONS TO BE OCCUPIED WERE TAKEN UP AT 061900 NOVEMBER 44, UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS.

ENGINEERS CONTINUED CLEARING MINE FIELDS AND BOOBY TRAPS, AND MAINTENANCE OF ROADS AND BRIDGES.

7 NOVEMBER: TROOPS OF CC-R CONSISTED OF 48TH A.I.BN., 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ., C/33RD ENGINEERS, B/814TH T.D., D/17TH TANK BN. WITH ASSAULT GUNS, AND D/203RD AAA; 444TH A.F.A. WAS IN DIRECT SUPPORT.

CC-R CONTINUED TO HOLD POSITIONS ALONG THE BOIS LE DUC AND DU NORD CANALS.

D/17TH TANK BN. AND ASSAULT GUNS WERE RELIEVED FROM ATTACHED TO CC-R AT 1600. REVERTING TO BN. CONTROL. D/17TH TANK BN. AND ASSAULT GUNS MOVED TO 17TH TANK BN. ASSEMBLY AREA VICINITY MARHEEZE, HOLLAND, CLOSING AT 1655.

LT. COL. FRED M. WARREN., O 266 2471: CAV., REPORTED TO CC-R HQS. FOR DUTY

AT 1430 C.O. CC-R ISSUED THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS TO C.O. 48TH A.I.BN., 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ., "C" AND B/33RD ENGINEERS, B/814TH T.D., D/203RD AAA; RELIEF OF CC-R FROM PRESENT MISSION BY 152 BRIGADE (BRITISH) WILL BE EXECUTED 7-8 NOVEMBER 1944 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLAN OUTLINED BELOW.

PLAN: ELEMENTS 152 BRIGADE WILL MOVE INTO CC-R SECTOR BEGINNING 1620. THREE INFANTRY BATTALIONS LOCATED VICINITY KRIJEL AND OSPEL, CLOSING THESE AREAS, APPROXIMATELY 2000.

48TH A.I.BN.: UPON NOTIFICATION BY C.O. 5 SEAFORTH BATTALION, THAT THE THREE INFANTRY BATTALIONS OF THE 152 ARE IN POSITIONS STATED IN PLAN, MOVE BY COMPANY TO VEHICLE PARK WEST OF CANAL LE DUC; THENCE VIA ROUTES INDICATED ON OVERLAY ISSUED NOW TO ASSIGNED ASSEMBLY AREA. VEHICLES EAST OF CANAL LE DUC WILL BE MOVED FIRST, AFTER NOTIFICATION THAT THE RELIEVING TROOPS ARE IN POSITION. PRIORITY ON OSPEL-HORIK ROAD TO CC-A 2000 TO 0700.

87TH CAV. RCN. SQ.: UPON NOTIFICATION THAT INFANTRY BATTALIONS 152 BRIGADE ARE IN POSITION ACCORDING TO PLAN, REMAIN INITIALLY IN PRESENT POSITIONS; MOVE 0400 TO ASSEMBLY AREAS REAR PRESENT POSITIONS PREPARED TO BEGIN MOVEMENT BY INFILTRATION AT 0700. MOVEMENT WILL COMMENCE UPON NOTIFICATION BY CC-A DIRECT TO 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ. THAT ALL CC-A ELEMENTS HAVE CLEARED ROAD OSPEL-SOUTH BRIDGE.

C/33RD ENGINEERS: ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ. AND FOLLOW 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ. VIA ROUTE INDICATED ON OVERLAY TO ASSEMBLY AREA. MAINTAIN ROADS WITHIN ZONE UNTIL TIME FOR MOVEMENT.

B/33RD ENGINEERS: PREPARE TO WITHDRAW TO VEHICLE PARK UPON ORDER OF C:O. CC-R ANYTIME AFTER 0800. AS SOON AS CLOSED IN VEHICLE PARK, MOVE TO ASSEMBLY AREA INDICATED ON OVERLAY.

B/814TH T.D.: COMPANY (LESS PLATOON ATTACHED 87TH CAV. RCN: SQ.) MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO ASSEMBLY AREA SHOWN ON OVERLAY. PLATOON ATTACHED 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ. WILL MOVE

WITH 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ.

D/203RD AAA: BE PREPARED TO MOVE 0900 ON ORDER C.O. CC-R.

D/17TH TANK BN: D/17TH TANK BN. AND ASSAULT GUNS 17TH TAN BN.
RELIEVED ATTACHED CC-R 1600 NOVEMBER 44, AND WILL MOVE AT THAT TIME TO
17TH TANK BN. ASSEMBLY AREA.

UNITS WILL REPORT: WHEN FIRST ELEMENTS INITIATE MOVEMENT FROM
PRESENT POSITION; WHEN ALL ELEMENTS CLEAR CANAL LE DUC; WHEN CLOSED IN
ASSEMBLY AREAS. 87TH CAV. RCN. SQ. REPORT WHEN PREPARED TO MOVE FROM
INITIAL ASSEMBLY AREA TO AREA WEST OF CANAL LE DUC.

RELIEF OF FIRST ELEMENTS OF CC-R STARTED 2320 AND LAST ELEMENTS OF
CC-R (B/33RD ENGINEERS) RELIEVED AT 0945 8 NOVEMBER. ALL ELEMENTS OF CC-R
CLOSED INTO ASSEMBLY AREA 1224. C.P. OF CC-R LOCATED VICINITY OF
MARHEEZE, HOLLAND.

8 NOVEMBER: INSTRUCTIONS FOR PROPOSED MOVE OF CC-R FROM VICINITY
MARHEEZE, HOLLAND, TO CONCENTRATION AREA VICINITY OF BANHOLT, HOLLAND,
HAD BEEN ISSUED TO UNITS BY CC-R IN F.O. #5, DATED 072200 NOVEMBER. THE
ROUTE WAS WEERT, MOLENBEERSEL, MAESEYCK, LANKLAER, MAASTRICHT, BRIDGE
ACROSS MAAS RIVER, HEER, GRONSVELD, ST. GEERTUID.

9 NOVEMBER: FIRST ELEMENT OF CC-R CROSSED I.P. AT 0939. DELAY
BEING DUE TO CC-A FAILING TO CLEAR I.P. IN SCHEDULED TIME. MARCH WAS MADE
IN RAIN AND SNOW. DISTANCE TRAVELED WAS 44.6 MILES. CLOSED INTO NEW
ASSEMBLY AREA AT BANHOLT, HOLLAND 1600.

10 NOVEMBER: PURSUANT TO DIVISION ORDER CC-R CONSISTED OF 38TH
A.I.BN. AND 17TH TANK BN.

REHABILITATION OF PERSONNEL AND ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE AND
RECONNAISSANCE OF ROUTES WAS ACCOMPLISHED.

11 NOVEMBER: TRAINING INSTRUCTION CONDUCTED TO INCLUDE CREW DRILL
ON ALL CREW SERVED WEAPONS, SCOUTING AND PATROLLING, REMOVAL OF MINES AND
BOOBY TRAPS, TERRAIN APPRECIATION, AND OTHER SUBJECTS SET FORTH IN
TRAINING DIRECTIVE, HQS. 7TH ARMORED DIVISION., 9 NOVEMBER 44.

12 NOVEMBER: TRAINING WAS BEING CONDUCTED AS OUTLINED BY DIVISION.
MAINTENANCE OF VEHICLES AND WEAPONS AND ALL EQUIPMENT WAS CONDUCTED.

LECTURE ON "CONDUCT IN GERMANY" FOR OFFICER AND NON-COMMISSIONED
OFFICERS OF THE FIRST 3 GRADES OF 33RD

ENGINEERS, 814TH T.D., 17TH TANK BN., AND 38TH A.I.BN. CONDUCTED BY MILITARY GOVERNMENT OFFICER.

13, 14, 15, AND 16 NOVEMBER: CC-R CONDUCTED COMBINED TANK-INFANTRY PROBLEMS. THE PURPOSE OF THESE PROBLEMS WERE TO TRAIN THE SMALL INFANTRY-TANK TEAM IN CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATION REQUIRED FOR SUCCESS IN AN OPERATION OF COMBINED ARMS. (SEE INCLOSURE #1)
CONCURRENT TRAINING WAS AS PRESCRIBED BY DIVISION.

17 NOVEMBER: UNITS OF CC-R CONTINUED TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE OF VEHICLES AND WEAPONS.

COMBAT EFFICIENCY OF CC-R ON 17 NOVEMBER WAS: TANKS--66%, PERSONNEL--98.5%, MORALE EXCELLENT.

18 NOVEMBER: DIVISION DIRECTED DAY OF REST, WITH ONLY NECESSARY GUARD AND FATIGUE BEING EXECUTED.

19 AND 20 NOVEMBER: TRAINING AS PRESCRIBED BY DIVISION.

21 NOVEMBER: ANOTHER TANK-INFANTRY PROBLEM WAS CONDUCTED BY CC-R. AT 1255 G-3 CALLED C.O. CC-R INFORMING HIM TO CANCEL TRAINING FOR THE AFTERNOON AND MAKE PLANS FOR MOVEMENT TO VICINITY WEST OF HEERLEN, AND TO PREPARE FOR OPERATIONS TO THE EAST. TRAINING WAS CANCELLED AND PLANS FOR MOVEMENT MADE.

22 NOVEMBER: THE FOLLOWING OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED A AT 0030 TO C.O. 38TH A.I.BN. AND 814TH T.D: CC-R ASSEMBLES NORTH OF VALKENBURG PREPARED FOR OPERATIONS TO THE EAST. BILLETING PARTIES AND GUIDES REPORT TO LT. COL. WARREN AT CC-R C.P. 0700. ALL AA GUNS WILL BE MANNED. REPORTS WILL BE MADE FROM UNITS ON CLOSING; SUBMIT OVERLAY SHOWING COMPANY AREAS AND C.P. LOCATIONS. RADIO SILENCE.

CC-R AND ATTACHED UNITS MOVED FROM BANHOLT, HOLLAND, TO VICINITY SCHIMMERT, HOLLAND, CROSSING DIVISION I.P. AT MARGRATEN, HOLLAND, AT 0930. ALL ELEMENTS OF CC-R CLOSED INTO ASSEMBLY AREA VICINITY SCHIMMERT, HOLLAND, AT 1200. RAINY WEATHER WITH POOR VISIBILITY PREVAILED.

CALL FROM G-3 TO C.O. CC-R AT 2118 ALERTING A/814TH T.D. FOR MOVEMENT ANYTIME AFTER 0830; C.O. OF A/814TH T.D. TO REPORT TO COMMAND COMMANDING GENERAL, 2ND ARMORED DIVISION, 0830, FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

23 NOVEMBER: THANKSGIVING DAY SPENT IN MAINTENANCE

OF VEHICLES AND PERSONNEL IN THE MORNING; ONLY NECESSARY FATIGUE AND SECURITY IN THE AFTERNOON.

24, 25, AND 26 NOVEMBER: TRAINING AS PRE-SCRIBED BY DIVISION. ASSAULT GUN CREWS OF 38TH A.I.BN. RECEIVED INSTRUCTION FROM 434TH A.F.A. BN IN THE 105MM HOWITZER.

AT 2045, :26 NOVEMBER, CC-R WAS NOTIFIED BY G-3 THAT 17TH TANK BN. WAS RELIEVED FROM ATTACHMENT 84TH INF. DIV. AND ATTACHED CC-R, AT NOON 27TH FOR SUPPORTING FIRES WITH DIVISION ARTILLERY. DIVISION ARTILLERY REPRESENTATIVES WERE TO GUIDE 17TH TANK BN. TO PREVIOUSLY RECONNOITERED AREAS. BATTALION WAS TO CLOSE IN NEW POSITIONS BY 1630 27TH NOVEMBER.

27 NOVEMBER: UNITS OF CC-R CONTINUED TRAINING AND MAINTENANCE OF VEHICLES AND WEAPONS, AND RECONNAISSANCE OF AREA IN THE VICINITY OF UBACH, GERMANY, FOR POSSIBLE MOVE.

DIVISION ISSUED OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS AT 1500 ATTACHING 38TH A.I.BN., 17TH TANK BN., B/40TH TANK BN., D/40TH TANK BN., 1/B/814TH T.D., 1/C/814TH T.D. TO CC-R. 814TH T.D., (-) WAS RELIEVED FROM ATTACHED TO CC-R.

CC-R WAS INSTRUCTED TO MOVE 28 NOVEMBER, BY ROUTES AND TIME AS APPROVED BY XIII CORPS TO PREVIOUSLY RECONNOITERED AREA EAST OF WURM RIVER IN VICINITY OF UBACH, GERMANY. ALSO TO PREPARE PLANS FOR EMPLOYMENT TO NORTH, NORTHEAST, AND EAST; MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH 84TH AND 102ND INFANTRY DIVISIONS; 17TH TANK BN TO REMAIN :WITH DIVISION ARTILLERY, BUT AVAILABLE TO CC-R IF NECESSARY.

C/33RD ENGINEERS WERE ATTACHED FOR MOVEMENT ONLY. AFTER SWEEPING CC-R AREA OF MINES C/33RD ENGINEERS ATTACHED TO 40TH TANK BN (-).

28 NOVEMBER: TROOPS OF CC-R AS OF 0800 CONSISTED OF 38TH A.I.BN., 17TH TANK BN., B AND D/40TH TANK BN., 1/B/814 T.D., 1/C/814TH T.D., ORDNANCE DETACHMENT/129TH ORDNANCE, AND MEDICAL DETACHMENT/77TH MEDICAL BATTALION.

AT 0800, C.O. CC-R REPORTED TO C.P. 84TH INF. DIV FOR CONFERENCE AND THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS WERE REACHED; C/40TH TANK BN. AND D/40TH TANK BN TO REMAIN IN PRESENT POSITIONS. C/33RD ENGINEERS TO CLEAR GAPS ACROSS ANTITANK DITCH. THREE M-36 T.D.'S MOVE TO DUG IN POSITIONS NORTH OF SUGGERATH PREPARED TO FIRE NORTH, NORTHEAST, AND EAST; FOUR M-36 T.D.'S MOVE TO CONCEALED POSITIONS JUST SOUTH OF GEREONSWEILER PREPARED TO FIRE NORTHEAST AND EAST; TO RECONNOITER POSITIONS ON HIGH GROUND NORTH AND NORTH-EAST GEREONSWEILER WHEN ADVANCE OF INFANTRY PERMITS. C.O. CC-R, C.O. 40TH TANK BN. AND HIS C.O. COMMANDERS., C.O.'S 2ND AND 3RD BNS., 335TH INFANTRY REGIMENT, TO MEET AT ADVANCED C.P. 40TH TANK BN. IN GEREONSWEILER 1330 TO INSURE COORDINATION OF UNITS AND COMMUNICATIONS.

AT 1300 NOVEMBER 44, C.O. CC-R WENT TO ADVANCED C.P. 40TH TANK BN IN GEREONSWEILER, GERMANY, FOR CONFERENCE AND THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS WERE REACHED: TANKS REMAIN IN NORTH EDGE OF GEREONSWEILER UNTIL ENGINEERS ANNOUNCE THAT GAPS ARE READY, THEN MOVE RAPIDLY TO JOIN RESPECTIVE INFANTRY BNS. TANKS WILL NOT WAIT FOR INFANTRY BUT WILL PASS THRU AND PROCEED TO DIVISION OBJECTIVE; TANKS WILL NOT ENTER TOWN (INDERN) AHEAD OF INFANTRY BUT WILL SPLIT AND MOVE AROUND, THE EDGE OF TOWN TO FAR SIDE; TWO TO FOUR TANKS WILL REMAIN ON NEAR SIDE OF TOWN TO FOLLOW INFANTRY THRU, GIVING DIRECT FIRE ON CALL. TANKS WILL REMAIN ON OBJECTIVE WITH RIGHT BATTALION TO GIVE DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT UNTIL POSITION HAS BEEN ORGANIZED FOR DEFENSE; DUE TO EXPOSED POSITION, TANKS WITH LEFT BN. WILL NOT REMAIN ON THE DIVISION OBJECTIVE BUT WILL MOVE TO DEFILED POSITION. TANKS WILL WITHDRAW TO GEREONSWEILER, AFTER DIVISION OBJECTIVE IS CONSOLIDATED, ONLY UPON ORDER OF C.O. CC-R AFTER HE CLEARS WITH CG 84TH INFANTRY DIVISION.

CC-R AND ATTACHED UNITS LEFT ASSEMBLY AREA VICINITY SCHIMMERT, HOLLAND, AND CROSSED THE I.P. AT AALBECK, HOLLAND, AT 1230. ALL ELEMENTS CLOSED INTO ASSEMBLY AREA VICINITY OF UBACH, GERMANY, AT 1500.

29 NOVEMBER: CC-R WAS IN POSITION SUPPORTING CORPS ATTACK BY FIRE (17TH TK BN), PREPARED TO MEET COUNTERATTACK FROM NORTH, NORTHEAST, OR EAST.

AT 1630 C.O. CC-R ORDERED B/40TH TANK BN AND 1/C/814 T.D. TO MOVE FROM GEREONSWEILER TO LINDERN, GERMANY, TO REINFORCE A/40TH TANK BN. IN HOLDING LINDERN AGAINST COUNTERATTACK WHILE AWAITING ARRIVAL OF INFANTRY. THE COUNTERATTACK WAS REPELLED.

C.O. CC-R ORDERED B/17TH TANK BN RELIEVED FROM INDIRECT FIRE MISSION AND ASSEMBLED FOR MOVEMENT TO REPLACE B/40TH TANK BN.

30 NOVEMBER: CC-R CONTINUED IN CORPS RESERVE. CORPS DIRECTED THAT HOLDING LINDERN, GERMANY, WAS ESSENTIAL; THAT THE NUMBER OF TANKS IN LINDERN MUST NOT BE REDUCED. A CHANGE OF TANK COMPANIES HAD BEEN PLANNED BUT WAS NOT EFFECTED DUE: TO REORGANIZATION ION OF INFANTRY. D/40TH TANK BN WAS USED DURING THE NIGHT 29-30 TO RESUPPLY BOTH TANKS AND INFANTRY UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS. AT 2112, 17TH TANK BN. WAS RELIEVED FROM ATTACHED TO CC-R AND ATTACHED TO 102ND INFANTRY DIVISION.

AT THE CLOSE OF PERIOD CC-R CONSISTED OF 38TH INFANTRY BN., B AND D/40TH TANK BN., 1/B/814 T.D., 1/C/814 T.D., ORDNANCE DETACHMENT (DIRECT SUPPORT), AND A MEDICAL DETACHMENT (DIRECT SUPPORT). B/40TH TK BN., 1/B/814 T.D., 1/C/814 T.D. WERE COMMITTED.

(signed)
JOHN L. RYAN, JR.
COLONEL, CAVALRY
COMMANDING

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS CC-R
7TH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 257, U.S. ARMY

31 December 44

SUBJECT : AFTER ACTION REPORT, MONTH OF DECEMBER, 1944.

TO : THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
(THROUGH CHANNELS)

During the period 1-16 Dec 44, CCR, 7th AD operated in Germany, and reference to all places during that time should be inferred to be in Germany, although not specifically stated.

During the period 17-31 Dec 44, the Command operated exclusively in Belgium, and similarly, all places referred to during that time must be inferred to be in Belgium.

Abbreviations used in this report include unit designations as follows:

7th AD	7th Armored Division
CCA	Combat Command "A"
CCB	Combat Command "B"
CCR	Combat Command "R"
17th	17th Tank Battalion
31st	31st Tank Battalion
40th	40th Tank Battalion
23rd	23rd Armored Infantry Bn.
38th	38th Armored Infantry Bn.
48th	48th Armored Infantry Bn.
440th	440th Armored F. A. Bn.
489th	489th Armored F. A. Bn.
33rd	33rd Armored Engineer Bn.
87th	87th Cav. Rcn. Sq.
203rd	203rd AAA (air) Bn.
814th	814th T. D. Bn.

1 December 1944

At the beginning of the period for which this report is submitted, the staff of Combat Command Reserve, 7th Armored Division consisted of:

Col. John L. Ryan, Jr. - C. O.
Lt. Col. Fred M. Warren - Ex. O.
Lt. Col. Ernest M. Smith - Ass't. Ex. O.
Capt. Norwood G. Read - S-2
Major Fred C. Sweat - S-3
Major Clement O. Stevenson - S-4
Major Glenn C. Hairston - Surgeon
Lt. James F. Stidham - Comm. Officer
Lt Harry Miller - Ordnance Officer

The troops at that time attached to each command were:

38th Arm'd Infantry Battalion
D/40th Tank Battalion
1/B/814 TD Battalion
1/C/814 TD Battalion

and in addition an ordnance and a medical detachment in direct support; the CP of the command was located at Ubach; and the command was in corps reserve, with several elements already committed. (reference is made to "After Action Report" for the month of November, previously submitted)

C/33, which had been attached to the 40th, was relieved from that attachment and attached to CCR at 1020. The C. O. of such unit was directed to assemble immediately, necessary engineer equipment and be prepared to clear and effect a crossing of enemy anti-tank ditch located between Beeck and Lindern. Such directive was in accordance with corps and Division operations instructions for projected attack on Lindern.

Information was received that two medium tanks of the force attached to 84th Infantry Division had been destroyed by enemy bazooka fire in Lindern area, the previous night.

