The men were dug in on a line centering around 811896 (see overlay). They were on the west of the road behind a line of small fir trees, across the road, and at the edge of the woods to the right of the road. Two medium tanks were behind the advanced positions and two were further back. Positions of D/40 light tanks were in town. 17th Bn tanks and 23d AIBn units held the crossroad at 820895. Capt _____ Davenport was in charge of the block.

The men were dug in on a line centering around 811896 (see overlay). They were on the west of the road behind a line of small fir trees, across the road, and at the edge of the woods to the right of the road. Two medium tanks were behind the advanced positions and two were further back. Positions of D/40 light tanks were in town. 17th Bn tanks and 23d AIBn units held the crossroad at 820895. Capt _____ Davenport was in charge of the block.

Early that evening, the third platoon was ordered out of its positions in the woods to tie into the right flank of the first platoon. The men were drawn up in a semi-circular position on the Rodt road. This move was made after A Co had moved north of Poteau and the 40th Tanks had gone north of Poteau.

At 2330, the third platoon outpost reported that enemy tanks and infantry were coming down the road from Rodt. This road had been mined. The enemy tanks, however, fired flares down the road and saw the mines. The first two tanks cut north into the clearing, and then backed into the woods to the east. The third tank came across the clearing, firing all of the time, and overran the left sector of the third platoon.

Capt Vogelsang ordered the company to withdraw to a previously designated position just south of Poteau (see map). As soon as the men began to dig in, the Capt saw that the position was a bad one. It was in the open, and the ground was hard and excellent for tanks. He got in a peep and went back to the Bn CP to get permission to change the positions. His peep collided with another peep just north of Poteau. The driver[s] of the two peeps were injured, and Capt Vogelsang suffered a leg injury. The Bn S-2 came along at that time, and agreed to stay with the wounded men until help arrived. Captain Vogelsang went to the Bn CP in the S-2's jeep, and explained the situation. The Bn CO ordered the S-2, who arrived shortly with the two injured men in another vehicle, to reconnoiter for new B Co positions.

The new positions were to the west and north of the town. A Co was on the right flank. C Co was in the town itself. The men left their positions south of the town at 1745 and were dug in by 1900. The enemy tanks were still in the woods but did not fire. Enemy patrol action continued that night, but there was no attack in the B Co sector.

There was continuous enemy patroling the night of 21 December, but no action until 0400 22 Dec when the enemy attacked in unknown strength on the left (west) flank. It was probably a combat patrol. Shortly thereafter, other patrols struck to the west of the platoon's positions, circling the flank, and to the east of the road. The Germans shouted, whistled, and sang. The engineers, the anti-tank platoon and the tanks opened up and inflicted heavy casualties, but they were outnumbered and the enemy was able to circle the flank to the west and infiltrate the positions, getting into the general area of the command post and into the houses which lined the road. Between 0400 and 0600, three men were killed and two were wounded. This does not include engineer losses. The enemy got into the same house as the CP and killed three engineers. The Americans managed to get out the back way. The Germans captured the AT platoon's headquarters track. One of the wounded infantrymen crawled beneath the track and spent the rest of the night there, unnoticed by the Germans.

One prisoner taken, a man of about 40, told his captors that there were three companies. One had made the initial attack, and the other two were to follow with tanks. One of our tanks had six bazooka shells fired at it. Five missed and the sixth glanced off. Through it all, the men in the forward lines held their positions. Our tanks ranged about firing at the enemy. The 50 calibre machine guns did a great deal of damage.

At 0600, the enemy in the houses along the road apparently became confused, probably because the expected reinforcements failed to arrive. Many of them tried to get back to their own positions. Pfc Dumbrowski and Cpl Finke killed nine of them with rifle fire. As it grew light, the tanks began to clean up the houses and the woods to the north systematically, spraying the area with m/g fire. The infantrymen and the engineers cleaned out the area. The CP was set afire by a tank, and Pfc EVERETT and two engineers entered it. The Germans were in one room and the Americans in the rest. The Germans surrendered and the Americans put out the fire. The half-track was recaptured.