Early in the day, the 38th was directed to retain one company on a 30 minute alert, and the balance of the bn was then available for combat training, and accordingly training in small arms firing, sniper firing, and m. g. technique was conducted. Directions were given to rotate the alerted company from day to day, so long as this directive was effective, for obvious reasons. At 1615 the entire 38th was placed on 30 minute alert and the C.O. and S-3 directed to report to this headquarters.

At 1640 the C. G., 7th A. D. arrived at the CP of this command, and stated that all infantry of the 84th Infantry Division had been committed and indicated that an infantry reserve was required at a more forward position to support the 84th's attack on Linnich. The C. G. thereupon directed that 38th be moved at once to an assembly area, vic of Setterich. Being familiar with such area, and its condition, the C. O. , CCR anticipating it might

be necessary to bivouac in the field, directed C/33 to send out all available men with mine detectors and begin at once to sweep the area selected by C. O. 38th for his assembly area.

Prior to his departure at 1725 the C. G. , 7th A. D., stated that 40th (-1 co) would be relieved from attached to 84th Inf Div., and attached to CCR sometime during the night.

C .O., CCR, in anticipation of commitment of troops in that area, called upon the 1141 Engr Group for detailed road information to and terrain study of vicinity Linnich (inclusive).

The 38th completed its move and closed in an assembly area vicinity Setterich at 1915. Delay was occasioned by mines and booby traps uncovered there. As a precautionary measure vehicles were dispersed along side roads (which had been swept), rather than placing in open fields (until further examination of fields by Engineers in daylight).

40th was relieved from attached to 84th Inf Div and attached to CCR at approximately 2100. C. O. 40th was directed to move into assembly area vicinity of 38, however, after reconnaissance of such area it was determined that it was unsuitable because of crowded condition of available billets and the uncertainty of safety conditions in the field. The 40th thereupon chose an area in Ubach which was approved by G-3, and after obtaining road priority from 102nd Inf Div (thru whose sector it was necessary to move) the 40th began and orderly withdrawal from the line to its assembly area, by infiltration.

2 December 1944

The 40th closed in its new assembly area at 0115. Information received early this morning indicated that Linnich was now in our hands, although between 0400 and 0500 strong enemy patrols had effected a penetration of the outskirts of town.

The C. O., CCR held a staff and commanders meeting at which time the assembly was thoroughly briefed on the current operations and situation. The C. O. stressed the importance of all units being continuously and immediately available for commitment to the NE - N - NW, and disseminated his plans for counter-attack. His plan and instructions include routes and alternate routes, ip for approach march, attack formations, artillery support, and coordination of communication between the respective arms. In addition, he directed that air sentries be alert and all AA guns manned, and that all members of staff and each commander make a detailed and comprehensive terrain study of the area in which it was probable we might operate.

At 1410 the 17th (-B) was relieved from attached 102nd Inf Div, attached to CCR, directed to move to assembly area previously occupied vicinity of Ubach, and ultimately closed there at 1520

The Corps Commander visited CP this command at 1655.

B/40, relieved from attached 84th Inf Div at 2000 and reverted to Bn control (atch CCR), withdrawn from commitment under cover of darkness and closed in a temporary bivouac area Immendorf at 2230 - with plans to rejoin parent organization in Bn assembly area the following day. The 84th Inf Div was most cooperative in furnishing guides at all times to guide units of this command to and from their positions.

At 2035 the 1141 Engr Group furnished the detailed and current road information and terrain study requested the day previously.

3 December 1944

At 0800 the C. O. 17th stated that approximately 50% of his med tanks were already equipped with track extensions and requested permission to immobilize the balance in order to complete such modification. He was authorized to do so providing that no more than 25% of the tanks of any one company be immobilized at any one time.

At 0905 this command was directed to and did furnish one engineer squad for road maintenance at Div Headquarters. Staff during the morning inspected all units for dispersion and concealment of all vehicles.

At 1200 direct liaison between this command and Corps was discontinued.

At 1308 C/38 was relieved from attached to CCR and attached to 84th Inf Div for not to exceed two days. This company was attached for the purpose of support or reserve for a Bn of the 334th Regt already committed. By telephone communication between this Hq and G-3, 84th Div, satisfactory arrangements were completed for the guiding, reception, and supply of this co while under 84th Div control. The co moved at 1430, was met by MP's of this 84th at CR puffendorf and there directed into position via Immendorf, Prummern, and released to direct control of C. O. 334th Inf Regt.

At 1600 a member of the of the PI Team, 7AD, arrived at this Hq and discussed terrain, enemy installations, and interpreted aerial photos of vicinity Brachelen; and at 2100 the 1141 Engr Group submitted additional road and terrain information.

4 December 1944

No change was made on the troop list or the mission of CCR, this date. The command was still charged with being prepared to repel counter-attack anywhere in the Corps Zone.

The Corps Commander directed this Div to conduct Tank-Inf team training during the current period as time would permit. The C.G. 7AD in turn directed the C.O., CCR to prepare necessary problems in accordance with such directive, select the terrain therefor, ascertain that the terrain chosen was free of mines,

and supervise and conduct the problems.

5 December 1944

Plans were drawn for the problem referred to 4 Dec, reconnaissance was conducted for suitable terrain, and conferences were conducted with 3 section of 84th and 102nd Inf Divisions.

C/38, was relieved from attached to 84th Inf Div, reverted to Bn, and attached to CCR at 2000.

6 December 1944

C/38 rejoined its Bn and closed in assembly area 0400. At 0830, C.O. CCR conducted staff and commanders meeting at which were discussed various administrative matters and command functions. Plans were continued for the training program, and conferences held with 3 section of 84th and 102nd Inf Divs. B/40 reverted to CCR control at 1600. Plans were prepared for the release and march of the 40th to rest area at Scherpenseel.

Division directed this Command to have 1 co/17 on immediate alert for tank support upon call of the 84th Inf Div. The 38th was directed to move from present area in Setterich to area previously occupied by it in Ubach.

7 December 1944

The 38th (- C) was relieved from attached this command and attached CCB at 0600.

Plans were completed for Tank-Infantry training, area cleared of mines, and Divisions concerned so notified.

17th conducted indirect firing under supervision of 440th; C/38 conducted training in firing .30 cal. m/g (lt) from the hip; and engineers were engaged in road maintenance in the command area.

8 December 1944

84th Inf Div informed this command that it would conduct certain Tank-Infantry problems of its own, and requested that one tank platoon be made available for such purpose. Conferences were held with 3 section, 84th Div, satisfactory arrangements completed, and, 1 platoon 17th made available to the Div.

At 1200 C/38 reverted to Bn control and in turn attached to CCB. Two EM were assigned from 17th to attend school of driving instruction of amphibious vehicles.

9 December 1944

The 17th was relieved of attachment this Command, and attached to 84th Inf Div as of 1400 this date. Only troops now assigned CCR are C/33.

Staff officers attended Rocket Launcher demonstration conducted by XIX Corps.

All personnel were advised of the possibility of enemy air attack.

10 - 15 December 1944

During this period C/33, the only troops attached to CCR, engaged themselves in road maintenance and conducted training in their special field. Staff officers attended "POZIT" artillery demonstrations conducted by NUSA, and tank - infantry demonstrations conducted by the 84th Inf Div., the 2nd AD, and the 30th Inf Div. Direct liaison between this command and the 84th and 102nd Inf Divs. was discontinued on the 11th. Col. Ryan departed on leave and Lt. Col. Fred M. Warren, as Ex. O., assumed temporary command at 1000 on the 13th. Reconnaissance was made of the Scherpenseel rest area, and G-3 outlined plans for the supervision of training of all troops occupying that area.

16 December 1944

Actg C. O. CCR, attended staff and commanders meeting held by CG, 7th AD at the latter CP. At this meeting the CG discussed administrative and training matters, and announced the contemplated plans for next ten days or so, contingent of course upon the tactical situation. All matters were subsequently discussed with CCR staff by actg C. O.

At 1422, C/33 was relieved from attached CCR and reverted to Bn control.

At 1755 a message was received from Div which cancelled all passes, leaves, and furloughs, schools, etc, and alerted all units for movement on one hour's notice after 0800 the following day; and at 1810, in furtherance of such alert, this Hq was called upon to furnish a billeting detail.

At 1855 the 17th and 38th were attached CCR, and they were immediately notified of such attachment and directed to be prepared to move as previously indicated.

17 December 1944

At 0140 liaison officer from Div arrived at Hq CCR with route and final instructions for movement vicinity Vielsalm. All units were subsequently sufficiently informed and leading elements CCR crossed the IP on time (0800), and the column cleared the IP at 0915.

The CP of CCR² was closed at Ubach 0837.

The march to Vielsalm was made without incident, weather cold, clear to snow.

The 38th closed in new assembly area 1230, Hq CCR closed at 1430, and the 17th closed at 1500. The CP of CCR opened at RECHT at 1430.

At approximately 1530 this Hq received its first intimation of enemy action or proximity when one of our drivers reported that "he had heard" that the Germans had occupied Ligneuville about 30 minutes after our column had cleared there. Such statement at the time appeared utterly false and unfounded, however, the C. O. and S-3 determined to investigate and began a reconnaissance toward such town. The roads were deserted and upon nearing the town they were halted by an MP and the driver's story verified. The reconnaissance party thereupon returned to the CP and apprised all personnel of the situation so far as known, alerted them all, and established patrols and guards from Hq personnel. The C. O. and S-3 thereupon proceeded to CP 106th Inf Div where, they were informed, the CG CCB could be found. Upon arrival at the CP the C. O. and S-3 reported to CG 7th AD who gave information respecting the current situation, and stated that 38th was relieved of attachment CCR. Upon return to CP (CCR) the C. O. consulted with C. O. 17th and traded information.

At the CP, staff meeting was held after study of the road net and terrain it was determined to try and hold Recht during the night. The 17th was directed to send one company forward and establish road blocks. About 2100 a representative of Hq (rear) CCB appeared at the CP and informed us that his CP was also established at Recht and it was thereupon determined to consolidate our forces for mutual support.

At 2045 the driver for the C/S appeared at this CP and reported that his jeep had been ambushed, that he and the C/S had dismounted, separated, and that he had ultimately found his way back to our line - but did not know of the chief's condition or position. The driver also reported upon a large enemy column that he had observed. The Ass't S-3 escorted the driver to Div CP to make report and request some Infantry for this Command.

At 2130 the 18th cav rcn sq. reported another German ambush 1½ miles east of Recht, and from then on stragglers came infiltrating with additional news of the ambush tactics being employed, i.e., use of captured American vehicles and equipment, and men dressed in our uniforms.

All personnel employed in defensive position and on road blocks.

² The text is actually partially obliterated by a punched hole, but the initial C is clear and the second C partially remains, and the final R presumed since this is the CCR After Action Report.

18 December 1944

At 0200 enemy infantry attacked Recht and began infiltrating from the NE and E. The size of the force could neither be determined nor accurately estimated. Firing increased in intensity, flares were used continuously, small arms and automatic weapons fire was reasonably heavy and continuous. Enemy infantry was armed with bazookas. Without supporting infantry it was determined that a stand under such circumstances would only be a sacrifice of tanks and it was therefore ordered to evacuate the town. Some casualties were inflicted on enemy force, but number undetermined. The tanks in position were directed to cover the withdrawal of Hq (rear) CCB and this Hq, and at 0315 the withdrawal began. While the CP was moving we observed trains of a cavalry unit parked in the SW sector of the city and upon inquiry as to what they were doing there, were informed that the trains were directed to remain there while the sq. was making reconnaissance. When questioned about the fire fight in the town they admitted hearing it but didn't know what it was about. The C. O. this Hq informed them of the situation and ordered their withdrawal of this tank company. enemy used some incendiaries and several buildings were ablaze. The withdrawal was ultimately effected without personnel or vehicular loss.

At 0225 message was received from Div assigning mission of establishing road block and attaching 1/38; 1/33, and plat/814 to CCR as of 0800.

In the withdrawal from Recht SW to Poteau it was observed that roads to and from Poteau were double banked and traffic stationary. Upon arrival at CR Poteau (from Recht) it was impossible to proceed further because of road congestion. Division was informed of the situation by radio and called upon to furnish traffic mp.

Because it was impossible for a "Peep" to get through S-4 volunteered to walk to Div CP and inform Div of the situation and road condition. Meanwhile, C. O. and S-3 worked unceasingly to unsnarl traffic congestion and get vehicles moving, because it was quite certain that enemy would attack such a concentration at daylight. By daylight some semblance of order was restored and vehicles began to move. Our column, including Hq (rear) CCB cleared CR at Poteau at 0720 at which time first enemy fire was brought down there.

At 0800 CCR was made responsible for the NE and E sector of Division Zone, the following troops available - 17th, 1/38³, c/33, 1/87, 1 plat/814.

By 0905 CP of this Hq had been established at Ville Du Bois, and the attachments effective as of 0800 had not reported. The 17th was in contact and engaged with enemy infantry and tanks S of Recht, and therefore the inf co attached CCR was directed to report directly, and at once to C. O. 17th.

The enemy attack at Poteau was initially not strong, but continued throughout the day, and included small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, and tank fire - casualties light, but information scarce and situation fluid. The road Petit Their-Recht was cut at Poteau and this command given mission of establishing road blocks and defensive positions W of Petit Their.

At approximately 1200 a defensive position had been established on the high ground at Petit Their with all available stragglers that passed thru there. Two such positions were manned with 96 men from 106th Inf Div, about 87 men from 14 Cav Group, C/33, 1/plat B/23, 6 tanks, and 2 TD's.

This force was quickly welded into an efficient combat team and position rapidly organized. Reconnaissance and combat patrols were sent out immediately to establish communication and contact with CCA in Poteau.

At 1310 all Cav. was withdrawn and ordered to report to 106th Inf Div (rear) for reorganization.

The C/S 7 AD visited CP CCR and inspected position at Petit Their. During the remainder of the day, defensive positions at Petit Their were strengthened and patrols pushed to the North and East.

19 December 1944

The 17th was actively engaged with enemy infantry and tanks - artillery support was rendered thru adjustment and relay thru this Hq (no F. O.'s being with 17).

At 1015 all elements of 106 Inf Div were directed released from CCR control, and sent to rear for refitting and reorganization.

At 1312 the 17th and the attached Inf company were relieved from attached this command and attached CCB.

At 1320 this Hq received mission "clear and make safe road Vielsalm-Poteau and establish contact with CCA." At this time the force in defensive position at Petit Their consisted of 7 squads engineers, 2 mg squads and 1 AT squad B/23, 6 tanks 31, 1 FO tank, 2 TD's, and 2 AG's 105.

At 1530 a provisional Cav Troop consisting of 3-o and 80 EM, 3 half tracks, 4 M-8's and 1 M-20 was attached CCR. This force was directed to screen and patrol the left (N) flank and continue mounted patrols Vielsalm - Poteau.

Information received indicated enemy inf and tanks in position high ground area N of Poteau.

Road block was established with 2 TD's bridge at Ville Du Bois.

Armored FA Bn vicinity our CP directed to have one battery ready at all times for direct fire on enemy armor if penetration came from N or W - behind our defensive positions.

Active defense at Petit Their all day, included combat patrols N-NE-and E and continuous reconnaissance of entire sector.

20 December 1944

The active defense at Petit Their, reconnaissance to the N and E, and road patrolling Vielsalm to Poteau, continued throughout the day.

At 0930 this command was furnished with the Division plan for withdrawal to be executed on order. Such plan provided for the passage thru our lines of CCA, this command to cover the withdrawal, and blow the RR overpass bridge at Ville du Bois only after the maximum amount of vehicles, guns and equipment had crossed. Plans were formulated and promulgated in accordance with such directive.

At 1145 the 440th was withdrawn from support.

After several morning patrols had made their reports it was determined that an attack from Petit Their might be successful in driving enemy forces completely out of Poteau, to the N and NW.

This was desirable from two standpoints; ie, 1st to join up with CCA to the East and open lines of communication, and 2nd, afford an opportunity to salvage millions of dollars worth of equipment abandoned by other units in field SE of CR at Poteau. The forces available to CCR were greatly limited and already committed on assigned missions. Permission was requested of G-3 to make such attack, and immediately granted. However, prior to the launching of the attack all tanks attached CCR were withdrawn and ordered to join task force Jones. Because of this reduction of forces the acting C. O. determined not to attack at this time, and further reduce defensive positions.

At 1500 CCR was charged with maintaining road block already in position N of Vielsalm and all elements there (3 TD's/814, 2 M-16's/203, 1 sgd/33) were immediately attached this command.

At 1530 this Hq informed Division that road Petit Their - Poteau, although subjected to intermittent fire, was open for lightly armored vehicle, and that a parallel dirt road was negotiable for wheeled vehicles. Contact was made and maintained between this Hq and CCA. Small arms, some artillery, and Nebelwerfer fire continued to fall intermittently in Poteau. This command established a road block, supported by hasty mine field, and an OP position approximately $\frac{1}{2}$ mile E of crossroads at Poteau. This was for the night period only and CCA was accordingly informed of its location and purpose.

21 December 1944

The active defense of our entire sector was continued. Defensive positions were strengthened; and the engineers established blocks, booby traps, and hasty mine fields. All buildings were occupied by our troops at night time and at first light a thorough reconnaissance of our sector completed. Reconnaissance and combat patrols were put out at intervals thruout the day to investigate repeated reports of enemy forces EVERWHERE, but no new contact was made, and no penetration of our position was attempted.

Liaison was effected and defensive plans coordinated with the 82nd A/B Div.

Information was rife throughout the day, and tension grew. The entire staff was organized and positions in the line assigned and manned by such personnel.

22 December 1944

At 0330 Division directed that the Cav. Troops be withdrawn from its present screening mission and move without delay, cover highway Salmchateau-Bovigne, establish strong points there, and prevent enemy from cutting that line of communication. The Cav. reported strong point s established by 0800, and at 0802 this Hq was directed to recall the Cav. and resume its original mission. The original mission was resumed between 1200 and 1400. During the time that the Cav. was withdrawn, the north flank was entirely exposed and so a patrol was organized from personnel CCR Hq and that patrol functioned in the interim.

At 1205 two German soldiers in civilian clothes were captured, and at 1230 two German soldiers in proper uniforms were captured 100 yards south of the road and about 1/2 mile W of Petit Their. This occasioned more patrolling but further evidence of German troops was lacking.

At 1333 the C. G. 7AD directed C. O. CCR to report in person to C. O. CCA and offer the latter the 6 TD's now attached to CCR, if CCA was in need thereof or could profitably employ them.

The C. O. CCR complied with this directive and discussed the matter with C. O. CCA. C. O. CCA stated that he could have used to advantage when requested but that the threat now had eased and he felt it unnecessary to move the TD's from their present position. TD officer in the party made a reconnaissance and recommended that they not be moved. C. O. CCA concurred. Upon return to CP, C. O., CCR informed C. G. of the entire discussion and decision.

Otherwise active defense and patrolling continued in our entire sector.

23 December 1944

At 0535 Division announced H Hour for withdrawal as 0600. CCA was scheduled to withdraw at H plus 12 hours, 489th at H plus 14 hours, and CCR at H plus 1530 hours. During the morning, active defense and patrolling within our sector continued and plans were completed for the withdrawal. Because of continued rumors of enemy tank threats the available TD's were replaced and dispersed more in depth, which served a dual purpose of defense and support of anticipated withdrawal. Conferences were held with all parties interested and involved in the withdrawal.

Final order for bridge demolition was that it would not be destroyed until the artillery had cleared, and then upon order of CO CCR.

At 1345 this Hq was notified that CCA would pass thru our lines one hour earlier than originally anticipated and at 1445 a meeting was held at CP CCR of all staff and commanders of attached units. Detailed plan for the withdrawal was discussed and everyone completely informed of his duties and positions.

At 1510 information was received that the Cav. OP North of Ville du Bois had been ambushed and destroyed - this was discouraging news at the last minute and increased anxiety because of our assigned mission. Another strong patrol was immediately dispatched to that area, and soon returned with the reassuring information that an enemy patrol of 12-15 infantry had infiltrated to the OP and destroyed one M-8 with bazooka fire, wounded one man - but the enemy had been driven off with some but unknown casualties - otherwise our OP was intact.

All personnel were cautioned to be extremely alert and cautious until completion of our primary mission.

Notice was given when CCA started its move.

CCA cleared the RR overpass bridge at 1630, and 489th started its withdrawal at 1635 clearing the bridge at 1650. The first defensive line at Petit Their not being engaged, was directed to withdraw mounted, as quickly as possible, at 1700. The bridge was demolished at 1715 and the Infantry occupying that defensive position was ordered to withdraw at 1730. The C. O. and S-3 after reconnaissance and determination that all troops were withdrawing and the withdrawal plans complied with, made a hasty departure at 1745.

CP CCR closed Ville du Bois at 1700 and opened vicinity Houssonlog 1700. CCR closed in its new assembly area at 2015.

24 December 1944

At 0832 CCR was alerted for immediate move.

At 1030, C. O. CCR conducted meeting of staff and unit commanders and informed all present of the Div plan for defense of new zone. CCR made responsible for the area Aisne-Bomal inclusive. Plans for defense thereof as announced consisted of two road blocks, each composed of 2 TD's/814, 2 Inf squads C/38 and 1 engr squad C/33. One road block to be set up at RJ 428999 and the bridge there prepared for demolition - the other road block at RJ453979. The Cav. Troop was directed to screen our front, and make reconnaissance of all approaches within our sector. All other troops in CC reserve at Izier. An advance CP to be established at Izier. Immediate reconnaissance of the sector for any other necessary blocks. Units were directed to move at once and get in position.

At 1145 1/B/23 reverted to Bn control.

At 1255 17th relieved from CCB and attached to CCR. At 1300 C.O. 17th directed to move his Bn to Izier and that he precede it and meet C. O. CCR there. Two platoons that Bn were alerted, and it was directed that one platoon report to and reinforce each of the 2 road blocks.

At 1515 all TD's detached from CCR, attached to CCA, and directed to proceed and report vicinity Manhay at once.

At 1530 the Cavalry Troop was also detached from CCR.

Because of the above detachments, the road blocks were subsequently reformed and the Rcn Plat. of 17th charged with road patrol and contact between 2 strong points.

At 1635 the 87th and 14th Cav attached to CCR for outposting Lourthe⁴ river between Bomal and Comblain Aupont, activity to be coordinated with C. G., CCB.

At 2000 C. O., CCR reported to Cp CCB to complete plans in accordance with preceding directive. Upon arrival there C. G. CCB informed CO CCR that the attachments and mission previously assigned had been cancelled and remained a responsibility of CCB.

25 December 1944

Christmas Day 1944 started off early, just as usual. Continuous phone calls thruout the night reminded us of the good old civilian habit of extending holiday felicitations. And midnight rising reminded us of our childhood when we rushed down stairs to greet old Santa Claus. But, although the early hour activities were reminiscent of such happy days, the comparison ended there.

At 0200 this Hq was relieved of the mission assigned it on 24 December, that is, defending sector Aisne-Bomal; and CCR with attached troops reverted to Div. reserve. At 0225, that portion of CCR held in mobile reserve at Izier was directed to proceed without delay to CR Werbomont and await further instructions there. The troops employed on road blocks were released at this time and directed to meet C. O. CCR at Div CP. Orders ultimately received directing CCR to be prepared to support either CCA or CCB - or to counter-attack anywhere in Div zone as called upon.

At 0725 C/38 was detached from CCR and reverted to Bn control.

At 1615 the 17th was moved onto an assembly are 2 miles N of Manhay, with mission same as previously stated. Because of the proximity of 17th CP to Div CP it was agreed between the C/S and C. O. CCR that C. O. 17th would station himself at Div CP where he could receive orders directly without any delay; the 17th still under CCR, however.

⁴ L'Ourthe

26 December 1944

At 0015 C. G. 7th AD directed C. O. CCR to inspect the area vic Harze, at first light, to ascertain that all vehicles of this Div and all attached units are properly dispersed and concealed. Check was made as directed in the morning, and another in the afternoon to determine that all corrective measures were taken as suggested in the morning.

At 1320 1/B/17 was attached to 517th Par. Regt.

At 1535, message from Div directing that all troops carry gas masks, was relayed to all subordinate units.

Mission of CCR and location of troops unchanged during the day.

27 December 1944

At 0830 the C/S directed C. O. CCR to ascertain that no 7th AD troops occupied the area which he then defined, vic Izier - which area was to be occupied by units of the 75th Inf Div. During the morning, CCR staff was divided into 3 parties and carried out this directive.

At 1215 the CCR staff was directed to make reconnaissance of new Div assembly area - route to and roads in such area, billets available, vehicular standing, etc. Report of such reconnaissance was submitted to Div by 1600.

No change in mission or location of troops CCR.

28 December 1944

Div operations instructions respecting withdrawal of units to new assembly area, in Corps reserve, received. At 1000 billeting parties from all units to be attached to CCR upon crossing release point in the contemplated move, leave CCR CP for reconnaissance of their respective areas. In such operations instructions it was indicated units attached to CCR would be 31st, 38th, C/33, A/814.

At 1515 this Hq. notified that withdrawal would not be effective today, and all units were placed on 15 minutes alert to be prepared to repel any enemy attack.

At 1915 C. O. CCR conducted staff and commanders meeting briefing all on present situation and projected plans, so far as known.

29 December 1944

Mission and location troops CCR unchanged.

At 1705 this Hq. informed that A/814 would not be attached to CCR.

30 December 1944

At 0415 Div announced H Hour for withdrawal and movement to assembly area at 0445. CCR was scheduled to move at H plus 30 minutes and the first elements of 17th crossed the IP at 0515. 17th crossed the Release Point at 0530 at which time it was detached from this Hq and attached CCA. C/33 crossed the IP at 0548 and cleared the Release Point at 0555.

The 38th and 31st were attached to CCR upon crossing the Release Point at 0830 and 0858, respectively.

CCR staff and all units were directed to begin at once a reconnaissance of that portion of the Corps zone in which it was anticipated this command might be called upon to operate, and to reconnoiter also routes to such area from present assembly positions. These reports were received, consolidated, and a master plan evolved and submitted to Division.

During the afternoon the C. O. and S-3, this Hq, visited all units and inspected areas occupied by them. The C. G. 7AD visited CP CCR at 1532 and discussed current administrative matters and stressed the importance of continued alertness and aggressiveness of all officers and men.

All units engaged in rehabilitation, reorganization, maintenance vehicles and weapons.

The following changes in the staff CCR were made this date:

1600 - Major Sweat relieved as S-3 this Hq and assigned 40th.

1610 - Major Stevenson relieved as S-4 this Hq and assigned 48th.

1745 - Major Carl M. Corbin assigned this Hq as S-4, vice Stevenson transferred.

1820 - Col F. P. Tomkins reported and assumed command CCR, vice Ryan transferred.

31 December 1944

During the morning, the Ex. O. escorted the new commander to each of the units attached CCR and introduced all commanders. C. O. CCR visited all Bns and C.O.s, and spoke to the various commanders with respect to anticipated operations, what he desired and expected, clarified the general situation so far as he knew it, etc.

All troops were engaged in small unit training, small arms firing, reformation of units, receipt of reinforcements, maintenance of vehicles and weapons, rehabilitation, and reconnaissance of areas of contemplated operations.

At 1500 the 31st was relieved from attached CCR and attached to CCB - and the 40th was relieved from attached CCB and attached CCR - both changes effective in place and no movement of troops required.

At 2400, at the close of the period for which this report is submitted, the staff of CCR was composed of:

Col. Francis P. Tomkins	C. O.
Lt. Col. Fred M. Warren	Ex. O.
Lt. Col. Ernest M. Smith	Asst. Ex. O.
Capt. Norwood G. Read	S-2
Major Richard D. Gillis	S-3
Major Carl M. Corbin	S-4
Major Glenn G. Hairston	Surgeon
1st Lt. James F. Stidham	Comm. O.
1st Lt. Henry Miller	Ordnance O.

troop list was as follows:

40th Tank Battalion
38th Armored Infantry Battalion
C/33 Armored Engineer Battalion

the CP of the command was located at Houssonloge and the command (as a portion of the Div) was in Corps reserve.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

(signature)
FRED M. WARREN,
Lt. Col., Cavalry
Executive Officer

6 Inclosures:

Incl. #1 Journal, CCR, 7th AD, Dec 44.
Incl. #2 S-3 Per. Rpt., CCR, 7th AD, Dec 44.
Incl. #3 Incoming Msgs. " " "
Incl. #4 Outgoing Msgs. " " "
Incl. #5 Opn. Instr. for withdrawal.
Incl. #6 S-2 report., CCR, 7th AD, Dec 44.

HEADQUARTERS CC-R
7TH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 257, U.S. ARMY

31 JANUARY 1945

SUBJECT : AFTER ACTION REPORT, MONTH OF JANUARY, 1945

TO : THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
(THROUGH CHANNELS)

During the period of January 1945, CCR, 7th AD operated in Belgium exclusively and references to all places during the time covered by this report, should be inferred to be in Belgium, although not specifically stated.

Abbreviations used in this report include unit designations as follows:

7th AD	7th Armored Division
CCA	Combat Command "A"
CCB	Combat Command "B"
CCR	Combat Command "R"
31st	31st Tank Battalion
40th	40th Tank Battalion
38th	38th Armored Infantry Bn.
48th	48th Armored Infantry Bn.
434th	434 Armored F. A. Bn.
440th	440th Armored F. A. Bn.
33rd	33rd Armored Engineer Bn.
87th	87th Cav. Rcn Sq.
203rd	203rd AAA (air) Bn.
814th	814th T. D. Bn.
508 PIR	508 Par. Inf. Regt.
23rd RCT	23rd Regt. Combat Team
2nd	2nd Inf Div.
30th Div.	30th Inf. Div.

At the beginning of the period for which this report is submitted the staff of Combat Command Reserve, 7th Armored Division was composed of :

Col. Francis F. Tompkins	C. O.
Lt. Col. Fred M. Warren	Ex. O.
Lt. Col Ernest L Smith	Asst. Ex. O.
Capt Norwood G. Read	S-2
Major Richard D. Gillis	S-3
Major Carl M. Corbin	S-4
Major Glenn G. Hairston	Surgeon

the troops attached to the Command at that time were:

38th Armored Infantry Bn.
40th Tank Bn.
C/33rd Armored Engineer Bn.;

the CP of the Command was located at Houssenloge; and CCR, within the 7th Armored Division, was in Corps Reserve (XVIII Corps A/B), prepared for commitment on Division order. (reference is made to " After Action Report" for the month of December 1944, previously submitted.)

Jan 1. Preparations completed, and units CCR began movement to new assembly area, vicinity Oneux (486104).

Jan 2. CCR closed in new assembly area, CP closed at Houssonloge 1100, and opened at Oneux at 1155. Lt. Col. Smith relieved from atchd Hq. CCR. C.O. CCR presented Bronze Star ribbons to three enlisted men of this headquarters.

Jan 6. Lt. Walter H. G. Weissenberger assigned, and joined CCR as liaison officer, 1200. One officer and one NCO each unit attended four hour refresher course in Defense against chemical warfare, conducted by Division Chemical Officer, 1300-1700.

Jan 7-8. Artillery F. O. school 1500-1600 each day, conducted by instructors furnished by 440th. On the 8th, Major Bowman, Ex. O., 9th Armored Group, arrived at this CP to discuss the matter of assignment of personnel in that Group to this Command.

Jan 10. B/814 attached at 1125. Detachment A, 9th Armored Group, consisted of 6 officers, 1 Warrant Officer, and 61 enlisted men closed and reported at 2000, pursuant to par. 1 GO No. 4 Hq. XVIII (AB) Corps, dated 10 Jan 45.

Jan 11. At 1045 the C. O., CCR, welcomed the officers and enlisted men from the 9th Armored Group to CCR, oriented them on the general and special situations, and explained their duties, etc. D (-) 203 attached at 1200.

Jan 12. Units CCR began movement to new assembly area vicinity Lambermont.

Jan 13. CCR closed in new assembly area. CP closed at Oneux, and opened at Lambermont at 1020. 87th Rcn attached at 1500.

Jan 14 C/33 relieved from attached at 1800.

Jan 15. Units alerted for move to new area, and billeting details sent forward for reconnaissance, vic Xhoffraix.

Jan 16 Major Charles R. Grant, recently assigned to this Division, arrived at CP, to spend two days with this Command. C.O. held staff and commanders meeting.

During the period January 3 to 19, while located in the vicinity of Oneux, CCR prepared, conducted, and supervised small Task Force problems designed to emphasize the control, operation, and communication as necessary in the Tank-Infantry-Engineer-Artillery Team. During the entire period reconnaissances to new assembly areas, and probable sectors of commitment, were conducted extensively. Maintenance of vehicles and weapons, and complete storage were stressed. Grousers were installed as available, and special cleats were welded on all track laying vehicles. Combat vehicles were painted white. All of such work was essential for obvious reasons, ie., the frozen and slippery condition of roadways and the snow covered terrain. The commanding officer made many personal reconnaissances, and conducted Staff and Commander's meetings to keep all informed of the situation and the contemplated role of CCR. All units were alerted for possible movement during this period.

Jan 20. Command began movement to new area at 1500, closing at 1300. CP CCR closed at Lambermont 0900 and opened at Xhoffraix at 1105. Because of the inclement weather (freezing and snow) authority was obtained from Corps to use an alternate route. At 1400, the 38th and B/814 were alerted for further movement and ultimately moved to Waimes. An advanced CP CCR was established in Waimes at 1745.

Jan 21. At 0518 the 38th was placed on a 1 hour alert which at 0635 upon direction of C. G. 7th A. D. was changed to an immediate alert. The C.O. and S-3 of 38 were directed to report to C.G. CCB and at 0855 the 38 was detached from this Command and attached to CCB. At 1040 the 87th was alerted and ultimately moved to Waises. Advanced CP CCR was moved to location previously occupied by CCB in Waimes at 1415. All units were alerted for movement throughout the day, and were leap frogged from one rear position to another more advance, from vicinity Xhoffraix to vic Waimes.

Jan 22. At 0340 CCR was directed to be prepared to move on order to the S and SE. At 0800 the 508 PIR (reinf) was attached, and the Command made responsible for the defensive positions then held and occupied by CCA, effective at 0900. Pursuant to such directive, C.O. CCR, ordered his advanced CP moved to Montenau; the 87th reconnoiter area Montenau-Evalange for secondary defensive positions; the 40th displace forward with one Company in the Montenau-Evalange area, and the remainder in mobile reserve Waimes-Bruyers; C/33 reconnoiter all roads in our sector and make recommendations for their repair; D/203 to offer AAA protection to the 40th in bivouac; CCR rear move to Waimes; and all trains consolidate vicinity Xhouffraix. By 1015 the advanced CP had

been established in Montenau and the 87th had completed its reconnaissance. Contact was established with the 23rd RCT and plans completed for transfer of sector responsibility, and relief of troops then holding. Although CCR assumed responsibility for the defensive sector at 0908; the 23rd RCT was not relieved until

1540, due to misunderstanding. At this time, Lt. Col. Tuttle (23rd RCT) arrived at CP CCR and was informed that C.O. CCR had already reported to the 2nd Inf. Div. that CCR had assumed responsibility. Reconnaissances were conducted throughout the day by all units - and plans formulated for an attack on St. Vith. C.O. CCR conducted staff and commanders meeting at which such plans were discussed.

Jan 23. At 0100 the 48th (-) and C/ 814 were attached, in position. At 0300 all unit commanders at CP CCR discussed plan for attack on St. Vith. The plan called for coordinated attack, 87th (-), with one Co. medium tanks attached on the north (left) flank; and 48th (-) with one Co. medium tanks attached, on the south (right) flank. 87th to advance rapidly and aggressively, seize and hold high ground NE of St. Vith, and assist in the advance of 48. The 48th to seize St. Vith. Artillery plan discussed with C.O. 434 called for 15 minutes intensive barrage all available artillery on St. Vith, a continuous barrage of one Bn. until arrival of foot troops at edge of town, and shifting of artillery to Wallerode and other predetermined locations. All plans were drawn for the attack, and at 0950 C.O. CCR was informed that CCB would seize the objective. 48 (-), C/814, C/33 detached CCR and attached CCB at 0950. At 1230 C.O. CCR issued the following order to C.O. 87 "CCB attacks at 1400 to seize St. Vith. CCR moves rapidly into St. Vith and patrols the exits S and E. 87 with B and D/40 attached will proceed immediately to initial assembly area Ndr. Emmels to arrive not later than 1430. Proceed forward on St. Vith Rd., as traffic conditions permit, to vic. Henninger, continue on same road, on mission, on order C.O. CCR, establish direct liaison with 30 Inf. Div. Don't close SW of woods in grid square 84 until definitely approved by 30 Div or ordered by C.O. CCR. B/40 will be committed only on order C.O. CCR." At 1505 the 508 PIR (reinf.) was detached from CCR and made responsible for the defensive sector formerly the responsibility of this Command. A/40 was attached to 508, to be used only in case of counter attack by enemy troops.

At 1055 C.G. CCB requested this Command to have C/33 clear the road Ndr. Emmels - St. Vith. C.O. CCR established advanced cp with CP 87 at Ndr. Emmels. Plans completed and reconnaissance patrol, 87, sent out to S, SE, and E St. Vith.

Jan 24. At 0315 C.O. CCR was directed to withdraw all cavalry patrols previously sent out, so that artillery could fire missions, this was accomplished at 0553. Information that supporting Engineers, sweeping snow from the roadway had uncovered box mines and deposited them in dangerous locations on the side of the road was relayed to Div. with a request that the same engineers be employed in their removal. This was ultimately done. At 1045 the 87 was directed to make rapid exploitation through St. Vith to the SE, mounted, if possible, otherwise dismounted. Subsequently, it was determined not feasible to make any mounted movement thru St. Vith, because of total destruction there. At 1500 C.O. CCR returned from commanders meeting at Division with an entirely new plan of operations and announced that 40 (-B) was now attached to 424th RCT, and D/87 was attached to CCB; the balance of CCR (now consisting of 87 (-D) and B/40) relieved of all previous commitments and now in Div. Reserve. Ar 1710 B/814 was placed in direct support of the 424 RCT during attack, and until the 424 reached its objective, at which latter time B/814 would revert to CCR.

Elements of 87 (reconnaissance patrols) reached and occupied Division objective "Nina", without encountering opposition. However, at approximately 1800 information was received from such patrols that they had been driven back approximately 400 yards by enemy force consisting of 30-40 infantry supported by 4 tanks. During the engagement our patrols inflicted casualties on the enemy and took 11 prisoners. By 1938 these patrols had gained contact with leading elements CCD and had guided them to position, high ground about 400 yards north of "Nina". The combined troops then regained the objective and 87 patrols were directed to remain with elements CCB during the night and assist in the recapture and organization of the objective. At 2045 this Command was directed to organize a small task force to consist of 1/87, 1/B/31, 1/D203 - and to move such Force into an assembly area vic Montenau before daylight, prepared to move on 1 hour's notice to relieve elements 424 then in Ebertange. B/814 was directed to support the contemplated attack 424, from its present position. B/31 attached CCR at 2100. The Force Commander (C.O. A/87) contacted C.O. 1st Bn. 424 at 2300 and arranged all details, including communication and relief; and the Force organized as required closed in its assigned area about 2400. Although it was anticipated and earlier directed that all elements of the 87 be withdrawn during the night, subsequent orders directed that they remain in position and continue their patrolling missions until recalled.

Jan 25. Elements 87 remained in position, and assisted CCB in the attack on "Nina". B/814 was relieved from support of the 424 RCT at 1730.

Jan 26. Lt Weissenberger on S/D with 7th AD returned to duty this command. B/87 was directed to relieve A/87 from defensive positions Evertange when 424 RCT moved out of that area. At 1058 B/40 moved to vic Born and executed defensive plan previously determined upon, closed in that area 1330. D (-)/203 and 87 (-) detached from CCR at 2000. Billeting details were called for late in the night by Div, indicating a projected move.

Jan 27. Billeting details reported to Div CP at 0900 and received instructions respecting move to Eupen. Billeting details from all attached units CCR assembled at CP CCR Montenau and departed at 0930 under control S-1, CCR, for reconnaissance vic Eupen. 38 released to CCR from commitment in combat moved to an assembly area vic Eibertingen, and closed there at 1400. At 1640. the 38 was recalled by CCB, detached from CCR, and directed to move at once to St. Vith area. Ultimately the 38 was recommitted and remained under CCB control the entire night. At 1800 the force in Eibertingen (B/87 reinf) was relieved of its defensive position and elements thereof immediately rejoined parent organizations. At the same time, and by same order (G-3, 7 AD) B/31 and B/87 were relieved of attached CCR. CCR directed not to begin movement to new area prior to 281230. Upon arrival in new area CCR to be composed of 38, 40, C/33, D (-)/ 203, B/814.

Jan 28. March order for move to Eupen issued. C/33 directed to precede main body and make such road repairs (snow drifts, etc.) as needed to insure uninterrupted advance of column. 38 to join CCR in Eupen when relieved by C.G. CCB. Leading elements CCR crossed IP, Ligneuville 1300. CP closed Montenau 1300 and opened Eupen same time; CCR (-38)

closed in new assembly area 1930. Weather cold and snow, visibility poor, condition of roads slippery. CCR released from attached XVIII Corps (A/B) and attached V Corps upon arrival in new area.

Jan 29. 38 released by C.G. CCB at 0030, assembled vic Born and crossed IP there at 0300, and closed new assembly area Baelen 0800. 38 was given remainder of day for rest and rehabilitation. 40 and other units performed 1st echelon maintenance vehicles, weapons, and radios. S-3 CCR made reconnaissance of range facilities V Corps.

Jan 30. 0830 Staff and Commanders meeting. C.O. CCR briefed all present on enemy and friendly information in new sector, and discussed the Corps plan; and directed that all officers, to and include company level, be thoroughly informed. Commanders were directed to make minute terrain study and consider possible uses of CCR in the Corps plan. B/814 and 40th conducted range practice and test firing.

Jan 31, All units conducted maintenance, continued training, and attended showing of TF "Germany".

At 2400 at the close of the period for which this report is submitted, the staff of CCR composed of:

Col. Francis P. Tompkins	C. O.
LT. Col. Fred M. Warren	Ex. O.
Capt. Norwood G. Read	S-2
Major Richard D. Gillis	S-3
Capt James W. Gooley, Jr.	Asst. S-3 & Com. O.
Major Carl M. Corbin	S-4
Capt. Olaf W. Christopherson	Asst. S-4 and Hq. Co. Commander
Major Glenn G. Hairston	Surgeon
Capt. George Vogel	Dental Officer
Capt. John L. Fellows, Jr.	Liaison Officer

troop list was as follows:

38th Armored Inf. Bn.
40th Tank Battalion
C/33rd Armored Engr. Bn.
D/203rd AAA (AW) Bn.
B/814 Td Bn.

the CP of the Command was located at Eupen and the Command (within the Div.) was in V Corps Reserve.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

(signed)
FRED M. WARREN,
Lt. Col., Cavalry
Executive Officer

5 Inclosures:

Incl. #1 Journal, CCR, 7th AD, Jan 45.
Incl. #2 S-3 Per. Rpt., CCR, 7th AD, Jan 45.