About 0830, enemy mortar fire became very heavy, and there was a great deal of machine gun fire from the woods. One mortar shell exploded in the left (west) flank positions, knocking out an anti-tank gun. Cpl. Finke, who was in charge there, gave leadership of the squad on the flank to another man, loaded five wounded men on the half-track and drove it out.

The houses, however, were not completely cleared and many of the enemy remained hiding out in them.

About 0900, enemy tanks were heard in the woods to the north. One hit the mines in the road and apparently was immobilized. Visibility at the time was only about 100 yards. For about an hour, the men were unable to move because of heavy m/g fire. Lt. Smart finally ordered the men to fall back to positions nearer the town. Most of them made it, but the squad on the left flank were unable to move. None of them got back.

As the others retreated, they cleaned out the houses. In one house, 13 Germans were captured and three dead were found. The 13 were taken to the TD's at Krombach. About 45 other Germans surrendered at this time. As the Germans were taken to Rodt, others voluntarily came from the houses and joined the column, One tank went into the town with the prisoners.

As the prisoners went down the road and were lined up, German tanks appeared. The number is not known, but there were at least four. One pulled into town from the west unnoticed, and got behind a building on the other side of which the prisoners were lined up.

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There were 36 officers and men of the AT platoon and 38 engineers. 18 members of the AT platoon and 14 engineers got back.

There was no enemy action noticed in the Co sector.

About 2100, Lt Van Winkle was called to the Bn CP and ordered to make a reconnaissance for the withdrawal of units to Manhay. The withdrawal was supposed to take place at 2300. Just as the recon was completed, enemy tanks and infantry attacked C Co, about 2000 yards to the south. This was at 2230. To help C Co, the second platoon of B Co was moved southwest 200 yards through heavy woods to a position where they could fire up the road to the south and help throw back the attack. The tanks remained where they were.

The fight continued for about an hour, with the second platoon joining in. At about 2330, two Tiger tanks came down the road, passed the Co CP. They were followed by two other tanks (not Tigers). The Tigers came within 10 yards of the house in which the CP was located, apparently not knowing what it was being used for. The German infantry was not following very closely.

Lt Van Winkle was awaiting an order from the bn CO to withdraw. After the two Tiger tanks passed, the order was given. By that time, the infantry had closed in with the second two tanks which were around the bend in the road. This cut off the second platoon of B Co. The platoon had to withdraw in small groups.

When the tanks came down the road, the 1st and 3rd platoon members and the tankers left. The tanks' machine guns drove the men back, and they made their way back toward Manhay as best they could.

Lt Van Winkle went to the 1st platoon to try and use its radio and report the situation, but it was out of order. He found one wounded tanker and the communications sergeant, also wounded. He got these men back to the woods to the north, then returned to the CP and checked the 1st and 3rd platoon positions. Everybody had left.

He then made a wide circle back of the woods, since the tanks commanded the road to Manhay. He came out on the Manhay-Vaux Chavanne road and ran into the tanks of the 14th Tank Bn of the 9th AD about half-way between the towns. He reported on the situation to a tank officer, then went to Manhay to see if he could find his company. He could find no friendly troops in town. Enemy tanks were in Manhay, spraying the main streets with m/g fire. Lt. Van Winkle returned up the road and spoke to the tank officer. The tanks were bumper to bumper, and German tanks were only about 150 yards off on the other road. The tank officer called the bn CO and received orders to withdraw up the road and not to fire. Lt. Van Winkle went with the tanks and made his way back to this own outfit the next day.

In the meantime, the second platoon broke into units which made their way north. Most of them got through Grandmenil where they ran into units of the 3rd AD. Others got back through Manhay. One man was missing in action. Lt. Kiline led part of his platoon back to Harze, and Lt Lavrenz, third platoon leader, went to Manhay by himself and there managed to pick up some of the first and third platoon members. Four men are MIA from these two platoons. Some of the men did not get back to their unit for several days.