Incl. #3 Incoming Msgs. CCR, 7th AD, Jan 45.

Incl. #4 Outgoing Msgs. " " " "

Incl. #5 S-2 Report, " " " "

HEADQUARTERS CCR
7TH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 257, U.S. ARMY

28 February 1945

SUBJECT : AFTER ACTION REPORT, MONTH OF FEBRUARY., 1945

TO : THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
(THROUGH CHANNELS)

During the period of February 1945, CCR, 7th Armored Division, operated in Belgium and Germany. All tactical employment was in the Strauch - Steckenborn - Schmidt (Germany) area.

Abbreviations used in this report include unit designations as follows:

7th AD	7th Armored Division
CCR	Combat Command "R"
40th	40th Tank Battalion
38th	38th Armored Infantry Bn.
434th	434 Armored F.A. Bn.
33rd	33rd Armored Engineer Bn.
87th	87th Cav. Rcn. Sq.
203rd	203rd AAA (AW) Bn.
814th	814th TD Bn.
78th	78th Inf. Div.
309	309 Inf Regt - 78 Inf. Div.
310	310 Inf Regt -
311	311 Inf Regt - " " "
303	303 Eng Regt -
102	102nd. Cav. Group

At the beginning of the period for which this report is submitted staff of CCR 7th Armored Division, was composed of:

Col. Francis P. Tompkins	C.O.
Lt. Col. Fred M. Warren	Ex. O.
Capt. Norwood G. Read	S-2
Major Richard D. Gillis	S-3
Major Carl M. Corbin	S-4
Capt. James W. Gooley, Jr.	Asst S-3 and Com. O.
Capt. Olaf W. Christopherson	Asst. S-4 and Hq Co.
	Commander
Major Glenn G. Hairston	Surgeon
Capt. George Vogel	Dental Officer
Capt. John L. Fellows, Jr.	Liaison Officer

the troops attached to the Command were:

38th Armored Inf. Bn.
40th Tank Battalion
C/33 Armored Engineer Bn.
D/203 AAA (AW) Bn.
B/814 TD Bn.

the CP of the Command was located at Eupen, Belgium; and CCR, within the 7th Armored Division, was in V Corps Reserve, prepared for commitment separately from the Division, on order of V Corps (Reference is made to "After Action Report" for the month of January 1945.)

2 February 1945

1810: C.O. CCR directed to report to CP V Corps at 1930. Upon reporting there at the designated time he was informed respecting the Corps plan, and probable attachment CCR to 78.

3 February 1945

0830: Staff and Commanders meeting, all units CCR represented. C.O. CCR discussed the Corps plan, and briefed all present respecting friendly and enemy dispositions, new troop lists, boundaries, and objectives, etc. He further directed that all units make reconnaissance of the projected zone of action, and make and maintain liaison with elements of the 78.

0900: C.O. CCR directed to report to C.G. 78 at 1000, at which time he was informed of the 78 plan.

0925: C.O. CCR, from CP 78, placed Command on 4 hour alert status.

1300: Staff and Commanders meeting. C.O. CCR briefed those present in the plan of 78, and the mission of this Command. He directed C.O. C/33 to report at once to Engineer 78, in order to properly coordinate all engineer activities; and all commanders to complete their reconnaissance as soon as possible. Warning order was issued stating that an advance CP would be established during the afternoon of the 4th,

and that movement of troops would start shortly thereafter so as to be prepared to attack at first light 5 February.

1600: CCR attached to 78.

2045: 3/310 attached to CCR.

2055: A/87 attached to CCR.

4 February 1945

0815: Staff and Commanders meeting at which C.O. CCR issued his verbal order for march to new area and plan for the attack. He directed a night march to close in the attack position just prior to H hour in order to (1) attain maximum amount of surprise and (2) provide maximum amount of rest for all personnel. For other details of the order see copy of written order confirming fragmentary oral orders (incl. #5).

1430: Advanced CP CCR opened Konzen, Germany - and thus CCR returns to Germany after an absence since 17 Dec, when it was ordered from the Ubach area to participate in the "Battle of the Bulge."

2345: One light tank with crew attached to 309 for liaison and communication purposes.

During the period 1-4 February all units CCR were engaged primarily in preparation for use by V Corps, having been forewarned and sent early to the Eupen area for such purpose. During the interim of arrival in that area and actual commitment, troops were engaged in maintenance of vehicles, radios, and weapons; test firing of weapons of newly acquired vehicles; range practice; instruction in the removal of mines and booby traps; removal of white paint from vehicles (snow camouflage); and area reconnaissance within the zone of contemplated attack.

On the 4th, time was available for route reconnaissance to the new area. All officers, down to and including platoon leaders, were required to participate in such reconnaissance during daylight to familiarize themselves with route to assembly area, route to LD, and terrain features in sector of operations. Contact was made and liaison effected with units of 78, particularly 309, 311; and the Command otherwise prepared for commitment. In anticipation of the organization of 3 task forces B/40 and 1/B/814 were attached to 3/310 and reported to the C.O. thereof 041100. This afforded opportunity in daylight for any organization desired within the task force, and time for coordination of communications, etc.

5th February 1945

CCR, with 3/310 attached, prepared to attack 050700 Feb 45 to seize and secure assigned objectives (Strauch and Steckenborn initially) within its zone and clear such zone of enemy troops. The Command was organized into three Task Forces, IE.,

TF McDANIEL
38th
C/40
1/C/33
1/B/814 (spt)

TF LUTZ
3/310
B/40
3/B/303
1/B/814 (spt)

TF BROWN
40 (-B &C)
A/87
C/33
B/814 (-)
D/203 (-)

TF Lutz was organized the day previously (as indicated above) and was already in attack positions, all other troops of the Command were in the Eupen area, and were required to be moved.

0001: Leading elements TF McDaniel crossed IP at Eupen enroute to attack position vicinity Simmerath, Germany, and closed there at 0440. CP TF McDaniel, Simmerath.

0400: Leading elements TF Brown crossed IP enroute to reserve assembly positions vicinity IMGENBROICH, and closed at 0650. CP established there.

0630: TF Lutz crossed LD under cover of darkness and by 0700 reported in position on objective DOT (010245) without opposition. He was directed not to advance until ordered to do so by C.O. CCR.

0640: C.G. 78 cancelled artillery preparation. He stated that all early reports were that units were unopposed and reaching objectives with little or no organized resistance, and that he desired to conserve arty ammunition if there were no enemy troops in sector.

0700:: TF McDaniel launched attack and crossed LD, (Witzerath - Kesternich Road).

0730: Advanced CP CCR closed Konzen, opened Simmerath.

0800: TF McDaniel reported position (012267) 400 yards NE objective Hedy, no opposition encountered. C.O. CCR thereupon directed TF Lutz to proceed on his next assigned mission, objective Peggy (Steckenborn).

0920: C.G. 78 directed that when TF Lutz occupied his position Peggy, (Steckenborn) had it cleared and consolidated, TF McDaniel would relieve it and assume responsibility for that sector, and ultimately relieve elements of the 311 in vicinity Hechelsheid.

0947: TF McDaniels reported progress with little opposition on objective Hedy (Strauch).

1010: 78 announced completion of Phase I of its plan and directed that Phase II become operational.

1035: TF Lutz on SW edge of objective Peggy (Steckenborn) reported receiving small arms fire from occupied pill boxes to the east.

1100: TF McDaniel reported all opposition overcome and objective Hedy (Strauch) cleared and secure.

1110: TF Lutz reported continued progress and by 1155 the west edge of his objective was cleared and patrols were dispatched to gain contact with TF McDaniel.

1220: TF Lutz directed by C.O. CCR to continue and increase his pressure to the east, where it was reported he was meeting increasing opposition from enemy installed in pill boxes and strong points.

1225: TF McDaniel reported objective "Mae" (016293) secured and that patrols had been started to the N to gain contact with elements of 78.

1300: TF Lutz reported held up by mine field and small arms fire from pill boxes. C.O. CCR directed immediate employment of available TD's and tanks, by direct fire on strong points - and continue mission aggressively.

1645: Last enemy organized resistance overcome and TF Lutz reported Steckenborn cleared and secure.

1745: C.O. CCR directed TF Commanders to consolidate positions for the night, McDaniel to give particular attention to the north and northeast, and Lutz to the northeast and east; and further directed that McDaniel be prepared to relieve Lutz the following morning.

2000: C.O. CCR, acting C.O. 38 conferred with C.O. 310 at his CP and discussed plans for the attack on Hechelsheid. It was agreed that CCR assist and support the attack of the 310 by attaching certain armor, and that the attack would be launched at 0600 the following day.

2050: CCR directed to send patrols to SE, make contact with and provide security in conjunction with the 102, vicinity Ruhrberg.

6 February 1945

0600: 1/B/814, 1/B/40 attached to TF Lutz.

0755: TF McDaniel reported C/38 moved from Strauch to gain contact with and relieve TF Lutz in Steckenborn.

0815: TF McDaniel instructed to send out patrols to N and E, observe road condition, road blocks and obstructions, mines, and whether under enemy fire.

0815: TF Brown (-) (CCR Reserve) moved to and closed in vic Simmerath.

0915: TF Lutz relieved. 3/310 released to Regimental control and C.O. 310, C.G. 78, so notified. All other attachments to Lutz reverted to parent organizations.

1010: Truck 1/4 Ton (not of this Command) destroyed by running over mine on road Simmerath, and 78 requested to furnish engineers to sweep road Simmerath - Steckenborn.

The following attachments to TF McDaniel were effected as indicated.

1015: A/87
1035: D/203
1200: 1/B/814

1315: TF McDaniel relieved elements 78 in Hechelsheid and assumed responsibility for that sector. Patrols immediately dispatched to objective 112 (0426) and assumed control thereof at 1600 after contact had been effected with 2/311 at that time.

1700: CP TF McDaniel closed Simmerath, opened Steckenborn.

1737: C.O. CCR directed hourly patrols on road (020282) - (029291).

1820: 78 informed this Command that the enemy had infiltrated at (030282), all of our units instructed.

1842: TF McDaniel directed to establish defensive position, along general line (028292) - (048273).

7 February 1945

1100: 1/C/33 detached 38 and reverted to company control.

1445: C.O. CCR directed to report to C.G. 78.

1505: 102 extended its northern boundary to (043263) and TF McDaniel relieved of responsibility for everything south thereof.

1550: 303 requested and granted use of two tank dozers 40.

1705: Contact point for 38 - 102 changed to (046270).

2120: C/33 attached 38.

2240: B/814 attached 38, C.O. CCR directed C.O. 38 organize small TF consisting of 1/38, 1/40, 1/B/814, 1/C/33 to be held in assembly area as mobile reserve and to be committed only on order C.O. CCR.

78 operations plan for following day discussed with commanders and C.O. 38 warned his mission would be to "mop up" and comb the area passed through by the 78.

8 February 45

0400: 38 and 102 effected contact and 38 relieved of responsibility for sector south of point (048273).

0630: 2 tank dozers 40 attached 303 for use this date.

0800: TF Meads organized as mobile reserve, administratively attached to TF McDaniel, but to be committed only on order C.O. CCR.

1045: Capt Goldman NUSA historian, visited CP CCR.

1425: This Command informed by Corps that the 9th Div. was moving up into our sector and that such Div had priority on all billets in Strauch.

1715: C/33 directed to perform road maintenance highway Simmerath - Schmidt, and also clear battery areas 434 of mines.

9 February 45

1400: Quota of one officer and one EM on D/S to medium bomber base for 10 days to study air-ground communications and liaison, received.

10 February 1945

1200: CCR relieved of attached 78. Command (-40 & B/814) alerted for move and return to Eupen. Command reverted to Div. control, Corps reserve.

1410: Informed that movement not authorized, because of condition of roads.

11 February 45

0910: C.O. CCR reported to C.G. Corps, for operational instructions.

1155: C.O. CCR, from CP V Corps, stated that because our troops were unable to move from the area anyway, it was considered likely that the 38th at least would be employed in a pending operation. He therefore directed the 38 be attached to 102, time of attachment to be announced; that the attachment, if effective, was to be for a particular mission (river crossing) and that the C.O. 38 report to C.O. 102, at Kesternich, at 1400, for details and instructions.

1400: Ex. O. CCR, Ex. O. 38, S-3 38, reported to C.O. 102 as directed, and were informed of the details for contemplated river crossing, and role of 38. Liaison was established between 38 - 102, radio communication was provided for and reconnaissance initiated by co Commanders. C.O. 38 made an aerial reconnaissance of sector of operation.

1623: G-3 V Corps announced that plans for the river crossing were abolished and operation canceled - therefore attachment of 38 to 102 would not become effective. After proper confirmation of this directive, troops were notified and liaison with 102 was severed.

2325: G-3 this Division phoned and stated that roads were in such poor condition we were called upon to furnish details for road maintenance and were directed that the 40th furnish 300 men, exclusive of supervisors (non-coms., etc.) to work under the 164 Engr. Bn. (C), whose CP was at Malmedy; and the 38 furnish 300 men (exclusive of supervisors), to work under the 148 Engr. Bn. (C) whose CP was at Stavelot, Representatives of each of our Bns were directed to report to the respective Eng. Bn. CP's at first light, receive instructions and arrange for billeting of men near base of work, and provide for 9 days stay.

Each Bn was directed to use its own organic transportation to maximum, but was informed that G-4 would furnish any additional trucks required for this detail. Engineers to furnish necessary tools.

During the period 041600 - 101200 Feb 45 CCR was attached to 78 for Operations in the Simmerath area, and assisted in the "Battle of the Dams". In the first day's action the Command was charged with the seizure of Strauch and Steckenborn, and protection of the 78 S and SE flanks. These missions were satisfactorily accomplished, without delay. On the second day CCR supported elements of the 78 in attack on and capture of Hechelsheid. Thereafter, the mission of this Command was more of a supporting and reserve role. Patrols were frequent - mopping up operations after 78 had initially passed thru an area - and reconnaissance and screening to the E and SE were specific missions. During the first two days, when CCR had an independent assigned objective the following results obtained:

- 2 - Towns captured (Assisted in capture 1 other)
- 3 - 88MM Guns destroyed
- 6 - 75MM (HD) Guns destroyed.
- 3 - MG's captured.
- 20 - Small Arms captured.
- 2 - 60MM Field Pieces captured (abandoned)
- 10 - Occupied Pill Boxes knocked out.

16 - unoccupied Pill Boxes overrun and scorched.
162 - Enemy captured.
25 - Enemy known killed.

and our own losses were

5 - Wounded
2 - Tanks immobilized by mines.

After release from attached 78 on 10 Feb, the command was unable to move from Vic Simmerath because of the condition of all roads, and on 11 Feb it was alerted for further commitment. It was contemplated and planned that CCR be attached to 102 to assist and support such unit in the projected river crossing at (046240). However, after plans were made and reconnaissance completed, the operation was canceled.

12 February 45

Road maintenance details dispatched to respective areas. Advance CP CCR closed Simmerath 1600 and rejoined main CP at Eupen, closed there at 1818.

13 February 45

C.O. CCR departed for England on Army order. Ex. O. assumed temporary command.

14 February 45

1200 A/87 moved from Steckenborn area to Limbourg and released from attached CCR, reverted to squadron control.

16-17 February 1945

All commanders and respective staffs participated in CPX conducted by Div.

21 February 1945

0800: Staff and Commanders meeting, all units CCR represented. Discussed general plan and schedules for road maintenance, and stressed importance thereof; anticipated operations generally in V Corps and adjacent Corps; all officers directed to make careful terrain study Heimbach - Euskirchen - Zulpich - Sistig - Kall area.

1820: C.O. CCR returned to duty from England, and resumed Command.

28 February 45

0800: C.O. CCR notified Division - SHAEF Reserve.

1800: All troops employed on road maintenance details relieved from such duty and returned to units. Division released SHAEF Reserve and revert Corps control.

During tile period 12-28 Feb 45 the Command furnished an average of approximately 750 men daily on road maintenance projects in the Malmedy - Stavelot - Elsenborn area. In addition, those men not so employed were engaged in maintenance of vehicles, weapons, and radios; all tanks were equipped with camouflage wire netting and infantry carrying devices; demonstrations and training conducted, especially by crew members of vehicles and weapons.

At 2400 at the close of the period for which this report is submitted, the staff of CCR was as indicated at the beginning of the period, as shown on page 2 hereof; the troop list was as follows:

38th Armored Inf. Bn.
40th Tank Bn.
C/33 Armored Engr. Bn.
B/814 TD Bn.
D/203 (-) AAA (AW) Bn.

the CP of the Command was located at Eupen (Belgium); and the Command., within the Division, was in V Corps Reserve.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Fred M Warren
FRED M. WARREN,
Lt. Col., Cavalry
Executive Officer

6 Inclosures:

- Incl. #1 Journal, CCR, 7th AD, Feb 45
- Incl. #2 S-3 Per. Rpt., CCR, 7th AD, Feb 45.
- Incl. #3 Incoming Esgs. CCR, 7th AD, Feb 45.
- Incl. #4 Outgoing Msgs. CCR, 7th AD, Feb 45.
- Incl. #5 Opn. Instr.
- Incl. #6 S-2 Report, CCR, 7th AD, Feb 45.

HEADQUARTERS
RESERVE COMMAND
SEVENTH ARMORED DIV.
APO 257 , U.S. ARMY

2 April 1945

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT, MONTH OF MARCH 1945

TO : THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.
(THROUGH CHANNELS)

At the beginning of the period for which this report is submitted, the staff of CCR, 7th Armored Division consisted of:

Col. Francis P. Tompkins	C.O.
Lt. Col. Fred M. Warren	Ex. O.
Major Norwood G. Read	S-2
Major Richard D. Gillis	S-3
Major Carl M. Corbin	S-4
Capt. James W. Gooley	Asst S-3 & Comm O.
Capt. Olaf W. Christopherson	Asst S-4 & Hq. Co. Comdr.
Major Glenn G. Hairston	Surgeon
Capt. George Vogel	Dental Officer
Capt. John L. Fellows, Jr.	Liaison Officer
Lt. Walter G. Weissenberger	Liaison Officer to Div. Headquarters

Troops attached to the Command were:

48th Armored Infantry Battalion
38th Armored Infantry Battalion
40th Tank Battalion
B/814 Tank Destroyer Battalion
C/33 Armored Engineer Battalion
D/203 AAA (AW) Battalion

1 March 1945

Command assembled in area Lammersdorf, Steckenborn, Simmerath, Germany, just West of the Roer River.

1-6 March 1945

Period devoted to maintenance, training in small unit tactics and tank-inf coordination with special emphasis on carrying inf on tanks. Units test fired new wpns and conducted technical training on individual and crew served wpns.

7 March 1945

Command moved to new assy posns E of Roer R in vic Wallersheim, Germany. 38th Armored Inf. Bn. detached CCR and attached CCA 2300.

8 March 1945

40th Tank Bn. detached CCR and attached CCB 0700. 87th Cav. Rcn. Sqdn., 48th Armored Inf. Bn., 440 and 434 AFA Bns attached 0700. Command as newly constituted moved to new assy posns vic Ollheim, Germany, closing 1930. 48th Armored Infantry Bn., plus 1/B/814 continued march to Witterschlick, Germany, closing 2030.

Plans were completed for attack to E; to jump off at first light 9 March 45.

9 March 1945

48th AIB plus 1/B/814 attacked 0630 passing through elms 60th RCT along general N-S line through (515338). Attack was made with two companys in assault; one in reserve. Assault companys echeloned to right rear. Attack progressed rapidly with no opposition and by the end of the day the towns of Dottendorf and Freisdorf, on the W bank of the Rhine River had been occupied and defensive posns established and contact made with 87th Cav. Rcn. Sqdn. on right.

87th Cav. Rcn. Sqdn plus 1/C/33 furnished Adv. Guard and Rear Guard for march to new posns, vic Rottgen, Germany; reconnoitered routes to Bonn and Bad Godesberg; out-posted W of bank Rhine River in zone. CC CP opened Rottgen 1215. Tank Destroyer and Engineer attachments were released 1720 and reverted to company control.

10 March 1945

Command relvd of responsibility for defense of W bank of Rhine River by CCB 1030. 48th AIB, 87th Cav. Rcn. Sqdn., B/814 TD Bn. detached effective at 1030. Hqs. CCR, C/33, and D/203 AAA moved at 1030 to assy posn vic Miel, Germany, closing 1200, whereupon C/33 reverted to Bn. control. 40th Tk. Bn. attached 1200 moved to assy posn vic Heidgen closing 1450.

11 March 1945

38th AIB and 87 Cav. Rcn. Sqdn attached CCR 1900, in place. Adv. CP CCR moved to Bad Godesberg, closing 1900.

12-24 March 1945

Troops of CC remained in defensive posns along W bank Rhine River.

B/203 AAA (AW) attached 151500 March with primary mission of defense of fwd arty in town of Melhoim, Germany.

40th, B/814, Troop E/87 and AG's/38 supported fires of Div. Arty.

38th AIB established patrol contact with 78 Inf. Div. on E bank of Rhine River.

Traffic control points were established vic Bad Godesberg.

1/B/87 attached 161800 and placed under operational control 38th AIB.

Command relvd from all security responsibility W bank Rhine R 232000 March 1945.

C/33 atched and 87th Rcn Sqdn. detached 242000 March 1945.

25 March 1945

Command moved to new assy posns vic Notscheid, Germany closing 250020 March 1945.

B/87, C/31, A/48, C/814 (-2 plats), 72' 998 Tdwy Br. Co. atched 250900.

Organized three (3) Task Forces 251200 composed as follows:

<u>TF BROWN</u>	<u>TF GRIFFIN</u>	<u>TF JORDAN</u>
40 (-A, 2 Plats D)	38 (-A and B)	B/87
A/38	A/40	1/D/40
B/38	1/D/40	C/33 (-2 Plts)
B/814 (-1 Plat)	C/31	72' Tdwy
1/C/33	A/48	
	1/B/814	
	C/814 (-2 Plats)	
	1/C/38	

Completed plans for attack to the E to secure objs N of Limburg, Germany, employing two Task Forces abreast on Parallel routes with TF Jordan echeloned to left rear protecting the exposed left flank.

26 March 1945

TF Brown moved from assy posns vic Notscheid, Germany, crossing IP Vettleschass at 0200. Attacked from march column and by 0700 had reached Dierdorf where attack was held up by obstacles in form of craters and rubble in the streets making it impassable to tanks through the town. By 1000, routes had been reconnoitered and town by-passed to right, attack progressed well and by 1700 elements were in Obertiefenbach.

TF Griffin moved from assy posns vic Vittleschass, Germany, crossing IP at 260245 March. Attacked from march column as per instructions. Advance was rapid and steady throughout the day and by 1835 had reached Ailertchen.

CCR Headquarters moved from Notscheid at 0100 to Epgert, closing 0350.

B/87 provided flank protection of Command; established blocks at Puderback and Herschbach.

At 1240 orders were received to divert the attack NW and secure crossings over the Dill R at Sinn, Edingen, Katzenfurt, however, TF Brown having made such rapid progress was out of contact and these orders did not reach him until the next morning.

27 March 1945

TF Griffin continued attack to the E, secured the crossings over Dill R at Sinn and Edingen.

TF Brown attacked to the NE and secured crossings over Dill R at Katzenfurt. Plans were completed to continue attack to the E to securing crossings over the Lahn R at Bellnhausen, Roth, Neiderweimer.

28 March 1945

Tf Brown launched atk 280035 March 1945 from posn along E bank Dill R vic Katzenfurt, attacking to NE, advancing along route Kolschan, Oberlemp, Erda, reaching Frankenbach at 0354. Attack continued to obj vic Bellnhausen and Roth, seized and secured bridges over Lahn R at 0725. (Task Force Brown split into two (2) sub-task forces (Sweat and Wolfe) at Bellnhausen.

Task Force Sweat continued attack to NE seizing bridge at Roth, continued SE to Hachborn and Ebsdorf.

TF Wolfe continued atk SE to Ebsdorf where TF's Sweat and Wolfe met. Only scattered and light resistance through out entire operation.

TF Griffin launched attack 0115, crossing LD at Sinn and advanced along axis Dreisbach, Billersdorf, Altenkrchen, reaching Mudersbach at 0640 Attack continued to NE Rossbac, Seelbach, Rolishausen, Lohra, and Wenkbach which was secured at 0854. Atk was slowed down by stiffened en resistance who were resisting with small arms, machine guns, anti-tank and self-propelled guns. One anti-tank gun knocked out and en abandoned and destroyed 2 self-propelled guns and one tiger tank. Objs vic Schrock and Bettshousen were seized and secured by 1435. Physical contact with 3rd Armored Div. was made at Marburg at 1330.

29 March 1945

TF Brown in defensive posns vic Bellnhausen and Roth launched atk March 29 to NE with mission to seize and secure obj vic Kirschhain, Ammoneburg and Kleinseilheim. Atk advanced rapidly and at 0600 had secured obj vic Kleinseilheim and Ammoneburg. First en resistance was encountered to the approaches of bridge at Kirchhain. Town was heavily defended by bazooka teams (firing directly at men), mortars and small arms. House to house fighting necessary.

TF Beatty was attached to the Command 1130 to assist in clearing the town. By 1600 TF Beatty had completed an envelopment from the N and had entered the northern portion of the town.

At 1600 operational control of the troops clearing resistance in Kirchhain passed CCB and TF Sweat attached to CCB until resistance had been cleared. By 1800 all resistance in the town had been eliminated and TF Sweat returned to control of TF Brown under CCR and moved to assy area vic Betzicsdorf.

TF Wolfe continued atk to N to Bracht without opposition, where he was ordered to consolidate his positions and remain until first light.

TF Griffin from posns vic Schrock and Bettshousen atkd to seize objs vic Grossoelheim and Diderwald, crossing LD at 0530 First en resistance was met approx 1200 yds south of Bettshousen where a passive road block was encountered. Final obj secured 0730.

Atk continued to N to seize and secure S bank Eder R in zone. En resistance stiffened, encountering bazooka teams at Burgein, knocking out one tank. Six (6) en planes over area dropped one (1) bomb. Posns were consolidated, Burgein cleared of en and TF Griffin held in place for night.

30 March 1945

TF Griffin contd atk to N from vic Burgein to seize and secure S bank Eder R. Atk progressed rapidly and at 1200 was on obj. No en opposition encountered. Patrols were sent to N bank Eder R.

TF Brown (TF Sweat and Wolfe) launched atk in conjunction with TF Griffin, met no opposition. On obj 1200.

TF Wolfe diverted atk 1100 to secure dam at (925882), passed to operational control CCB 1225 and had secured dam by 1330.

31 March 1945

TF Wolfe relvd from operational control CCB at 1100. Moved to assy posn vic Altenlatheim closing 1745.

TF Sweat moved to assy posn vic Frankenau, closing 1820.

1/D/40 remained with 440 AFA Bn for security purpose.

38th AIB moved from defensive posns along S bank Eder R to assy posns vic Schmittloheim closing 1640. Sent patrols to the N, NE and NW. No contact with the En.

C/33 made road reconnaissance in immediate sector.

Command in assy posn, resupplied and prepared for employment.

SUMMARY

The attack of 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 March 1945 was characterized by fast moving tank columns with inf mounted on tanks, supported by Tank Destroyers and Engineers, against light, poorly organized en resistance. The en was caught almost entirely by surprise, and even though he possessed the means to considerably hinder our advance, he failed to do so. At the appearance of our tank columns, almost invariably, he threw his hands up in surrender or broke and ran.

During the operation, at least one Mark IV, and two Mark V tanks, 5-75MM SP guns, 140-motor transports, 5-150MM guns, 6-105MM guns, 15-240MM guns, 15-88MM guns, 175-horse drawn vehicles, were destroyed. Many other vehicles and millions of dollars worth of equipment was left in the woods beside the roads or overran by the attack. The prisoners were so numerous that it was impossible to handle them through normal PW channels and as a result were left to be picked up by Inf. Divisions mopping up in rear of the attack.

Troop list at close of period as follows:

38th Armored Inf. Bn.
40th Tank Bn.
C/33 Armored Engr. Bn.
B/814 Tank Destroyer Bn.
1/A/87th Rcn. Sqdn.

CP of the Command was located at Frankenau, Germany; and the Command, within the Div., was in III Corps.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Inclosures:

Incl. #1 Journal, CCR, 7th AD, March (signed)
#2 S-3 Per Rpt, CCR, 7 AD, March RICHARD D. GILLIS
#3 Incoming Msgs. CCR, 7 AD March Major, Infantry
#4 Outgoing Msgs. CCR, 7 AD March S-3
#5 Operations Instructions, CCR, 7th AD, March
#6 F.O.'s, CCR, 7th AD, March
#7 S-2 Material (Periodic, CIC, IPW & MG reports)

Headquarters
RESERVE COMMAND, 7th ARMD DIV
APO 257, USA

1 May 1945

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT, MONTH OF APRIL 1945

TO : THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
(THROUGH CHANNELS)

1. During the period month of April, 1945, CCR, 7th Armored Division, operated exclusively in Germany, and all reference to places herein are therefore in Germany although not specifically so stated in the body of the report.
2. Appropriate maps to properly read coordinates given herein may be obtained by reference to the Field Order of Operations Instructions issued by this headquarters prior to each operation, or sub-phase thereof, and submitted herewith as inclosure No. 5.
3. Abbreviations used in this report include unit designations as follows:

7th AD	7th Armored Division
CCA	Combat Command A, 7th Armored Div.
CCB	Combat Command B, 7th Armored Div.
CCR	Combat Command R, 7th Armored Div.
38	38th Armored Infantry Battalion
40	40th Tank Battalion
440	440th Armored Field Artillery Bn.
33	33rd Armored Engineer Bn.
87	87th Cavalry Rcn. Squadron
814	814th Tank Destroyer Battalion
203	203rd AAA (AW) Bn.
2	2nd Infantry Division
5	5th Infantry Division
9	9th Infantry Division
95	95th Infantry Division
104	104th Infantry Division
395	395th Inf Regt, 99th Inf Div.
400	400th Armored Field Artillery Bn.

At the beginning of the period for which this report is submitted the staff of the Reserve Command, 7th Armored Division was composed of:

Col. Francis P. Tompkins	C.O.
Lt. Col. Fred M. Warren	X.O.
Major Norwood G. Read	S-2
Major Richard D. Gillis	S-3
Major Carl M. Corbin	S-4
Capt. James W. Gooley, Jr.	Asst S-3 & Commo
Capt. Olaf W. Christopherson	Asst S-4 & Hq. Co. C.O.
Major Glenn G. Hairston	Surgeon
Capt. George Vogel	Dental Officer
Capt. John L. Fellows, Jr.	Ln. Officer

the troops attached to the Command were:

Hq. and Hq. Det., Res. Comd.
38th Armored Infantry Bn.
40th Tank Bn.
400th Armored Field Artillery Bn.
440th Armored Field Artillery Bn.
B/814th Tank Destroyer Bn.
C/33rd Armored Engineer Bn.
B (-) 203 AAA (AW) Bn.
2/C/203 AAA (AW) Bn.

the CP of the Command was located at Frankenau; and CCR, within the 7th Armored Div, was in III corps. (reference is made to "After Action Report" for the month of March 1945.)

Combat efficiency: Medium tanks: 80%
Tank destroyers: 100%
Other Combat Vehs: 100%
Morale: Excellent

1 April 1945

The Command remained in the assy area vic EDERSEE, after completion of successful break-thru of the REMAGEN bridgehead, and the exploitation reported in March "After Action Report". All troops were in readiness to resume their attack to the N or NE, units were employed in "mopping up" operations and in combing the woods for bypassed en personnel. During one day 59 en were processed thru the PW cage.

1/A/87 attached to CCR eff 1200 and upon reporting immediately placed under operational control of 38, with mission of maintaining patrols to the front (N) and left (W) flanks in our sector. Liaison was maintained with 104 on the left, and contact effected with 2 on our front.

2 April 1945

Units resumed and completed their search of woods adjacent to their respective assigned areas, and during the day 42 PW were processed. At 1835 the command was placed on a 2 hour alert, directed to be prepared to attack on order, en pocket contained in RUHR area. In order to affect an uninterrupted move under this directive, the

440 was ordered at 1840 to concentrate in the FRANKENAU area at first light 3 April. At 2345 Div G-3 announced a change in CC-R boundary and sector of responsibility effective 030800, which included the area previously occupied by CC-A. C/87 and 1/F/87 attached CC-R for the purpose of patrolling the additional sector.

3 April 1945

At 0800 CC-R assumed responsibility for the security of sector previously occupied by CCA; and C/87 and 1/F/87 began patrolling it and established road blocks. At 0820 the 440 closed in new assy area vic FRANKENAU. Reconnaissance platoon 40 reconnoitered routes to W and NW for avenues of approach to possible areas of commitment. C/33 performed maintenance of DAURODE-HAUBERN road. The Command maintained liaison with CCA in the RUHR pocket area and the 104. Units performed maintenance and restored vehicles. At 2300 all units were directed to be prepared to move on order after 040900. 1 officer and 11 em PW were processed during the day.

4 April 1945

0800 - 1/A/87, 1/F/87, and C/87 relieved from attached CCR and reverted to squadron control. Command began movement from FRANKENAU area at 0900 and closed in vic SACHSENBERG by 1330. CP closed in former location 1115 and opened in latter location 1230. Upon closing in new area 400 and 440 were relieved from attached CCR and reverted to Div. Arty control. In order to provide local security for the Arty Bns, 1/D/40 and 1/C/38 were attached to 400, and 1/D/40 and 1/B/38 were attached to 440. At 1740 the 38 and 40 were directed to simultaneously and individually reconnoiter 2 separate routes to the W as far as possible, and by 2340 final reports had been received on routes as far as OBERKIRCHEN. The Command established road blocks and instituted strong interior patrols within its assigned sector, with emphasis placed on apprehension of military personnel in civilian clothes, and other military stragglers. During the day 42 PW were processed (4 officers and 38 em).

5 April 1945

A and B/38 were relieved from attached 40, and reverted to control parent organization at 0840; and at 0845 Div directed that 38 be moved as soon as possible to vic NEU ASTENBERG. B/814 was attached to 38 at 0850, and immediately thereafter A/40 and 1/B/814 were relieved of attached 38 and reverted to 40. At 1005 the Command was placed on a 1/2 hour alert by CO CCR, prepared to move to a new assy area. CP closed at SACHSENBERG 1115 and opened NEU ASTENBERG 1330. 38 and B/814 (-) were detached CCR at 1200 and attached to CCB. The platoon (reinf) from B/814 was placed on CC CP security. At 1624 Div directed that C/33 be placed on road maintenance under control of Div Engr until such time as the CC would require their services. 40, by direction CO CCR, placed one med tk co on 30 minutes alert status eff 1700. 20 PW passed thru CCR enclosure during the day.

6 April 1945

3 tanks D/40 on special mission guarding building in HALLENBERG containing captured en signal material, under control of 9 Sig Officer, and 2 other tanks D/40 on another mission guarding a bldg in the same city containing V-2 bomb parts. At 1300 1/B/814 attached 40. CP closed NEU ASTENBERG 1500 and opened at OBERKIRCHEN same time. 40 was moved forward and closed vis LANGEWIESE at 1830. Preparations made for commitment of CCR troops in accordance with Div order previously received. No prisoners were processed this day. The weather for period 1 to 6 incl was cool and cloudy, with intermittent showers, and visibility poor.

7 April 1945

A/87 was attached to the Command at 1000 and 38th was attached at 1100. The CC became operational at 1200 when it assumed responsibility for the right flank of the Division. Prior to that time, CO CCR issued verbal order (later confirmed) to the TF and Bn comdrs, directing that as soon as A/87 had relieved elements of 38th on objectives 11 and 8, TF Griffin would attack to seize and secure HOLTHAUSEN. The plan announced was to have one co infantry exert direct pressure from the SW and one inf and one tk co advance on axis NDR SORPE-HOLTHAUSEN. After HOLTHAUSEN was secure TF Griffin was directed to be prepared to continue his attack on FREDERBERG. The attack developed as directed at 1230, when C Co attacked NW to secure the commanding terrain vic (G434880), and envelope HOLTHAUSEN, after which B co launched its frontal attack at 1420 from positions NDR SORPE (G437858). C made comparatively slow progress due to the nature of the terrain, and encountered dug in en inf at (G428882). B received heavy concentration of arty and mortar fire, but progressed favorably in the face of small arms fire from the town. By nightfall the two forces had joined, secured and out-posted the town, and the troops already committed had been reinforced by 1/A/40 and 1/B/814. At the end of the day A/38 was ordered to and had started move from vic (G410857) to pass thru B at HOLTHAUSEN, to secure the town of HUXEL. A/87 established a series of strong points along the line (G419855) to (G432865), established roadblocks at (G445869) and by nightfall had established contact with the 60 RCT. 40 (-A) moved from its positions vic LANGEWIESE to WINKHAUSEN, and closed there at 1620.

8 April 1945

The atk of A/87 on HUXEL (419880) continued in the face of small arms fire until the town was secured at 0145. This obj was then out-posted, patrols sent to NW vic (413886), and positions consolidated for the night. Meanwhile, CO CCR, by personal visit to CO 38 at CP 38 directed that TF Griffin resume the atk at first light - one co to move on "DOT", seize and occupy the ground, and be prepared to move on obj "POP", one co to follow in column, prepared to move on "GEORGE", and B/co to reorganize in position on "MOM" prepared to move W on the road and atk "GEORGE", on order. TF Griffin complied with this directive by resuming the offensive at 0630, attacking FREDEBERG (402883), seizing high ground vic (413885) and then turned SW on the city. By 0810 A co was reported 500 yds W of "GEORGE" advancing slowly on "DOT", receiving sniper and mortar fire. B co

advanced to and on "POP" without opposition.

At 0840 CO CCR relieved A/87 of its mission of establishing strong points along the ridge just below the 86 grid line between 41 and 43, and ordered that troop to follow the atk along the axis NDR SORPE-HOLTHAUSEN-FREDERBERG and establish road blocks on all roads leading into CCR sector from the NE, thus secure the Command's right (east) flank - and also, to continue to maintain contact with the 60 RCT.

The attack progressed slowly throughout the morning, as our troops were heavily engaged by en who resisted stubbornly with small arms, machine guns, artillery/and or SP, and some mortar fire. A/38 was delayed on "DOT" by this concentrated fire but no prepared positions were encountered. C/38 was eventually echeloned to right rear, and made physical contact with A/38. Both companies, after joining up, began to clear the woods, so that they could go into an assault position from which to launch the atk on "POP". The obj was cleared of en to S edge of woods (404880) by 1110, and the companies thereupon reorganized for the assault, in conjunction with B/38 and A/40. The later two elements attacked at 1150 from positions in HOLTHAUSEN (423874) along the axis (417873)-(411877)-(404879). The atk progressed rapidly to (412887) where a defended en road block was encountered. This block in contra-distinction to others encountered in the last succeeding days, was defended by small arms, machine guns and arty- and delayed the advance until 1545. Meanwhile, at 1355 the C.G. directed that this CC place some security detachment on "MIN" because CCB would pass there to our left and that flank must be secured. At 1450 CO CCR relieved A/87 of its mission protecting CC right flank and directed that one platoon immediately occupy obj "MIN" and the balance of the troop be prepared to relieve assault echelon on "POP" when it was taken. At 1910 the platoon reported as having occupied its obj. Fighting in FREDEBERG was organized and stubborn. Our entrance into the town was strongly opposed and upon entry therein, house to house fighting developed. It was necessary to comb the entire area, and by nightfall our troops controlled only several sections of the city. At 2110 the C.O. of troops reported his men worn and fatigued, and requested permission to consolidate for the night. CO CCR however desired to pass an armored TF thru these troops and the city, by first light next day, and therefore directed that the city be entirely cleared if possible; otherwise the minimum requirement was that a designated route must be cleared so that the TF could pass thru safely. The path thru town was cleared and secured. During the day 105 PW's were taken.

9 April 1945

In the projected plan of atk to pass TF Wolfe through TF Griffin at FREDEBERG, it became necessary to disengage one inf co and have it join Wolfe's column. CO CCR opportunely directed that 1 co be disengaged as early as possible, that it be consolidated, reorganized thoroughly briefed on the plan, and that it be prepared to join Wolfe by mounting tanks without delay upon arrival. During the evening, as intensity of fighting decreased, and the opportunity afforded, B/38 was disengaged and the directive complied with. TF Wolfe (-B) was assembled during the preceding night and at 0600 left its assembly

area E of FREDEBERG, passed thru that city, where the inf mounted the tanks, and the atk resumed at 0715, along the axis (380881)-(363880)-MAILAR (359901)-DOLOR (343915). Progress was slow thruout the day, as the TF ran into one road block after another. During the first 2 hours advance this TF encountered 5 undefended blocks, consisting of felled trees, rubble, and destroyed vehicles. While offering no active resistance, they delayed and impeded the advance. This column was delayed again in the morning by a thick, well concentrated, smoke screen. Visibility was nil, the smoke generator never discovered, and it was only after the screen dissipated that the advance resumed. Small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire were encountered, gradually increasing in intensity until (363880), where resistance stiffened and AT fire was received. By nightfall this TF had reached MAILAR (359901) and was opposed there by inf, tanks, and SP.

Meanwhile TF Griffin advanced at 1010 along axis FREDEBERG (403880)-EBLINGHOF (384870)-RJ (365664)-BERGHAUSEN (357876)-NDR BERNDORF (340888)-MENKHAUSEN (330965). This force also encountered a series of undefended road blocks consisting of felled trees, mine fields, and booby trapped destroyed vehicles. The atk of this clmn continued slowly in face of small arms, machine guns, and mortar fire until reaching BERGHAUSEN where poor road condition stopped it. The engineers repaired the road without delay and the advanced resumed against continued and increasing resistance. At the end of the day's operation the TF occupied positions on S edge of MENKHAUSEN.

TF Brown, initially in reserve, was committed at 1815 along axis BERGHAUSEN, NDR BERNDORF, NE to MAILAR in an effort to relieve pressure on TF Wolfe who was then attacking the defended town of MAILAR from the S. The 3/395 attached to CCR early this date, cleared the woods SW of MAILAR with little opposition, and outposted HEMINGHAUSEN.

A/87 was released from attached at 0615 and reverted to Sqdrn control, was re-attached at 1700 and during the night outposted NDR BERNDORF and BERGHAUSEN.

CP C CR moved twice during the day - closing NDR SORPE at 1050, opened FREDEBERG 1130, closed FREDERBERG 1505, opened BERGHAUSEN 1605, and 705 prisoners were processed (700 em and 5 off).

10 April 1945

CO CCR directed a continuation of the atk at daylight and issued his orders to the commanders at their respective CP's about midnight. These orders were subsequently confirmed in writing. Although it was intended that the atk be launched at 0530, and the forces were organized and ready to move at that time, fog was so heavy then that visibility was zero. Under such circumstances it was impracticable to employ tanks, so the infantry was dismounted and directed to advance and gain contact. As soon as visibility permitted, the atk was resumed with TF Brown advancing along the axis MAILAR (358902)-NDR BERNDORF (338887)-MENKHAUSEN (335905)-GRIMMINGHAUSEN (333916)-LOCHTROP (328927)-FRIELINGHAUSEN (328935). By 1030 this force had advanced to GRIMMINGHAUSEN against only light, scattered resistance. Meanwhile, TF Wolfe proceeded along the axis MAILAR (358902)-DOLOR (348916)-FRIELINGHAUSEN. Similar weather conditions prevailed on

this route and the advance was slow for that reason and also because of scattered resistance and passive road blocks. At DOLAR enemy armor supported by infantry was first encountered and one enemy tank known destroyed vic (343920). At 1320 TF's Brown and Wolfe joined at FRIELINGHAUSEN, where road blocks and mines were delaying factors. At this juncture the TF's were consolidated under Brown, and the atk continued to the N. All along the route the enemy resisted with small arms, machine guns, and SP guns and armor was encountered in strength at BREMKE. Continued aggressive pressure by our troops finally reduced this opposition and Brown advanced to his obj. Upon order CO CCR, patrols were sent further N to gain and maintain contact with the 5th Inf Div. Simultaneously with the attack of TF's Brown and Wolfe, TF Griffin advanced along the route HENGESBECK (318913)-BREMSCHEID (302939)-ESLAME (302930) meeting only light resistance until reaching BREMSCHEID. Enemy defended in and around this town with small arms, machine guns, and mortar, however, TF Griffin advanced with heavy concentration marching fire and overcame all resistance - destroyed several vehicles, captured 1 -80MM gun and took some prisoners. The same technique was employed at ESLAME and only little opposition was offered. The force likewise seized its obj and secured the bridge vic (303959). 3/395 supported the atk of TF Griffin by clearing the woods vic (288937), (295445), and (298957).

A/87 protected Command right flank and routes of approach into. CP CCR closed BERGHAUSEN at 1000, opened MENKHAUSEN 1205, closed MENKHAUSEN 1640, and opened FRIELINGHAUSEN 1720.

During the day the Command advanced about 5 miles, captured 10 towns, destroyed enemy materiel, and took 272 prisoners of war.

11 April 1945

CO CCR plans for resumption of the attack directed that TF Brown advance to the N, seize and secure WENTHOLTHAUSEN, and be prepared to move W on reconnaissance mission on order - and TF Griffin to seize and secure obj 100 (including the city of SIEPERTING), and then make rte reconnaissance MATHMECKE-GHEVENSTEIN. During the night information was received indicating that friendly troops might occupy WENTHOLTHAUSEN, MATHMECKE-GHEVENSTEIN before our atk and CCR troops were accordingly so informed. 3/395 (reinf) moved on obj 100 at 0700 and cleared all but the town by 0745. Small arms, machine gun, and tank fire were received from town of SIEPERTEN, but several artillery concentrations discouraged the enemy and 3/395 entered the town without incident and took about 40 prisoners.

Civilians had accurately informed troops of the location of mines, and being forewarned, no damage was done except delay occasioned by their removal. TF Griffin continued his mission, reconnaissance in force to the N and NW (MATHMECKE - GREVENSTEIN), and moved to an assy area. At GREVENSTEIN this force was delayed for a considerable period by accurate 20MM fire. Meanwhile TF Wolfe moved N rapidly and occupied WENTHOLTHAUSEN by 0718 without opposition, arriving there simultaneously with other friendly troops moving from the N and TF Brown moved from defensive position vic BREMKE to an assy area vic WENTHOLTHAUSEN, closing there at 1600. His troops thereafter conducted road reconnaissance W and NW so far as the situation would permit.

A/87 reconnoitered the woods (290970) east to the 30 grid line, and W to 27 grid; C/33 maintained roads in our sector and closed in new assy area MATHMECKE by 1800.

CP CCR closed FRELINGHAUSEN at 1100 and opened MATHMACKE at 1220. During the day 3 officers and 458 enlisted men prisoners of war were processed.

12 April 1945

Indications pointed to enemy disintegration and withdrawal, and the road net was not favorable to the attackers. CO CCR elected to pursue with the Command initially in one column - along the axis GREVENSTEIN (275006)-ALTENHELFELD (254018)-LINNEP (234014)-ENDORF (210992)-STOCKUM (174996)-ALLENDORF (151984)-ALTENAFFELN (099970). Order of march for the atk was TF Griffin-B/400-TF Butler-400 (-B)-TF Wolfe-440-TF Brown.

The atk progressed rapidly at first against only slight resistance, some inaccurate artillery and mortar fire being received along the rte. However, vicinity (220013) TF Griffin was absolutely blocked by impassable roads and had considerable difficulty in extricating his force. Griffin having informed CO CCR by radio of his difficulties, CO CCR immediately diverted the balance of the Command over an alternate route that subsequently proved satisfactory. CO CCR put 400 into firing position, sent out reconnaissance in force over new route, and directed TF Wolfe to by-pass Griffin vic LINNEP (234014), then move S to RJ (244001), thence W to ENDORF (210992). Opposition was encountered over this new route, but the advance continued encouragingly. At STOCHEM first enemy armor was encountered, and again between ALLENDORF-AFFELN. TF Wolfe was heavily engaged until 1720 when opposition was reduced. The atk continued to the N and W with TF's Wolfe and Brown clearing KUNTROP and NEUEURODE. TF Griffin attacked N from AFFELN clearing BLINTROP (079993) and GARBECK (068022).

During the current day's operation the Command seized 16 towns and villages, destroyed 5 tiger tanks, and 29 motor transports, 5 artillery pieces, 2 personnel carriers, miscellaneous motor vehicles, unrecorded number horse drawn vehicles and weapons, and captured 8 officers and 2822 EM.

CP CCR closed MATHMECKE 0800, opened KUNTROP 2230.

13 April 1945

The Command remained in defensive positions vic NEUEURODE (030981), KUNTROP (059986), and GARBECK (068022).

TF Wolfe was directed to send reconnaissance in force SW to vic WEREOHL (016958), to feel out and determine enemy strength and capabilities there. He was instructed not to become so heavily engaged that he could not disengage if it was later determined to move the Command on resumption of its original plan - however, if no opposition was encountered he was directed to proceed into and secure WERDOHL. This reconnaissance ultimately met stiff resistance which later ripened into a counter-attack from dominating ground N of

DOHL. Enemy employed medium artillery, mortar, small arms, and at least 2 heavy tanks direct fire. TF Wolfe called for and received heavy concentrations of heavy and medium artillery - which subsequently contained the counter attack and evidently changed the intentions of the few offensive minded enemy. Meanwhile, and before the artillery could be brought down, Wolfe's force was withdrawn to vic of its original defensive positions NEUEURODE, where it remained for the balance of this period.

Other troops continued their search of sector for enemy stragglers, and enforced military government on all occupied towns. As a result 15 officers and 2950 EM were processed thru the PW cage.

400 and 440 detached 0300.

14 April 1945

Command still in defensive position KUNTROP (059986), NEUEURODE (030981), GARBECK (068022), continued search of area for stragglers and enforced military government in occupied sector. Relieved of responsibility for sector at 0900 by 395.

C/33 cleared roads in our zone.

7 officers and 221 EM processed thru PW cage today.

CP CCR closed KUNTROP 1245, opened BECKUM 1430.

15 April 1945

Command launched atk from MENDEN at 0900, to the N and W, with TF Sweat leading. He advanced along the axis HALINGEN (990181)-DOHLHAUSEN (980185)-GRULAND (963171)-RJ (952160) and first encountered enemy resistance at (972179). The enemy took full advantage of natural defensive terrain features, and employed SP-88-20 and 40MM guns. In order to divert some of the pressure on TF Sweat, TF Wolfe (who was following in column) was directed to proceed via route HALINGEN (990181)-BERTINGLOH (983163)-KARTHOF (959141), envelop enemy flank. TF Wolfe was committed and engaged immediately. Opposition increased and pressure on SWEAT was diminished. In this squeeze plan numerous guns of all calibers and 2 Mark VI tanks were destroyed, enemy positions overrun and about 260 prisoners taken. Thereafter the forces were regrouped and reconstituted and the atk to W resumed, ultimately consolidating positions vic RJ (952160).

TF Griffin attacked along axis MENDEN (031159)-SUMMERN (983133) against determined and stiff resistance; however, TF Wolfe's envelopment which was intended primarily to assist TF Sweat, in reality was likewise of great material assistance to TF Griffin, and SUMMERN was cleared by 2000,

Elements of 5 and 95, operating in the same sector, were engaged in clearing woods and mopping up operations. Contact with the 95 was established at 1915 at (982198). Contact with the 5 was maintained thru-out the operation.

The 400 and 440 were attached at 0900. CP closed BECKUM 1010 and opened HALINGEN 1200. A total of 8 officers and 335 EM prisoners were taken this date.

16 April 1945

Again the enemy showed signs of disintegration, and evidence pointed to a collapse. CO CCR directed that an aggressive attack be resumed at first light, with TF's Brown and Griffin abreast. At 0600 the attack was abruptly interrupted when a representative of the C.G. 116 Panzer Division presented himself to leading elements of TF Griffin. This representative indicated that he desired to negotiate surrender of enemy troops. Lt. Col. Griffin immediately reported this incident to CO CCR who inquired as to just whom he represented. It subsequently developed that this German officer actually represented the C.G. 116 Panzer Div, and was also empowered to speak for the C.G. 53 German Corps. CO CCR reported all these facts to C.G. 7 AD - and then went forward to deal personally in the negotiations, pending arrival of the C/S. CO CCR met the C.G. 116 Panzer Division and accepted surrender of the latter and his troops. Meanwhile, C/S 7AD arrived on the scene and was escorted to Hq. 53 German Corps where negotiations were completed for the surrender of that Corps and such other troops in the pocket as were there. The C.G. was uncertain as to the compositions, strength, and disposition of the troops, due primarily to total breakdown of his communications. He was given until 1200 50 comply with surrender terms.

At 1025 the 87 (-) was attached to CCR for the purpose of assisting in gathering PW's, establishing road blocks, and establishing 2 PW cages for processing the anticipated influx of enemy personnel.

In compliance with the surrender terms, German troops began to flow from all directions at noon time toward the 4 appointed collecting points. Every mode of travel (excepting air) was impressed; some walked, some pushed carts, some rode horse-back, some rode surreys, others came in buggies, farm carts, wagons, dilapidated trucks, civilian cars, German Army vehicles of all types, and some even in previously captured American vehicles (still bearing their original identifying markings). Some strode in, in military formation, proud, erect, well dressed, healthy and well-fed - others appeared battle weary, tired, were dirty, hungry and bedraggled. Some were flippant, some were arrogant, some were crying, some ashamed - here indeed was a cross section of the German army - but all appeared uniformly happy that for them, at least, the war was over. "How soon could they go home" was their dominant thought.

The roads were jammed well into the night, and still they came - taxing our own facilities to receive them.

CP CCR closed HALINGEN, opened ERGESTE 1530.

17 April 1945

The flow of prisoners continued uninterruptedly it appeared. Collecting points were established in TF Brown's area, TF Griffin's area, and 87 area. From such collecting points they were evacuated to Div by their own organic and greatly varied transportation augmented by our own transportation. At 1200 CCR was relieved of responsibility of sector, including acceptance and evacuation of

prisoners. During the period 16-17 April 20302 PW were processed, which comprised the 116 Panzer Div, 180 Inf Div, 190 Inf Div, elements of the 3 and 9 Panzer Div, and miscellaneous flak and rear echelon troops. Our job done here, little time was wasted, and at 1400 the Command started its 140 mile march to vic DRANSFELD (407246).

18-28 April 1945

CP opened DRANSFELD 180805.

C/33, B/814, 87, 440 relieved of attached 181900. Command remained in assy area vic DRANSFELD during the period 18-28 April incl, devoted time to rehabilitation of personnel and maintenance of vehicles, radios, weapons, and other equipment. Test firing conducted. Interior security defenses established and road patrols maintained in assigned sector. CCR HQ prepared small unit tactical problems required to be solved by each officer and NCO platoon leader in the Command.

40 conducted critique on past operations and discussion of tactics of task forces, 38 conducted tactical ride.

29-30 April 1945

CP closed DRANSFELD 290900. The Command consisting of 38, 40, 440, C/33, B/814, E/87, 1/F/87, 1/B/203 departed DRANSFELD 290800 and closed in new assembly area 291910. CP opened HERMANSBURG 1800. E/87 and 1/F/87 relieved from attached upon closing in new area. Maintenance vehicles etc, resumed. Security defense and road patrols and blocks established.

During the period 18-30 April, 153 prisoners taken.

At 302400 April 1945, at the close of the period for which this report is submitted, the staff of CC-R was as indicated at the beginning of the period, as shown on page 1 hereof; the troop list was as follows:

Hq. and Hq. Det. CC-R
38th Armored Infantry Bn.
40th Tank Battalion
440th Armored Field Artillery Bn.
Co. C 33rd Armored Engineer Bn.
Co. B, 814th Tank Destroyer Bn.
1 platoon, Co. B, 203rd AAA (AW) Bn.;

the CP of the Command was located at HERMANSBURG (Germany); and the Command, within the Division, was in XVIII Corps (Abn)

RECAPITULATION

During the period covered by this report, CC-R inflicted the following losses upon the enemy:

Personnel casualties:

28,549 prisoners taken
150 killed (estimated)
184 known wounded

Captured materiel:

19 tanks
50 SP guns
950 M/T (assorted)
400 H/D vehicles (all types)
12 Artillery pieces
3 guns - 88MM

Destroyed materiel

35 tanks
42 SP Guns
73 M/T (assorted)
60 H/D vehicles (all types)
18 Artillery pieces
4 Guns - 88MM

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

(signed)
FRED M. WARREN
Lt. Col. Cav. USA
Executive Officer

6 Enclosures:

- Incl. No. 1 Journal, CCR, 7th AD, April 1945
- No. 2 S-3 Per. Rpt., CCR, 7th AD, April 1945
- No. 3 Incoming Msgs. CCR, 7th AD, April 1945
- No. 4 Outgoing Msgs. CCR, 7th AD, April 1945
- No. 5 Operations Instructions
- No. 6 Misc. (Tng Memos; Task Force Problems)
- No. 7 S-2 Material

HEADQUARTERS CC-R
7TH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 257, U.S. ARMY

31 MAY 1945

SUBJECT : LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL.

TO : THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

TRANSMITTED HEREWITH AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR COMBAT COMMAND RESERVE, 7TH ARMORED DIVISION, APO 257, U.S. ARMY.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

(signed)
WALTER H. G. WEISSENBERGER
1ST. LT. INFANTRY
UNIT HISTORIAN

HEADQUARTERS
RESERVE COMMAND, 7TH ARMD DIV
APO 257 , USA

31 May 45

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT, MONTH OF MAY 1945

TO : THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
(THROUGH CHANNELS)

1. During the period month of May 1945, CCR, 7th Armored Division operated exclusively in Germany, and all references to places herein are therefore in Germany although not specifically so stated in the body of the report.
2. Appropriate maps to properly read coordinates given herein may be obtained by reference to the Field Order or Operations Instructions issued by this headquarters prior to each operation, or sub-phase thereof, and submitted herewith as inclosure number 5.

1 May 1945

Combat Command CP at Hermannsburg, Germany (Z5973). The staff continued planning the impending operation which involved the crossing of the Elbe R into the bridgehead established by 82nd Airborne Division and continuing the attack toward the route to the Baltic Sea. C.O. spent the day reconnoitering the tentative routes to the new assy area in the vic of Goldenbow (T1542), especially the approaches to the bridge site across the Elbe R near Bleckede. The Command was organized into four Task Forces as follows:

TF Brown: Under the command of Lt. Col. John S. Brown, sub-divided into two Task Forces:

TF W under the command of Major Wolfe consisting of:

B/40 (-1)
1/D/40
B/38
2nd/B/814
2nd/C/33 (-1 squad)
3 AG's (105MM)/40

TF S under the command of Major Fred Sweat, consisting of:

D/40 (-1)
1/B/40
1/48
1 squad/C/33
3 AG's (105MM)/40

TF Griffin: Under the command of Lt. Col. Marcus Griffin sub-divided into two Task Forces.

TF McDaniels under the command of Major McDaniels consisting of:

C/38
A/40
3rd/B/814
1 squad/C/33
Mortar Platoon/38
Machine Gun Platoon/38

TF Stevenson commanded by Major Stevenson consisting of:

A/38
C/40
1st/B/814
3rd/C/33 (-1 squad)
3 AG's/38
Reconnaissance Platoon/38

The Command was organized in this manner to provide an elastic, highly mobile fighting force, capable of overcoming enemy resistance on either flank of the routes of advance by diverting either or both Task Forces.

Supporting troops of the Command were the 440th in direct support of the Task Force with one platoon of B/203 attached for anti-aircraft protection.

Combat Command troops consisted of Hq and Hq detachment, C/33 (-2 platoons).

At noon the Command was directed to move to the new assembly area anytime after 021100 May 45.

Military Government and CIC in conjunction with British authorities conducted the registration of 700 male civilians from the community of Hermannsburg, Germany. During

the process, one enemy officer and 40 enlisted men were identified and forwarded through regular PW channels to the Div PW cage.

The IPW team interrogated 3 German officers and 3 enlisted men who were apprehended while conducting a search of wooded area in the zone of responsibility. No tactical information was obtained and the 6 PW's were forwarded through PW channels.

2 May 1945

The Combat Command was ordered to move to the new assy area in the Task Force formation, TF Brown leading, beginning 1315. The first vehicle crossed the IP at Hermannsburg at 1311B. The CC CP closed at Hermannsburg at 1400 and reopened at Camin (T1543) 2350. The Recon Plat if the 38th and the 40th were ordered to recon to the N of the assy area for about 25 miles. They reached Raddingsdorf (T0881) where their vehicles ran low on gasoline. No enemy resistance of any kind was encountered. The two platoons however, liberated a number of allied PW's after the German guards surrendered to our recon parties. Numerous civilians were cluttering up the main roads moving to the South, away from the advancing Russian armies.

3 May 1945

All Task Forces closed in the assy area by 0130 except for a few stragglers. Upon arrival in the area, the troops were immediately alerted to move North along the planned routes starting at 1100. Literally thousands of enemy soldiers littered the roads with only one thought in mind; to surrender to our troops and get to the nearest PW cage. They were readily admitted there.

At 1100 the Task Force began movement to the N along pre-designated routes. No enemy resistance was encountered anywhere. The only delay caused to our columns were the thousands of German soldiers streaming in the opposite directions seeking the haven of our PW cages. In addition to their own personal equipment, many German soldiers and sailors surrendering to our troops carried their families and household goods with them. The endless caravan consisted of vehicles ranging anywhere from baby buggies to fire engines, into which human beings clung, along with varied equipment.

By 2000B all Task Forces had reached their objectives and immediately began to control civilian circulation and the ever mounting influx of PW's. Patrols also maintained security and established contacts with CCA and Div Res.

In the course of advance we liberated about 1000 allied PW's, mostly American. Pending availability of transportation and instructions, the allied PW's were instructed to remain in place: arrangements were made for food and necessary clothing needed by them.

The CC CP closed at Camin at 1120B and reopened at Grevesmuhlen at 1955.

4 May 1945

Task Forces were given definite areas of responsibility with CCR's zone. Security patrols were maintained and control of civilians was continued; the problem becoming more severe hourly due to the large number of refugees in the area. Many more hundreds of enemy soldiers were brought into the PW cages. Evacuation to the Div cage was suspended at noon due to the crowded conditions there. The Command was warned that it may have to retain the PW's now in the cages for several days. Arrangements were made through G-4 to feed the German soldiers with captured food stocks.

Up to and including this date 10,629 enemy PW's had been processed through our cages. Not counted in this number are the 6000 enemy wounded who passed through Grevesmuhlen on 11 German hospital trains on the way to Lubach and Hamburg where hospital facilities were available. One wounded American, a former PW of the Germans, was taken from one of the trains and forwarded through regular channels to a U. S. hospital.

5 May 1945

Div troops continued to exercise civilian control and maintained security patrols throughout the area. Road blocks were set up at all entrances to villages and towns in order to control circulation of German civilians.

A/48 was detached at 1200B and directed to return to battalion control and B/814 plus 1/B/203 were detached effective 1400B for a like purpose.

772 more PW's were brought into our cages.

6 May 1945

The Command maintained civilian control and security patrols throughout the area.

1001 allied soldiers liberated from German prison camps previously were evacuated to a central control point.

Period of 6 through 20 May 1945

All units of the Combat Command maintained routine security patrols and outposts during that period of time. PW cages were maintained by both the 38th and 40th at Schonberg and Grevesmuhlen respectively. Later, about 18 May, the two separate cages were consolidated and combined with the PW cage of CCA, 7th Armd Div at Grevesmuhlen for which C.O. CCR assumed responsibility on 17 May. The final number of prisoners held there was 10,518, of which 45 were SS officers, 137 SS enlisted men, 500 Wehrmacht officers and 8836 Wehrmacht enlisted men. Throughout the period the prisoners were fed by the Combat Command S-4 who procured rations from captured German army food dumps.

1001 Allied soldiers liberated from German PW camps previously, were evacuated to a central collecting point appointed by XVIII Corps A/B.

No hostile acts of any nature were reported within the area of responsibility.

The most significant event of the time which the Combat Command spent in the area of Grevesmuhlen was the announcement of the cessation of hostilities and unconditional surrender of the once mighty Nazi war machine. The news was first given to the staff of the Combat Command by Colonel John L. Ryan, Chief of Staff, in a telephone call to Lt. Col. Fred Warren, Executive Officer at noon on 7 May 1945. Col. Ryan emphasized that the news was not official, but that it could be disseminated to all troops. All battalions were notified immediately and the members of CCR Hqs were informed by the Hq. Co. 1st Sgt. The news was received with varied emotions. Shortly after 1300 7 May a copy of the TWX received at Div. Hq. from SHAEF announcing the surrender was received thru Message Center. The TWX instructed all units to cease any aggressive action against the enemy, but to take up defensive positions in order to beat off any attack from enemy troops who may not have been notified of the surrender. It gave the official time of cessation of hostilities as 090001 May 1945.

The Military Government detachment of the Combat Command, upon setting up in Grevesmuhlen, found the area in an administrative chaos. In all of the large towns, ie., Grevesmuhlen, Schonberg and Dassow, the population was four times as numerous as in normal times, which brought about extreme difficulties in housing and providing for the populace. The greatest trouble was caused by Russian and Polish slave laborers who immediately began looting German property and stores upon our arrival. However, that particular situation was soon remedied by both the actions of the Military Police and the eventual evacuation of all Russians nationals to the prearranged exchange point in Russian territory. A great number of German refugees throughout the zone of responsibility were put to work on the farms where labor was sorely needed. On or about 9 May the stores were reopened and the banks began transactions. Deposits in the banks were greater than withdrawals for the remainder of the stay of our military Government detachment. The clothing stores operated on the ration system in effect before allied occupation. Arrangement was made with the Callies Wholesale Grocery in Lubeck to supply stores in the area. At the end of the period all utilities were restored and operating which were shut off upon our arrival.

The civilian administration changed in the middle of restoration activities. The Burgermaster of Grevesmuhlen was found to be a member of the National Socialist Party and had been replaced by a more trustworthy person who remained in office until our departure.

At about 1900 on 26⁵ May 45 higher headquarters issued a warning order for movement of the Combat Command South to the vicinity of Kothern in the province of Anhalt beginning 0200 21 May 45. In the new area and for the move to it, the

⁵ Though it was probably supposed to be 20, it is typed as 26 in the original.

Combat Command was to lose the 440 AFA and C Company of the 33rd, both reverting to their respective battalion control on 19 May. The 87 Recon Sqdn was attached effective 1200 20 May 1945.

Arrangements were made for the relief of our troops in zone by elements of the 5th British Inf Div, the 52nd Anti Tank Regt and the 17th Brigade. The relief was completed at 1200 20 May 1945.

21 May 1945

Leading elements of the 87th crossed the IP at Rehna at 0157 and continued on route "B". CC CP closed Grevesmuhlen 0200. By 1035 the entire Combat Command had cleared the bridge site across the Elbe R near Katemin. At 1925 the Command had closed into its bivouac area near Dodendorf South of Magdeburg, CC CP opened Dodendorf 1800.

22 May 1945

Leading elements of the Combat Command crossed the IP 4 miles South of Dodendorf at 0600 and continued on route "B" and by 1150 all units had closed in their respective areas of responsibility where they relieved units of the 415th Regiment of the 104th U. S. Inf. Div. The relief was completed at 1700. Combat Command CP closed Dodendorf 0700 and opened Kothen 1020.

23 May 1945 through 31 May

All units maintained security patrols and outposts in their respective area of responsibility. No hostile acts were reported throughout the period.

Effective 261200 May 45 the 750th Tank Battalion was attached to CCR and it relieved the 434th AFA and the 440th AFA Bns in their zone of responsibility completing the relief 271000 May 45.

The Military Government detachment found the civilian administration well organized upon its arrival. Town teams from SHAEF were already set up in Kothen, Dessau and Berneberg. The establishment functioned in an auxiliary capacity to the town teams aiding in evacuating the displaced persons both westwardly and eastwardly. A great number of allied PW's were repatriated. Russian authorities agreed on two points of exchange both for PW's and DP's: One at Dessau and the other at Raguhn.

Memorial Day services were held 30 May in Kothen for all units of the Command in honor of the 1101 men and officers of the Division who died in action.

At the close of the period for which this report is submitted the troops of Combat Command "R" consisted of the following:

40th Tank Battalion
38th Armored Infantry Battalion
87th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron
750th Tank Battalion.

At the beginning of the period and continuing through to the close of the period the following officers were contained in the Staff of the Reserve Command, 7th Armored Division:

Col. Francis P. Tompkins	C.O.
Lt. Col. Fred M. Warren	Ex. O.
Major Norwood G. Read	S-2
Major Richard D. Gillis	S-3
Major Carl M. Corbin	S-4
Capt. James W. Gooley, Jr.	Asst S-3 & Commo.
Capt. Olaf W. Christopherson	Asst S-4 & Hq. Co. C.O.
Major Glenn G. Harrison	Surgeon
Major Harry Steinburg	Surgeon
Capt. George Vogel	Dental Officer

Capt. John L. Fellows, Jr.

Ln. Officer

Major Glenn G. Hairston served in the capacity as CC Surgeon from 1-13 May 45 and Major Harry Steinburg From 13- 31 May 1945.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

(signed)
WALTER H. G. WEISSENBERGER
1st Lt. , Infantry

6 Inclosures:

- Inc. No. 1 Journal, CCR, 7th AD May 1945
- 2 S-3 Per. Rpt., CCR, 7th AD May 1945
- 3 Incoming Messages, CCR, 7th AD, May 1945
- 4 Outgoing Messages, CCR, 7th AD, May 1945
- 5 Operations Instructions, CCR, 7th AD, May 1945
- 6 S-2 Material, CCR, 7th AD, May 1945

HEADQUARTERS RESERVE COMMAND
SEVENTH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 257, U. S. ARMY

30 June 1945

SUBJECT : LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL.

TO : THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
(THROUGH CHANNELS)

1. Transmitted herewith "After Action Report" for Combat Command Reserve, 7th Armored Division, APO 257, U. S. Army for the month of June 1945.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

(signed)
WALTER H. G. WEISSENBERGER
1st Lt., Infantry
Unit Historian

HEADQUARTERS RESERVE COMMAND
SEVENTH ARMORED DIVISION
APO 257, U. S. ARMY

30 June 1945

SUBJECT : AFTER ACTION REPORT, MONTH OF JUNE 1945

TO : THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON, 25, D. C.
(THROUGH CHANNELS)

1. During the period month of June 1945, CCR, 7th Armored Division operated exclusively in Germany, and all references to places herein are therefore in Germany although not specifically so stated in the body of the report.
2. Appropriate maps to properly read coordinates given herein may be obtained by reference to the Field Officer of Operations Instructions issued by this headquarters prior to each operation, or sub-phase thereof.

AFTER ACTION REPORT

During the entire month of June, the Headquarters of the Reserve Command was located in KOTHEN, with the 40th Tank Bn, the 38th AIB, the 87th Cav. Rcn Sq. and the 750th Tank Bn attached. Troops of these attached units carried out the mission of maintaining security patrols and road blocks in their respective areas of responsibility, along with guarding captured enemy installations of intelligence value. No other hostile actions than a few severances of wire communications and in one case a wire stretched across the road near BIENDORF occurred during the period. The discovery of the body of a guard of the 38th AIB⁶ in the MULDE RIVER near DESSAU after he had been missing from his post was a major incident of the period, but the action could not definitely be attributed to enemy personnel as the body did not show any marks of violence or struggle.

The Military Government section of the Combat Command assisted the SHAEF detachments in KOTHEN, BERNBERG and DESSAU in coping with the major problem; care and evacuation of displaced persons. During the month of June approximately 70,000 east-bound DP's and ex- PW's were turned over to Russian authorities at the DP bridge in DESSAU. In turn Russians at the same place turned over to us approximately 20,000 west-bound DP's who were evacuated either by air from airstrip R-32 in KOTHEN or by train from DESSAU and KOTHEN. Each and every DP coming west across the bridge was screened and checked by the CIC and IPW teams attached to the Combat Command. During that process a number of Germans were eliminated who were prohibited from crossing into American occupied territory. The DP's were also deloused with IDT powder as soon as they entered American territory.

A few raids on outlying villages were staged. These raids were planned because of information received about suspicious activities in those villages. However, none of the raids uncovered any such activities. A few Nazis above arrest level and numerous German soldiers without proper discharge papers were apprehended.

⁶ Pfc Jack A McHenry, 39840250, Headquarters Company/38, who disappeared while on guard duty on 28 May 1945

About June 20 the Combat Command was alerted for movement to a new assembly area near Buchen, Germany. Plans were made to turn the area over to the Russian Army. June 30 orders came from higher Headquarters to move the bulk of the Command to the new assembly area. A security detachment was to be left behind to prevent a mass movement of Germans to the West. One reconnaissance troop was assigned to the mission.

The 750th Tank Bn was detached June 21 at 1200 to become part of the 2nd Armored Division.

END

12th Army Group CIC Detachment
Kothen, Germany

4 June 1945

MEMORANDUM TO S-2

On 4 June 1945 Dr. Karl-Heinz Schirrmacher reported to this office. He stated that he had been an engineer with the Telefunken and Radio Company in Berlin. That he did considerable development and experimental work on the V-2 and other remote controlled weapons of considerable importance. That he had charge of testing all the remote controlled devices made by his company and that he is very familiar with their construction and operation. That he knows most of the German scientists working in this field. He stated that he is willing to cooperate with the American authorities in every respect and that he believes he has information of a technical nature that will be of extreme importance to them.

Dr. Schirrmacher's present address in Köthen is: Fasanerie b. Gärtnere, Wiechert.

Gilbert R. Sheldon
S/A CIC

IPW TEAM # 70
APO # 257
U. S. ARMY

5 June 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Incident.

TO : S-2, Combat Command "Reserve", 7th Armored Division,
APO 257, U. S. Army.

1. The following are to the best of my knowledge the facts in the incident causing the injury of Capt. LEYMARIE, HENRI, French Army.

2. On June 2, 1945, on or about 2030, Sgt. VAN DER VEEN, EDWARD, ASN 103084, Dutch Interpreter, CIC Det 507, Hq 7th Armored Division, was seated on a desk in the court of the house located at Wasserstadt, Dessau, Germany, Russian occupied area. Capt. LEYMARIE, HENRI, French Army and prisoner of war, formerly Commanding Officer "B" Battery, 34 French AA Bn, 432 AA GP, 5th U. S. Army, was seated on a chair next to the desk.

3. At the above stated time suddenly a muffled pistol shot was heard by the undersigned who was standing with the group and the Capt. was apparently hurt. The German pistol, MAUSER 6.35, carried by Sgt. Van der Veen had apparently accidentally discharged while he tried to readjust it in his shoulder holster. Sgt. Van der Veen explains that he forgot to unload the pistol, which he used in the earlier afternoon on a mission. It is believed that the pistol was not set on "SAFE" and thus might have discharged. The bullet passed through the desk and entered at the lower knee bone of the Capt. then getting wedged between the skin and the right outside anklebone.

4. First aid was administered immediately and the Capt. was then immediately evacuated by an ambulance of the 38 Armd Inf Bn.

5. Witnesses:

Lt. Richard H. Stern, Combat Command Reserve
Lt. de Vilmorin, Henry, French Liaison Officer, prisoner of war formerly att 142 Inf Rgt, 36 U. S. Inf Div
Lt. Frangolacci, Roger, French Prisoner of war, PF25557⁷
347 Bomber Sqdn, RAF, Alvington, York, England

(signed)
RICHARD H. STERN
1st Lt., Inf (MI)

⁷ The initial letter of his number could be R instead of P.

Wrought⁸ Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

7 June 1945

	<u>KÖTHEN⁹</u>	<u>DESSAU</u>	<u>BERNBERG</u>
POLISH	2736	POLISH	1221
TURKS	11		0
GREEKS	6		0
BULGARIANS	3		0
YUGOSLAVS	36	108	10
RUMANIANS	4	0	0
SWISS	11	0	0
AUSTRIANS	3	0	0
ITALIANS	3	19	0
HUNGARIANS	52	0	0
SPANIARDS	2	1	0
DUTCH	18	4	30
FRENCH	5	27	0
BELGIANS	18	18	0
DANES	5	0	0
NORWEGIANS	3	0	0
ESTONIANS	4	0	0
LITHUANIANS	8	0	0
LETTISH	19	0	0
FINNISH	1	0	0
ENGLISH	3	0	0
BRAZILIANS	3	0	0
UKRANIANS	84	0	0
RUSSIANS	0	0	83
CZECKS	0	0	11
MEXICANS	0	1	0
STATELESS	5	6	0

A small number of Russians have expressed a desire to go east.

This report was compiled from reports turned in by the various Military Government Teams.

*Eli W Bettley
Capt CE
M.G.O.*

⁸ WROUGHT was the code name for Combat Command R.

⁹ The handwritten word LANDKREIS is written above both KÖTHEN and BERNBERG.

(ATTN COL. WARREN,
ILSDORF
???¹⁰
raid by Capt Powers
& 40 TK

¹⁰ too faint to be read; appears to contain the letters OU.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH _____	_____	_____
TURKS _____	_____	_____
GREEKS _____	_____	_____
BULGARIANS _____	_____	_____
JUGOSLAVS _____	_____	_____
RUMANIANS _____	_____	_____
SWISS _____	_____	_____
AUSTRIANS _____	_____	_____
ITALIANS _____	_____	_____
HUNGARIANS _____	_____	_____
SPANIARDS _____	_____	_____
DUTCH _____	_____	_____
FRENCH _____	_____	_____
BELGIANS _____	_____	_____
DANES _____	_____	_____
NORWEGIANS _____	_____	_____
ESTONIANS _____	_____	_____
LITHOWANIANS _____	_____	_____
LETTISH _____	_____	_____
FINNISH _____	_____	_____
ENGLISH _____	_____	_____
BRAZILIANS _____	_____	_____
UKRANIANS _____	_____	_____
RUSSIANS _____	_____	_____
CZECKS _____	_____	_____
MEXICANS _____	_____	_____
STATELESS _____	_____	_____

BRIDGE¹¹

West to East

East to West

DP's _____	_____ 1891
PW's _____	_____ 1220

3111

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

¹¹ This probably refers to the bridge over the Mulde River at Dessau.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 12 June 1945

LANDKREIS KÖTHEN	
SWEDISH	0
POLISH	2608
TURKS	11
GREEKS	6
BULGARIANS	3
JUGOSLAVS	36
RUMANIANS	4
SWISS	0
AUSTRIANS	3
ITALIANS	200
HUNGARIANS	52
SPANIARDS	2
DUTCH	57
FRENCH	0
BELGIANS	24
DANES	5
NORWEGIANS	3
ESTONIANS	4
LITHOWANIANS	8
LETTISH	3
FINNISH	1
ENGLISH	3
BRAZILIANS	3
UKRANIANS	84
RUSSIANS	0
CZECKS	0
MEXICANS	0
STATELESS	5
AMERICANS	0
AREMINAN	0

STATKREIS DESSAU
1
1587
0
1
1
100
10
0
1
27
1
1
966
28
970
1
0
3
2
13
0
0
0
0
6276
5
0
9
1

BRIDGE

West to East

East to West

DP's 1507

_____2526_____

PW's 3474

— 89 —

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 13 June 1945

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH	<u>0</u>	<u>1649</u>
TURKS	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>
GREEKS	<u>6</u>	<u>13</u>
BULGARIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
JUGOSLAVS	<u>55</u>	<u>0</u>
RUMANIANS	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>
SWISS	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
AUSTRIANS	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>
ITALIANS	<u>216</u>	<u>7</u>
HUNGARIANS	<u>57</u>	<u>0</u>
SPANIARDS	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>
DUTCH	<u>170</u>	<u>0</u>
FRENCH	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
BELGIANS	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
DANES	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>
NORWEGIANS	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
ESTONIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
LITHOWANIANS	<u>16</u>	<u>0</u>
LETTISH	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
FINNISH	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
ENGLISH	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
BRAZILIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
UKRANIANS	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
RUSSIANS	<u>4500</u>	<u>0</u>
CZECKS	<u>18</u>	<u>100</u>
MEXICANS	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
STATELESS	<u>7</u>	<u>0</u>
Armenian	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Palistine	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Sweeds	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Portugese	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
	<u>123PW.396D.P. 519</u>	
	<u>249</u>	
	<u>1</u>	
	<u>1</u>	
	<u>3</u>	
	<u>2</u>	
	<u>13</u>	
	<u>6276</u>	
	<u>7</u>	
	<u>2</u>	
	<u>4</u>	
	<u>7</u>	
	<u>2</u>	

BRIDGE

West to East

East to West

DP's	<u>1769</u>	<u>3418</u> - Sent out
PW's	<u>1021</u>	

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 14 June 1945

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH	<u>2608</u>	<u>1686</u>
TURKS	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
GREEKS	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>
BULGARIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
JUGOSLAVS	<u>55</u>	<u>74</u>
RUMANIANS	<u>23</u>	<u>1</u>
SWISS	<u>10</u>	
AUSTRIANS	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
ITALIANS	<u>7</u>	<u>27</u>
HUNGARIANS	<u>57</u>	<u>0</u>
SPANIARDS	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
DUTCH	<u>163</u>	<u>61</u>
FRENCH	<u>5</u>	<u>37</u>
BELGIANS	<u>10</u>	<u>36</u>
DANES	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
NORWEGIANS	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
ESTONIANS	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>
LITHOWANIANS	<u>18</u>	<u>2</u>
LETTISH	<u>8</u>	<u>21</u>
FINNISH	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
ENGLISH	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
BRAZILIANS	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
UKRANIANS	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>
RUSSIANS	<u>5000</u>	<u>6277</u>
CZECKS	<u>21</u>	<u>9</u>
MEXICANS	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
STATELESS	<u>3</u>	<u>10</u>
<i>Sweed.</i>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>
<i>So. America</i>	<u>3</u>	<u>9</u>
<i>Palestines</i>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>
<i>Armenians</i>	<u>?</u> ¹²	<u>7</u>
<i>English</i>	<u>3</u>	
<i>Syrans</i>	<u>1</u>	
<i>Ruthenians</i>	<u>12</u>	

BRIDGE

West to East on Bridge	East to West on Bridge
DP's	<u>3213</u>
PW's	<u>451</u>
Total	<u>3664</u>

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

¹² This may be the number 3, but it is unlike any of the other 3's.

Received from Dessau apx 2000

by Train to Air Port - Kothen

Belgians - 87

French 96

Dutch 119

English 8

Brazilians 8

Total 318

1 Russian train at 96.1-62.2 apx 2158 - First last night

2 Russian trains at Mosighan apx 4000

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 15 June 45

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH	<u>2608</u>	<u>1710</u>
TURKS	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
GREEKS	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
BULGARIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
JUGOSLAVS	<u>84</u>	<u>8</u>
RUMANIANS	<u>23</u>	<u>10</u>
SWISS	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
AUSTRIANS	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>
ITALIANS	<u>42</u>	<u>38</u>
HUNGARIANS	<u>59</u>	<u>1</u>
SPANIARDS	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
DUTCH	<u>243</u>	<u>1</u>
FRENCH	<u>19</u>	<u>0</u>
BELGIANS	<u>22</u>	<u>0</u>
DANES	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>
NORWEGIANS	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
ESTONIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
LITHOWANIANS	<u>33</u>	<u>3</u>
LETTISH	<u>8</u>	<u>13</u>
FINNISH	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
ENGLISH	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
BRAZILIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
UKRANIANS	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>
RUSSIANS	<u>71</u>	<u>6280</u>
CZECKS	<u>50</u>	<u>9</u>
MEXICANS	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
STATELESS	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
Armenians	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Austrians	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
Sweeds	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>
Syrians	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
Ruthenians	<u>12</u>	<u>0</u>

BRIDGE

West to East

East to West

DP's	<u>2275</u>	<u>268</u>
PW's	<u>835</u>	<u>37</u>
Total	<u>3664</u>	

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 16 June 1945

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH	<u>2608</u>	<u>1710</u>
TURKS	<u>14</u>	<u>0</u>
GREEKS	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
BULGARIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
JUGOSLAVS	<u>84</u>	<u>8</u>
RUMANIANS	<u>23</u>	<u>10</u>
SWISS	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
AUSTRIANS	<u>10</u>	<u>2</u>
ITALIANS	<u>42</u>	<u>38</u>
HUNGARIANS	<u>59</u>	<u>1</u>
SPANIARDS	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
DUTCH	<u>379</u>	<u>4</u>
FRENCH	<u>159</u>	<u>17</u>
BELGIANS	<u>143</u>	<u>16</u>
DANES	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>
NORWEGIANS	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
ESTONIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
LITHOWANIANS	<u>33</u>	<u>3</u>
LETTISH	<u>8</u>	<u>13</u>
FINNISH	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
ENGLISH	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
BRAZILIANS	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
UKRANIANS	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>
RUSSIANS	<u>126</u>	<u>6280</u>
CZECKS	<u>72</u>	<u>9</u>
MEXICANS		<u>0</u>
STATELESS	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
Swedes	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>
Armenians		<u>1</u>
Syrians	<u>1</u>	

BRIDGE

West to East

DP's 3092

PW's 1483

East to West

<u>FRENCH</u>	<u>-19</u>	<u>BRITISH</u>	<u>-3</u>
<u>BELGIAN</u>	<u>-26</u>	<u>SWedes</u>	<u>-1</u>
<u>DUTCH</u>	<u>-19</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>-68</u>
<u>FRENCH</u>	<u>-13</u>		
<u>BELGIAN</u>	<u>-12</u>		
		<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>-25</u>

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 17 June 1945

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH	<u>2622</u>	<u>1628</u>
TURKS	<u>13</u>	<u>0</u>
GREEKS	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>
BULGARIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
JUGOSLAVS	<u>86</u>	<u>26</u>
RUMANIANS	<u>23</u>	<u>10</u>
SWISS	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
AUSTRIANS	<u>9</u>	<u>1</u>
ITALIANS	<u>42</u>	<u>36</u>
HUNGARIANS	<u>65</u>	<u>3</u>
SPANIARDS	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
DUTCH	<u>426</u>	<u>16</u>
FRENCH	<u>172</u>	<u>30</u>
BELGIANS	<u>135</u>	<u>15</u>
DANES	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>
NORWEGIANS	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
ESTONIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>
LITHOWANIANS	<u>33</u>	<u>2</u>
LETTISH	<u>8</u>	<u>21</u>
FINNISH	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
ENGLISH	<u>14</u>	<u>4</u>
BRAZILIANS	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>
UKRANIANS	<u>20</u>	<u>0</u>
RUSSIANS	<u>129</u>	<u>5721</u>
CZECKS	<u>73</u>	<u>5</u>
MEXICANS	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
STATELESS	<u>3</u>	<u>10</u>
SWEDES	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>
ARMENIANS	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
SYRIANS	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>

BRIDGE

West to East

DP's 2725

East to West

FRENCH -243 DUTCH -29
CZECHS - 98 AUSTRIANS-1
389 BELGIANS-18

PW's 1026

116

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 18 June 45

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH	<u>2623</u>	<u>1626</u>
TURKS	<u>24</u>	
GREEKS	<u>6</u>	
BULGARIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
JUGOSLAVS	<u>86</u>	<u>20</u>
RUMANIANS	<u>23</u>	<u>12</u>
SWISS	<u>30</u>	
AUSTRIANS	<u>9</u>	
ITALIANS	<u>42</u>	<u>17</u>
HUNGARIANS	<u>65</u>	
SPANIARDS	<u>3</u>	
DUTCH	<u>494</u>	<u>16</u>
FRENCH	<u>298</u>	<u>55</u>
BELGIANS	<u>177</u>	<u>6</u>
DANES	<u>5</u>	
NORWEGIANS	<u>6</u>	
ESTONIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
LITHOWANIANS	<u>33</u>	<u>2</u>
LETTISH	<u>8</u>	
FINNISH	<u>1</u>	
ENGLISH	<u>10</u>	
BRAZILIANS	<u>10</u>	
UKRANIANS	<u>20</u>	
RUSSIANS	<u>129</u>	<u>303</u>
CZECKS	<u>77</u>	<u>4</u>
MEXICANS		
STATELESS	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>

BRIDGE

West to East

DP's 3336

East to West

{DUTCH- 2
{BEL - 12
{FR - 905

PW's 478

670 FRENCH

SWEEDS	1
LATYIA	14
ARMENIANS	21
SO. AMERICANS	1
SUDETENLAND	1
ARABS	1
CHILEANS	2
SYRIENS	1

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 19 June 1945

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH	<u>2626</u>	<u>1622</u>
TURKS	<u>24</u>	<u>0</u>
GREEKS	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
BULGARIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
JUGOSLAVS	<u>86</u>	<u>24</u>
RUMANIANS	<u>23</u>	<u>14</u>
SWISS	<u>31</u>	<u>0</u>
AUSTRIANS	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>
ITALIANS	<u>42</u>	<u>17</u>
HUNGARIANS	<u>65</u>	<u>0</u>
SPANIARDS	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
DUTCH	<u>484</u>	<u>1</u>
FRENCH	<u>1155</u>	<u>9</u>
BELGIANS	<u>187</u>	<u>6</u>
DANES	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>
NORWEGIANS	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
ESTONIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
LITHOWANIANS	<u>33</u>	<u>2</u>
LETTISH	<u>8</u>	<u>21</u>
FINNISH	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
ENGLISH	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
BRAZILIANS	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
UKRANIANS	<u>20</u>	<u>0</u>
RUSSIANS	<u>129</u>	<u>125</u>
CZECKS	<u>77</u>	<u>10</u>
MEXICANS	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
STATELESS	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
ARABS	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
CHILEANS	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>
SWEDES	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
SYRIANS	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>

BRIDGE

West to East

DP's 1255

PW's 0

East to West

FRENCH - 378 GER JEWS - 15

BELGIAN - 199 LUXEMBURG - 2

DUTCH - 54

173

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 20 June 1945

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH	<u>2626</u>	<u>1622</u>
TURKS	<u>24</u>	<u>0</u>
GREEKS	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
BULGARIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
JUGOSLAVS	<u>86</u>	<u>24</u>
RUMANIANS	<u>23</u>	<u>14</u>
SWISS	<u>31</u>	<u>0</u>
AUSTRIANS	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>
ITALIANS	<u>42</u>	<u>17</u>
HUNGARIANS	<u>65</u>	<u>0</u>
SPANIARDS	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
DUTCH	<u>484</u>	<u>1</u>
FRENCH	<u>1155</u>	<u>9</u>
BELGIANS	<u>187</u>	<u>6</u>
DANES	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>
NORWEGIANS	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>
ESTONIANS	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>
LITHOWANIANS	<u>33</u>	<u>2</u>
LETTISH	<u>8</u>	<u>21</u>
FINNISH	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
ENGLISH	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
BRAZILIANS	<u>10</u>	<u>0</u>
UKRANIANS	<u>20</u>	<u>0</u>
RUSSIANS	<u>129</u>	<u>80</u>
CZECKS	<u>77</u>	<u>10</u>
MEXICANS	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
STATELESS	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
ARABS	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
CHILEANS	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>
SWEDES	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
SYRIANS	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>

BRIDGE

West to East

DP's 1497

East to West

*POLISH- 6 BEL. 18
DUTCH -23 SP. 1
75 FRENCH 25 GER. 2*

PW's 0

84

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

*The Phone to Bernburg is not working
so the report is of yesterday -
Polish are to be shipped by train out
of Bernburg today.*

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 21 June 45

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH <u>1306</u>	<u>1196</u>	<u>1436</u>
TURKS		
GREEKS <u>6</u>		<u>16</u>
BULGARIANS <u>3</u>		
JUGOSLAVS <u>79</u>		
RUMANIANS <u>24</u>		<u>10</u>
SWISS <u>10</u>		
AUSTRIANS <u>16</u>		
ITALIANS <u>17</u>		<u>9</u>
HUNGARIANS <u>38</u>		
SPANIARDS <u>3</u>		
DUTCH <u>155</u>		
FRENCH <u>22</u>		
BELGIANS <u>56</u>		
DANES <u>5</u>		
NORWEGIANS <u>6</u>		
ESTONIANS <u>3</u>		
LITHOWANIANS <u>30</u>		
LETTISH <u>8</u>		
FINNISH <u>1</u>		
ENGLISH <u>3</u>		
BRAZILIANS <u>3</u>		
UKRANIANS <u>63</u>		
RUSSIANS <u>132</u>	<u>120</u>	
CZECKS <u>45</u>		
MEXICANS	{ 1 Russ.	
STATELESS <u>3</u>	{ 1 Dutch	
SYRIANS <u>1</u>	{ 1 Ukrain.	

BRIDGE

West to East

DP's 1186

East to West

24 { 23 FR

PW's 0

17 { 1 DUTCH

DESSAU POLCH LEFT 500
KOTHEN " " 1267
1767

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

over

*The Phone to Bernberg is not working
so the report is of yesterday -
Polish are to be shipped by train out
of Bernberg today.*

Wrought Military Gov't¹³
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 21 June 45

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH	<u>1306</u>	<u>1196</u>
TURKS		
GREEKS	<u>6</u>	
BULGARIANS	<u>3</u>	
JUGOSLAVS	<u>79</u>	
RUMANIANS	<u>24</u>	
SWISS	<u>10</u>	
AUSTRIANS	<u>16</u>	
ITALIANS	<u>17</u>	
HUNGARIANS	<u>38</u>	
SPANIARDS	<u>3</u>	
DUTCH	<u>155</u>	
FRENCH	<u>22</u>	
BELGIANS	<u>56</u>	
DANES	<u>5</u>	
NORWEGIANS	<u>6</u>	
ESTONIANS	<u>3</u>	
LITHOWANIANS	<u>30</u>	
LETTISH	<u>8</u>	
FINNISH	<u>1</u>	
ENGLISH	<u>3</u>	
BRAZILIANS	<u>3</u>	
UKRANIANS	<u>63</u>	
RUSSIANS	<u>132</u>	<u>120</u>
CZECKS	<u>45</u>	
MEXICANS		{ 1 Russ.
STATELESS	<u>3</u>	{ 1 Dutch
SYRIANS	<u>1</u>	{ 1 Ukrain.

BRIDGE

West to East	East to West
DP's	<u>1186</u>
PW's	<u>0</u>
Dessau Polish left	500
Kothen "	"
total	<u>1267</u>
	<u>1767</u>
	{ 23 Fr
	{ 1 Dutch
	17 French

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

over

¹³ This duplicate page for 21 June 1945 is included, since it appears in the original.

1 train - at Bridge abt 10 crossed -
abt 8 trucks on bridge -
five¹⁴ coming this way

¹⁴ This may not be FIVE.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 22 June 45

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH <u>1306</u>	<u>1196</u>	
TURKS		
GREEKS <u>5</u>		
BULGARIANS <u>3</u>		
JUGOSLAVS <u>51</u>		
RUMANIANS <u>20</u>		
SWISS <u>10</u>		
AUSTRIANS <u>13</u>		
ITALIANS <u>17</u>		
HUNGARIANS <u>8</u>		
SPANIARDS <u>3</u>		
DUTCH <u>116</u>		
FRENCH <u>22</u>		
BELGIANNS <u>56</u>		
DANES <u>5</u>		
NORWEGIANS <u>6</u>		
ESTONIANS <u>3</u>		
LITHOWIANNS <u>30</u>		
LETTISH <u>8</u>		
FINNISH <u>1</u>		
ENGLISH <u>3</u>		
BRAZILIANS <u>3</u>		
UKRANIANS <u>40</u>		
RUSSIANS <u>126</u>	<u>1380</u>	
CZECKS <u>45</u>		
MEXICANS	{1 Russ	
STATELESS <u>3</u>	{1 Dutch	
SYRIANS <u>1</u>	{1 Ukrain	

BRIDGE

West to East	East to West
DP's <u>634</u>	<u>15</u> { 5 Fr
PW's <u>510</u>	<u>15</u> { 7 Belg
Total <u>1144</u>	<u>15</u> { 3 Dutch

Shipped from Bernberg 1600
Elisbene¹⁵ 1000
2600

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

¹⁵ ELISBENE is possibly something else, since it is not easy to read.

One train of Russians in Dessau¹⁶

"	"	"	at Raguhn	train NR.	-	19221	
"	"	"	at Yessmitz	"	"	-	1929F.
"	"	"	at Wolfen	"	"	-	19223
							{1921F}
Two	"	"	at Heidelberg	"	"	-	{1940F}

All DP. and P.W have been sent out of Dessau except Polish. The ones that cross the bridge are sent by truck to Leipzig.

Bernburg reports that all P.W. and D.P. have been sent out as of 23 June 45. Ones left are considered Germans.

Train was sent to Deleztzsoh¹⁷

Train that came into Ortermeinburg was sent to Eisliben

¹⁶ Since this entire page is handwritten, there may be transcription errors.

¹⁷ The last tow sentences are written by a clearly different hand than the rest of the page.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 23 June 45

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
POLISH <u>1065</u>	<u>1196</u>	
TURKS		
GREEKS <u>6</u>		
BULGARIANS <u>2</u>		
JUGOSLAVS <u>46</u>		
RUMANIANS <u>11</u>		
SWISS <u>12</u>		
AUSTRIANS <u>20</u>		
ITALIANS <u>10</u>		
HUNGARIANS		
SPANIARDS <u>6</u>		
DUTCH <u>6</u>		
FRENCH <u>6</u>		
BELGIANS <u>1</u>		
DANES <u>1</u>		
NORWEGIANS <u>3</u>		
ESTONIANS		
LITHOWANIANS		
LETTISH <u>6</u>		
FINNISH <u>1</u>		
ENGLISH <u>3</u>		
BRAZILIANS		
UKRANIANS		
RUSSIANS <u>9</u>	<u>5843 in NORTH CAMP</u>	
CZECKS <u>6</u>		
MEXICANS		
STATELESS <u>3</u>		

BRIDGE

West to East

DP's 999
PW's 302

East to West

35
76
{ 28 - FRENCH
{ 4 - BELGIANS
{ 3 - DUTCH
{ 68 - FRENCH
{ 8 - POLISH

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 25 June 45

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATTKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
RUSSIANS <u>52</u>	<u>5750</u>	<u>3600</u>
POLISH <u>1065</u>	<u>1196</u>	
AMERICANS		
ARABS		
AUSTRIANS <u>21</u>		
BELGIANS <u>2</u>		
BULGARIANS <u>2</u>		
CZECKS <u>9</u>		
DANES <u>1</u>		
DUTCH <u>1</u>		
ENGLISH <u>3</u>		
ESTONIANS <u>0</u>		
FINNISH <u>1</u>		
FRENCH <u>8</u>		
GREEKS <u>6</u>		
HUNGARIANS <u>52</u>		
ITALIANS <u>12</u>		
JUGOSLAVS <u>73</u>		
LETTISH <u>6</u>		
LITHOWANIANS <u>8</u>		
MEXICANS <u>0</u>		
NORWEGIANS <u>3</u>		
RUTHANIANS <u>0</u>		
RUMANIANS <u>12</u>		
SO. AMERICANS		
SPANIARDS <u>3</u>		
SWEDES <u>0</u>		
SWISS <u>12</u>		
SYRIANS		
TURKS		
UKRANIANS <u>6</u>		
STATELESS <u>3</u>		

BRIDGE

West to East

DP's 1092

East to West

{ 3 FRENCH
{ 5 DUTCH

PW's 520
1612

21
29 FR

NO TRAINS REPORTED

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 26 June 45

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATTKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
RUSSIANS <u>53</u>	<u>5326</u>	<u>1600</u>
POLISH <u>1065</u>	<u>1418</u>	
AMERICANS _____		
ARABS _____		
AUSTRIANS <u>21</u>		
BELGIANS <u>2</u>		
BULGARIANS <u>2</u>		
CZECKS <u>9</u>		
DANES <u>1</u>		
DUTCH <u>9</u>		
ENGLISH <u>3</u>		
ESTONIANS <u>0</u>		
FINNISH <u>1</u>		
FRENCH <u>8</u>		
GREEKS <u>5</u>		
HUNGARIANS <u>52</u>		
ITALIANS <u>12</u>		
JUGOSLAVS <u>73</u>		
LETTISH <u>6</u>		
LITHOWANIANS <u>8</u>		
MEXICANS _____		
NORWEGIANS <u>3</u>		
RUTHANIANS _____		
RUMANIANS <u>12</u>		
SO. AMERICANS _____		
SPANIARDS <u>3</u>		
SWEDES _____		
SWISS <u>12</u>		
SYRIANS _____		
TURKS _____		
UKRANIANS <u>6</u>		
STATELESS <u>3</u>		
(EXILES) [1 UKRANIAN]		
[1 DUTCH]		
[1 RUSSIAN]		

BRIDGE

West to East

DP's 1809
PW's 1137

East to West

1 Fr
3 Dutch
1 American
4 Bel

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 27 June 45

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATTKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
RUSSIANS <u>53</u>	<u>6132</u>	<u>3600</u>
POLISH <u>1002</u>	<u>1418</u>	
AMERICANS		
ARABS		
AUSTRIANS <u>21</u>		
BELGIANS <u>2</u>		
BULGARIANS <u>9</u>		
CZECKS		
DANES		
DUTCH		
ENGLISH <u>3</u>		
ESTONIANS <u>1</u>		
FINNISH		
FRENCH <u>4</u>		
GREEKS <u>1</u>		
HUNGARIANS <u>52</u>		
ITALIANS <u>12</u>		
JUGOSLAVS <u>73</u>		
LETTISH <u>2</u>		
LITHOWANIANS <u>8</u>		
MEXICANS		
NORWEGIANS <u>3</u>		
RUTHANIANS		
RUMANIANS <u>12</u>		
SO. AMERICANS		
SPANIARDS <u>3</u>		
SWEDES		
SWISS <u>12</u>		
SYRIANS		
TURKS		
UKRANIANS <u>5</u>		
STATELESS <u>3</u>		

BRIDGE

West to East

DP's 2313

East to West

{ 30 French
{ 2 Dutch
(4 Belgians

PW's 328

36 6 French

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 28 June 1945

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATTKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
RUSSIANS <u>53</u>	<u>3000</u>	<u>3600</u>
POLISH <u>996</u>	<u>1475</u>	
AMERICANS <u>0</u>		
ARABS <u>0</u>		
AUSTRIANS <u>21</u>		
BELGIANS <u>0</u>		
BULGARIANS <u>2</u>		
CZECKS <u>9</u>		
DANES <u>0</u>		
DUTCH <u>0</u>		
ENGLISH <u>3</u>		
ESTONIANS <u>0</u>		
FINNISH <u>1</u>		
FRENCH <u>4</u>		
GREEKS <u>6</u>		
HUNGARIANS <u>52</u>		
ITALIANS <u>8</u>		
JUGOSLAVS <u>73</u>		
LETTISH <u>0</u>		
LITHOWANIANS <u>8</u>		
MEXICANS <u>0</u>		
NORWEGIANS <u>3</u>		
RUTHANIANS <u>0</u>		
RUMANIANS <u>12</u>		
SO. AMERICANS <u>0</u>		
SPANIARDS <u>3</u>		
SWEDES <u>0</u>		
SWISS <u>12</u>		
SYRIANS <u>0</u>		
TURKS <u>0</u>		
UKRANIANS <u>5</u>		
STATELESS <u>3</u>		

BRIDGE

West to East

DP's 1828

East to West

FRENCH-15 DUTCH-6 BELG-6 I¹⁸

PW's 353

9 FRENCH

ONE TRAIN W/1200 RUSSIANS LEAVING LEAPOLDSHALL
TODAY FOR DESSAU

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.

¹⁸ Below the 6 and the I are written what may be WEND.

Wrought Military Gov't
APO 257

Consolidated DP Report:

Date 30 June 45

<u>LANDKREIS KÖTHEN</u>	<u>STATTKREIS DESSAU</u>	<u>LANDKREIS BERNBERG</u>
RUSSIANS _____	262	_____
POLISH <u>1158</u>	<u>1548</u>	_____
AMERICANS _____	_____	_____
ARABS _____	_____	_____
AUSTRIANS <u>2</u>	_____	_____
BELGIANS _____	_____	_____
BULGARIANS _____	_____	_____
CZECKS <u>10</u>	_____	_____
DANES _____	_____	_____
DUTCH <u>11</u>	_____	_____
ENGLISH _____	_____	_____
ESTONIANS <u>1</u>	_____	_____
FINNISH _____	_____	_____
FRENCH <u>3</u>	_____	_____
GREEKS _____	_____	_____
HUNGARIANS _____	_____	_____
ITALIANS _____	_____	_____
JUGOSLAVS <u>5</u>	_____	_____
LETTISH _____	_____	_____
LITHOWANIANS <u>3</u>	_____	_____
MEXICANS _____	_____	_____
NORWEGIANS _____	_____	_____
RUTHANIANS <u>11</u>	_____	_____
RUMANIANS _____	_____	_____
SO. AMERICANS _____	_____	_____
SPANIARDS <u>1</u>	_____	_____
SWEDES _____	_____	_____
SWISS _____	_____	_____
SYRIANS _____	_____	_____
TURKS _____	_____	_____
UKRANIANS <u>13</u>	_____	_____
STATELESS _____	_____	_____

BRIDGE

West to East

DP's 1731

PW's 343

East to West

<u>123</u>	{ 52 F
<u>33</u>	{ 35 Bel
	{ 36 Dutch
	{ 31 F.
	{ 2 Bel

Shipped All Russians from
Leopoldshall & Dessau

ELI W. BETTLEY
Captain, C.E.
M. G. O.